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During eight turbulent years in the World War I era, policy makers, soldiers, and veterans 
laid the groundwork for the extension of government sponsored medical care to millions of 
former service members. In the process, they built a pillar of the American welfare state. 
Legislation and rehabilitation plans formulated shortly after the U.S. entered the Great War 
aimed to minimize the government’s long-term obligations to veterans, but within less than a 
decade, those who had served gained conditional access to their own direct assistance agency 
and a national system of hospitals. This dissertation explains why that drastic transition occurred, 
and how one group of citizens won the right to obtain publicly funded health services. The story 
of wartime health policies has a variety of larger implications. It shows how veterans’ welfare 
shifted from centering on pension and domicile care programs rooted in the nineteenth century to 
the provision of access to direct medical services; how rehabilitation and citizenship rights were 
conceived of and perceived at the dusk of the Progressive Era; how race, class, and gender 
shaped the health-related experiences of soldiers, veterans, and caregivers; how shifting ideals 
about hospitals and medical care influenced policy; and how interest groups capitalized on the 
tense political and social climate to bring about change. On a general level, an examination of the 
roots of a nationwide veterans’ hospital system demonstrates how privileges were won in the 
twentieth century United States. It reveals a moment of state expansion, but it also illustrates the 
wider tendency of the U.S. government to award entitlements selectively. Given those factors, 
the policies that paved the way for the advent of a veterans’ medical system deserve to be 
considered – alongside later federal assistance programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid – as foundational in the development and shape of the American welfare state. 
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Medical Welfare and the Great War 
 
The transition was remarkable. In September 1917, as millions of Americans mustered 
into service and the nation’s army and industry mobilized for war, hopes were high. “Science to 
Rebuild Our War Cripples,” boasted a New York Times headline. Military hospitals would heal 
and re-educate each wounded soldier, the newspaper reported, then “return him to civil life ready 
to be as useful to himself and his country as possible.”
1
 Approximately two years later, it was 
clear that things were not going according to plan. Some soldiers were not being returned to 
“civil life ready to be… useful,” but instead remaining in government hospitals and “receiving 
treatment that cannot be justified by anyone who has any regard for the well being of the men 
who fought to maintain the country.”
2
 By 1923, early wartime hopes had come full circle. There 
had been “huge waste” in the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars on hospital care for 
those who served during World War I, the Washington Post reported. The money had been 
“loosely spent” and “lavished with only the vaguest sort of plan.”
3
 In the shadow of that 
realization, the government moved forward in the early 1920s with the creation of a vast 
veterans’ hospital system, which would ensure that former service members – even in “civil life” 
– would have access to publicly funded hospitals.  
From 1917 through 1924, policy makers, soldiers, and veterans laid the groundwork for 
the extension of government sponsored medical care to millions of people. In the process, they 
                                                
1
 "Science to Rebuild Our War Cripples," The New York Times September 17, 1917.  
2
 "Bad Treatment of Sick Soldiers," The Atlanta Journal-Constitution January 28, 1920. 
3
 "Charge Huge Waste in Hospitalization," The Washington Post March 21, 1923. 
 2 
built a pillar of the American welfare state. World War I-era policies shaped military and 
veterans' health care for the greater part of the twentieth century, and underpinned the 1921 
creation of the Veterans’ Bureau (VB), one of the nation’s first and most enduring direct 
assistance government agencies. In 1924, all ex-soldiers – not just those harmed in the line of 
duty – gained legal access to the veterans’ hospitals overseen by the VB. The guarantee of 
medical care for veterans provided allowances for some of those who made extreme personal 
sacrifices. It also instantiated and furthered the precedent that, in the U.S., state-sponsored 
privileges could be earned not by national birthright, but by virtue of membership in a definable 
group.  
Medical treatment for U.S. military personnel and veterans was not expanded strictly by 
virtue of an unbridled societal commitment to “care for him who shall have borne the battle,” as 
Abraham Lincoln said in his second inaugural address. Indeed, for many months after President 
Woodrow Wilson similarly proclaimed, in the winter of 1918, “this nation has no more solemn 
obligation than healing the hurts of our wounded,” the government struggled to come to terms 
with its self-declared responsibility.
4
 A calamitous situation resulting, in part, from pre-war 
planning oversights, as well as vigorous political lobbying rooted in widespread anti-radicalism 
and expanding expectations of professional medicine, led to the creation and growth of a 
federally sponsored hospital system for veterans. 
 
The story and its significance  
In the months surrounding the United States’ declaration of war in April 1917, 
government officials and medical professionals readily acknowledged that wounded and ill 
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 "President Wilson’s Message on Healing the Hurts of Our Wounded," The Come-Back December 24, 1918. 
 3 
soldiers were an inevitable consequence of raising an army. But they attempted to de-emphasize 
the reality that war had the potential to turn industrially productive citizens into dependents by 
stipulating that major medical rehabilitation work would be overseen entirely by the military. By 
the time soldiers were discharged as civilians, the rationale went, they would be fully self-reliant. 
The 1917 War Risk Insurance Act guaranteed that ex-soldiers could receive necessary medical 




The oversight was massive, especially considering the number of people who served in 
the war – and were therefore eligible for future care.
6
 A review of statistics regarding military 
diagnoses and treatment provides a picture of the most common ailments, as well as the diverse 
                                                
5
 Section 302 of the Act stipulated that, “the injured person shall be furnished by the United States such reasonable 
medical, surgical, and hospital services and supplies, including artificial limbs, trusses, and similar appliances, as the 
director (of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance) may determine to be useful and reasonably necessary.” It contained 
little explanation of how these ideals would become reality. An Act to Amend an Act Entitled 'an Act to Authorize 
the Establishment of a Bureau of War Risk Insruance in the Treasury Department,' Approved September Second, 
Nineteen Hundred and Fourteen, and for Other Purposes, Public Law 90, H.R. 5723, 40 Stat. 398,  Sixty-Fifth 
Congress, First Session, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 6, 1917). 
6
 This dissertation focuses mainly on the army (and, by extension, soldiers), since that is the military branch that 
mobilized the highest number of personnel, and that the federal government relied on to provide the bulk of 
rehabilitation services. Between April 1917 and December 1918, the U.S. Marine Corps grew from 13,725 to its 
peak wartime strength of 75,101 officers and enlisted personnel. Although marines were “essentially part of the 
Naval establishment,” and as such had access to Naval hospitals, there were only six such hospitals in the U.S., 
overseen by a relatively small Navy Medical Corps. Both at the front and in the U.S., some marines and sailors were 
treated in army hospitals. Edwin N. McClellan, The United States Marine Corps in the World War (Washington, 
D.C.: Historical Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, 1920). The official army order allowing navy personnel to be treated in 
army reconstruction hospitals was handed down on May 27, 1918. A.G. Crane, The Medical Department of the 
United States Army in the World War; Volume 13, Part One: Physical Reconstruction and Vocational Education, 
ed. M.W. Ireland (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1927), 39. The Navy experienced tremendous 
growth during World War I, expanding from 67,000 in service in April 1917 to nearly 500,000 in November 1918. 
John Lehman, On Seas of Glory: Heroic Men, Great Ships, and Epic Battles of the American Navy (New York, New 
York; London; Toronto; Sydney; Singapore: The Free Press, 2001).  The Coast Guard contributed 15 cruising 
cutters, 5,000 enlisted men, and 200 officers to the Navy during the war. Thomas P. Ostrom, The United States 
Coast Guard and National Defense: A History from World War I to the Present (Jefferson, North Carolina; London: 
MaFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2012), 14. Between April and August 1917, the ranks of the National 
Guard swelled with incoming volunteers, from 177,000 members to 377,000. On August 5, 1917, President Wilson 
drafted the guardsmen into service, at which point they became members of the U.S. Army. John K. Mahon, History 
of the Militia and the National Guard (New York; London: Macmillan Publishing Company; Collier Macmillan 
Publishers, 1983), 156. Eventually, veterans of all branches were eligible for government sponsored medical care. 
 4 
needs and backgrounds of troops. Of the approximately 4.3 million service members mobilized 
between April 1917 and December 1919, 204,765 were eventually discharged as physically or 
mentally unfit for military duty. More than 80 percent, or about 169,000 of them, were 
discharged due to disease.
7
 Tuberculosis was the most common war-time disease, constituting 
approximately 21,600 discharges. More than 10,000 service members were discharged for 
“mental deficiency,” the second most common ailment.
8
 About 12 percent, or 25,000 service 
members, were discharged with a disability due to wounds received in action. The great majority 
of the latter group – 86 percent – had sustained gunshot wounds; slightly more than 11 percent 
were victims of poisonous gas, which could cause long-term ailments ranging from respiratory 
problems to skin burns.
9
 In all, approximately 224,000 U.S. Army troops were wounded in 
action during World War I, in addition to almost 10,000 Marines. Almost 52,000 of those service 
members went on to receive further care in domestic military hospitals.
10
  
                                                
7
 Albert G. Love, "A Brief Summary of the Vital Statistics of the U.S. Army During the World War," The Military 
Surgeon Vol. LI, Number 2(August 1922): 147-48. A great majority of the soldiers discharged due to disease had 
never left the United States; see Chapter Two for a discussion of this issue, and a further description of wounded and 
ill soldiers.  
8
 Diagnoses and classifications of psychological conditions varied greatly throughout the war. “Mental deficiency” 
fell under the general category of “mental alienation,” which also included diagnoses such as “psychoneurosis” (for 
which approximately 2,000 service members were discharged) and “constitutional psychopathic states,” (which 
constituted approximately 3,700 discharges). Ibid.: 166-89. Annessa Stagner has pointed out that estimates of those 
discharged with shell shock range from 15,000 to 76,000, which she attributes in part to “the ambiguity regarding 
the meaning of shell shock.” Annessa Stagner, "Healing a Soldier, Restoring the Nation: Representations of Shell 
Shock in the United States During and after the First World War," The Journal of Contemporary History 
(Forthcoming). Later chapters of this dissertation will discuss the fact that, in the 1920s, providing enough hospital 
beds for veteran-patients suffering from psychoneurosis and related conditions proved a great challenge, and helped 
pave the way for an expansive veterans’ hospital system.   
9
 Love, "A Brief Summary of the Vital Statistics of the U.S. Army During the World War," 147-48.  
10
 Ibid.: 165. According to Love, the number of soldiers treated at some point during their service for illness or 
injury was extremely high: Between April 1917 and December 1918, the Army Medical Department admitted about 
2.57 million patients to the sick report. 2.4 million of them were serving in the U.S., while 873,816 were serving 
abroad.  
 5 
During and immediately after the Great War, some of the patients with the most complex 
medical needs were sent to Walter Reed Army General Hospital, where they became part of a 
burgeoning military medical system. The turn of the twentieth century marked a period of 
accelerated change in the history of military health care in the United States. Wounded and ill 
troops had long received first aid on the battlefield or in rudimentary field and camp hospitals 
that was aimed primarily at returning them intact to their units. But beginning in the 1890s, as 
the military mirrored and built upon trends evident in civilian society, soldiers were treated in 
large-scale permanent army general hospital complexes with multi-faceted and complicated 
missions that extended well beyond the provision of medical care. These institutions – Walter 
Reed Army General Hospital among them – helped lay the foundations of the modern army 
health care system.  
The immediate effect of pre-war policies aimed at guaranteeing that soldiers would be 
discharged as fully healed civilians were most evident at institutions such as Walter Reed, where 
the army implemented sweeping rehabilitation measures that included services such as 
occupational, physical, and vocational therapy. The rehabilitation project at Walter Reed was 
presented and perceived in a variety of ways. Army representatives portrayed military hospitals 
as camp-like sanctuaries of learning, healing, and growth. Some patients and their relatives, on 
the other hand, complained that care and conditions at the institutions were sub-par.  
Regardless of perspective, it soon became evident that, for many, military hospitals 
would serve as mere starting points on a long path of institutional care. By the winter of 1918-
1919, government officials increasingly paid heed to claims from both soldiers and bureaucrats 
that the pre-war hope of rehabilitating service members under the auspices of the military was 
unrealistic. Injured and ill soldiers, as well as temporarily enlisted medical personnel, opted for 
 6 
hasty discharges rather than prolonged hospital stays. At the same time, some ex-service 
members argued that they were being discharged from the military before they were fully 
capable of taking care of themselves. All the while, soldiers and veterans increasingly came 
forward with latent war-related ailments such as tuberculosis and mental illness. Throughout 
1919, Congress acknowledged that the rehabilitation project would have to go beyond the 
purview of the military, and dictated that multiple government agencies work together to provide 
medical services for an ever-increasing number of veterans. Even as more funding was allocated 
for veterans’ medical care, those agencies struggled to define areas of jurisdiction and standards 
of treatment.  
Meanwhile, as soldiers were discharged from service, they joined a number of 
organizations that served as both social networks and political advocacy forums. Two such 
groups, the American Legion and Disabled American Veterans (DAV), made the fight for access 
to government-sponsored health services central to their agendas. The Legion and DAV 
advocated for injured and ill veterans because they were being mistreated. But, in lobbying for 
increased government services, the groups’ leaders also hoped to stave off political radicalism 
among seemingly vulnerable ex-service members. Even as they claimed all veterans were a class 
apart, both the American Legion and DAV allowed state chapters to adopt their own policies 
regarding whether or not ex-soldiers of color could be accepted to the organizations, fought in 
Congress against the integration of both military and veterans’ hospitals, and adopted anti-
immigrant platforms. The groups’ policies – adopted in the wake of intra-organizational 
disagreements about the virtues of egalitarianism – showed that the priority of gaining benefits 
for white, male veterans took precedence over gaining benefits for all veterans. Although steeped 
in the social milieu of the time, the tactics of the American Legion and its counterparts were 
 7 
highly effective. By the early 1920s, the groups counted members of Congress among their 
ranks, and they wielded great political power. 
By the time veterans’ advocates proposed the re-organization and expansion of veterans’ 
hospital care, government officials and professionals involved in the system were open to 
change. They were eager to alleviate the effects of previous attempts to coordinate services of 
various government agencies, which had been largely unsuccessful and brought about a chorus 
of charges of neglect. In August 1921, following a build-up of frustration with bureaucratic 
insolvencies and amidst increasing veterans’ activism, the Veterans’ Bureau was established. 
Later, enhanced funding for veterans’ health care, the overall expansion of medical institutions 
for ex-soldiers, and further advocacy efforts led to the creation of a congressional committee 
specifically intended to review and help pass legislation pertaining to World War veterans.  It 
helped usher into law a measure stipulating that all veterans – not just those who had incurred 
injuries and illnesses in the line of duty – should have access to free medical care. Former service 
members were thus granted access to institutions as a reward for their membership in a newly 
powerful interest group of citizen-veterans. 
This dissertation tells the story of how and why veterans were granted special rights, but 
it pays heed to the fact that those rights were offered first and foremost to white, male veterans, 
and that the extent of them ebbed and flowed over time. During and immediately following the 
war – in both military and veterans’ hospitals – women who served, soldiers of color, and those 
with less visible injuries, (tuberculosis and shell-shock, for example), often faced even larger 
hurdles than others in their quest to access high-quality medical care. And within less than 15 
years of the establishment of the Veterans’ Bureau, costly veterans’ benefits (for all ex-service 
 8 
members) faced major cuts; indeed, the system remained vulnerable to being under-funded 
sporadically for the remainder of the twentieth century.  
A variety of pertinent literature fields – from the history of military medicine to the role 
of interest groups in American politics – will be reviewed in the relevant chapters. Here, I 
discuss three areas of historical inquiry to which this dissertation contributes: soldiers’ and 
veterans’ benefits, the American welfare state, and public health policy.  
 
A long history of veterans’ benefits 
The World War I era serves as only one chapter in a much longer story about a unique 
relationship between former service members and their government, however it also marks an 
important turning point. After the Revolutionary War, veterans received hard-fought pension 
payments in return for their service. Theda Skocpol’s formative work on citizenship rights and 
Civil War veterans notes that by the late 1880s, a colonial-era state-by-state system of veterans’ 
benefits had been largely replaced by a federal system, and a huge number of former service 
members, widows, and dependents across the nation – including more than one-third of all 
elderly men living in the North – received quarterly payments from the U.S. Pension Bureau.
11
 In 
the late nineteenth century, veterans also won access to a national system of Soldiers’ Homes, 
which served mainly as domicile units for aged men with nowhere else to turn.
12
  
                                                
11
 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), The data on the Pension Bureau is on p. 1.  
12
 Even though some Soldiers’ Home campuses contained hospitals, the institutions were designed to serve – as their 
names suggested – as homes, rather than as medical care facilities. As this dissertation shows, that had much to do 
with the fact that hospitals were much maligned in the post-Civil War years, (whereas by World War I, they were 
more widely viewed as ideal venues for medical treatment). The formative work on Soldiers’ Homes is Patrick J. 
Kelly, Creating a National Home: Building the Veterans' Welfare State, 1860-1900 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University, 1997). Soldiers’ Homes and other helpful secondary sources are discussed throughout this dissertation; 
see especially Chapters One and Four.  
 9 
But the establishment of the Veterans’ Bureau and veterans’ hospitals – as many 
legislators of the time were only too eager to point out – went well beyond the measures of the 
past. Legislation of the early 1920s led not only to the outlay of millions of dollars for the benefit 
of millions of veterans, but it also firmly established an exclusive, publicly sponsored medical 
system that provided many former members of the military with a direct, personal, long-term, 
service- and institution-oriented connection with their government. In short, it was the 
bureaucratic fallout, activism, and legislation of the World War I era – not the pension system of 
the nineteenth century – that directly shaped veterans’ benefits through the beginning of the 
twenty-first century.  
Scholars who focus on the development of the veterans’ welfare state in the 1930s and 
1940s have recently pointed to the post-World War I era as crucial in shaping benefits moving 
forward. As Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin put it, “it was clear even before the 
armistice of 1918 that postwar policymaking would never again be the same. Indeed, the 
innovations of the interwar period form an immediate and influential background to the 
proposals that would find their way into the G.I. Bill in 1944.”
13
 Likewise, Kathleen J. Frydl 
notes that “the political stewards who orchestrated (the GI Bill) were veterans of World War I; in 
some more informal way, they were also veterans of that poorly handled readjustment. The latter 
experience yielded some useful political knowledge.”
14
 Stephen Ortiz echoes that sentiment, 
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 Glenn C. Altschuler; Stuart M. Blumin, The G.I. Bill: A New Deal for Veterans (New York, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 32. 
 
14
 Kathleen J. Frydl, The G.I. Bill (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 37. 
 10 
noting that in the wake of the Great War, “the federal government succeeded in setting up a 
seemingly judicious and incorruptible new veterans’ system,” which would be built upon later.
15
 
The drastic change that took place in the nature of veterans’ benefits – and the 
enthusiastic fight for hospitals that was part and parcel of that change – was due in no small part 
to the dynamic state of American medicine and health care. In the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, thanks to advocacy efforts of professionals in the field, industrialization, and 
urbanization, the perception of health and hospitals was in transition. The germ theory of disease 
absolved individuals of blame for their ailments, and took away the shame of seeking care; 
illnesses like tuberculosis were gradually seen largely as products of one’s environment, as 
opposed to a form of punishment for individual moral transgressions. In the first decades of the 
twentieth century, chronic illnesses overtook epidemics as the leading cause of death among 
Americans, and gained credence as medical ailments best treated by professionals. At the same 
time, Progressives fought for state and federal assistance for workers who fell ill or sustained 
injuries on the job.
16
 As these drastic changes occurred, doctors and administrators self-
consciously ensured that hospitals boasted new technologies such as X-ray machines and 
amenities including well-appointed private rooms. By the second decade of the twentieth 
century, middle- and upper-class Americans were increasingly drawn to seeking medical care at 
such institutions, as opposed to in their homes. Medical care, in other words, was gradually 
professionalized and commodified.
17
 In this historical context, services previously available to 
                                                
15
 Stephen R. Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus March and G.I. Bill (New York, New York: New York University Press, 
2010), 16. 
16
 Dying for Work: Workers' Safety and Health in Twentieth-Century America ed. David Rosner and Gerald 
Markowitz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), See especially the introduction. 
17
 The history (and historiography) of American hospitals will be discussed at length in Chapter One of this 
dissertation. For background: David Rosner, A Once Charitable Enterprise (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982). Charles E. Rosenberg, The Care of Strangers: The Rise of America's Hospital System (New York: 
 11 
veterans – the convalescent care offered in Soldiers’ Homes a primary example – were rendered 
inadequate in the eyes of many.  
A veterans’ hospital system also became a reality because of two unique characteristics 
of World War I. First, the medical ailments that resulted from the war lent themselves to 
treatment in newly idealized hospital settings. With the advent of more lethal weapons and 
improvements in military medicine, soldiers were more likely to sustain and survive dire injuries. 
More common than battlefield injuries were tuberculosis and various psychological conditions – 
chronic diseases that were widely believed to necessitate extended medical, as opposed to 
domicile or community-based, care. Second, the U.S. government instituted large-scale 
conscription to build up its army in 1917 and 1918. The state’s responsibility to draftees, it 
seemed to the general public and veterans themselves, was greater than it had been to career 
soldiers in other conflicts.
18
   
  
The American welfare state 
Soldiers’ and veterans’ benefits are part of the larger American welfare state, which has 
been characterized by scholars as an amorphous mix between government and private 
interventions that assist the needy and various select members of society.
19
 William J. Novak and 
                                                
Basic Books, 1987). Morris J. Vogel, The Invention of the Modern Hospital: Boston, 1870-1930 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980). Rosemary A. Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the 
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Gary Gerstle’s recent debate about whether the American welfare state is strong or weak 
illuminates some key areas of concern for historians of social policy. Novak argues that the 
American state “is and always has been more powerful, capacious, tenacious, interventionist, and 
redistributive than was recognized in earlier accounts of U.S. history.” He points out that the 
reach of the American state remains largely hidden because “it is so widely distributed among an 
exceedingly complex welter of institutions, jurisdictions, branches, offices, programs, rules, 
customs, laws, and regulations.” Therefore, he says, “realistic and pragmatic approaches to 
American state development” must pay heed to the idea that “American power has long been 
distributed among a series of individuals, groups, parties, associations, organizations, and 
institutions not readily designated as wholly wither public or private.”
20
  
Gerstle, on the other hand, takes issue with the idea of “advancing an argument for (the) 
state’s unremitting strength as a substitute for the older argument about its chronic weakness.” 
The nature – and largesse – of the state, he argues, is a product of historical circumstance and, in 
the United States, it has changed considerably over time. Gerstle also notes that individual states 
have often “frustrated the legislative ambitions of the central state.” Finally, he argues, Novak’s 
characterization of the American welfare state’s “public-private character” as a marker of 
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In fact, attempting to come to a resolution about the question at the core of the Novak-
Gerstle debate – whether one might characterize the American welfare state as strong or weak – 
is less productive than addressing the question of how and why the American welfare state 
developed, over time, as it did. After all, both scholars (and many others) agree that the structure 
of the U.S. state is highly complex, disbursed, and decentralized.  
Historians have provided various explanations for the shape of the American welfare 
state. According to Ira Katznelson and Alice Kessler-Harris, for example, federal social 
programs such as Social Security were guided largely by ideology, and strongly entrenched 
notions that white males were the only citizens worthy of so-called entitlements. The most 
generous social programs, Kessler-Harris and Katznelson have shown, reinforced societal racial 
and gender hierarchies, in that they were initially largely inaccessible to white women and all 
African Americans.
22
 Linda Gordon also argues that welfare programs entrenched, rather than 
unsettled societal norms. So-called pension and aid programs designed for the benefit of 
impoverished mothers in the 1920s and 1930s, Gordon shows, were intended to protect women 
who had been shut out of the one acceptable model of household economy: reliance on a male 
breadwinner. The resulting mothers’ pensions programs were under-funded and demeaning.
23
 In 
the inter-war years, Katznelson, Kessler-Harris, and Gordon all show, policy-makers based 
social programs on the idea that there were deserving and undeserving poor people.  
Historian Jennifer Klein and political scientist Jacob S. Hacker make arguments more 
centered on institutional development. Privately-funded initiatives, both scholars argue, have 
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undercut the expansion of a more extensive public welfare system. Klein reaches back to the first 
decades of the twentieth century, describing the rise of employer- and union-sponsored health 
plans through a telling profile of the increasing powers and capabilities of the insurance industry. 
By the New Deal years, she argues, the boundaries of the American national welfare system – 
which remain largely intact to this day – were formally set: the private programs of the 1910s 
and 1920s would provide benefits alongside public ones, forming a cooperative arrangement 
between business and government.
24
  
While Klein discusses the American welfare state and, more specifically, health benefits, 
in the context of welfare capitalism and an ongoing ideological and power struggle between 
employers, unions, and a variety of other interest groups, Jacob Hacker uses a different 
framework. Like Klein, he emphasizes the idea that public and private benefits historically have 
been “path dependent”; the development of one has reinforced the development of the other. 
(The fact that Medicare covers only the elderly, for example, was path dependent on the fact that 
employer-sponsored benefits had been developed to cover workers.)  But Hacker draws on 
different evidence to make his case. Instead of examining American industry and the players 
surrounding it, he investigates the political structures behind the development of the American 
“welfare regime.” This regime, Hacker says, consists of three elements: several direct-spending 
programs – for example, Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security; “indirect or hidden 
government interventions,” including tax breaks, regulations and credit subsidies; and finally, 
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private social protections, a product of both “government policy and of the distinctive 
organizational and economic imperatives of the institutions that provide them.”
25
  
Military and veterans’ medical care in the World War I era showcases the “characteristic 
sprawl” of the American state, but it is also an example of strong state centralization.
26
 During 
and after the war, the army and federal government allowed private organizations, such as the 
American Red Cross and the American Legion, to play a large role in defining and executing 
policies pertaining to the nature and extent of hospital care for soldiers and veterans. But the later 
creation of the Veterans’ Bureau and the veterans’ hospital system serves as a distinctive 
example of the U.S. government declining to relegate welfare to the private sector, and instead, 
creating a massive federal bureaucracy. Indeed, from the 1920s on, veterans’ medical care has 
remained a foundational direct spending program.  
The story of soldiers’ and veterans’ medical care in the World War I era corresponds with 
histories of other welfare programs, which were governed by strongly entrenched ideals 
regarding race, class, and gender. Although veterans’ hospitals were accessible to white women 
and people of color, they were by no means egalitarian; policymakers designed the system 
holding the interests of white, male veterans as their highest priority. In this way, Veterans’ 
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Public health and health policy 
This study of military and veterans’ health care in World War I fits into a larger field of 
public health history defined as “the history of collective action in relation to the health of 
populations.”
27
 It is guided by the calls of public health historians who came of age in the 1970s 
(as part of a larger generational movement taking place in many academic fields), and who 
argued that the history of medicine and public health should go beyond the study of “great 
doctors.” Social history and circumstance, these scholars said, are highly relevant to larger 
stories about medicine and health.
28
 Over the past forty years, following that historiographical 
tide change, scholars have pursued important work on the effects of epidemic and chronic 
diseases on immigrant and minority populations.
29
 Like previous studies, this dissertation notes 
the importance of social factors in shaping not only the experience of disease, but also how a 
society elects to respond to a perceived health need.    
Recently, as debates about the state of the American health care system have garnered 
public and political attention, medical and public health historians have put out a new call for the 
relevance of history to the study of health policy. More than twenty years ago, Robert Kelley 
argued that historians must endeavor to study the history of public policy, just as they study areas 
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such as the family and immigration. By “making historical studies of what happened to adopted 
policies once they were put into operation,” Kelley said, “historians can make an especially 
important contribution.”
30
 More recently, Charles Rosenberg has noted that studying the history 
of health policies, in particular, “tells us a great deal about the relationships among interest and 
ideology, formal structures and human need, professionalization and social welfare, and 
technology and its applications.”
31
 Rosenberg, among others, argues not only for the relevance of 
history but also for the necessity of defining health policy broadly. That term, argues Rosemary 
A. Stevens, denotes more than just pieces of legislation. Health policies “reflect more general 
perceptions about what is important or fair or doable (or all three) in a particular culture, at a 
particular time, in a particular place.”
32
 To these ends, this dissertation looks at conditions and 
policy debates surrounding soldiers’ and veterans’ hospital care in an effort to illuminate larger 
realities about changing perceptions of health, medicine, governmental responsibility, and 
citizenship rights in World War I era America.      
In the small but growing literature field of the history of U.S. health policy, one question 
(related to the topic of this dissertation) reigns supreme: Why did the United States remain, 
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throughout the twentieth century, the only wealthy nation with no system of nationally sponsored 
health insurance?
33
 Historian Colin Gordon identifies six key historical moments in the national 
health insurance policy debate, each ending in defeat for proponents of a state sponsored system 
of universal coverage. Between 1910 and 1933, Progressives centered their efforts on the 
American Association for Labor Legislation, which lobbied for state-by-state government-
sponsored insurance, and in the mid-1930s, there was support for the inclusion of national health 
insurance in the Social Security Act of the New Deal. In both instances, concerns about 
“socialism” put forth by interest groups including the American Medical Association drowned 
out calls for equal access. Between 1945 and 1950, the idea for national health insurance 
surfaced again, but was countered by alternatives focused on enhancing what was, by then, a 
well-established private, employer-based system of benefits. In the 1950s and 1960s, as some 
held tight to the notion of universal insurance, moderates and conservatives focused on the 
politically safer task of filling in the gaps of private insurance – providing coverage for the needy 
and elderly – eventually leading to the 1965 passage of Medicare and Medicaid. In the 1970s, as 
costs of care rose, president Richard Nixon proposed the Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan, 
which stipulated that firms with more than 25 employees provide employer-sponsored coverage 
for workers and their families. Nixon’s plan, which also included programs that would improve 
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and take the place of both Medicaid and Medicare, died in the wake of his 1974 resignation from 
office. By the early 1990s, the final key moment identified by Gordon, the Clinton health plan 
had abandoned efforts at government-sponsored universal health insurance, instead calling for 
federal subsidies, and a blanket enhancement of the private employer-based system. At any one 
of these moments, a combination of forces – war, the politics of the election cycle, and a 
conflagration of private interests – shaped debates, and, in turn, the piecemeal policies (Medicare 
and Medicaid, for example) that eventually surfaced.  As a result, at the beginning of the 21
st
 
century, the American system of health insurance rested precariously on a divided foundation of 
publicly- and privately-administered benefits.  
The Veterans’ Bureau and its hospitals are a great anomaly when one considers their 
political context. They were established in the early 1920s, in the shadow of the Great War, 
when a conservative Congress and a new Republican president demonstrated great eagerness to 
prioritize fiscal discipline. In fact, the traditional historical narrative paints the 1920s mostly as a 
dark and static moment in the allocation of government entitlements, after the disbursal of 
benefits for Civil War veterans in the nineteenth century, and before the watershed measures of 
the New Deal in the 1930s. For example, Colin Gordon writes: “Beyond Sheppard-Towner, the 
1920s saw no significant health reform proposals… Republican administrations pressed 
voluntarist solutions through organizations like the American Child Health Association.”
35
 But in 
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spite of efforts by legislators in the 1920s to ensure that the Veterans’ Bureau would be only a 
temporary fix to a short-lived problem, it became a crucial federal agency. It was the forerunner 
to the current United States Department of Veterans Affairs, which oversees the Veterans Health 
Administration (VHA) – “the largest integrated health care system in the United States.”36 The 
VHA serves approximately 8.3 million beneficiaries, who have access to a variety of types of 
institutions, including more than 150 hospitals.37  
Even as scholars of American health policy eschew a focus on the formative nature of the 
early years of the Veterans’ Bureau, they acknowledge the agency’s overall importance within 
the American welfare state. In addition to providing direct assistance to a large swath of citizens, 
they say, it created one sector of a “protected public” who would thereafter be likely to oppose 
health care reform for the larger population.38 
Such a phenomenon was uniquely American. In other Western nations, World War I 
helped instantiate a faith in professional medicine, but instead of bringing about a long-term 
medical system for one sector of the population, it served as a catalyst for ongoing movements 
toward the nationalization of health programs. In England, for example, doctors who had served 
in the war became advocates for “reorganizing medical services at home” so they could be more 
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coordinated and accessible for the greater population.
39
 There, the notion that a great portion of 
those eligible to serve in the military were unable due to lack of physical fitness, argues Harry 
Eckstein, “drove home the fact that the general public has a large stake in the health” of potential 
fighters.
40
 Many had come to the same conclusions in the U.S., but failed to convince the larger 
public that it indicated the necessity for a large-scale change in access to medical services. In 
England, the realization helped bring about the 1919 creation of the office of the Ministry of 
Health and a series of laws throughout the 1920s aimed at a “reorganization of medical care in 
the best interests of the general public.”
41
 The policies of the interwar years helped the country 
transition from the 1911 National Health Insurance Bill, which served as a compulsory workers’ 
insurance system, to the 1948 establishment of the National Health Service, which offered free 
medical care to the entire population.
42
 England, like France, Germany, and Canada, initially 
offered special medical and rehabilitation services to soldiers and veterans in the World War I 
years, but instead of dovetailing off into permanent specialized medical systems, the programs 
were eventually largely subsumed by or integrated into larger national health structures.
43
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The health benefits extended to U.S. soldiers and veterans during the World War I period 
tell us much about the development of American social and health policy. In many respects, the 
eventual establishment of a national system of veterans’ hospitals indicated a massive expansion 
of the reach of government: they provided an institutional safety net for one group of citizens, 
and went a long way in ensuring the well-being of generations of veterans who made great 
personal sacrifices. The implementation of a veterans’ hospital system also illustrates the 
tendency of the United States government to award entitlements selectively, to those who 
advocate strongly for themselves by demonstrating worthiness as well as need. Given these 
factors, legislation of the 1920s pertaining to soldiers’ and veterans’ hospital care deserves to be 
considered – alongside later federal assistance programs such as Social Security and Medicare – 
as foundational in the development and shape of the American welfare state and health policy.  
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Studies on World War I era medical care and social policy 
Rosemary A. Stevens asks a question of particular relevance to this dissertation: “How 
does a country without a national health program for all justify national health benefits for a 
few?” The success of federal health programs in the U.S. – the funding of biomedical research, 
medical care for the elderly and poor, and hospital care for veterans – “rests on the ability to 
define a group clearly as a distinct and limited class of beneficiaries,” Stevens concludes. 
Furthermore, she argues, U.S. health policy is “not a product of political philosophy but a 
response to sectional or immediate needs, a crisis of the moment, rather than any long-term 
social agenda.” Stevens studies the establishment of the veterans’ medical system in order to 
ascertain whether the U.S. government could successfully administer a health program. And, she 
concludes, the “veterans’ case is a good example of American flexibility in policy-making… the 
system worked!”
44
 In a later book chapter about the establishment of the Veterans’ 
Administration, Stevens provides a rich picture of how and why the Veterans’ Bureau came to 
be, arguing that two major forces led to the creation of a veterans’ hospital system: a vocal 
veterans’ lobby that drew attention to the problems at hand, and an increasing drive to “reform 
federal government agencies under the banner of business efficiency.”
45
  
Stevens’ accounts are the most recent and thorough of a handful of book chapters, 
scholarly articles, and congressional reports examining the advent of a veterans’ medical system 
in the World War I years. Robert D. Leigh, Gustavas A. Weber, and William P. Dillingham 
provide earlier overviews of the core issues that arose in relation to veterans’ medical care in the 
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World War I era.
46
 Their accounts serve as accessible and utilitarian guides to the major turning 
points and most important pieces of legislation of the period. They mention some of the primary 
players involved, and key areas of conflict. On the whole, these scholars are most interested in 
what went wrong in the arena of soldiers’ and veterans’ medical care, the role played by the 
federal government during a turbulent time, and who was to blame for shortfalls in the system. 
Robert D. Leigh, for example, writing less than a decade after the Armistice – as “furnishing 
national medical and hospital service on a huge scale” continued to pose a problem – argues that 




My project is aimed at providing both detail and context for the events and conflicts 
explored briefly in these works, and presenting new questions and points for consideration: Why 
did the army initially become the entity that would oversee rehabilitation? What did army 
rehabilitation look like, and how did it help pave the way for demands for further care? How did 
soldier- and veteran-patients perceive the care they were receiving? What was the nature of the 
transition from military to civilian care, and why was there so much tension between agency 
authorities in the post-war years? How and why did veterans’ groups become involved in the 
battle for veterans’ hospitals, and what was the impact of their efforts? On a more general level: 
What does soldiers’ and veterans’ medical care in the World War I era reflect about military and 
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veterans’ policy in the twentieth century? What does it reveal about values surrounding public 
health and medicine in the United States? What does it tell us about the American welfare state? 
In my story, there is no hero or villain; there is mass confusion and disagreement about 
how to plan for (and eventually fulfill) an unknown need, about bureaucratic jurisdiction, and 
about what was logical and rational for a government to provide for a group of citizens. In order 
for a health crisis to get attention, I argue, it has to fit a prevailing social agenda. And only when 
people can “apply their values” to potential solutions do they become acceptable.
48
 As this 
dissertation aims to make clear, such was the case for veterans’ hospital care following World 
War I. 
A handful of book-length projects exist relating to the general topic of World War I era 
health care for U.S. soldiers and veterans. Recent work especially pertinent to this dissertation 
focuses on connections between the army rehabilitation program and changing notions of 
disability, the treatment of specific diseases by the Army Medical Department, and the impact of 
the period’s social policies on the American welfare state.  
Beth Linker’s work on rehabilitation in the World War I era shows that the period 
marked a turning point in the understanding of disability in the United States, one in which 
rehabilitation – as opposed to the provision of pensions – became a governmental and military 
priority.
49
 Linker’s conclusions have important implications for a study of the roots of the 
veterans’ medical system: they help demonstrate why hospitals, and the prospect of “cure” that 
they represented, became a central focus of World War I era policies. While Linker uses military 
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health initiatives in order to elucidate changing understandings of disability, I use them instead 
as a means of examining broad questions about health policy and the American welfare state. 
Linker looks at how army rehabilitation efforts came about, and what a new emphasis on 
rehabilitation said about core societal values, including manhood and work.
50
 I investigate how 
and why the army rehabilitation program was at once comprehensive and vague, where related 
efforts of multiple government agencies ultimately fell short, and how hospital care came to be 
battled over and won as a political right for some U.S. citizens.  
Carol R. Byerly has also done much to improve our understanding of the larger 
implications of military health initiatives in the World War I period. Her books on the army’s 
treatment of influenza and tuberculosis show  that the medical fallout of war extends well 
beyond highly visible battlefield injuries such as gunshot wounds and amputations. In fact, 
according to Byerly, chronic illness and disease were hugely influential in shaping governmental 
and military medical efforts during and after the First World War.
51
 This dissertation builds upon 
Byerly’s findings, arguing that the veterans’ hospital system came to be not mainly because there 
was a perceived necessity to care for a relatively small number of those who incurred visible 
wounds in battle, but in order to treat the long-term effects of chronic diseases such as 
tuberculosis and mental illnesses. 
K. Walter Hickel’s work focuses less directly on the health of soldiers than it does on the 
ideology of government-sponsored benefits for them, and the relationship of the latter to the 
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development of welfare in the United States. Hickel argues that the 1917 War Risk Insurance Act 
established three major principles on which the American welfare state came to rest: federally-
sponsored allotments and allowances for the financial support of mothers who could not draw 
support from male providers; disability as a justification for support; and vocational training 
programs for the rehabilitation of those who lost the capacity for wage labor. According to 
Hickel, the Act “initiated modern social policy in the United States.” The WRIA is crucial to 
U.S. social policy history, he argues, because the privileges it offered to disabled soldiers were 
eventually “extended one by one to the civilian population throughout the country.”
52
  
This study corroborates the finding that the WRIA helped normalize the idea of offering 
vocational rehabilitation to injured industrial workers, and substantiated the notion that disabled 
people and their dependents were worthy, as a group, of monetary and institutional benefits. But 
my interpretation of the significance of social policies passed during the World War I era differs 
from that of Hickel. One benefit guaranteed to veterans by the WRIA that was never extended to 
all Americans was access to government sponsored medical care. The granting of the latter to 
soldiers and veterans can, in fact, be seen as one of the first major policies that limited the reach 
of the institutional federal welfare state to a select few based on ideals of service and honor. The 
War Risk Insurance Act helped set the precedent that only some were worthy of access to 
publicly funded heath benefits and put in place a framework for a distinctly selective American 
welfare state.  
That crucial piece of legislation serves as the starting point of our story. 
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Preparing the homefront for the health outcomes of war:  
Policy provisions for domestic medical care of service members (1917) 
 
 
 In the months surrounding the United States’ declaration of war in April 1917, 
government officials and medical professionals readily acknowledged that wounded and ill 
soldiers were an inevitable consequence of raising a mass army. Practitioners and policy makers 
knew that thousands of troops and support personnel had been treated in England and France 
since 1914 for a variety of ailments, from psychological conditions and tuberculosis to 
amputations and gun shot wounds. Even so, the details of how to provide for the long-term 
health needs of veterans were pushed aside as seemingly more pressing issues – the legitimacy of 
U.S. entry in a European war, mobilizing the nation’s economy for the conflict, the justness of 
military conscription – occupied public and congressional attention. Some policymakers, 
doctors, and government bureaucrats made it their business to call attention to the notion that 
soldiers would eventually become wounded and ill citizens in need of extended care, and 
attempted to plan accordingly. But their efforts were poorly coordinated and, in some cases, 
short-sighted, in part because the problem was both daunting and unpredictable in scope. 
Medical professionals and social reformers who shaped pre-war policies argued that major 
rehabilitation work should be overseen by the military. According to their rationale, by the time 
most soldiers were discharged as civilians, they would be fully medically rehabilitated and 
relatively self-reliant.  
The War Risk Insurance Act (WRIA), records of the Council of National Defense 
(CND), and the army reconstruction plan showcase how social reformers, politicians, medical 
professionals, and military personnel envisioned soldiers’ and veterans’ medical care. Analyzed 
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together, they provide a rich picture of the means by which the U.S. government prepared for the 
health outcomes of the Great War; they demonstrate that early policy discussions and decisions 
honored much-prized Progressive Era ideals of industrial efficiency, but left important questions 
unanswered. The injustices that were perceived to result from somewhat haphazard pre-war 
planning provided the political capital necessary for advocates of veterans’ rights to successfully 
lobby for a nationwide veterans’ hospital system. Pre-war laws regarding soldiers’ after-care, in 
other words, helped justify the claim that veterans were entitled to access to federally-funded 
hospitals.  
 
The War Risk Insurance Act  
Amendments to the 1914 War Risk Insurance Act, debated during the summer of 1917 
and approved October 6, 1917, set the legislative tone for the conceptualization of the treatment 
of Great War soldiers and veterans – wounded, ill, or healthy. The WRIA, which aimed first and 
foremost to provide life and disability insurance benefits to service members and their families, 
envisioned soldiers and veterans as potential economic and industrial liabilities. In this way, the 
legislation was representative of the larger realities of the period; concurrent Progressive efforts 
to promote employer-based insurance coverage, workers’ compensation, and advances in 
industrial hygiene gained relevance by centering on the message that healthy workers were 
productive workers. Relatively good medical care (or at least some medical care), in other words, 
was good business. It was logical then, that the WRIA guaranteed that those who needed medical 
services could receive them courtesy of the federal government. The act stopped short, however, 
of stipulating where and how those services could be accessed. As one scholar has written: “The 
War Risk Act contained a promise of complete medical and hospital care, including prosthetic 
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appliances and other supplies, to be provided at government expense for veterans with service-
connected disabilities; but no provision was made for implementing the promise.”1 
Expanding on the War Insurance Law of 1914, which offered government sponsored 
insurance for American ships assisting in the war effort, and was later amended to include 
coverage for the captains and crews of those ships, the 1917 WRIA indicated that the U.S. had an 
expanded agenda when it came to ensuring security, not only for those who served, but for their 
families as well. As Walter Hickel has pointed out, the legislation, in many ways, was “intended 
to benefit families, not individual men.”2 It guaranteed that the United States government would 
supplement compulsory monthly allotments paid by service members to their wives and children. 
The statute provided drafted soldiers the option of purchasing life insurance policies of $1,000 to 
$10,000 and, like the Civil War era General Pension Act, offered compensation for disability 
incurred in the line of duty. Unlike laws passed to benefit veterans of the Revolutionary and 
Civil Wars, however, the payments were based not only on need and whether or not a veteran 
was disabled, but also on how many family members he supported, the type of disability he 
incurred, and the extent to which it hindered his earning power. Those conditions eventually 
became onerous for caregivers and the government to measure.  
In addition to providing payments to families and life and disability insurance, the War 
Risk Insurance Act guaranteed that those who needed medical care could receive it, but it did not 
stipulate where and how. According to Section 302 of the act, “the injured person shall be 
furnished by the United States such reasonable governmental medical, surgical, and hospital 
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services and with such supplies, including artificial limbs, trusses, and similar appliances, as the 
director (of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance) may determine to be useful and reasonably 
necessary...”
3
 The law contained no further explanation of how such ideals would become 
reality. The oversight was glaring, considering that medical care was, at the time, viewed as an 
occasionally costly commodity. Extracts from a report to the Dallas Wage Commission of April 
1917, for example, which were included in debates regarding the WRIA, noted that medical 




The War Risk Insurance Act was shaped by four major assumptions and ideas. Its authors 
aimed to discourage the dependency that was thought to have increased among Civil War 
veterans in the late nineteenth century. At the same time, they subscribed to the long-held belief 
that the national government had a responsibility to those who served in the military. Third, War 
Risk Insurance Act architects considered the composition of the World War I era American 
Expeditionary Forces, arguing that the federal government had a particularly heavy obligation to 
its soldiers, given that the majority had not volunteered, but instead were conscripted to serve. 
Finally, A.E.F. soldiers were envisioned as fathers, brothers, and sons – pillars of their families’ 
economic security – as opposed to individuals without obligations. 
As they debated the contents of the War Risk Insurance Act in the summer of 1917, 
politicians, insurance experts, and social reformers openly acknowledged that the primary 
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intention of the legislation was to alleviate the possibility that a massive pension scheme would 
take hold, as had been the case following the Civil War of approximately sixty years prior. One 
of the primary goals of the War Risk Insurance Act, in fact, was to help create a sense of 
responsibility among those who served, even as they capitalized on government benefits. 
Although compensation in the form of pensions “is a helpful measure of justice,” Secretary of 
the Treasury William G. McAdoo, Jr. argued, “rehabilitation and reeducation, fitting him for a 
life of activity and usefulness, either in his former or some other vocation, is an obligation 
fundamental both to him and his fellow men.”
5
 The WRIA did not address the complicated issue 
of vocational education – that would arise later – but it did bolster the notion of personal 
responsibility in another way: the legislation would be modeled on workmen’s compensation 
acts rather than on pension systems of the past. This meant that compensation would be 
determined by one’s personal situation, with a focus on the beneficiary’s number of dependents. 
It also meant that the individual would be obligated to abide by the terms of the bill by, for 
example, submitting to regular medical check-ups, in order to continue receiving payments. 
The central premise behind adopting such a model was that soldiers and veterans should 
receive certain benefits based on both the extent of their disability and their personal 
backgrounds as civilians, not merely because they had served. “The great outcry against the 
compensation system had not been due to the moneys that were paid to the men who died or 
were disabled because of injuries received while serving this country,” declared Julian Mack 
during hearings regarding the WRIA, referring to the public reaction following the Civil War. 
“The outcry,” he said, came with the establishment of the service pension legislation in the 
                                                
5
 To Amend the Bureau of Insurance Act So as to Insure the Men in the Army and Navy, Hearings before the 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. 5723, Part 1,  Sixty-Fifth Congress, First Session, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 11, 1917), 14. 
 33 
1890s, which “aims to give a man a pension because he was a soldier, and sometimes a soldier 
for 30 days, and sometimes not much of a soldier at that for 30 days.”
6
 As they debated the terms 
of the War Risk Insurance Act, Mack and his colleagues were pondering a deeper question, one 
that would arise surrounding veterans’ benefits repeatedly in the near future: should soldiers and 
veterans receive government entitlements strictly by virtue of past service in the armed forces (in 
other words, because they belonged to a distinct group of citizen-veterans), or should the nature 
of that service, and other considerations apply?  
Mack, a lawyer and judge by trade, was summoned by his government to help plan for 
the compensation and insurance of soldiers and sailors because of his reputation as an important 
Progressive reformer. In the 1910s, he called on his good friend Jane Addams to help him 
manage the affairs of “the first children’s court in the world” in Chicago, Illinois. There, he 
implemented his credo that a child offender who entered the court “should, of course, be made to 
know that he is face to face with the power of the state, but he should at the same time, and more 
emphatically, be made to feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude.”
7
 The perspective 
that a soldier’s social status and background should determine his level of compensation was 
firmly rooted in the Progressive Era ideologies of Mack and his fellow reformers. In juvenile 
cases, Mack wrote in 1909, “the problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or 
girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had 
best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.”
8
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The government, Progressives strongly believed, could be a force for good not only in regulating 
industry, but also in reforming the behavior of individuals – not least of all those who were poor 
or not fully “Americanized.”9  
When making their case regarding former soldiers, social reformers could note a long 
tradition of government action. An array of scholarship points out that, since the eighteenth 
century, veterans in the United States have been granted unique government entitlements. The 
Revolutionary War Pension Act of 1818 served as a poor law of sorts; veterans who could 
demonstrate financial need received annual payments up to $240. After the Civil War, federal 
pensions were re-figured with the intention of limiting the number of potential beneficiaries: 
benefits would be contingent on one’s degree of disability, lawmakers mandated. But thanks in 
large part to the eagerness of politicians to gain the favor of veterans as a voting bloc, coverage 
was gradually expanded over time; by the late 1880s, more than one-third of all elderly men 
living in the North, as well as men, widows and dependents of veterans across the nation, 
received quarterly payments from the U.S. Pension Bureau.10  
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As historian Patrick J. Kelly notes, while land and monetary payments were made to 
veterans throughout the nineteenth century, institutional assistance “emerged much more 
slowly.” Asylums and hospitals were difficult to maintain and, as Kelly puts it, “they smacked of 
monarchical institutions like France’s Hotel des Invalides.”
11
 In the years following the Civil 
War, however, as the middle and upper class reform groups which had proactively taken charge 
of veterans’ care found themselves increasingly financially strapped, such institutions became 
impossible to avoid, and a national system of soldiers’ homes was established.  By 1900, eight 
branches existed, which had housed more than 100,000 union veterans in states across the 
country, including Ohio, Wisconsin, Maine, and Virginia. At many of these institutions, hospitals 
were maintained on vast campuses along with residences and workshops. But the primary 
purpose of the soldiers’ homes was not to provide medical care; instead, they were intended to 




Although it fit into a long tradition of the U.S. government granting entitlements for 
veterans, the World War I era War Risk Insurance Act was a product of its time, and marked a 
breaking point in many respects. The turn of the twentieth century witnessed changing ideals of 
medical care, as well as the passage of federal social legislation regarding workplace safety and 
health. Both of those broad societal trends directly influenced pre-war policies regarding hospital 
care for soldiers and veterans. The War Risk Insurance Act contained a stipulation that veterans 
would be provided with “hospital services and supplies,” because hospitals were, in the lead-up 
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to World War I more than during any other conflict, considered to be ideal sites of care. Until the 
1880s, disease was not thought to be random, but a form of retribution for social deviance, best 
treated in almshouses and charity hospitals which advocated moral, as well as hygienic, 
behavior.
13
 But by the turn of the twentieth century, both the rich and poor accessed care in 
hospitals, which were by then thought to provide certain amenities unattainable in the home: a 
sanitary environment and medical technologies, such as the X-ray. In 1873, 178 hospitals existed 
in the United States. By 1909, there were more than 4,300.
14
 These hospitals were products of 
new understandings of disease pathology, changing socioeconomic conditions, and the advent of 
an industrial economy. They were also products of a distinctive Progressive Era approach to 
science and medicine focused on efficiency, economy, and a new understanding of bacteriology. 
Various historians argue that hospitals went from serving as moralistic, charitable 
institutions in the nineteenth century to focusing heavily on medical problems and which 
technologies could alleviate them in the early twentieth century. But scholars differ as to why 
such a change came about. David Rosner and Morris Vogel emphasize that it was not just 
medical and scientific advances such as the germ theory of disease that allowed hospital 
administrators to claim that their facilities could provide better care than that available in the 
home. A popular turn toward institutional medical care, Rosner notes, was less a sign of 
unflinching scientific progress than it was a reflection of new material realities emerging from 
industrialization. As socioeconomic conditions changed at the turn of the twentieth century, in 
other words, so did the purpose and perceptions of hospitals. During the depression of the 1890s, 
Rosner explains, New York municipalities ceased reimbursing hospitals on a per capita basis for 
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the immigrant “charity cases” that flooded hospital wards. Thus, hospital trustees became cost-
conscious and business-focused, and increasingly aimed to attract paying patients. Economic 
need, political realignment, and urban expansion forced trustees to turn to doctors as a source for 
middle- and upper-class patients. Thus, changes brought about by industrialization, Rosner 
argues, led to the broad and lasting transformation of hospital care.
15
 Charles Rosenberg takes a 
more internalist view, arguing that the move toward a clinical focus was attributable largely to 
the increasing power of doctors as an interest group, and their drive to use the hospital as an 
arena to promote their own professional self-interest.
16
 Rosemary Stevens points to various 
factors as shapers of hospital care: newly available medical technologies, the advent of university 
medical education that relied on a partnership with hospitals, and the larger paradox of the 




In addition to being shaped by larger social and demographic realities and 
transformations in the world of professional medicine, the War Risk Insurance Act was 
ideologically modeled on contemporary legislation focusing on various aspects of workers’ 
rights, from minimum wage laws to workplace safety standards. In the years surrounding World 
War I, 25 states passed workers’ compensation laws, prompted by the advocacy efforts of a 
“coalition of radicals, reformers, labor leaders, and even business representatives” who believed 
the newly powerful United States was “woefully behind the industrialized European community” 
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in guaranteeing workplace health and safety standards.
18
 The years between 1910 and 1920, then, 
marked a distinct moment in which advocates increasingly called on the government to 
recognize that workers had certain inherent rights that were worthy of protection. The fact that 
the War Risk Insurance Act went further than previous legislation aimed at veterans fits within 
this context. Soldiers and veterans were, after all, at the simplest level, employees of the federal 
government.  
 The composition of the army was also an important factor in the shaping of the WRIA. 
Authors of the Act argued that conscript soldiers, in many respects, deserved more than 
volunteers or career soldiers or officers. Although many Civil War soldiers had been conscripted, 
World War I was the first conflict during which the majority of troops were drafted into service. 
Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo argued that the U.S. government thus had a 
weighty responsibility in the current conflict: 
We are not relying on the volunteer system in this war. We are drafting men and 
compelling them to make, if necessary, the supreme sacrifice for their country. A 
higher obligation, therefore, rests upon the government to mitigate the horrors of 
war for the fighting men and their dependents in so far as it is possible to do so 
through compensations, indemnities, and insurance. Less than this, a just, 
generous and humane government can not do. We must set an example to the 
world, not alone in the ideals for which we fight, but in the treatment we accord to 
those who fight and sacrifice for us. … (soldiers) should know that if they are 
disabled, totally or partially – if they come back armless, legless, sightless or 
otherwise permanently injured – definite provision is made for them, and that they 
are not going to be left to the uncertain chances of future legislation or to the 
scandals of our old pension system. Every man should know that the moment he 
is enlisted in the military service of the government, these definite guarantees and 
assurances are given to him not as charity but as a part of his deserved 
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compensation for the extra-hazardous occupation into which his government has 
forced him.
19
   
 
Julian Mack agreed. He argued that men who enlisted voluntarily in the armed forces as 
individuals could be “dealt with… alone” by the government through monetary payments for 
losses of limbs and the like. “But in these days of the draft and conscription,” Mack said, “when 
you take a man away from his family against his will the family ought to be considered as the 
unit not only in arriving at the man’s compensation.”
20
  
Mack’s statement makes it clear that the WRIA focused first and foremost on the 
government’s responsibility to a soldier’s family; it emphasized the importance of seeing the 
soldier not as a man alone, but as a husband, father, and provider. When the legislation is seen in 
this light, it is easier to understand why legislators overlooked the details of how soldiers and 
veterans could access personal medical care following their service: dependency – whether on a 
hospital or any other institution – was the antithesis of the endpoint to which policymakers 
aspired in the pre-war years.  
As they debated the WRIA in the summer of 1917, some predicted that the legislation 
would lead to subsequent demands for more benefits. John A. Key (D—OH), Chairman of the 
Committee on Pensions, predicted that, “should the pending bill be enacted with its present 
provisions… within a year from the date of its passage, Congress will be flooded by bills, 
seeking by special acts of Congress individual cases to adjust, rectify, and remove the 
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 In fact, the WRIA led not only to a flood of complaints regarding 
individual cases, but also laid the groundwork for the establishment of a nationwide veterans’ 
hospital system. Key’s words proved prophetic. 
Others, however, took the stance that decisive action was necessary as mobilization 
moved quickly forward. Supporters of the WRIA argued that unique times called for drastic – 
and hasty – measures. “When it comes to saying exactly what should be offered at the end of the 
war, it is a little difficult to formulate it in two or three weeks, and to say exactly what is 
practicable,” noted Philemon Tecumseh Sherman, a New York lawyer who specialized in 
workmen’s compensation, unemployment, and old-age insurance, regarding details in the 
WRIA’s insurance plan. “We left the exact formulation of that to be determined later.”
22
  
Multiple scholars have brought to light the main components of the WRIA and pointed 
out its historical relevance. William H. Glasson called it a “radical departure from the existing 
pension system.”
23
 Beth Linker concurs, pointing out that the Act was written by prominent anti-
pension Progressives who “saw medical rehabilitation as a means of conservation, a way to 
preserve the nation’s economic and human resources.”
24
 K. Walter Hickel argues that it was not 
only a “crucial step in the codification, institutionalization and reification of (a) medical 
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conception of disability…” but also served as a “formative step in welfare state building.”
25
 
Rosemary Stevens, too, argues that the framers of the WRIA believed pensions were 
“unscientific,” but she notes that the Act also signified a trend of the times – the growing 
popularity of life insurance policies; there were 49 million private life insurance policies in effect 
in the US by 1917, Stevens notes, up from 25 million in 1907.
26
  
To scholars who focus specifically on the medical care of veterans, the War Risk 
Insurance Act represents a valiant, but ultimately short-sighted effort. According to Stephen 
Ward, the very fact that Congress debated and passed the legislation marked a step forward in 
terms of preparedness, at least in comparison with efforts surrounding previous wars. But, Ward 
also notes, laws like the WRIA, which provided for hospitalization and pension benefits, “were 
often written without knowledge of the types of medical problems likely to arise during the war. 
What in fact constituted a legitimate basis for hospitalization was thus often vague and ill-
defined.”
27
 In their history of the Veterans’ Administration, Gustavas Weber and Laurence 
Schmeckebier point out that the War Risk Insurance Act’s stipulation that medical and surgical 
hospital services would be provided for ex-servicemen led to “one of the most complicated and 
difficult tasks ever undertaken by the federal government.”
28
 In other words, although the Act 
did not itself establish a veterans’ hospital system, the rights it guaranteed eventually helped 
bring about medical welfare for millions of veterans.  
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The Council of National Defense Medical Board 
While the WRIA established the legislative tone for the conceptualization of medical care 
for soldiers and veterans, meetings of the Council of National Defense Medical Board between 
April 1917 and June 1918 serve as a window on to the changing priorities of government 
officials, military personnel, doctors, and other professionals. In its early days – as the U.S. 
government declared war on Germany in April 1917, established the military draft in May 1917, 
and passed the War Risk Insurance Act in June 1917 – the CND Medical Board concerned itself 
largely with the war’s affect on a distinguished and changing profession. Over time, in addition 
to serving as a forum for professional concerns of civilian doctors, the CND Medical Board 
became a sort of clearinghouse for information. Surgeons General of the Army, Navy, and Public 
Health Service, as well as officials of the Red Cross, used its meetings to share with each other 
organizational activities. Even as they exchanged information, representatives of these entities 
continued to work independently of one another, completing the portion of war preparedness 
work for which each was respectively responsible. As “a veritable patchwork of public and 
private institutions”
 
helped to stock and sanitize military camps and train and examine soldiers, 
they focused more on their own organizational goals than on taking a wide-angle view of all 
prospective pre-war needs, including planning for the post-war care of veterans.
29
 At various 
CND meetings, officials pointed out the need for non-military hospitals that could address the 
specific heath needs of former service members, but argued that the problem was too vast to be 
addressed hastily or piecemeal. Everyone acknowledged the problem, but no one directly 
addressed it.  
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Created under an act of Congress in August 1916, and fully organized in March 1917, the 
CND was charged with the “coordination of industries and resources for the national security and 
welfare” and the “creation of relations which will render possible in time of need the immediate 
concentration and utilization of the resources of the nation.” It consisted of the Secretaries of 
War, the Navy, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, who were responsible for electing seven 
representatives “with special knowledge” of a specific industry or natural resource, or who were 
“otherwise specially qualified...” In its first annual report released in June 1917, the CND self-
consciously declared a phenomenon that scholars would later analyze: “It has become a truism 
that no past war has been so essentially a war of the mechanic and the machine, and it is the 
realization of this truth that has been the inspiration of the policy pursued by the council…”
30
 
The bulk of CND activities had to do with large industry – for example, coordinating railroad 
operation and “managing” conflicts between labor and capital.
  
The seven chosen Council 
representatives included the civic and business elites of the day: Daniel Willard, president of the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, oversaw transportation and communications; Julius Rosenwald, 
president of Sears Roebuck & Co. was in charge of supplies; banker Bernard M. Baruch 
coordinated raw materials, minerals, and metals; American Federation of Labor president 
Samuel Gompers managed labor issues. The Council, on the whole, was emblematic of what 
Alan Brinkley refers to as “a brief experiment in state management of the economy,” one that 
fulfilled the hope of Progressives and many others that “government, capital, and labor” could 
cooperate “on behalf of a great national mission.”
31
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Among the “industrial” representatives on the CND, Chicago surgeon Franklin H. Martin 
was tasked with heading efforts concerning medicine and surgery. A personal friend of Army 
Surgeon General William C. Gorgas, Martin’s career was emblematic of “a virtual revolution” 
taking place in the medical profession and its affiliated institutions; at the turn of the twentieth 
century, the increasingly powerful American Medical Association promoted the implementation 
of universal standards for medical education as medical specialization increased, and the practice 
of surgery – separate and apart from general practice – gained respectability.
32
 During these 
years, Martin helped establish the journal, Surgery, Gynecology and Obstetrics, and regularly 
served as an active member of local and state medical societies. In 1913, he helped to found, and 
became Director-General, of the American College of Surgeons, an organization that had a 
mission ranging from hospital standardization to passing guidelines for the proper care of 
fractures and malignant diseases.
33
  
Martin did not have to search far for the personnel or structure of his CND General 
Medical Board; he had a prototype in the Committee of American Physicians for Medical 
Preparedness, which had been formed in April 1916 by joint action of the presidents of the 
American Medical Association, the American Surgical Association, the Congress of American 
Physicians and Surgeons, and the Clinical Congress of Surgeons of North America. Members of 
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this national entity, aware that Congress was debating the National Defense Act, quickly 
organized nine-member state committees with two overarching duties: to obtain information 
regarding medical resources in local communities, and to secure applicants for the Army Medical 
Reserve Corps.
34
 When the Committee of American Physicians for Medical Preparedness offered 
its services to President Woodrow Wilson soon after its formation, Wilson replied that he was 
“regretful that existing laws did not permit the acceptance by the federal government of 
gratuitous services.” But the administration managed to get around the problem by asking the 
Committee to do its work under the auspices of the CND, thus capitalizing on the power and 
considerable reach of the private sector group.
35
 With the formation of the CND Medical Board, 
prominent American medical professionals went from meeting and corresponding privately, to 
serving as officially sanctioned experts for the federal government. Professors of medicine, 
municipal health officials, and officers of professional organizations oversaw a variety of 
committees on war-related topics such as shell shock, ophthalmology, surgical methods, cardio-
vascular impairment, drug addiction, tuberculosis, public health nursing, and alcohol, among 
others.   
Throughout 1917, questions regarding how the war would affect health professionals 
dominated CND General Medical Board meetings. Its members worked to gain support from 
Congressional representatives for measures exempting medical students from the draft, and 
establishing higher rank and pay for doctors who enlisted in the military. The Medical Board also 
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attempted to establish professional standards for those who remained at home. It ordered doctors 
who took on patients of colleagues who were sent “over there” to cap their fees, and abstain from 
permanently winning over patients to their own practices. The Medical Board also spent much 
time organizing state committees to coordinate enlistment drives. Civilian professional groups 
thereby assisted the army in reaching its quota of wartime doctors. Further to this cause, the 
Medical Board assisted with the staffing of a Medical Reserve Corps, which allowed medical 
students an alternative to being drafted into enlisted service. In addition, it helped to coordinate 
stipulations for medical suppliers who intended to do business with the government.
36
  
Meetings of the Medical Board also served as a forum for the exchange of information, 
where the Surgeons General of the Army, Navy, and Public Health Service (PHS) provided 
concise reports of their activities surrounding physical examinations of troops, base camp and 
ship sanitation, and staffing of medical personnel. Reports of the Public Health Service, for 
example, focused on the main components of that organization’s war-related work: hygiene and 
sanitation in military camps and the communities surrounding them. Aside from reporting on the 
Public Health Service’s sanitary work, PHS Surgeon General Rupert Blue also lobbied actively 
at CND meetings for a comprehensive study of the health of industrial workers in war industries, 
which he argued was necessary for efficient mobilization.
37
 Blue, an advocate of compulsory 
sickness insurance and the advancement of workers’ health, evidently hoped to use wartime 
mobilization as a means by which to pursue a long-held professional passion. In this, he was not 
alone. Many understood that with the frenzy of war came opportunity. Professional 
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advancement, for example, was a priority of women physicians, orthopedists, and dentists, all of 
whom participated in CND meetings and argued that they should enjoy equal access to work as 
part of the United States military effort.
38
 Reports of the PHS and other organizations show that 
preparing for war left few resources within already strapped organizations to devote to the 
seemingly distant concern of providing care for soldiers with chronic conditions and wounded 
and ill veterans  
Various parties, however, rightfully predicted that there would be some demand for after-
care. In April 1917, a member of the Board’s hospital committee noted that a “previous report” 
had recommended that the CND be “given authority to consider the ultimate need of special 
hospitals or facilities for the care of special groups of cases such as neurological, orthopedic, 
mental, those suffering from shell shock, etc.” But “ in order to guard against the duplication of 
work, it was voted that the chairman be requested to determine whether or not they (sic) desire 
this committee to take up this problem and to organize these special hospital facilities…” To be 
sure, the representative noted, “the committee is ready to be of service in every possible way, in 
undertaking constructive work, but it wishes to avoid duplication of work which may already be 
provided for in some other way.”
39
 In its May 13, 1917 report to the Medical Board, the CND 
hospital committee acknowledged that “a study of the ultimate need of convalescent hospitals, 
and a large group of special hospitals such as shell shock, orthopedic, cardiac, etc.” was “of such 
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magnitude and requires so much detailed and special information, most of which can only be 
obtained from the sanitary service of our allies, that your committee feels this work is quite 
beyond this committee…” The Medical Board thus rescinded the responsibility of deliberating 
the provision of extensive hospital services and suggested the issue be addressed by the Army 
Surgeon General’s Office.
40
 In the winter of 1917 and the spring of 1918, the topic of hospital 
care rarely came up in CND Medical Board meetings.  
But the related subjects of civilian and military cooperation in the administration of 
medical care for soldiers, including the idea of facility-sharing (both crucial issues during and 
after the war) were discussed within the professional medical community. In December 1917, 
Dr. Sigismund Shulz Goldwater of the American Hospital Association told the CND Medical 
Board that his association “deplored the fact” that the army did not want to utilize “existing 
institutions.” Given the fact that the “Army must be sure of preparation, must have absolute 
control of everything it does, Goldwater conceded, it was “easy to understand” why it must 
oversee care of its own personnel.” Still, he argued, “there are instances in which private 
institutions and hospitals can be utilized to advantage.” He urged the powers that be not to 
“assume that the hospitals already existing have nothing to contribute.”
41
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Goldwater elaborated on the issue in the pages of Modern Hospital magazine. That 
journal, which began monthly publication in 1913, contained news of relevance regarding the 
fast-changing landscape of American medical institutions; articles focused on issues ranging 
from ideal construction plans to emerging clinical specialties.
42
 In mid-1918, Goldwater sat on 
the editorial board of Modern Hospital along with Henry M. Hurd, Frederic A. Washburn, 
Winford H. Smith, W.L. Babcock, John A. Hornsby, and M.K. Chapin, who constituted a tight 
circle of some of the most prominent civilian hospital policymakers of the day. Winford Smith, 
for example, succeeded Hurd as the superintendent of the prestigious Johns Hopkins Hospital, 
and served in that post from 1911 through 1946. All the while, he assisted in the planning and 
organization of some of the country’s most prominent medical centers: Duke, Cornell, 
Vanderbilt, and Yale Universities, as well as the Universities of Chicago and California. Smith, 
like many other highly respected doctors, served in both World War I and World War II.
43
 In the 
years surrounding the Great War, the pages of Modern Hospital revealed that these professional 
men balanced their concerns for civilian medical practice with what they understood as the 
necessities of war.   
Goldwater’s April 1918 Modern Hospital article highlighted the fact that some in the 
civilian medical world viewed with unease the concept of a distinct military health care system. 
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“The time of military officers would be wasted,” Goldwater argued, “if devoted to the care of 
physical wrecks returned from France, this being a job for a civilian, not a military man.” 
Goldwater was not taking issue with the idea that the Army Medical Department should maintain 
control of some cases – soldiers who fell ill at cantonments, for example, or those who were 
being cared for at or near the front lines.  He was concerned mainly with the domestic care of the 
severely wounded and seriously ill. “The extension and development of existing civil hospitals 
and sanatoriums under government direction, in accordance with a Government program, and 
with the support of Government funds,” he argued, “may conceivably be a better way of 
providing the additional facilities required than the purchase of hospitals sites in localities remote 
from the centers of population, and the erection, upon such sites of costly ‘special military 
hospitals…’” The latter, Goldwater said, would have difficulty attracting “competent staffs” 
which could be retained after the war. Goldwater urged the government to undertake a 




The question of civilian versus military control was especially vexing when it came to the 
issue of vocational education, which pre-war planners included as a crucial aspect of an injured 
soldier’s “cure.”
45
 In England, Council of National Defense representatives pointed out, 
participation in vocational rehabilitation programs was optional, and enrollment was only about 
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 A report from the Conference on Reeducation and Rehabilitation of the Maimed 
and Crippled noted that “the establishment of reconstruction hospitals, or hospital schools, for 
the repair of cripples and disabled persons is essential,” and that such institutions should be 
“widely distributed,” “large rather than small,” and “under military control.” “It has been found 
that many disabled soldiers in European countries would not undertake reeducation, and 
apparently preferred to be permitted to remain helpless and, thus, a social liability,” the report 
noted. “Every man should be compelled to undertake to learn an occupation that will enable him 
to be self-supporting or partly self-supporting.” Jefferson R. Kean, Director of Military Relief for 
the American Red Cross concurred with the report’s findings. While treating soldiers abroad, he 
said, “it was impossible to accomplish anything with these men unless they were under military 
discipline and treated as soldiers until repair work has been completed. The problem is military 
and should be under military control.”
47
 In March 1918, Charles H. Mayo, Chairman of the CND 
Committee on Surgery and co-founder of Minnesota’s famed Mayo Clinic, expressed his staunch 
support of this policy. “The Surgeon General has full control of the men in the army until they 
are discharged,” he said. “This is exactly as it should be and it is fortunate for us. So, military 
medical and surgical service will reconstruct disabled men.”
48
 In other words, the United States 
should keep men soldiers until they could be discharged as workers, or at least as semi-
independent. 
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One problem with such a policy was that it required the acquiescence of soldiers 
themselves, including many who sought to be discharged as soon as possible regardless of their 
physical state. In May 1918, Frank Billings, who oversaw the army’s rehabilitation program, 
pointed out this looming dilemma: “Many will want to go out of the army,” he said. “They have 
been abroad for months in an unusual environment and want to get out – they are homesick. We 
must create a sentiment to educate that soldier. He must not return to his home until he can make 
a living for himself better than he did before – until he can enjoy life.”
49
 
Others rightfully predicted that the rehabilitation project would gradually expand, and 
gain import among various groups as time passed, but all fingers pointed to the Army Medical 
Department as the proper entity to oversee hospital care for ailing soldiers, regardless of the 
likelihood that they would return to duty. The rehabilitation process “would have to go on for 
years after the war, and (large general hospitals) would take the place of the old Soldiers’ Home 
as at present,” Army Surgeon General William Gorgas said at a CND meeting in October 1917, 
but the long-term vision of such institutions was somewhat hazy: 
“Some provisions will have to be made for these great hospitals after the war is 
over. That was discussed quite extensively in the recent insurance bill (the War 
Risk Insurance Act), which has been passed. We concluded to let that go and not 
decide the exact means of taking care of them until the time comes. If it was 
advisable for the War Department to continue control of these hospitals in the 
training process, we will do that. If some other machinery is thought advisable, 
we will use that method. But it seems to me if we get these institutions organized 
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The Army Surgeon General, like the head of the CND hospital committee, knew that post-war 
hospital care and rehabilitation programs for veterans would be necessary, but pushed the matter 
aside as he focused on more immediate concerns.  
Two months later, the topic came up at another CND meeting. “This is a subject that will 
attract the attention of every one on this side of the Atlantic as soon as the boy lands on the 
coast... It appeals to society, business men, to labor men, with whom they must compete, it 
appeals to vocational teachers, to general educational organizations, to great foundations that are 
seeking opportunity to spend money in the right direction,” said James Bordley of the Army 
Medical Department in December 1917. Still, he added, “it seems to me that this thing should be 
organized by the medical departments of the Army and Navy and coordinated with other 
activities in such a way that the reconstruction program may be carried out by the right people, in 




Army plans for medical care and “reconstruction” 
 Both the War Risk Insurance Act and the policies of the CND were based on the 
assumption that ex-soldiers should be discharged from the army only after they were medically 
rehabilitated. It followed that some of the most extensive plans for so-called reconstruction took 
place within the Army Surgeon General’s office, which, throughout 1917 and 1918, put forth 
proposals for a rehabilitation program that assigned military hospitals a central role in the 
provision of medical and therapeutic care. Based largely on the experiences of other belligerent 
nations, the army plans focused heavily (like the rhetoric of the WRIA) on the importance of 
industrial productivity and vocational training. They marked a drastic step away from the 
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traditional tenets of military medicine and hinted at a new idealization of the notion of 
institutionalized comprehensive care involving doctors and therapists of various specialties.  
Proposals for a sweeping army reconstruction plan faced many challenges. First, there 
were the fundamental logistical issues of expanding the available number of doctors and hospital 
beds. Then, there were conflicts about jurisdiction. As the army’s newly created Department of 
Physical Reconstruction attempted to concoct plans for the aftercare of soldiers, civilian 
educators argued that it was inappropriate for the military to maintain control over individuals 
who would likely never return to duty. Such complex issues precluded the Office of the Surgeon 
General from quickly handing down a clear and comprehensive policy on rehabilitation. Thus, 
for the greater part of the war, American troops were treated in base and general hospitals in the 
U.S. according to rules dictated in a variety of General Orders from the War Department or, in 
many cases, the individual judgments of Medical Reserve Corps doctors in a given region or 
institution.  
Between the summers of 1917 and 1918, as millions joined the ranks of the American 
Expeditionary Forces, and the consequences of war went from being theoretical to real, the army 
made hasty attempts to recruit doctors from the civilian world. In June 1916, the Army Medical 
Corps counted 443 active duty officers – doctors who were commissioned to work full-time with 
the military. There were also 146 officers on active duty in the Medical Reserve Corps.
52
 On the 
eve of war, Col. Edward L. Munson, a Yale-educated army medical officer who specialized in 
training needs and methods, estimated that an army of one million men would require a Medical 
Department with 8,000 officers and 100,000 enlisted personnel. In order to fulfill the mandate, 
the army turned to the American Medical Association, which shared a membership roster that 
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included approximately two-thirds of the nation's physicians, as well as background files on “‘a 
most complete list of quacks, irregular practitioners, cults…’” The AMA helped the army 
facilitate an extensive outreach campaign between May and September 1917. It consisted not 
only of solicitations in the Journal of the American Medical Association for doctors to serve, but 
also of the mailing of 69,000 letters to doctors across the country urging them to join the Medical 
Reserve Corps.
53
 By June 30, 1918, there were 867 active duty Medical Corps officers, and 
20,855 Medical Officers in the Reserve Corps. The latter number comprised about 14.5 percent 
of the United States’ approximately 146,300 physicians.
54
  
In spite of an initial shortage of medical officers, army officials resisted the repeated 
appeals of white women and African American physicians, who lobbied for commissions during 
the war. As Carol Byerly has shown, these officials argued that it was untenable for white, male 
line officers to be commanded by anyone but white, male doctors. But as more and more sick 
and injured soldiers were discharged throughout 1918 and 1919, Army Medical Department 
administrators encountered an increasing need for doctors to serve on examining boards 
responsible for assigning degrees of disability. They were thus forced not only to hire women 
contract surgeons and African American doctors, but also people born outside the United 
States.
55
 Although women were barred from serving as fully commissioned medical officers, 55 
served as “contract surgeons,” and more than 80 served overseas with volunteer organizations 
such as the Red Cross.
56
 Only a small percentage of African American physicians who wanted to 
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serve were offered commissions. Largely limited to serve in black units, the 1.5 percent of 
medical officers who were African American reported experiencing racial discrimination in a 
Medical Corps that prided itself on being “fit and well-educated… white and male.”
57
  
The entity that managed the medical care of soldiers – the Army Surgeon General’s 
Office – consisted of more than 20 divisions in the summer of 1917. Many were headed by 
temporary civilian recruits of the Medical Corps as opposed to career Army Medical Department 
officers, and each had a specific mandate. Titles of divisions indicate the main priorities of the 
Surgeon General’s Office during the war years, and demonstrate that the medical rehabilitation 
of soldiers was only one among many concerns: the Division of Finance and Supply, the 
Division of Food and Nutrition, the Hospital Division, the Museum and Library Division, the 
Division of Gas Defense, and the Board of Publications. The Office also contained various 
sections centered on medical specialties, including the Dental Division, and the Divisions of 
Neurology and Psychology, General Surgery, Orthopedic Surgery, and Internal Medicine. On the 
eve of war, in part because of the growing trend toward medical professional organization and 
specialization, the Office of the Surgeon General was highly compartmentalized.
58
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The Hospital Division of the Surgeon General’s Office, created in July 1917, was 
charged with, among other things, devising formulas and methods for increasing domestic bed 
capacity and obtaining buildings for post, camp, and general hospitals, as well as hospitals 
geared strictly at treating soldiers who had served overseas. Planning for hospitals for returning 
troops was, in many ways, the most complex task of the division. Using the experiences of its 
allies as a guide, the Hospital Division aimed to locate facilities close to soldiers’ homes and 
families, so it estimated the total need for beds within each of 16 regional districts that had been 
used to organize the military draft.
59
  
When the U.S. declared war in April 1917, the medical facilities of the army were 
decidedly limited. There were 9,530 hospital beds contained in 131 post hospitals, four general 
hospitals, and five base hospitals. The conditions in at least some of these facilities were sub-par.
 
Following the Civil War, Army Medical Department officials had deemed large field hospitals 
havens of filth and disease, and advocated for smaller 12-, 24- and 48-bed post hospitals. The 
latter were severely underfunded, often in ill repair and lacking in such basic sanitary measures 
as clean drinking water.
60 
The number and quality of domestic hospital beds would have to grow 
exponentially, and very quickly, as the U.S. became more mired in the war effort. Using the 
experiences of France and Britain as a guide, Army Medical Department officials calculated that 
enough military hospital beds should exist to cover 3.5 percent of all American Expeditionary 
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Forces troops.61 In 1917 and 1918, Congress appropriated more than $37.8 million and $200 
million respectively for the construction and repair of hospitals. That was a vast increase over the 
average annual expenditure of $400,000 in each of the ten years prior to the war.62  
Many army officials – like their counterparts on the Council of National Defense, and the 
architects of the WRIA – were determined not to place enlisted men in civilian institutions, 
which they felt could be technically and organizationally inferior to those of the military and 
lacking in disciplinary measures necessary to achieve so-called “curative results.” Also, those 
facilities were needed to care for civilians, and could hardly be adapted to military needs: they 
lacked the staff living quarters necessary in an army hospital, and were too small and 
geographically disbursed to be managed by the military efficiently. As one army report put it 
soon after the war, “after due consideration, it was decided that the use of civil hospitals for the 
care and treatment of troops was not feasible because of the uncertainty of the supply of beds, the 
impracticability of taking over entirely civil hospitals in sufficient number without creating a 
hardship on the civil population, and the difficulty in operating a military and civil organization 
in the same institution.”63  
To meet the increased need for facilities for injured and ill soldiers, the Surgeon 
General’s Hospital Division planned to utilize military post hospitals and temporarily leased 
privately-owned land and buildings, and in a few cases, aimed to build entirely new structures; 
each of these institutions would be under military control. Various War Department divisions 
had to approve funding and construction plans for each leased or newly purchased facility. 
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Although the “path from plan to the start of construction remained long and paved with red 
tape,” by August of 1918, the Hospital Division had successfully made available approximately 
95,000 beds at general, port, and base hospitals.
64
   
On November 7, 1917, the Office of the Army Surgeon General released an auspicious 
and all-encompassing “plan for physical reconstruction and vocational training,” meant to serve 
only as a “tentative outline,” as Surgeon General William Gorgas put it. Physical reconstruction, 
as Gorgas later defined it, was “the completest (sic) form of medical and surgical treatment 
carried to the point where maximum functional restoration, mental and physical, may be 
secured.” The ultimate goal was to return the patient to service or civilian life “with the full 
realization that he can work in his handicapped state, and with habits of industry much 
encouraged…”
65
 The proposed plan stipulated that sick and wounded men who had served 
abroad would be received at one Staten Island, New York hospital. There, medical officers 
would individually examine each patient and, if the case warranted further treatment, recommend 
transfer to a hospital in the patient’s home district. If the doctor believed the individual could not 
                                                
64
 The quote is from Gillett, The Army Medical Department, 1917-1941, 62-3. By October 1918, 170,000 beds were 
available. From then on, numbers steadily decreased, reaching just under 30,000 by September 1919. Most 
temporary military hospitals on leased properties had been abandoned by May 1919. At that point, larger military 
general hospitals scattered throughout the country were assigned to take on chronic patients who remained in the 
service. Charles Lynch, The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War, Volume 1: The 
Surgeon General's Office 338-39. For a detailed overview of the activities of the Hospital Division, see p. 327. 
65
 A.G. Crane, The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War; Volume 13, Part One: 
Physical Reconstruction and Vocational Education, ed. M.W. Ireland (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1927), 8. The Surgeon General’s plan was partially based on research findings regarding other countries’ 
rehabilitation programs. The army, like the Council of National Defense considered the impact of war on 
populations in France and England. For example, a representative of the Surgeon General’s Office, Joel E. 
Goldthwait, attended the Inter-Allied Conference for the study of professional re-education in May of 1917, where 
experts from various nations discussed topics including physical re-education and treatment, the placing and 
employment of disabled men in civilian life, and the economic and social interests of the disabled. For more 
information on the conference, see A. Griffith Boscawen, Report on the Inter-Allied Conference for the Study of 
Professional Re-Education, and Other Questions of Interest to Soldiers and Sailors Disabled by the War, 8th to 12th 
May 1917 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1917). Also, Douglas Crawford McMurtrie, A Bibliography of 
the War Cripple, Series 1, Number 1 (New York: Red Cross Institute for Crippled and Disabled Men, 1918). For 
more on Goldthwait’s involvement with the war effort, as well as his personal background as an advocate for 
industrial workers in need of rehabilitation, see Linker, War's Waste: Rehabilitation in World War I America, 52. 
 60 
benefit from further treatment, or was incapable of resuming his former occupation, a 
recommendation would be made for his discharge on a surgeon’s certificate of disability, which 
would have to be subsequently approved by a board of three people: one specialist from the 
soldier’s branch of service, an internist, and a vocational officer. If the medical officer believed 
the soldier had attained the maximum benefit from treatment, but would clearly be unable to 
resume his previous occupation, he was obliged to supply a report regarding which occupations 
might be feasible for the patient after training. That report would be reviewed by the vocational 
officer, who would make employment recommendations of his own, then suggest which general 
hospital the soldier should be transferred to before moving on to a non-hospital vocational 
rehabilitation program.
66
   
The plan divided the country into 16 districts, which would contain both general and 
reconstruction hospitals. The latter would be equipped with special physical and occupational 
therapy curative workshops. The connected “matter of training men in professional lines,” the 
report conceded, “is partially worked out but not completed.” Some military hospitals would 
contain commercial schools that would offer an array of classes, including English, mathematics, 
salesmanship, advertising, and bookkeeping, among others. In some cases, the government could 
pay for courses at existing schools while attendees remained under the oversight of army 
officers. By retaining men in service, the government would ensure that they were “comfortably 
cared for,” and that their training would be expeditiously completed. It would also be following 
the mandate of Section 302 of the War Risk Insurance Act, which stipulated that as injured 
soldiers followed rehabilitation courses “as the United States may provide or procure to be 
provided… a form of enlistment may be required which shall bring the injured person into the 
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military or naval service.” In the most general sense, Gorgas’ rehabilitation plan was aimed at 
“making [the wounded soldier], in so far as possible, an independent, wholly self-supporting, 
self-respecting workman who receives his wage because he earns it and is in no sense an object 
of charity.” In other words, “the returned soldier’s claim on an opportunity to earn a livelihood is 
not to be considered a concession to be granted, but rather a right to be recognized.”
67
 
The familiar issue of military control was broached in a subsequent Surgeon General’s report 
meant to clarify the reconstruction plan. It noted the same concern that CND Medical Board 
meeting attendees had discussed: in England, where vocational training was voluntary, (in other 
words, completed after soldiers had been discharged from the military), only 15 percent of 
patients were choosing to complete the courses. The report emphasized that soldiers under 
military control would be subject to “strict Army discipline.” The soldier simply had to “be made 
to understand that before he is discharged from the army he is to be functionally restored as far 
as possible and is to receive proper training that will enable him to overcome his handicap.” 
According to the report, medical and surgical work, as well as vocational training “rightfully” 
should be handled by the Surgeon General’s office. But various governmental and private groups 
were attempting to address the problem, which was “liable to disorganize our whole program.”  
While the advice of these organizations was valued, according to the Surgeon General, it should 
be given via an advisory board directly headed by the Secretary of War or the Council of 
National Defense. Such a hierarchy would help avoid the disorganization evident in England, 
France, and Canada, where reconstruction work was divided among various different agencies.
68
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Implicit in the Surgeon General’s proposed policy was the idea that certain injuries and 
illnesses were suited to treatment via rehabilitation work while others were not. Originally 
overseen by the orthopedic department, the reconstruction effort was to focus on soldiers who 
had sustained recognizable bodily injuries, not those who were diagnosed with less visible 
maladies, such as mental illnesses. In December 1917, the Secretary of War dictated that the 
latter group would be eligible for admittance to public institutions focusing specifically on those 
conditions, including St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, DC or public hospitals in or near 
their draft districts. In some cases, according to the plan of the Secretary of War, they would 
follow a distinct course of treatment that focused on cure through therapy and work.
69
 As more 




The Secretary of War and other parties viewed Gorgas’ plan as impractically broad and 
sweeping, but it at least served as a viable alternative for an army already facing major 
challenges related to the provision of medical care. By the winter of 1917-1918, influenza and 
pneumonia were threatening domestic camps and the first ill and wounded began arriving from 
overseas. Reconstruction work thus began in early 1918 at Fort McHenry in Baltimore, Fort 
McPherson in Georgia, and Walter Reed Army General Hospital in Washington DC. As late as 
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the summer of 1918, the Surgeon General requested that the Secretary of War lend legitimacy to 
the rules he was passing down to hospital personnel via his own office; he asked that a “general 
order be issued stating the policy of the War Department in regard to the physical reconstruction 
of soldiers and including rules for the transfer of such sick soldiers from different camps to 
special hospitals.”
71
 Around the same time, Gorgas also requested that the definition of physical 
reconstruction – “complete medical and surgical treatment, carried to the point where maximum 




One challenge precluding the passage of a comprehensive army reconstruction policy 
was intra-organizational politics. The Surgeon General’s Office, where civilian doctors helped 
formulate policy, conflicted openly with the Office of the Secretary of War during the early 
months of war. Doctors affiliated with the Surgeon General’s Office who wished to provide 
comprehensive health care for injured and ill troops, subscribed to the contemporary notion that 
the practice of medicine extended to therapy and cure, and could help create productive citizens. 
But their values did not jibe with the institutional norms of the military. Indeed, there was a 
cognitive dissonance between the strict tenets of military medicine, which placed the army’s 
mission above individual patients’ well-being, and the common rhetoric surrounding soldiers and 
veterans, which assumed that those who made bodily sacrifices during service should enjoy 
access to special rights and privileges.  
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In late 1917, great tension was developing between medical officers and their army 
colleagues.
 
A high-ranking army doctor recalled soon after the war that there was a lack of 
regard on the part of the Secretary of War for the necessities of running a successful 
rehabilitation program. “Memoranda requesting approval of needed hospital construction, 
equipment for physiotheraphy, for occupational therapy and for a qualified personnel,” he 
reported, “were disapproved wholly or in part or were returned for additional information from 
the General Staff.”
73
 As a case in point, during Congressional hearings about pneumonia 
outbreaks at training camps throughout the country during the winter of 1918, the two cohorts 
exchanged accusations. Surgeon General Gorgas argued that mass illness and unsatisfactory 
conditions at camps could be explained by the fact that his superior officers had been non-
responsive to Medical Department requests for more clothing, space, and medical staff. Secretary 
of War Newton D. Baker rejected such claims. Individual medical officers, he said, were to 
blame. He went so far as to court martial two doctors for the deaths of recruits from pneumonia, 
thus absolving himself and his line command of any responsibility. The exchange, according to 
historian Carol Byerly, signified strong tensions between the two departments that remained 
throughout the war.
74
 Secretary of War Baker’s eventual approval of Gorgas’ request that a 
reconstruction policy be formulated can be seen as a tacit acknowledgement that a more unified, 
structured system was necessary. Baker was also likely moved to act by the public interest (and 
publicity) surrounding the health and welfare of a newly assembled majority conscript army.  
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The 1918 hearings hinted at the fact that army officials were not only faced with the task 
of planning for the medical treatment of severely injured troops via a comprehensive, long-term 
rehabilitation policy, but that they also needed to address the more immediate concern of how to 
treat troops who were found to be ill before fulfilling many of the duties for which they were 
recruited. Under what conditions, the Secretary of War had to decide, could such soldiers be sent 
to the front? In March 1918, Baker ordered that “no officer or man who is physically unable to 
perform full military duty will be permitted to accompany his organization to France unless it is 
believed by the medical officers… that he will be able to perform full duty within two weeks 
from date of departure.” Others, the Secretary of War said, would be transferred to depot 
brigades, or U.S.-based organizations.
75
  In the months immediately following the war, 
congressional representatives were disturbed to find that some of these very same troops – those 
who were recruited by the army, but were unable to serve for an extended period, or in full 
capacity because of a supposed physical or mental inability – were nonetheless eligible for state-
sponsored military and veterans’ medical care.
76
 
Perhaps the most sweeping challenge to the uniform implementation of an army 
rehabilitation policy was the pervasive question of the extent to which the military and its 
medical personnel should oversee rehabilitation work. In other words, where did military 
responsibility end, and civilian responsibility begin? When did a wounded soldier become a 
rehabilitating veteran?  
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Early in the war effort, the Army Surgeon General’s office demonstrated its willingness 
to take an active role in all aspects of rehabilitation and after-care – beyond the expansion of 
hospitals and the provision of strictly medical therapies. In the summer of 1917, approximately 
four months after the U.S. declared war, Medical Department Lieutenant Colonel Theodore 
Lyster recommended that Army Surgeon General Gorgas appoint one person to spearhead efforts 
surrounding “reconstruction, reeducation, and aftercare of disabled soldiers.”
77
 Gorgas heeded 
Lyster’s call by establishing in August 1917 a Department of Physical Reconstruction (DPR) 
within the army.  
He chose as its head physician Frank Billings, who was deemed one of the “foremost 
medical men of the country” when he first accepted a commission in 1908, along with some of 
his more prominent colleagues, to the newly established Army Medical Reserve Corps.
78
 Billings 
received his medical degree from Northwestern University in 1881 and underwent subsequent 
training in Vienna, Paris, and London, then served as an attending physician at various Chicago 
hospitals between 1890 and 1920. Credited with helping to shape medical education standards, 
he served as Dean of Rush Medical College, and president of the American Medical Association, 
the Association of American Physicians, the National Association for the Study and Prevention 
of Tuberculosis and later, the Institute of Medicine.
79
 Billings and other prominent civilian 
doctors who worked with the Army Medical Corps during the war saw their work with the 
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military as both a patriotic duty, and highly relevant to the civilian medical world. Billings 
pointed out that tactics used in the treatment of soldiers could be applied to victims of industrial 
accidents. “One may not contemplate the physical and mental rehabilitation of disabled soldiers,” 
he wrote in 1919, “without a consideration of the past and present neglect of the disabled men in 
the great industrial armies of the world.” General rehabilitation principles, Billings argued, 
“should be the same as that applied in military organizations, but the program should be 
modified to meet civilian demands and conditions.”
80
  
Billings’ Division of Physical Reconstruction cooperated with the Surgeon General’s 
Hospital Division, as well as clinical divisions such as General Surgery and Neuropsychiatry, but 
had a general mission that was, at the outset, “not well defined” and occasionally controversial.
81
 
Surgeon General Gorgas instructed his new department head to “take immediate steps to 
coordinate all activities of both military and civilian interests relating to physical 
reconstruction.”
82
 In other words, the DPR was to ensure that disabled and ill soldiers received 
the therapies and vocational training necessary to become self-supporting civilians.  
It was a daunting assignment. Various parties had a stake in the nature of the DPR’s 
plans. Civilian educators hoped ex-soldiers would receive vocational training outside of military 
institutions, and that a wartime reconstruction plan would pave the way toward a federal mandate 
for the training of injured civilian industrial workers. But Billings was a standard-bearer for the 
other major group with an interest in the nature of the DPR’s plans: Army Medical Department 
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doctors, who in 1917 and 1918, provided treatment for the first American casualties of war. The 
great majority of those medical practitioners were civilians who had joined the army temporarily, 
and they felt strongly that efficiency would be increased and attrition rates decreased if soldiers 
remained in military hospitals – and under the supervision of medical, as opposed to educational 
professionals – for the duration of their rehabilitation.
83
 
Secretary of War Baker likely had some of these issues in mind when he suggested that 
the Surgeon General call a conference in January 1918 between representatives from his office as 
well as 13 other organizations, including the Council of National Defense, the American Red 
Cross, the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, the Department of Labor, the Public Health Service, 
and the Federal Board for Vocational Rehabilitation (FBVE). These were the primary players in 
rehabilitation and related efforts, and the intention of the conference was to ensure coordination 
and cooperation. Gorgas appointed a committee of 14 – one representative from each group – to 
draw up a program for soldiers’ rehabilitation, and named not a military official, but a 
representative from the United States Bureau of Education as its head. The Committee came to 
the conclusion that the Surgeon General – and by extension the DPR – should oversee medical 
and surgical work necessary for “functional and mental restoration” of service members. But 
once troops “had reached as complete a state of physical and mental rehabilitation as possible,” 
they should be discharged and placed “under the control” of another government agency that 
would oversee vocational education.
84
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As Beth Linker notes, civilian vocational educators debated – sometimes contentiously – 
with army doctors throughout the winter of 1917 and 1918 regarding how best to pursue the 
common goal of returning disabled and ill soldiers to productive citizenship. The educators 
argued that they should oversee all after-care, since vocational education promoted 
independence, while continued medical treatment and long-term hospitalization promoted the 
opposite. DPR head Frank Billings and other volunteer army doctors took issue with the 
portrayal of medicine as such a limited field, and with civilian educators’ depictions of them as 
“‘martinets’” blindly attempting to keep all rehabilitation efforts under the control of the 
military. The army was the only entity, they pointed out, actually providing care for disabled 
soldiers while other organizations merely passed judgment.85  
Eventually, the vocational educators’ arguments won the day. In April 1918, the army 
dictated that the Federal Board for Vocational Education – which had been created 
approximately a year earlier to provide aid to state vocational schools training conscripts – would 
oversee the vocational education aspect of rehabilitation.86 Legislative approval came in July 
1918, with the Smith-Sears Act, which appropriated $200 million for the rehabilitation of 
disabled veterans, and placed the FBVE in charge of oversight. 
Throughout the spring of 1918, as it became clear that the FBVE would gain control of 
vocational education efforts, some army officials questioned the Surgeon General’s proposed 
reconstruction policy, wondering where “medical reconstruction” (the province of the Army 
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Medical Department) ended, and “physical and mental rehabilitation” (which the FBVE was to 
oversee), began.
87
 According to the originally proposed reconstruction plan, noted Colonel E.D. 
Anderson, Chairman of the army’s Equipment Branch, it was unclear “where the Surgeon 
General intends to draw this line of distinction.” Anderson took issue with the Surgeon General’s 
stipulation that prior to discharge, “work, mental and manual” should be used to ensure that 
“maximum functional restoration, mental and physical has been secured.” Such an order, he 
argued, conflicted with the province of the FBVE.
88
   
Once the FBVE was officially placed in charge of vocational rehabilitation for veterans 
in July 1918 via the Smith-Sears Act, representatives of the Surgeon General’s Office also 
expressed worry that discharged soldiers would not, of their own volition, apply for aid or obtain 
the help they needed. “Disheartened men,” one official said, would not pursue such an 
opportunity.
89
 It was imperative, these army rehabilitation advocates argued, to at least begin 
practical rehabilitation work while soldiers were still enlisted.  
To these ends, Col. James E. Russell, Dean of the Teachers’ College of Columbia 
University, was appointed director of the Education Section of the Department of Physical 
Reconstruction. His efforts were guided by the belief that “mental depression and indisposition 
to respond to medical and surgical treatment on the part of the wounded men covered [by the 
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Smith-Sears Act] is particularly active owing to the seriousness of their injuries and the 
consequent lack of hope of being of future use to the community.” Russell suggested that “cheer-
up” work begin in army hospitals, in the form of “real education,” to help lay the groundwork for 
later work by the FBVE.
90
 In formal outlines of the work to be completed by the Education 
Section, submitted in the spring and summer of 1918, Russell defined “real education” in broad 
terms, encompassing everything from musical entertainment, handiwork, lectures, sports, 
elementary classes for those who were illiterate, and technical and academic classes in subjects 
such as drawing, applied science, and agricultural work. In large army general hospitals, plans of 
the education division guided occupational therapy and recreational programs, and constituted a 
major thrust of the army’s attempt to ready soldiers for civilian life.
91
   
Secretary of War Baker finally approved a comprehensive reconstruction plan from the 
Surgeon General on August 1, 1918 – 16 months after the United States declared war and 
approximately three months before the Armistice. It stated that there were three types of cases to 
be treated in military hospitals: those able to return to full military duty, those fit for limited 
service, and those eligible for discharge due to disability. Fifteen hospitals across the country 
were designated as reconstruction hospitals, where the Surgeon General’s recommended 
discharge policy would be in effect: that “no member of the military service disabled in line of 
duty, even though not expected to return to duty, will be discharged from service until he shall 
have attained complete recovery or as complete recovery as may be expected when the nature of 
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his disability is considered.” The policy further stipulated that, “modern medical treatment does 
not end with medical cure.” Although soldiers who would be able to return to duty constituted 
the highest priority in military hospitals, those who might serve in a limited capacity or be 
discharged due to disability, the plan said, should “have, while in the hospital, such physical 
training and general education as will best promote their physical reconstruction.”
92
 A few 
months prior to signing the rehabilitation plan, Baker had approved the Surgeon General’s 
request to organize 15 hospitals “to receive cases requiring special physical reconstruction 
treatment,” as well as the request that the Surgeon General’s office be authorized to prepare 
special regulations (subject to approval by the War Department) for physical reconstruction.
93
  
In spite of their shapers’ best intentions and attempts to be pro-active, the army’s policies 
were, in many ways, too slow in coming. The number of soldier-patients in army general 
hospitals had increased dramatically during the year the Secretary of War and Army Surgeon 
General debated about a reconstruction policy. For example, at Walter Reed Army General 
Hospital, approximately 4,300 patients were admitted in 1917; during 1918, the hospital 
admitted more than 14,435.
94
 Thousands of patients were thus treated before a comprehensive 
policy existed regarding their after-care.  
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Within three and a half months of the passage of the reconstruction plan, the Armistice 
brought about new questions. As one scholar writes, “the quick advent of peace before half the 
army could even reach Europe proved a mixed blessing for the some 334,000 men then in army 
hospitals and those who would later come down with tuberculosis or shell shock.”
95
 Although 
reconstruction hospitals in the U.S. did not see peak populations until March 1919, the Armistice 
came in November 1918.
96 
Thus, the mindset of the government and public shifted toward peace, 
even before many soldiers made their way back from abroad. And funding for army programs 
was increasingly harder fought as the war became, in the minds of many, an increasingly distant 
memory. Once the end of the war came, many approved reconstruction hospital projects were 
abandoned, and the army relied on expanded base and general hospitals.
97
 Timing, in some ways, 
helps to explain the confusion and redundancies experienced by soldiers, administrators, and 
medical professionals during much of the war.  
As government entities struggled to decipher areas of jurisdiction, an array of volunteer 
organizations played central roles at large army hospitals. Walter Reed Army General Hospital’s 
campus, for example, housed branches of agencies such as the American Red Cross, the Young 
Men’s Christian Association, the Jewish Welfare Board, and the Knights of Columbus. Hospitals 
offered rare opportunities for the organizations: “When men are sick and lonely they are most 
susceptible to kindness,” one YMCA training manual said. “The atmosphere of hurry and bustle 
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is absent and there is ample time to think.”
98
 In a complex partnership with the army and 
government, these organizations assisted greatly in rehabilitation efforts. They provided patient-
troops with options for disciplined leisure, arranging baseball games, movie viewings, dances, 
and other activities. As such, they played an integral role in the army’s attempts to foster a sense 
of socialization, normalcy, and contentment among wounded and ill service members. As one 
army report put it, the involvement of these “associated societies and corporations” demonstrated 




Perhaps no civilian organization was more integral to efforts surrounding soldiers’ 
rehabilitation than the American Red Cross. During World War I, its staff – paid and volunteer – 
pursued the organization’s founding mission “to act in matters of voluntary relief and in 
accordance with the military authorities as a medium of communication between the people of 
the United States and the armed forces of the United States.”
100
 The Red Cross spearheaded a 
wide array of aid efforts, from providing supplies, canteens, ambulance companies, and base 
hospitals, to operating information offices and supplying nurses at military hospitals both abroad 
and in the U.S. During the war, 8.1 million workers served in the organization, of whom 23,822 
were nurses.
101
 The American Red Cross was a primary vehicle through which civilians could 
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demonstrate support for those who served. On May 1, 1917, there were approximately 496,000 
members spread among 562 chapters. By February 28, 1919, thanks to wartime campaigns for 
support, membership had ballooned to approximately 20 million adults and 11 million children 
in 3,724 chapters. Wartime funding drives in June 1917 and May 1918 helped bring in a total 
collection of more than $169.5 million to devote to relief work. Almost a quarter of those funds 
(approximately $38 million) were devoted to providing services at hospitals in the U.S. There, 
the Red Cross supplied stationery, stamps, telegrams, entertainment, and in some cases, staff and 
convalescent centers. The organization also helped hospitalized soldiers and sailors who were 
“worried about their home affairs” establish communication with their families, in some cases 
providing loans so they could visit loved ones.102  
As the case of the Red Cross makes clear, medical professionals, the government and 
army were not the only entities attempting to devise policies for the care of the war-wounded. In 
fact, the attempt by volunteer organizations to provide comprehensive services likely served to 
raise expectations of health services among soldiers, their families, and the general public, and 
contributed to veterans’ demands for better after-care.  
 
Policy limitations and questions: Discharge and “line of duty” injuries 
 
Two complex questions pervaded debates about reconstruction policies before, during, 
and after the war, and would play an integral role in the shape of the military and veterans’ 
hospital systems for many years to come. First, when was it proper for the army to discharge a 
wounded or ill soldier? After all, individual soldiers and doctors had different expectations of 
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what constituted “complete recovery,” and varying beliefs regarding how to judge whether 
“further treatment” would lead to improvement. Second, what constituted a “line of duty” injury?  
Army officials continually re-evaluated the question of when the military ceased being 
responsible for wounded and ill soldiers, repeatedly amending policies regarding discharge even 
after the Armistice. In January 1918, Col. D.W. Ketcham of the Army General Staff drafted a 
memo to the Secretary of War requesting the re-consideration of December 1917 War 
Department regulations, which had stipulated that “when an enlisted man becomes unfitted for 
military service, a certificate of disability for discharge will be prepared by the soldier’s 
immediate commanding officer and forwarded.”  Ketcham suggested that the policy be 
broadened. Echoing a recommendation of the Surgeon General, he argued that no soldier should 
be discharged “until he has attained complete recovery or as complete recovery as it is to be 
expected that he will attain when the nature of his disability is considered.” Ketcham justified the 
policy based on the fact that “it would be most unfair” to release from service “physically unfit 
soldiers.” Reminiscent of the sentiments of the drafters of the War Risk Insurance Act, Ketcham 
noted that volunteer and drafted soldiers deserved assurance “in case they are incapacitated 
through injury or disease, that they will be clothed, housed, fed, and given medical treatment 
until as complete a cure as it is possible to attain has been effected.” Retaining such soldiers in 
the army also alleviated the possibility that they would become “an unnecessary and unjust 
burden” on their relatives and communities.
103
  
In February of 1918, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker approved the Surgeon General’s 
recommended discharge policy, amending Paragraph 159 of Army Regulations to read: “When 
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an enlisted man becomes unfitted for military service, full or partial duty, because of wounds or 
disease contracted in line of duty, he will not be discharged until he has attained as complete 
recovery as is to be expected when the nature of his disability is considered.” A certificate of 
disability and discharge would be prepared, the new regulation said, only “when it is believed 
that further treatment will not improve his condition.”
104
   
Army officials pondered a litany of new discharge regulations in the winter of 1918-
1919, as a massive influx of sick and wounded troops flooded into domestic army hospitals, and 
as doctors and patients expressed an increasing eagerness to be released from service. In order to 
avoid the possibility that previous orders “unduly retard the discharge from the service of men 
clearly unfit for military service,” Henry Jervey, Assistant Chief of Staff in the Office of the 
Secretary of War, offered various clarifications to War Department policies. Cases that would 
not benefit from “further sojourn” in hospitals, convalescent centers or development battalions, 
Jervey noted, “should be promptly discharged.” Utilizing an iteration of the relatively vague 
terminology contained in the army reconstruction plan, Jervey added that only the surgeon 
overseeing a particular case could “judge whether or not maximum restoration has been 
secured.” Soldiers who had “funds or who have relatives or friends in position to afford them 
specialized care” could be discharged once a commanding officer determined that “care is 
assured.”
105
 The new rules further provided that all soldiers who had “acquired a lower physical 
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standard than that given them when they entered the service,” should be discharged once it was 
determined that “maximum improvement has been obtained or that physical disabilities have not 
been exaggerated or accentuated as a result of service in line of duty.” Those whose maladies 
were aggravated by service were to be sent to convalescent centers, “providing further benefit 
can be expected by additional treatment, training and hardening processes.”
106
  
The constantly changing discharge rules begged another question: how could army 
doctors assess whether an illness or injury was incurred in the line of duty? Would soldiers be 
treated by the Army Medical Department in military hospitals for illnesses that arose, but likely 
did not originate, during their time in service, or would they be immediately discharged?  
Tuberculosis among new recruits was an especially vexing problem that, between the fall 
of 1917 and the spring of 1918, prompted a re-thinking of army rationale regarding the definition 
of the term “line-of-duty.” In September 1917, Surgeon General Gorgas issued a circular 
stipulating that chronic tuberculosis would be considered to have existed prior to service if the ill 
soldier had been enlisted for less than three months, unless “exposure in line of duty” led to the 
condition.
107
 Eight months later, in April 1918, the Surgeon General’s office recommended that 
its own policy be overturned since it had led to “considerable injustice.” There was a “lack of 
uniformity” in how doctors judged whether or not cases of TB could be connected to service. For 
this reason, the Surgeon General suggested a new blanket policy that “any soldier who shall have 
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been accepted on his first physical examination (after arrival at a military station) as fit for 
service, shall be considered to have contracted any subsequently determined physical disability 
in the line of duty.” The Secretary of War approved the Surgeon General’s request, and 
established that soldiers could be treated in military hospitals for tuberculosis, and by extension, 
other illnesses, even if they existed prior to service.
108
 There was some room for judgment on the 
part of individual doctors: if it could be shown that the illness was “the result of (a soldier’s) own 
carelessness, misconduct, or vicious habits,” or that “the history of the case shows unmistakably 
that the disability existed prior to entrance into the service,” physicians could list the disease as 
having occurred not in the line of duty. The relatively lenient policy made perfect sense, given 
the fact that, before and during the war, the army was attempting to retain as many people as 
possible.  
But in the near future, questions would arise regarding the extent of the government’s 
responsibility for treatment of veterans who disputed medical boards’ judgments that their 
maladies did not originate in the line of duty. In March 1919, then Army Surgeon General 
Merritte W. Ireland noted that although Section 302 of the War Risk Insurance Act stipulated 
that the Bureau of War Risk Insurance must provide medical and hospital care “for former 
soldiers suffering from disabilities incurred in the line of duty,” it was “not empowered by that or 
any other law known to this office to provide medical and hospital care for former soldiers 
suffering from disabilities which did not originate in the line of duty [emphasis in the original].” 
He explained:  
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The view may possibly be entertained by some that the government owes no 
obligation to men suffering such disabilities, and that is probably true so far as the 
disabilities themselves are concerned, but it does to my mind owe the obligation 
of benevolence at least to the men who were exposed to the hazards of the 
military service, thus depriving them for the time being of their private control 
over their own lives and denying them the opportunities perhaps of accumulating 
competency. I think this is especially true in the case of defects which may be 
wholly or measurably remedied by surgical operations… the cure of these defects 
would be not merely a private benefit or advantage to the men but would also be a 
service of measurable value to the community. 
 
Ireland concluded that, “because of the service which such men rendered, it would be a matter of 
well deserved grace for the government to make provision for the medical and hospital care not 
by way of indemnity for damage suffered by them in the public cause but by way of gratitude for 
the services rendered.” Congress, he said, should authorize the admission of such patients to 
army hospitals for treatment within 90 days of their discharge.
109
  
Brigadier General Lytle Brown, Director of the army’s War Plans Division, took issue 
with the leniency of the Surgeon General’s suggested policy, and helped convince the Secretary 
of War to reject it. Brown noted, “a soldier has ample opportunity before his discharge in the 
great majority of cases for obtaining medical treatment… if he does not desire to take advantage 
of the opportunities afforded him, it is his own fault and not any fault of the War Department.”
110
 
Chief of Staff Peyton C. March, concurred, adding that Ireland’s policy inadvertently favored 
those discharged in the later stages of mobilization because of its stipulation that a soldier must 
seek treatment within 90 days of his discharge. More importantly, it allowed for extended 
treatment for “soldiers whose disabilities… may, in fact, have been the result of their own willful 
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misconduct.” Finally, March declared: “such soldiers are sufficiently provided for under the 




Debates surrounding definitions of “line of duty” and the proper limitations of the 
purview of the Army Medical Department hinted at the variety of policy and administrative 
challenges that emerged as disabled and ill soldiers of the First World War were treated by the 
Army Medical Department, and subsequently became a societal responsibility. As the 
government struggled to fulfill its pre-war promise of providing medical care for former troops, 
attempts to arrive upon mutually agreeable policies, and coordinate the services of multiple 
federal agencies brought about conflicts regarding jurisdiction and led to shortfalls in care. 
 
Conclusion   
 
The War Risk Insurance Act, Council of National Defense, and army plans for 
reconstruction reflect important characteristics of their time. The War Risk Insurance Act 
encapsulated Progressive Era ideals regarding the balance between efficiency, individual and 
familial responsibility, and governmental obligations to citizens. The existence and discussions 
of the CND Medical Board demonstrated the strengthening of the notion that the U.S. state was 
composed of a delicate balance between public and private interests. The army’s reconstruction 
plans made it clear that the United States military was no longer a locally based fighting force, 
but instead, a culturally shaped institution with an expanding social and professional agenda.  
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When the three are examined in concert, it becomes clear that the government perceived 
a need for long-term medical care for veterans, but failed to formulate feasible plans for its 
institutionalization. A variety of factors – the determination to create a self-sufficient veteran 
class prime among them – led the framers of the War Risk Insurance Act and others to the 
conclusion that the army should be in charge of rehabilitation efforts. There was thus a lack of 
planning for future medical needs of veterans in the civilian sector. At the same time, there were 
delays in the passage of a wide-ranging army rehabilitation plan and a related lack of clarity 
regarding discharge rules and which government agency would control after-care. While the 
army was the entity most proactively and comprehensively planning for the treatment of service 
members, it was also the one least able to sustain it, seeing as chronically ill and severely injured 
troops – and many of the doctors who had signed on to treat them – would not remain enlisted. 
Even as army officials accepted the responsibility of caring for soldiers until they were 
“maximally cured,” what that term meant, and what would happen to military personnel after 
discharge, was largely unknown. The short sightedness of these pre-war policies created a space 
for the mass expansion of services in the post-war years. 
Before being discharged from the army into a somewhat confusing organizational 
catacomb, thousands of ill and injured soldiers adapted to their health circumstances in domestic 
military institutions such as Walter Reed Army General Hospital in Washington, DC. The 
relative brevity of U.S. involvement in the war meant that the army rehabilitation program was 
nascent even as the country demobilized. Nonetheless, throughout early 1918, the Army Medical 
Department eagerly built reconstruction programs at various U.S. hospitals. Those facilities had 
multi-faceted and complicated missions that extended well beyond medical treatment.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
“Take your place and carry on”: 
Occupational therapy and rehabilitation  




When Lena Hitchcock was assigned to Walter Reed General Hospital in early 1918 as 
one of the United States Army’s first occupational therapists, she was determined to “prove (her) 
courage and achieve heroic deeds.”  Hitchcock found herself snubbed, however, by patients, 
army doctors, and nurses alike. Doctors were “furious that we had been foisted upon them,” she 
later reported. Ill and wounded soldiers recently home from France “were bitter and 
disgruntled… they continually, but unsuccessfully, tried to bait me into unbecoming retorts.” 
Furthermore, Hitchcock noted, “The nurse in charge was as unfriendly and suspicious of me as 




At Walter Reed, Lena Hitchcock served at the army’s flagship occupational therapy (OT) 
program for soldiers and veterans of the Great War. The Walter Reed program offered patients 
the opportunity to participate in activities such as knitting, woodwork, bookkeeping and 
typewriting. The primary purpose of OT programs for soldiers, from the perspective of army 
administrators, was to prime bodies and minds for economic self-reliance and productivity. Both 
soldiers and therapists attempted to extend the personal benefits of structurally and ideologically 
limited military OT programs like the one at Walter Reed: soldiers, by attempting to expand and 
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capitalize on the government’s promise of educational opportunity; and therapists, by laying the 
groundwork for economic and professional advancement. Occupational therapy at military 
hospitals encapsulated a new type of military health care and demonstrated the extent to which 
soldiers were rehabilitated and prepared for civilian life under the auspices of the army.  
 The story of occupational therapy during the Great War helps illustrate the impact of pre-
war policies geared at making domestic military hospitals the primary venue of treatment for 
injured and ill soldiers.
3
 The tenets and machinations of the OT program of the Educational 
Section of the Army’s Department of Physical Reconstruction make it clear that the government 
held, and unabashedly shared with soldiers gendered, market-focused goals for rehabilitation 
programs. An examination of the program’s implementation at Walter Reed demonstrates that 
soldiers resisted therapeutic measures rooted in Progressive Era ideals of social control, which 
they deemed demeaning and feminizing. It also reveals that many of those who helped to 
structure army health care had respect for soldiers, but also distinct conceptions of what qualified 
them as heroic or “weak.” Justifications for models of and access to care were based on such 
conceptions. Finally, a study of occupational therapy at Walter Reed highlights the stories of 
women like Lena Hitchcock. Even as she and her colleagues served as facilitators of a program 
based on gendered and racialized constructs that linked manliness with industrial usefulness, and 
female service to “tact,” “charm,” and an “attractive personality,” they partook in an American 
tradition of pushing the boundaries of military infrastructure in order to enhance their own 
professional status and citizenship rights. 
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 During World War I, the physical repair of United States troops was only one among 
many organizing principles of a burgeoning modern military health care system that meant 
different things to different groups. From the government’s perspective, an efficient military 
medical system could bolster an image of military and scientific prowess and alleviate the 
possibility of a soldier becoming a life-long pensioner. For doctors and other health care 
personnel, military medical practice could provide a forum for professional and scientific 
development and advancement. White women (as nurses and therapists) and people of color (as 
nurses, doctors and enlistees) also attempted to use the army and its medical care institutions to 
advance their own claims on citizenship and professional rights. Other service members, given 
their varying wartime experiences and array of injuries and illnesses, had multi-dimensional 
understandings of the purpose of military medicine, and thus reacted differently to governmental, 
army, and professional efforts: some patients, for example, actively attempted to use hospitals as 
forums for education and rehabilitation; others resented and rejected such notions. Ill and 
wounded American soldiers were not a monolithic group; they were distinguished by race, class, 
and type of ailment. These personal attributes could heavily influence one’s hospital experience. 
 
Army medicine before World War I and the roots of Walter Reed Army General Hospital 
The army’s occupational therapy program was part of an organizational culture in 
transition. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Army Medical Department operated within a 
military that was focused – via wars with Indian tribes across the United States and engagements 
in Latin America and the Philippines – on the larger mission of American expansion and 
imperialism. After health debacles during the Spanish-American War, army doctors argued 
successfully that more resources needed to be devoted to preventive medicine and the staving off 
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of epidemic diseases. Their efforts were helped by the fact that typhoid, yellow fever, and 
malaria were increasingly seen as barriers to trade. In the first decade of the twentieth century, 
army doctors not only undertook disease research in countries boasting rich resources in order to 
make them safe for U.S. troops and business, they also fought for professional respect and 
control within the army. Their advocacy efforts reflected larger trends occurring in the civilian 
medical world, and a push towards a more modern army, one that was increasingly 
institutionalized and professionalized. Walter Reed Hospital, which began treating patients in 
1909, was a symbol of the changing infrastructure of both the U.S. Army, and the role and 
perception of its medical services. 
As European countries enhanced their military infrastructures in the 1870s, the United 
States embarked on a process of demilitarization following the bloodiest conflict in the young 
nation’s history. In the wake of the Civil War in the 1860s, Army Medical Department officials 
advocated for increased staff and enhanced institutions. But their high hopes did not fit an 




The situation began to change in the 1880s and early 1890s, when army higher-ups urged 
an expansion of American military power, both as a means of quelling widespread domestic 
labor conflicts, and as protection for the United States’ burgeoning worldwide trade and 
economic interests.
5
 Between 1890 and 1920, Samuel P. Huntington has argued, the U.S. 
                                                
4
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government and military officials had a “positive reaction to the end of isolation and a favorable 
response to the opportunity to play power politics.” During what Huntington refers to as the 
“Neo-Hamiltonian” period, policy-makers and army elites re-imagined American military ideals 
and structure.
6
 Not all policy-makers, of course, were in the same camp – some were staunchly 
opposed to the expansion of a standing army they saw as a threat to republican values.
7
 In spite 
of objections from the latter group, the share of the federal budget spent on the military grew 
from 20 to 40 percent between 1880 and 1905. Although the greatest share of those funds went 
to the exponentially growing navy (whose budget increased nearly eightfold in these years), the 
army fared relatively well for itself; its budget tripled.
8
  
The mission and purview of the Army Medical Department expanded along with the 
larger military infrastructure, in part by virtue of the effects of the 1898 Spanish-American War. 
During that conflict, deaths due to disease far outnumbered deaths due to battle, and military 
hospital care was widely viewed as inadequate. In the aftermath of war, Congress and the general 
public were appalled that the U.S. had lost so many service members to diseases such as typhoid 
and yellow fever. And they were disturbed to learn of overcrowded army camps, where proper 
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The Spanish-American War also furthered the army’s pursuit of a larger public health 
mission. With U.S. troops occupying so-called tropical regions in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines, Army Medical officers played an important role in the establishment of American 
hegemony.
10
 Edward Erskine Hume, a member of the Army Medical Department from 1917 
through 1952, argued that international medical research and regimented public health 
campaigns could be represented as both humanitarian in nature, and as an encapsulation of 
American scientific prowess. Hume argued that the “word ‘health’ is a talisman which can 
successfully unlock many a domestic as well as foreign door.” Even “when civil authorities do 
not cooperate in a satisfactory manner with the military,” he said, “it is hard to imagine a 
situation in which there is friction between the military and civil officers of health.” Hume 
suggested that “many a wise military commander has, by means of the friendly relations between 
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the medical officers of such commands and their civilian colleagues, brought about a complete 
understanding and team work with civil authorities.”
11
  
While generally prioritizing the health of U.S. troops as opposed to local citizens, army 
doctors undertook fruitful campaigns around the turn of the century aimed at the eradication of 
some of the major epidemic threats of the time: yellow fever, hookworm, and typhoid, among 
others.
12
 Their efforts were fostered by the United States’ burgeoning economic interest in its 
neighbors to the south. The latter helped bring about the 1890 founding of the Pan American 
Union, intended to serve as a forum for the discussion of trade regulations in the region, and the 
related 1902 establishment of the Pan American Health Organization, which aimed to devise 
standardized measures to stave off the spread of disease.
13
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 After the Spanish-American War, between 1902 and 1916, the army’s mission and 
physical presence expanded as the reforms of Elihu Root, who was Secretary of War from 1899 
through 1904, “laid the foundations for a modern army.”
15
 In those years, as the army attempted 
to create a streamlined organizational structure and a sense of professionalism, it spent just two 
percent of its funding on the purchase of arms.
16
 Root’s reforms ensured that the “other” 98 
percent would be spent on institutionalizing the military beyond tanks and guns. They not only 
provided more centralized control at the highest level of army administration and laid the 
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groundwork for the modern-day National Guard, but also led to the 1903 creation of the Army 
War College and the enhancement of several military branches.
17
   
In the years surrounding Root’s tenure as Secretary of War, military medicine followed 
trends evident in the civilian medical world, which was becoming increasingly professionalized, 
and centered on ever-stricter standards for education. Beginning in 1847, with the formation of 
the American Medical Association, physicians banded together to forward standard models of 
certification.
18
 Abraham Flexner’s 1910 report on medical education, which argued for the 
necessity of universal degree requirements for physicians, articulated some of the primary 
concerns of a newly powerful interest group.
19
 Scholars have pointed out three major outcomes 
of Flexner’s report: it led to the shutting down of “mediocre” medical schools with 
predominantly African American and female student populations, thus making mainstream 
medical education and practice accessible mainly to a select few; it successfully argued that 
analytic reasoning should serve as the basis for
 
medical education; and finally, it established that 
clinical practice would constitute a critical phase of medical training. The latter had the larger 
effect of accelerating a trend that was already underway – the affiliation of medical schools with 
hospitals.
20
 The health care infrastructure of the U.S. Army was embedded in this larger medical 
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culture. Army doctors fought vigorously at the turn of the twentieth century for respect and 
professional legitimacy. Their campaigns for better pay, increased staff, and higher professional 
and institutional standards helped bring about the 1886 creation of a Hospital Corps, the 1893 
establishment of the Army Medical School, the 1908 recognition of the Medical Corps, and the 
1911 founding of the Dental Corps.
21
  
 Around this time, army doctors began advocating for a new army general hospital near 
the nation’s capital, a facility they argued could serve as a beacon in a military hospital system 
dominated by small, far-flung, often ramshackle post hospitals.
22 
One of the main differences 
between a general hospital and a post hospital was that the former could serve as a haven for 
treatment for a variety of types of complex cases, and was under the command of the Army 
Surgeon General, whereas the latter was under the control of the post commander. By 1900 some 
general hospitals founded in the years surrounding the Spanish-American War had been closed, 
but four continued to serve patients. There were two facilities that served as magnet institutions 
of sorts, treating all types of patients: the General Hospital at San Francisco (re-named Letterman 
General Hospital in 1911) and the Army General Hospital at Washington Barracks in 
Washington, D.C., the predecessor to Walter Reed, which advocates argued was in dire need of 
modernization.
23
 Additionally, two specialty-care general hospitals treated soldiers during and 
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after the war. The oldest of all the permanent general hospitals, founded in 1887 at Hot Springs, 
Arkansas, served patients with conditions such as syphilis, rheumatism, neuralgia and skin 
diseases, which might benefit from treatment with hot mineral waters – the Arkansas hospital’s 
main attraction.
24
 The other specialized-care army general hospital, which focused largely on the 
treatment of tuberculosis, was opened in 1899 in Fort Bayard, New Mexico. 
 
 
Army doctors perceived a new Washington, D.C.-based general hospital as an opportune 
locus of control. They argued that the problems surrounding the administration of medical care 
during the Spanish-American War stemmed from the fact that army physicians lacked 
authority.
25
 In his account of field medicine in the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American 
War, Graham A. Cosmas bolsters this idea: “Surgeons in camp and field had no power to enforce 
their recommendations for sanitation, and commanders often brushed aside their warnings and 
suggestions and even belittled the medics as fussy old women who tried to coddle the soldiers.”
26
 
If a state-of-the-art general hospital existed near Washington, D.C., many Army Medical 
Department officials felt, they would have control over a permanent, reliable institution, and be 
more able to provide high-quality care.  
 Advocates of a new general hospital also noted other potential benefits of such an 
institution. It could be an educational asset, they said, used in the instruction of personnel of the 
Hospital Corps, who served as ward masters, nurses, cooks, and orderlies, as well as in the 
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curriculum for students of the Washington, D.C.-based Army Medical School.
27
 Two other 
central functions of the proposed general hospital would be to treat so-called “special cases,” and 
to review cases of officers seeking discharge due to disability. Special cases were defined 
according to the interests of both the soldier and the government. “Cases of illness and injury are 
constantly arising in the military service which require special skill and special appliances for 
their treatment in order to save the men to the service, to reduce the pension list, and to give men 
disabled in the service of their country the benefit of the most advanced medical and surgical 
knowledge,” said the 1902 Surgeon General’s report. As was the case in the civilian medical 
world, the report continued, it was impossible to outfit every hospital with the proper equipment 
and medical personnel to treat every patient. In civilian life, patients from the country and small 
towns and cities were regularly sent to medical centers with “specially trained medical men in 
attendance.”
28
 A similar model should exist in the military; complicated medical cases of officers 
and enlisted men should be overseen within the army infrastructure, not outsourced to large 
civilian hospitals (as had been the case during the Spanish-American War). “The military 
service,” according to the Surgeon General, should “hold control of its own cases.”
29
  
 The Surgeon General’s justifications for sending soldiers seeking discharge due to 
disability to a new general hospital was pragmatic: “(Officers’) real physical condition when 
claim of permanent disability is made is often a matter of conjecture. It is important that if 
disability is not permanent that this fact be ascertained and the officer saved to the government.” 
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The Surgeon General’s report acknowledged that transport to a Washington, D.C. general 
hospital from posts scattered throughout the country for assessment would mean an “increased 
expenditure for mileage.” But, soldiers and officers would never come from further west than the 
Rocky Mountains; personnel who sought medical attention from that region would be sent to the 
general hospital at San Francisco. In any case, the Surgeon General noted, the cost of transport 
was “insignificant when compared with the saving of a trained officer or man to the service who 
would otherwise either die or have to be supported for the rest of his life on the retired list or as a 
pensioner.”
30
   
   
 
       “Company of Instruction Training at Washington Barracks”
31
 
 Funding for what became Walter Reed Army General Hospital was included in a 1905 
civil appropriations bill under a section entitled “Miscellaneous Objects, War Department.” 
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$100,000 was allotted for the purchase of the site, and $200,000 more for hospital construction.32 
When the Georgian-style main building of Walter Reed was erected in 1908 containing 80 beds, 
it was praised by The Washington Post as being “modern in every detail” and “of stately 
Colonial style.”33  
 In its early years, Walter Reed operated as the post hospital for Washington Barracks and 
a general hospital for the United States east of the Mississippi. Between 1911 and 1916, the 
number of patients admitted at the hospital increased from 565 per year to 1,350. Venereal 
disease was a common ailment among patients, as was tonsillitis and appendicitis, but reasons 
for admission and surgeries performed were highly varied. Throughout the period, the 
Washington, D.C.-based Army Medical School maintained an active relationship with Walter 
Reed, performing thousands of Wasserman tests each year in order to ascertain whether patients 
had syphilis, in addition to blood cultures and “laboratory examinations of pathologic 
specimens.” Walter Reed’s Commanders in the 1910s also worked hard to ensure that the 
hospital would grow – aesthetically – “into a general hospital that shall be a credit to the army.” 
They reported that enlisted men helped plant hundreds of trees, bushes, and flowers, and 
undertook infrastructural improvements such as road repair and installing new outdoor light 
fixtures. In 1916, the hospital was still somewhat of a small operation: it had a 180-bed capacity 
and an average of nine medical officers on duty, along with 26 nurses.34 
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Exterior view of Walter Reed Army General Hospital, 1917. As the army  
planned a comprehensive rehabilitation program in the World War I era, facilities and 




With the onset of World War I, both Walter Reed and the Army Medical Department 
underwent major transitions. The hospital went from being a young facility providing treatment 
for a relatively small (albeit growing) number of service members to serving as a destination 
institution for some of the most complex medical cases in a large and hastily assembled army. 
On a broader level, the Great War marked a major turning point for the Army Medical 
Department. It saw, as historian Bobby Wintermute argues, a new turn toward the heroic 
possibilities of combat medicine.
36
 As an extension of this new turn – and as a result of the very 
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 The services administered and numbers treated at Walter Reed Army General Hospital 
greatly expanded during the war. In June 1917, construction of temporary buildings began, 
including additional nurses’ quarters, barracks, a mess hall, a store house, and a guard house, 
among other structures. That year, approximately 4,300 patients were admitted to the hospital 
and an average of 23 medical officers were on duty, along with 44 nurses.
38
 In 1918, admissions 
swelled to a wartime peak of 14,435 patients. By that point, there were an average of 86 officers 
and 148 army nurses on duty, in addition to about 34 reconstruction aides and numerous other 
civilian personnel.
39 
In 1918, Walter Reed had many characteristics of a major medical center. It 
offered specialized services in orthopedics, neurosurgery, amputations, dermatology, urology, 
and eye, ear, nose, and throat, among others. It was also home to the new Army School of 
Nursing, a laboratory with bacteriological, chemical, and pathological sections, and 
physiotherapy, occupational therapy, and vocational education departments.
40
   
  
The wounded 
Sick and wounded World War I-era military personnel – the people most likely to fill 
military, and later, veterans’ hospital beds – could be classified in at least three broad categories. 
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Hundreds of thousands of troops (one estimate puts the number at slightly more than 200,000) 
were inducted into the military by local draft boards, but upon arrival at their respective army 
camps, deemed physically or mentally unacceptable for service.
41
 One official explained the 
numbers by noting ‘the hasty and superficial examinations given by inexperienced and 
indifferent medical examiners for enlistment, immediately following the declaration of war...”
42
 
It did not help that standards for acceptance into the army changed over time, and local draft 
boards were “overworked and undermanned in the face of a large flow of recruits.”
43
 A sampling 
of approximately 52,600 of these accepted but later rejected men showed that almost 9,000 were 
denied entry into the army due to “diseases of bones and organs of locomotion.” Eye, digestive, 
and circulatory system diseases each accounted for between 7,000 and 8,000 rejections. Another 
4,700 accepted by local draft boards were found to have tuberculosis upon arrival at army camps; 
3,500 were diagnosed with “mental diseases.” Slightly more than 2,000 were rejected on the 
grounds that they had venereal diseases.
44
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There was uncertainty and disagreement about whether this group was entitled to the 
compensation and medical care guaranteed by the War Risk Insurance Act (WRIA). The Army 
Judge Advocate General ruled that, “a man who has been accepted by a draft board and 
dispatched to a camp had been drafted into active service.” But the Bureau of War Risk 
Insurance, the government agency responsible for allocating the compensation and medical care 
under the WRIA, held that “the man did not actually enter active service until he was accepted 
by the medical officers of the army.”
45
 Public Law 104, passed December 24, 1919, settled the 
matter. Much to the chagrin of some members of Congress and medical professionals, it 
stipulated that these many thousands of troops were eligible for compensation and medical care, 
in spite of never having rendered service in any official capacity. They were, the law held, 
officially hired by the U.S. government once they were accepted by their local draft boards, and 
therefore deserving of subsequent disability benefits.
46
  
The second group eligible for care as soldiers and later, as discharged veterans, included 
those who never saw service abroad, but who fell ill while stationed at camps or bases in the U.S. 
In October 1918, when the army was at its peak strength, there were approximately 1.9 million 
troops serving in Europe, 1.6 million in the United States, and 300,000 in other countries.
47
 
Approximately 75 percent of discharges for diseases such as tuberculosis, venereal diseases, and 
“mental deficiency” were among soldiers who never left the U.S.
48
 After the war, advocates of 
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military medical care boasted that those statistics demonstrated “evidence of the efficiency of 
preventive medicine” at the front. In retrospect, one analyst argued that a large number of 
soldiers eventually discharged due to disease were ill upon enlistment, seeing as a “great 
majority” never saw overseas service.
49
  That assertion was difficult to prove, given that military 
camps were breeding grounds for influenza, tuberculosis, and other diseases. As we will see, 
army rehabilitation officials felt as though this group of patients was decidedly less deserving of 
treatment than those who had returned from the front. As the war effort waned and funds dried 
up, many others would argue that the lack of glowing service records among some of those who 
sought medical care justified a lessened government responsibility to veterans.  
The third group of military personnel treated for injuries and illnesses were those who 
served abroad. Approximately 224,000 soldiers were wounded in action during World War I, in 
addition to almost 10,000 Marines. More than 65 percent of injuries resulted from gunshot 
wounds, and about 32 percent from poisonous gases. Some of the battle-wounded were treated in 
military hospitals abroad and either discharged, or sent back to the front lines. But between April 
1918 and December 1919, approximately 52,000 of the more than 147,000 service members 




The wounded from overseas were generally gathered from their locations near the front 
in base hospitals in France then brought by hospital train to embarkation hospitals at one of two 
French ports. The soldiers were then transported – by a naval hospital ship or army vessel – to a 
U.S. port at either Hoboken, New Jersey or Newport News, Virginia. There, they were housed at 
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debarkation hospitals while medical officers determined which domestic base or general hospital 
was best suited to care for them, and sought approval for their placement from the Surgeon 
General’s Hospital Division. Although an effort was made to locate soldiers close to their own 
homes, their medical conditions were the most important factors when it came to determining 
where they would be treated.
51
 
“Equipped for the care and treatment of all varieties of injury and disease,” general 
hospitals were different from camp, base, or embarkation hospitals, in that they focused on the 
treatment of soldiers with complex medical conditions, especially those who had served abroad. 
The number of general hospitals varied throughout the war effort, but more than 50 existed at 
one point. Some specialized in treating patients with certain conditions, such as tuberculosis or 
shell-shock; one – General Hospital No. 7 at Baltimore, Maryland provided care for patients who 
had been blinded. But virtually all were focused on the general mission of meeting “any surgical 
or medical requirement.”
52
 In May 1919, there were almost 40,000 beds available in general 
hospitals across the country.
53
 Among these many institutions, Walter Reed Army General 
Hospital in Washington, D.C. was a flagship. 
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The origins and ideals of occupational therapy 
The roots of the army’s occupational therapy program were planted in the late nineteenth 
century, when women reformers involved in the settlement house and mental hygiene 
movements found eager partners in male medical practitioners striving to establish the 
importance of the mind-body connection in health. At the Hull House in Chicago, workers and 
the upper classes alike could partake in arts and crafts such as weaving and design – activities 
that later qualified as occupational therapy. The goals of such endeavors differed according to a 
subject’s social standing; Progressive reformers believed the activities could quell the 
revolutionary impulses of dissatisfied workers, or “return to productive life… an incipient 
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leadership class.”55 Society ladies saw in arts and crafts the opportunity “as non-working-class 
people to capture what they perceived to be a productive and meaningful life experience.” 
Working-class men and women, on the other hand, could use arts and crafts to “feel more 
connected to and less hostile toward factory processes of labor.” By allowing the impoverished 
immigrant worker to partake in the production process from start to finish, the theory went, he or 
she could appreciate the meaning behind a monotonous assembly line job.56 Doctors also found 
that allowing ill hospital patients to partake in activities such as sewing and woodworking 
assisted with their “normalization.”57 By the outbreak of World War I, clinics using crafts for the 
treatment of patients with chronic physical illness existed in San Francisco, upstate New York, 
and New York City. By 1917, OT had gained enough legitimacy to be included in the United 
States government’s plans for the treatment of wounded soldiers of the Great War.58  
In February 1918, the Surgeon General’s Office undertook its first trial of occupational 
therapy at Walter Reed Army General Hospital. The program began modestly, in the home of the 
institution’s handyman, who instructed patients in “the simplest kind of carpentry.” In April 
1918, the Division of Physical Reconstruction of the Surgeon General’s Office allotted $3,000 
for therapy tools and staff. By the end of 1918, a comprehensive educational program was in 
place offering arts and crafts classes such as drawing, wood carving, jewelry making, engraving, 
and rug weaving, in addition to “commercial work,” which consisted of more vocationally-
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centered activities, such as bookkeeping, typewriting, automobile repair and “truck farming out 
of doors.”
59
 The Walter Reed program served as a model for other army medical institutions. By 
mid-1919, approximately 350 occupational therapists had served in 52 U.S. army reconstruction 
hospitals.
60
    
By encouraging participation in occupational therapy, the army aimed for medical 
progress and social control. According to a January 1919 report from the newly formed Walter 
Reed Occupational Therapy Department, the goals of arts and crafts and commercial work at the 
hospital were manifold, but above all, pragmatic and industrially-oriented. “The specific 
purpose,” the report said, “is to help each patient find himself and function again as a complete 
man, physically, socially, educationally and economically.” In a physical sense, OT could help 
“restore his body so far as possible to its normal condition.” In terms of education, it could 
“[furnish] him with such a training that he may make the most of his mental and physical 
resources and increase his personal efficiency.” The social and economic goals of OT included, 
according to the report, “enabling [the soldier] to feel that despite his physical handicap he may 
still be a self-reliant and self-respecting member of the community,” and “providing him a means 
of earning a comfortable livelihood so that with his return to civil life he may be an economic 
asset instead of a liability.”
61
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Both occupational and vocational education officials focused on the benefits of work for 
recovering soldiers.
62
 “The best way to bring back courage to a wounded soldier and the best 
way to restore the use of a stiff elbow is to employ the man and his elbow in useful work, 
naturally taking care not to overdo the process,” wrote Herbert J. Hall, who would serve as 
president of the American Occupational Therapy Association from 1920-1923. “Idleness,” he 
added, “means degeneration of body and spirit.”
63
 A pamphlet issued by the Federal Board for 
Vocational Education (FBVE) noted the dual emphasis – on body and mind – of work therapy. 
Aside from allowing exercise of joints, it would create a “wholesome interest in something 
outside the patient’s morbid interest in himself and his symptoms” and prepare a soldier’s 
“mental attitude” for “normal demands” of the world outside the hospital.
64
  
 Government agency publications proudly trumpeted the goals of work-focused 
rehabilitation directly to soldiers and veterans. A pamphlet from the FBVE, “To the Disabled 
Soldier and Sailor in the Hospital,” was frank about the motivation behind encouraging soldiers 
to participate in rehabilitation efforts before leaving military hospitals. Following a detailed 
account of an array of government services and benefits available for disabled soldiers, the 
publication used a question and answer format to illustrate its point: 
Why is my country so anxious to help me ‘go over the top’ into civil life?  
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It wants to conserve you as a part of its precious man power. Every man restored to 
profitable occupation is an asset, and hence a relief to the nation. Every man who fails to 
contribute to production is a liability, and hence a burden to the Nation. Don’t add to her 
burden by being just one more man diverted from industry who does not get back again. 
Take your place and carry on.
65
   
 
As the pamphlet indicated, the soldier’s proper “place” was in a steady job in industry, one that 
allowed him to reclaim the manhood threatened by disability. At Walter Reed, participation in 
occupational therapy and commercial education classes was a means of proactively attempting to 
better one’s situation. 
Carry On, a magazine published by the Red Cross, edited by the Office of the Surgeon 
General, and available to patients in hospitals like Walter Reed, pointed out the utility of 
occupational therapy by arguing that “the making of some useful object has roused the interest of 
many a despondent man and brought him to a realization that he can again become fit and 
productive – an inspiring outlook for the man who once thought he was down and out.”
66
 The 
cover of the April 1919 issue of Carry On furthered this perspective when it published the 
“Creed of the Disabled: once more to be useful – to see pity in the eyes of my friends replaced 
with commendation – to work, produce, provide, and to feel that I have a place in the world – 
seeking no favors and given none – a MAN among MEN in spite of this physical handicap 
(emphasis in original).”
67
 A “place in the world” derived from a sense of worth and 
employability, since, as one proponent of occupational therapy later put it, “the normal 
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atmosphere of the average man is that of work activity, and the production of something 
masculine.”
68
 Classifications of rehabilitation as a means by which to reclaim manhood were 
pervasive in the medical literature of the time. “The man who has lost his right hand and who 
learns to write with his left,” wrote Herbert J. Hall, “accomplishes more than he realizes, for he 
discovers that he is still a man.”
69
  
Although occupational therapist Lena Hitchcock and her colleagues, like army brass, 
subscribed to prevailing conceptions of individual responsibility and manhood, by virtue of 
serving on wards daily, they acquired a less lofty view of the goals and prospective benefits of 
occupational therapy. “So far, none of our occupational therapy is orthopedically (sic) 
corrective,” Hitchcock reported while performing reconstruction work in France in 1919, “but at 
least it prevents the boys from drinking too much and losing all their money shooting craps.”
70
  
Alberta Montgomery, who began working at Walter Reed as a reconstruction aide in 
August 1918 and served as the hospital’s director of occupational therapy from January 1922 
through 1933, was likewise focused on the immediate mental benefits of OT.
71
 Her notes on 
patient treatment in early 1919 document her assessment of various patients. Among her weekly 
observations: “work keeps him more quiet;” “work supplies a field for initiative and creative 
structural thought;” “work keeps him from thinking about his troubles;” “work makes him less 
restless;” “work makes him more ambitious;” “work makes him concentrate on plans for future;” 
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“work makes him more contented;” “work keeps him happy - makes him forget his condition.”
72
  
According to the assessments of Montgomery and Hitchcock, work through occupational therapy 




“Occupational Therapist, Roberta Laughlin, of San Jose, Cal., 
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Some soldiers resisted rehabilitation tactics they viewed as militarized or irrational and 
refused to assume roles (from jewelry-maker to industrial wage-earner) prescribed for them. 
Many served in the army with a clear goal of capitalizing on benefits such as government-
sponsored education. And that goal, at least sometimes, did not jibe with partaking in arts and 
crafts activities.  
Although occupational and vocational training were both based on a general belief in the 
value of work therapy, soldiers themselves distinguished between different types of work. Lena 
Hitchcock reported as much from her occupational therapy post at a hospital in France. “Just as 
at Walter Reed,” she wrote, “the men were suspicious and scoffing – ‘women’s work’ – they 
called it.” Alberta Montgomery’s notebook is replete with accounts of soldiers who resisted 
participating in bedside activities like knitting and jewelry making. According to Montgomery, a 
soldier named Burns reported that he “does not want to do anything that would look, as he says, 
‘the least bit feminine.’” So, he was assigned to “sawing and making equipment.” Merlin 
Meyhard, who was in the hospital with a gun shot wound to his left hand and had been crafting a 
cord belt during visits to the OT shop, told Montgomery that he preferred auto repair work. 
Jerome McGinn, also in the hospital with a gunshot wound and working on a cord belt, told the 
reconstruction aide he was more interested in schoolwork than occupational work. “Wants to 
complete his belt later -- is working on electricity now and is interested in that,” Montgomery 
noted of McGinn. Likewise, Montgomery reported that Verne Caldwell, hospitalized for a 
gunshot wound in his forearm, “wants to take full advantage of the opportunity for education 
offered by the government.” When Caldwell did partake in a cord belt project, Montgomery said, 
“he did this only to show someone else how and did not use the injured arm.” Instead, Caldwell 
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devoted his intellectual and physical efforts to drafting classes at the hospital.
75
 He and many 
others, evidently, were interested in enhancing their own employability and industriousness, but 




James E. Russell, chief educational officer of the Division of Reconstruction for the 
Office of the Surgeon General, attempted to address this issue head on. Occupational therapy 
was meant, above all, he said, to be useful, – a feat that could be achieved through practitioners’ 
industriousness. “The criticism we have encountered,” Russell noted in a journal article, “is that 
this work of occupational therapy leads nowhere, that it does not provide a suitable job for a full-
blooded man.” He urged occupational therapists to provide soldiers with “something worth 
doing, a real task instead of a play task.” This, Russell proposed, might lead to a lessening of 
hostility and mockery among soldiers. He made his plea in December 1918 with some 
earnestness: after all, the army had plans to call for 4,000 more reconstruction aides over the 
course of a year.
77
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Various scholars have offered perspective on the proposed connection between 
masculinity and recovery efforts. Soldiers’ rehabilitation following the Great War depended on 
their return to “full citizenship,” according to Beth Linker, which was contingent on a definition 
of manhood based on both economic and social characteristics.
78
  Roxanne Panchasi 
contextualizes postwar rehabilitation efforts in France as being emblematic of a larger striving 
for “rational management of the destructive and disordering effects of the war experience,” and 
argues that the disabled soldier’s body posed a quandary that could “confuse the boundaries 
between men and women.” “The rehabilitation of the disabled soldier,” she writes, was a “crucial 
site of the negotiation of (a) wartime and postwar ‘crisis of masculinity.’”
79
 According to Ana 
Carden-Coyne, the disabled male was seen not only as feminized, but as infantilized as well. 
Rehabilitation through occupational therapy, she argues, could be thought of as “an active 
process of returning men from an inert state… especially by undertaking feminine and 
‘kindergarten’ tasks, such as knitting, beadwork and basket weaving (‘for mother’), through to 
‘some more masculine and practical occupation,’ which involved operating industrial machines, 
or other mechanic activities...”
80
 Such an assessment helps place the diverse educational 
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Practitioners and patients 
Less central to scholarly studies has been the popular distinction between worthy and 
unworthy soldiers. During World War I, disabled soldiers and army doctors evaluated each other 
and came up with mixed reviews. Although there were vast differences in their educational and 
cultural backgrounds, doctors, nurses, and patients who encountered each other in hospitals 
abroad reported feeling great respect for one another. In U.S. hospitals, however, where patients 
who had never left the country were treated for non-battle injuries, judgments were sometimes 
less favorable.  
Contrasting with the doctors and army higher-ups who devised rehabilitation programs, 
the majority of wounded veterans of World War I had left school between fifth and seventh 
grade and 25 percent were illiterate. The rate reflected that of the army in general: according to 
results of army intelligence tests, 21.5 percent of all white troops and 50.6 percent of all black 
troops were officially illiterate.
81
 As Grace Harper, chief of the Bureau of Reconstruction and 
Re-education of the American Red Cross put it, “Many wounded men are somewhat like 
children.” In rehabilitation efforts, she said, “ignorance is our stumbling block.”
82
  
 Soldiers, for their part, passed their own judgments of caregivers. Joseph W. Bubendorf 
reported having polar experiences at a hospital in the U.S. and a hospital in France. He recalled 
seeking treatment for an abscess that had formed on his hand after a fall at Camp Merritt in New 
Jersey in the winter of 1918: “They had medical inspection once a day at 5pm and the officer in 
charge, if you could call him such – stuck his head in the door and called – ‘is everybody all 
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right?’ hoping he would have nothing to do – so I called out – ‘no – I need attention’ so he pulled 
out his jack knife and drained the abscess with no sign of a dressing. I recovered eventually.” 
Bubendorf’s impressions of services at Camp Merritt differed sharply from his experience 
working at a hospital in France, where, he said, injured patients were given hot showers and 
treated with great care.
83
 John V. Hawley, who served as a Cook in a convalescent hospital in 
France referred to the doctors he worked alongside, as “gentlemen.” They were “dedicated” to 
the cause, he said, and some were “family men that left a fine practice to help out when their 
country needed them. THEY WERE TOPS (emphasis in original).”
84
 
Bubendorf’s suggestion that doctors abroad were more highly qualified than those who 
served in the U.S. was seconded by Paul B. Magnuson, an orthopedic surgeon assigned to the 
Surgeon General’s office during the war to “get men (who were doctors) and put them in the 
position in which we thought they would best serve.” When Magnuson began his work in the fall 
of 1917 and tried to find medical professionals to staff domestic hospitals, he realized that, “most 
of the best ones had gone into the Army early; some had been ordered overseas at their own 
request, so the pickings were pretty slim by this time...”
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 As troops judged medical personnel, doctors and other caregivers shared perspectives 
about soldiers. Many reported being overwhelmed by the heroism and grace of their patients in 
the face of almost incomprehensible physical and mental challenges. “I wish you could 
accompany me through my wards on any old morning and see these boys paying the price of war 
without any brass bands or speeches to cheer them on, yet doing it gladly and without 
complaint,” wrote New York surgeon Condict Cutler to a colleague in June 1918 from a field 
hospital in France.
86
 Cutler further reported having a tremendous “admiration for their spirit,” 
and a desire to “do everything I can for all my patients.”
87
 Arthur Purdy Stout, a professor of 
pathology at Columbia University and army volunteer in France, had similar feelings of empathy 
for his patients. “It is particularly hard to see the wounded die,” he wrote in his diary. The dead 
and wounded, he said, were “fine lads who started out so bravely to this land of France and have 
to leave so many loved ones behind.
88
 Rustin McIntosh, a Pediatrician at Columbia-Presbyterian 
Hospital who volunteered with the army in France, was grateful for the friendly attitude of his 
underlings. “I am getting more accustomed to giving orders and handling the men,” he wrote to 
his family in March 1918. “They’re such darn good fellows that it’s much easier than it might be; 
they always interpret things with charity and give you the benefit of the doubt.”
89
 Nurse Nettie 
Trax, who also served in a hospital in France, reported that her soldier-patients were “absurdly 
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grateful.” “Never before have I felt a sense of achievement nor felt that my own bit of work was 
worth something to somebody,” Trax said. “But it is here.”
90
  
 Tensions arose, however, when injuries and illnesses were not the result of battle. When 
army higher-ups and medical practitioners faced complicated questions regarding treatment and 
rehabilitation for soldiers who had never left the U.S., impressions of heroism were replaced by 
more tenuous opinions. Between April 1917 and December 1918, the Army Medical Department 
added about 2.57 million patients to the sick report. 2.4 million of them were serving in the U.S., 
while 873,816 were serving abroad.
91
 A March 1918 Military Surgeon article submitted by the 
Army Surgeon General’s office expressed concern with this massive number of cases. It cited an 
army doctor’s contention that ten percent of those reporting to sick call and the camp dispensary 
were “pure malingering,” while “40 percent exaggerate symptoms, which would not be sufficient 
to cause a cessation of work in civil life, (and) 40 percent (were) somewhat sick and would stop 
work in civil life, but would not send for a doctor.” That left only ten percent who were “quite in 
need of attention and in civil life would stop work and procure medical attendance.” In order to 
eliminate waste and determine if a recruit was being truthful about his condition, doctors were 
encouraged to ask and ponder a litany of questions about his work, family, and personal life. 
Without indicating that the soldier was “under suspicion,” doctors should try to ascertain how 
successful he was prior to service in school and at work. Had he deserted wives and children? 
Had be been a “good mixer” or was he “solitary, secretive, and morose?” Did he “bear grudges” 
against people? What did other people think and say of him? Did he “think the world a good 
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place to live and enjoy?” What were his “views as to war and the rights of the individual?” A 
patient’s answers to such questions, the article said, “will often flatly contradict the possibility 
that his present claims are genuine.” As many troops as possible should be kept out of hospitals, 
the Surgeon General’s Office article noted, but those admitted who might be feigning their 
maladies, should not be told exactly why they were admitted, and could be offered a “light diet” 
and “disagreeable medications.” Additionally, “anesthetics for diagnostic purposes are frequently 
given, as, during semi-consciousness, the patient often says things which contradict previous 
statements.” Hospital stays of supposed malingerers could also be made less pleasant and thus 
limited, the article said, if “visits of family and friends were discouraged,” and if the soldier-
patient was “confined to his quarters when not on duty.”
92
 Such drastic measures gave a great 
deal of power and autonomy to medical officers.  
 At Walter Reed, many of the approximately 14,000 patients treated in 1918 had 
supposedly non-heroic injuries and illnesses, and a relatively small number were discharged with 
a disability incurred in the line of duty. More than 1,500 patients admitted to the hospital in 1918 
were treated for influenza. The large majority of patients who received care at the hospital that 
year – 10,376 officers and enlisted men – were returned to duty. Another 866 patients were 
transferred to other hospitals. Of the 688 discharged due to disability, 198 were reported to have 
incurred their injuries or illnesses in the line of duty, the majority of which were listed as 
“injuries and diseases of organs of locomotion.” (Some of the 597 soldiers fitted with prosthetic 
limbs at Walter Reed in 1918 were likely included in that number.) Other major causes of 
discharge due to disability were tuberculosis (22 cases total discharged, 20 of whom were said 
not to have incurred the disability in the line of duty), and “mental deficiency, moron” (26 cases 
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discharged, 24 not incurred in the line of duty). At least 24 conditions listed as eligible for 
discharge from Walter Reed Hospital in 1918 pertained to mental illness, including “mental 
deficiency, imbecile,” (seven discharges total, none incurred in the line of duty), “constitutional 
psychopathic state, emotional instability” (eight cases discharged, none incurred in line of 
duty).
93
 The listed conditions indicate the types of medical issues that would necessitate 
treatment following the war.  
Many army officials, meanwhile, deemed these troops sorry embodiments of long-term 
health threats less likely than gun shot wounds and amputations to be alleviated by rehabilitation. 
The 1921 Surgeon General’s report quoted base commanders, who lamented, “‘Never in the 
history of the army has its ranks been filled with such poor physical specimens and such young 
lads so susceptible to disease.’” They postulated that, “a large majority of cases… have 
disabilities which existed prior to enlistment, and a number… have been previously discharged 
from the military service with the same disability.’” Ultimately, these commanders concluded, 
“it would seem that a great deal of laxity existed in the recruiting system which permitted the 
enlistment of these men.’”
94
   
In an address before the National Society for the Promotion of Occupational Therapy in 
November 1918, James E. Russell, chief educational officer of the Division of Reconstruction 
for the Office of the Surgeon General, concurred. Alleging that many soldiers in military 
hospitals were predisposed to tuberculosis and heart conditions – “weaklings and not soldiers” – 
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Russell argued, “some of these men are not worthy of the efforts being expended upon them.” 
Men “who were just no good and never will be any good,” he said, were “hardly worth saving.”
95
  
On the other hand, Russell noted, there was another type of patient – the soldier wounded 
heroically overseas. Such “full-blooded men” were “only slightly weakened by their wounds; 
their disabilities are of a kind that do not tend to break them down physically, maybe an 
amputation of one leg, maybe an arm off, maybe the loss of sight or hearing or any other 
accident that may come to any individual leaving him still strong and physically fit to work if the 
right work can be found.”
 96
  
Russell’s ideas about “full-bloodedness” were firmly rooted in the contemporary 
understanding of disability. As Philip Longmore notes, when the United States entered World 
War I, disability was seen as “a defect residing in the individual and therefore requiring 
individual medical rehabilitation, special education, and vocational training to improve 
employment prospects.”
97
 Marina Larsson concurs, noting that there is “consensus among 
historians that at the beginning of the twentieth century, disability became understood as a 
problem the individual could rise above through psychological adjustment, rather than a 
condition that entailed inevitable physical limitations, suffering and dependence.”
98
 In fact, some 
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advocates of the time recognized the potential for the war, and the wounded soldiers left in its 




Race in the wards 
Soldiers’ rehabilitation experiences depended not only on preconceived notions about 
gender and disability, but also about race. More than 13 percent of soldiers serving in the United 
States Army during World War I were African American.
100
 Official army policy dictated that 
medical and military efficiency would be prioritized above all else, and that white and black 
soldiers would be treated in the same wards according to their ailments, not according to race. 
But in at least some domestic army hospitals, in the face of rising social tensions, army higher-
ups made exceptions to the rule. 
In some wards and classrooms of Walter Reed, integration was more widely practiced 
than it was at other facilities. One photo depicting the hospital’s rehabilitation efforts shows a 
black soldier at a rug-weaving loom. Another depicts a group of five wounded soldiers – two of 
them black – posed on the porch of a hospital building. They look into the camera, their residual 
limbs displayed. White therapists are featured in the photo as well, one of them with her hand 
resting on one of the black soldiers’ legs.  
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Alice Duffield, a white nurse who spent the bulk of her wartime service treating young 
black soldiers diagnosed with pneumonia at Camp Pike in Little Rock, Arkansas, shrugged off 
the suggestion that, as a working class southern white woman, she would have thought anything 
of bathing and taking the temperatures of African American soldiers. “Didn’t bother me,” 
Duffield said in an oral history interview recorded more than 70 years after the war. Family and 
friends “never said one thing about it,” she maintained. “It was just nursing, that was all there 
was to it.”
102
 Duffield’s impressions paint a somewhat innocuous picture of a time when some 
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While white nurses like Alice Duffield might be tasked with treating black patients, they 
did not live alongside their African American nurse colleagues. Aileen Stewart, one of 
approximately 1,800 black nurses certified by the Red Cross to serve with the army during 
World War I, reported that there was virtually no interaction between white and black nurses at 
Camp Sherman in Ohio. After graduating from nursing school at the Freedmen’s Hospital in 
Washington, D.C. in 1917, she was barred from assuming a post as an army nurse, but was 
recruited by the Red Cross to treat West Virginia miners during the 1918 flu epidemic. Only 
after peace was declared did the army open its doors to nurses of color.
104
 Two weeks after the 
Armistice in November 1918, Stewart and her classmates received a letter from the Army 
Surgeon General’s Office offering them long-awaited positions as army nurses. One of the first 
African American women nurses to receive a commission, Stewart was sent with her cohort to 
Camp Sherman. There, she later recalled, “We were assigned to ‘separate but equal’ living 
quarters on the base, which was the accepted system of segregated living.” The home had ten 
bedrooms, showers, a living room, dining room, and kitchen, and, Stewart recalled, “we had a 
full-time Negro maid who prepared our meals and served them to us in our own dining room.”
105
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The segregation “‘didn’t seem a big thing’” Stewart said. “Of course, we didn’t know enough to 
be offended. We made our own social life, didn’t socialize with the white nurses.’”
106
  
Medical treatment of soldiers, in fact, posed a distinct challenge to the United States 
army’s official policy of racial segregation, which remained in place through 1948. Hospital 
wards were different from staff quarters and army camps, where the military worked diligently to 
maintain segregated units and living spaces. Upholding the policy of separate quarters for black 
and white soldiers in health facilities was simply untenable, according to Colonel D.W. Ketcham 
of the War Plans Division. “In hospitals, patients have to be classified by diseases rather than 
with reference to other considerations,” he said, “and moreover, while men are sick in bed there 
is scarcely any opportunity for friction due to race troubles.”
107
 Thus, during the Great War, 
hospital wards and occupational therapy workshops provided a brief foray into racial integration 
for at least some soldiers and caregivers. The fact that stated policy pertaining to military 
hospitals was integration, not segregation, as it was in civilian (and, in the near future, veterans’) 
hospitals, corresponds with the notion that military medicine was based, first and foremost, on 
military efficiency.  
Some white soldiers were jarred by and hostile to the experience of integration. James 
Cunningham believed his assignment to the mental ward at Walter Reed qualified as an 
inexplicable punishment, not least of all because of who he found himself surrounded by: “I am 
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not restricted to this ward (Ward X) as yet and I hope I won’t (be) with your kind assistance,” 
Cunningham wrote to the wife of a Marine Corps Colonel in July 1918. “It will kill me if I am as 
I think nearly all in the ward are crazy and (50%) fifty percent of the Patients are Negroes.”
108
 
Cunningham’s claim was based on the contemporary realities of medical treatment. As Vanessa 
Northington Gamble notes, in the civilian world and especially in the South, black patients were 
often admitted to mental institutions rather than general hospitals, so that they might be kept 
separate and apart from the majority of fully cognizant white patients. If administrators of 
Southern hospitals did allow African Americans to enter majority-white facilities, they were 
often relegated to separate wards and offered inferior care.
109
 It made sense then, for 
Cunningham to assume that if he found himself among black patients, he must be receiving 
substandard treatment.  
The Inspector General duly undertook an investigation of Cunningham’s sundry claims, 
including the one, in the words of the ensuing report, “that he was transferred from Ward 41 to 
43 (formerly called X) and placed among crazy negroes (sic) as punishment.” Ultimately, the 
Inspector General’s report concluded not only that Cunningham was receiving proper treatment, 
but also reiterated Col. Ketcham’s point in no uncertain terms: “It is customary to treat white and 
colored soldiers in the same wards at this hospital.”
110
  
Although it may have been “customary” to treat black and white soldiers in the same 
wards at Walter Reed and other institutions, segregation was practiced throughout the war at 
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numerous hospitals. When the mother of a black soldier complained about “discrimination 
against the colored soldiers” at Army General Hospital No. 9 in Lakewood, New Jersey, Winford 
H. Smith of the Surgeon General’s Office responded that the Commanding Officer of the facility 
had been instructed to ensure that “‘colored soldiers are to be given the same attention in the 
service of meals as is given to the white soldiers.’” Smith further explained:   
Over a year ago evidence of considerable friction developed in many of the 
hospitals particularly in the south, and numerous complaints were received 
because of the indiscriminate mixing of colored and white patients in the same 
wards. After careful consideration, and believing it to be in the interest of 
harmony and to the advantage of the colored soldiers quite as much as to the 
white, instructions were issued from this office to the effect that so far as 
practicable, the colored soldiers would be placed in wards by themselves, but that 
they would receive the same careful consideration in every detail as was accorded 
any other soldiers. Wherever colored soldiers were patients in the hospital in 





Carol Byerly points out that Army Surgeon General Gorgas officially approved a policy of 
segregation for hospitals in both the north and south in March 1919, “‘in the best interest of all 
concerned’” and “‘so far as possible.’” At General Hospital No. 8 in Otisville, New York, 
education and rehabilitation courses were segregated, with black soldiers receiving instruction in 
their segregated wards, rather than in classrooms.
112
  
Although Smith of the Surgeon General’s Office maintained that there “has been no less 
vigilance in the care and treatment of the colored soldiers,” there were plenty of reports that 
African Americans encountered hostility in military hospitals, not least of all from fellow 
patients who were white. In the fall of 1918, two black privates at the Mineola base hospital in 
New York complained to local Urban League officials that a fellow African American soldier, 
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Charles Parker, was “unmercifully beaten up by white privates from the south because he would 
not give his place during mess time to some white soldiers who came after him and would not 
get in at the end of the line.” Private Parker, his peers said, would likely lose sight in one of his 
eyes as a result of being “attacked with white soldiers’ knives and forks which they had for 
eating purposes.” The soldiers suspected of aggression were being held under arrest by the army, 
but the allegations were difficult to prove since, “none of them will disclose the guilty ones 
among their number,” according to The Chicago Defender. The soldiers who reported the 
occurrence to Urban League officials said they were hesitant to return to camp, “and one was so 
downhearted that he actually shed tears,” disappointed in a “government that cannot protect its 
own soldiers from the ‘crackers,’ as he phrased it.”
113
 The Defender later referred to complaints 
about “segregation and discrimination of the vilest sort” and hospital “treatment… below the 
standard of human endurance” as “an obvious example of a country’s crime against a race that 
has always shed its blood that this nation might occupy the exalted place in the world of today 
which is now does.”
114
  
Efforts abounded in the African American community to provide for ill and injured black 
soldiers by protecting them from such injustices, celebrating their wartime efforts, and offering 
social options. The Circle of Negro War Relief “constituted the nearest approach to a Red 
Cross… through which the colored people cooperated during the war.”
115
 According to a leader 
of the organization, the group was founded in New York in November 1917 “with the idea of 
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having the colored women of America, and some men, too… do as much as they possibly could 
for the colored soldiers.” Within a few months, similar groups arose in locales “extending from 
New York to Utah and throughout the New England states as far south as Florida.” By 1920, 60 
groups of 25 members or more throughout the United States were affiliated with the Circle of 
Negro War Relief. The groups “did just what other war organizations did,” according to its 
leaders: they arranged visits to soldiers in the hospital with baked goods and handmade knits, and 
sponsored lectures and events. And they attempted to ensure that black soldiers and veterans had 
social options beyond segregated military camps and tension-filled hospital wards.
116
 In 
Baltimore, for example, the War Camp Community Club for Colored Soldiers reserved a church 
Hall so that “soldiers and sailors (could) spend their brief furloughs in moral surroundings and 
away from dens of vice.” The club featured a reading room, cafeteria, billiard hall, writing room, 
and sleeping quarters.
117
 The high demand for such services was confirmed by the fact that 
within just a few weeks, the hall was overcrowded, and the club was appealing to residents of the 
city to help house soldiers and veterans.
118
 The Baltimore War Camp Club remained active 
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The African American social halls were a world away from the hostile environments of 
military and government hospitals, and were embraced by government officials eager to see 
feelings of patriotism ignited in the black community. At the opening of a club for black soldiers 
in Rockford, Illinois, doctor George C. Hall noted the importance of contributions of African 
Americans to the war effort. They represented “true Americanism,” according to Hall. “All races 
were giving their lives and their treasures,” he said, “that the benefits coming as the result of this 
tremendous sacrifice should know no person by race, creed or religion.”120 In the summer of 
1918, the federal government’s Committee on Women’s Defense Work authorized African 
American educator, Alice Dunbar Nelson, to visit various southern cities to ascertain whether a 
national council of black women might be organized. By officially sanctioning local efforts and 
bringing them into the fold of the government, officials felt they could “ensure a degree of 
cooperation and coordination with the least likelihood of upsetting existing social relations.”121  
 
The OT recruits and women’s professional advancement via the military 
The military tried but failed to recruit both military and civilian men as teachers in newly 
established reconstruction programs at hospitals like Walter Reed. But the men lacked teaching 
experience, and were also unwilling to accept the paltry salaries that came along with such work; 
according to an information sheet for a Civil Service examination for occupational therapy aides, 
starting salaries were $1,680 per year, approximately $600 less than the average salary of a 
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bricklayer, painter or plumber.122 In fact, the army had traditionally turned to females as 
personnel of last resort – even in caregiving capacities; during the Spanish-American War, it 
attempted to recruit 6,000 males to care for troops in camps infected with typhoid. When those 
efforts proved in vain, the military turned to recruiting women, signing up more than 1,500 of 
2,500 applicants.123  
General Joel E. Goldthwait, chief of orthopedics at Massachusetts General Hospital, and 
others – notably Elizabeth Upham Davis of the Federal Board for Vocational Rehabilitation, who 
had initiated courses in ‘invalid occupations” at Milwaukee-Downer College in Wisconsin – 
promoted the idea of the involvement of women occupational therapists in soldiers’ recovery 
programs during and after World War I.124 Stated qualifications for the job were based both on 
academic prowess and personal grace, though most publications emphasized the latter.  “A 
young woman entering the profession should be a person of both academic and manual ability,” 
one pamphlet said. “She should possess tact – initiative – a strong sense of responsibility – good 
poise – a good sense of humor – excellent physical health and emotional stability.”125 Another 
pamphlet, entitled, “Opportunities in Occupational Therapy,” stipulated that the prospective 
therapist “must be patient and cheerful and like to work with people.” She should also possess 
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some artistic ability, like to work with her hands, and be between the ages of 21 and 50 years old. 
“Other personal qualities which are most desirable,” the pamphlet continued, “are tact, 
resourcefulness, a sympathetic attitude, and a love for the work.”
126
 Herbert J. Hall elaborated on 
those points in a February 1919 article. Calling on “women of the right qualifications to aid 
materially in a very important war work,” he asked that applicants have not only “a reasonable 
cleverness in acquiring the technique of simple handiwork,” but also “suitable personality.” The 
latter, he implied was more complicated than artistic ability: “It cannot be acquired.” Hall went 
on to convey the gravity of the duties of an occupational therapist. “It is a serious business, this 
good start on the right road for the crippled soldier,” he said. “If the work is made a joke or a 
kindergarten exercise, then bedside occupations will do more harm than good.” At the same 
time, Hall argued that aides should avoid a “a too-technical or matter-of-fact approach. My 
feeling,” he noted “is that the young woman who is to succeed in this work must have that subtle 




Part of a larger contemporary wave of “well-educated daughters of the middle class” who 
sought to capitalize on wartime professional opportunities, both Lena Hitchcock and Alberta 
Montgomery answered the army’s call for reconstruction aides.
128
 The first decades of the 
twentieth century, when women began working their way into the army in significant numbers, 
was a transitional moment for the world of women’s work. For the first time, according to Alice 
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Kessler-Harris, “To aspire, to achieve, not merely to do a job, became at least a possibility for 
daughters as well as for sons.”
129
 Hitchcock’s reasoning for entering the army supports this 
notion, and contradicts the idea that women in caregiving professions mythologized a “calling” 
to work based on a moral duty.
130
 Hitchcock, for one, was less attracted by the military’s request 
for women with tact, cheerfulness, and patience, than she was by the prospect of personal 
betterment. Her mother had been a Red Cross Nurse, which likely influenced her decision to join 
army ranks as an occupational therapist: 
Long before the United States declared war on Germany, I wanted to go overseas. 
Probably my motives were mixed. The tremendous odds against the allies 
appealed to all the chivalry of youth, sense of romance and adventure. The 
military atmosphere in which I was steeped at that time also undoubtedly 
influenced me. Then also I very probably entertained a vain desire to prove my 
courage and achieve heroic deeds. I need not point out that the dreams engendered 
by my childhood diet of tales of heroism and patriotism never materialized but, 
whatever the motives, I was determined somehow to get there.
131
    
 
Prior to departing for service as a reconstruction aide in France, Hitchcock, who was born in 
Virginia, paid a visit to her grandfather. Since she was the “only one in the family who the army 
wants and will take,” he told her, she “must hold the banner high as the men and women of (her) 
family had always done.” As Hitchcock’s grandfather bid her farewell, he added: “May God 
bless you and keep you and help you to fulfill your duty,” then handed her a check. Across the 
bottom, he had written “For Patriotism.”
132
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Alberta Montgomery’s service at Walter Reed illustrates the wartime entrenchment of a 
burgeoning profession. One of seven children of a central Illinois farmer, Montgomery was a 
1915 graduate of Columbia University’s Teachers’ College.
133
 James E. Russell, who so clearly 
delineated the difference between “full-blooded men” and “weaklings,” served as the Dean of the 
Teachers’ College, which was a center of the occupational therapy movement in the years 
leading up to the World War. By 1918, its students were making “practice-teaching” visits to a 
nearby hospital, helping to shape one of the first formal occupational therapy training 
programs.
134
  Montgomery, for her part, took a wide range of courses as an undergraduate at J. 
Millikan University and later at Columbia, including Latin, French, German, algebra, geometry, 
physics, chemistry, botany, physiology, biology, zoology, agriculture, ancient history, U.S. 
history, and civics. On applications for teaching jobs, Montgomery noted that drawing and art 
were her specialty areas.
135
 When she was appointed as a reconstruction aide at Walter Reed in 
August 1918, she left a job in the Art Department of a Decatur, Illinois high school.
136
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While serving at Walter Reed, Alberta Montgomery and Lena Hitchcock joined a long 
battle waged by women to enhance their citizenship rights and better their professional 
conditions through military service. They and their counterparts joined the United States military 
during World War I for the same variety of reasons – from personal to patriotic – as their male 
counterparts. Mercedes Graf emphasizes this point in regard to women contract surgeons’ 
service during the Great War: “Many enterprising women doctors were guided by their desire to 
become more active in the war effort as well as to prove themselves as professionals.”
137
  For 
women as well as men, the military served as an integral institution of the state, wherein 
citizenship rights and privileges might be claimed and forwarded.  
 Thousands of women partook in the Great War effort as part of the U.S. Navy, Marines, 
and Signal Corps, as well as by serving in social welfare organizations such as the Red Cross, the 
YMCA, and the Salvation Army. In the latter capacity, they filled a wide variety of roles, 
including acting as medical professionals at foreign base hospitals and organizing war bond 
fundraising drives.
138
 The most egalitarian of the military branches was the U.S. Navy, which 
opened its ranks to 11,000 women who served as so-called “Yeomanettes,” a handful of whom 
were African American.  Providing much needed clerical assistance in offices both in the country 
and abroad, these young women – much to the dismay of many contemporary observers – were 
paid the same wages as their male yeoman counterparts.
139
 The Marine Corps also recruited 
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women for clerical jobs – though it did so almost a year and a half after the Navy, in August 
1918, only once it became clear that there was a grave shortage of personnel. Like the Navy, the 
Marines hoped to reserve males for tasks seen as more physically grueling than office work.
140
  
Women who served as nurses throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries helped 
pave the way for their counterparts to be recruited in the World War I era. Thanks to the 
establishment of a permanent Nurse Corps in the army in 1901, and in the navy in 1908, military 
nurses were no longer considered civilian personnel, but instead, appointees of the military 
branch with which they served.
141
 By virtue of that fact, by World War I, women nurses enjoyed 
some limited rights and privileges.
142
 In October 1917, the War Risk Insurance Act extended 
entitlements directly to female members of the Army and Navy Nurse Corps. Section 300 of the 
Act stipulated that the policy’s compensation rules applied to “any commissioned officer or 
enlisted man or… any member of the Army Nurse Corps (female) or of the Navy Nurse Corps 
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 Later interpretations of the law stipulated that since “medical, surgical, and 
hospital services are by law furnished ‘in addition to compensation,’” anyone eligible for 
compensation was, by extension, eligible for medical care.
144
 By April 1921, government 
officials were guaranteeing that more than 34,000 women who served as army and navy nurses, 
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According to the caption for this photo, which appeared in The Outlook, the  
newspaper of U.S. Base Hospital 116 in France: “German shells and bullets did not 
spare army nurses. Miss Johnston, wounded while helping other wounded soldiers (for she 
belonged to the Army herself), returned to America lately on the hospital ship ‘Comfort’  




Occupational therapists (along with contract nurses and Signal Corps telephone 
operators) who had been recruited for the war effort as civilians, enjoyed no such political 
favor.
147
 In the 1920s and 1930s, they attempted to obtain higher salaries and military rank, 
joined in their efforts by two other new and female-dominated groups within the military health 
care infrastructure: dieticians and physiotherapy aides. Emma E. Vogel, supervisor of 
physiotherapy aides at Walter Reed, wrote to the Army Surgeon General in 1930 to note that the 
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military failed to guarantee raises for aides after set periods of time. “If we wish to retain our 
head aides in the service over a period of several years,” she wrote, “it will be necessary to 
increase the salary.” Vogel went so far as recommending that the army decrease the first-year 
salaries of beginning aides, and use the savings to increase the salaries of head aides, “thus 
making a substantial inducement to remain in the Service, and to undertake additional 
responsibilities.”148  
Alberta Montgomery, Vogel’s colleague and head occupational therapist at Walter Reed, 
furthered the point in a subsequent letter to the Army Surgeon General. Montgomery seconded 
Vogel’s request for higher salaries and raises after continued service. She also went a step 
further, arguing that occupational therapy aides should not serve as civilian personnel, but within 
a medical auxiliary unit with a “more clearly defined status carrying the privilege of retirement 
for length of service or for disability.”149  
J.B. Huggins, Colonel in the Army Medical Corps, responded collectively to letters 
regarding salaries of physiotherapy and occupational therapy aides, as well as another regarding 
“the status of the dietician in U.S. Army hospitals.” Huggins, perhaps, felt his office was under 
sustained, calculated attack; the three letters to which he referred were sent within weeks of each 
other.  He was, at points, chilly in his reply. To provide salary increases on the scale proposed, 
Huggins argued, would cost $30,000 in the first year alone, “which, of course, would be out of 
the question.” After all, appropriations for the medical and hospital department, he reminded the 
aides’ advocates, were “being constantly reduced.” Furthermore, Huggins argued, “if it were 
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possible to adopt such a system, it is not believed that it would be in the best interests of the 
service to promote these employees automatically according to years of service.” He did agree to 
decrease the salaries of newly graduated reconstruction aides (from $1440 to $1320), and to 
provide higher pay for head aides. But, such adjustments would cost $6,440, which the 
complainants were asked to cover through a general “reduction in force.”150 The women 
therapists had achieved something, but, in the larger picture, the arrangement seemed a Faustian 
bargain, at best.  
That is not to say that occupational therapists did not make major gains during and as a 
result of the Great War. Indeed, the profession was legitimized by the actions of reconstruction 
aides, who had made a place for themselves in a national program to usher ill and wounded 
American soldiers swiftly back to physical “usefulness.” Even as army elites and medical 
personnel debated the utility of occupational therapy, as well as its purposes and strategies, 
military infrastructure provided a rich forum for professional growth. By 1917, occupational 
therapists had formed their own national professional organization, the Association for the 
Promotion of Occupational Therapy, (later re-named the American Occupational Therapy 
Association), and, soon after, established education and training standards. Regardless of debates 
that persisted during World War I and in the early 1920s about the usefulness of OT, the army’s 
investment in it as a viable therapy with medical value and its widespread use in the treatment of 
soldiers and veterans legitimized it as a new professional field. Meanwhile, repeated attempts by 
World War I occupational therapists to gain fuller access to benefits finally bore fruit six decades 
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after the war; in 1977, they, along with Signal Corps operators, clerks, and hospital dieticians 





 In the 1920s, the United States government was faced with a vexing problem: What about 
the soldiers who do not get better? What about long-term ailments like respiratory diseases and 
mental illness? When, and in what manner, should the enlisted man be, to use the parlance of the 
time, “disposed of”?
152
 As Walter Reed’s beds emptied of American Expeditionary Forces 
troops, enrollment in all areas of OT activities declined sharply. Between 1922 and 1926, 42 to 
57 percent of hospital patients were enrolled in occupational therapy at any given time. By 
August 1927, only 33 percent of patients were partaking in OT. Two years later, in October of 
1929, only 26 percent of hospital patients were doing so.
153
  
The focus of the OT program also changed over time. In December 1918, commercial 
work attracted large numbers of the 1,449 patients participating in occupational therapy work at 
the hospital, but traditional arts and crafts activities were much less popular: 142 patients partook 
in courses such as typewriting and bookkeeping, while only seven patients were enrolled in 
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jewelry, four in engraving, and five in clay modeling.
154
 A 1922 report from the Walter Reed 
occupational therapy department noted, “The men have been encouraged to take educational 
work rather than some type of craft work which would not prove so beneficial.”
155
  
But by April 1922, in spite of administrators’ best efforts to encourage patients to partake 
in supposedly useful pre-vocational classes, it was clear that a shift was underway – patients 
were moving away from commercial work and toward arts and crafts: by far, the most popular 
occupational therapy activity at Walter Reed was “reed, cane and fibre work,” an antiquated 
means of crafting chairs and other items; following close behind was textile work and 
woodwork.
156
 Over time, the mission of occupational therapy was re-defined from the practical 
restoration of manhood through the implantation of industrial usefulness to the Progressive Era 
goals of the profession – quelling hearts and minds of prospective, though damaged, workers. By 
1926, when enrollment in crafts had further increased, the annual report of the Army Surgeon 
General hinted at a population of increasing concern: OT reportedly garnered “excellent results 
in the treatment of nervous and mental patients.”
157
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 There are both pragmatic and theoretical explanations for the decreasing popularity and 
changing nature of occupational therapy services at Walter Reed. In general, army hospital 
services inevitably balloon during times of war then shrink thereafter. In some respects, the 
hospital’s World War I era program existed and lasted as long as it did because of a dearth of 
other options; in the months immediately following the war, there was no comprehensively 
organized veterans’ hospital system in the United States and pre-war policies mandated that the 
Army’s Office of the Surgeon General plan for and ensure services for injured and ill soldiers. 
Occupational therapy, which had gained credence as an effective means of industrial 
rehabilitation around the turn of the century, seemed to many like a worthwhile addition to the 
military program. Goals were less clear following the war, as the Federal Board for Vocational 
Rehabilitation became more involved in soldiers’ care, and army hospitals like Walter Reed 
played host not only to enlisted personnel, but also to chronically ill veterans whose care was 
paid for by the Bureau of War Risk Insurance. During this later period, a new veterans’ medical 
system was taking root, and administrators and government officials faced basic questions about 
how to coordinate care, where new hospitals should be located, who should be admitted to them, 
and how much funding they should receive. At Walter Reed, as occupational therapists and 
rehabilitation experts focused on ensuring that soldiers would re-enter society as productive 
citizens, if not workers, army and government officials focused on the broader mission of 
boosting the morale of wounded and ill troops, even as they began to trim the wartime 
rehabilitation program. We will see that they faced staunch resistance from soldiers themselves, 






Soldier-patients become civilian-citizens:  
Shifting presentations and perceptions of a military hospital (1918-1920) 
 
 Paul A. Bazaar recalled spending his early days at Walter Reed Hospital in “sober 
reflection.” The long, bed-lined wards and pastoral grounds were a world away from the front, 
where Bazaar had lost both of his hands when a grenade detonated prematurely. At Walter Reed, 
he said, “I painfully nursed the birth of a new hope, I made that little sphere the starting point of 
a new and brighter life…” Bazaar was discharged in February 1919, after being fitted with metal 
prostheses. By January 1921, he had graduated from business school, and was making a living in 
Rochester, New York, assisting people with their income-tax returns. “I am doing quite well,” he 
reported in a letter. “I find the going exceedingly rocky at times, and the obstacles many, but my 
philosophy, a light heart and a smile, helps to surmount most difficulties.”
1
   
 Of the approximately 230,000 American Expeditionary Forces troops wounded abroad, 
more than 50,000, like Bazaar, received treatment in U.S. military hospitals.
2
 The army sent the 
most complex cases to one of its general hospitals, which offered patients relatively advanced 
technologies and procedures, as well as some of the most extensive available rehabilitation 
options.
3
 There, recovering soldiers faced the reality of their physical conditions, and the notion 
that they were no longer combat-ready soldiers. At domestic military hospitals – for many ill and 
injured troops, one of the first stops on home ground – the government and army attempted to 
ensure that service members smoothly re-acclimated to a particular type of civilian life. Not all 
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discharged veterans were, in the eyes of the army and government, as successful as Bazaar; he 
had used his hospital time wisely, coming to terms with his injury instead of resenting it. He had 
taken advantage of the medical care offered to him, unlike many others who signed off their 
rights to government-sponsored health services in order to obtain a hasty discharge.  Bazaar had 
even gone on to obtain professional training, and become a working member of society. His was 
a model case.  
One thing about Bazaar’s experience, however, was typical: Walter Reed served as “the 
starting point of a new life” for many of its thousands of patients during and immediately after 
World War I. The hospital was a testing ground for the government’s rehabilitation program and 
its ideology of cure.  
The content of the Walter Reed’s newspaper, The Come-Back, during and immediately 
following the war demonstrates the high hopes the military and government had for healing 
wounded soldiers and returning them to society as so-called able-bodied citizens. The Come-
Back reflected the government’s desire to represent military hospitals as camp-like sanctuaries of 
learning, healing and growth. In this way, according to the newspaper, the institution harkened 
back to the nineteenth-century ideal for hospitals. It was more than a place to receive medical 
care; it constituted a tight-knit community rife with opportunities for educational and 
professional training that could equip patients with the tools necessary to enter the outside world. 
But the newspaper also hinted at the fact that military hospitals like Walter Reed were a 
harbinger of the dawning age of institutionalized, medicalized comprehensive care.
4
  It focused 
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on the activities of a community of devoted caregivers, trumpeted the considerable 
accomplishments of military medicine and newly emergent specialty care, and promoted a proud 
rendition of the history of one of the Army Medical Department’s most venerated institutions.  
While The Come-Back put forth a largely positive image of Walter Reed, patients and 
their relatives filed complaints alleging that care and conditions at the facility were 
unsatisfactory. Their claims illuminate some emerging issues of tension regarding standards for 
government-provided hospital services: what did the army owe injured and ill soldiers? When 
should they be discharged from the military and what part should the government play in 
ensuring their wellbeing as civilians?  
As emerging veterans’ advocacy groups such as The American Legion began to address 
these complex questions, and as the halls of Congress reverberated with calls for “adjusted 
compensation,” vocational training, and comprehensive medical care for former A.E.F. troops, 
the pages of The Come-Back reflected, in real time, how the army grappled with difficult 
realizations regarding soldiers’ health. As such, the newspaper’s consistently rosy coverage 
gradually gave way to tacit acknowledgements of shortfalls in the system. By 1920, it 
represented illness and injury not just as vague hurdles to overcome before one could hastily 
return to a job and family, but, occasionally, as arduously painful life-long challenges. The 
newspaper’s constant coverage of pending legislation pertaining to medical care and benefits 
served as an acknowledgement that access to hospitals and disability services was an issue of 
central political importance, and a societal conundrum of great proportions. 




Origins of The Come-Back 
In the fall of 1918, the Army Surgeon General established the Section of General 
Publicity to oversee the content of more than 40 newspapers published in hospitals abroad and in 
the U.S. with the hope that they could serve as potential morale-boosters. The new office would 
establish, supervise, and maintain publications “of interest and benefit to the patients, personnel 
and the community in general.” The Section of General Publicity kept “a watchful eye” on the 
publications it oversaw, even distributing a weekly newsletter to serve as a guide for potential 
topics worthy of coverage. But the production of newspapers like The Come-Back was reliant on 
the patients it aimed to reach: “Soldier talent secures the materials, soldier talent edits, and in 
many instances, soldier talent actually produces the paper on the press.”
5
  Still, rank-and-file 
personnel had limited autonomy. It is difficult to determine who actually penned articles that 
appeared in Walter Reed’s newspaper, since the large majority of the pieces contained no 
bylines, but it was primarily officers’ names that were listed in the editorial staff on each 
edition’s masthead. Majors, not Privates, it seems, ultimately determined what would appear in 
print.   
 Rehabilitation experts had long boasted of the potential benefits of such publications for 
soldier-patients. The army received reports that hospital newspapers and pamphlets helped 
convalescing European troops pass time more pleasantly and constructively. The German 
Lubbecker Lazarett-Zeitung (Lubeck Hospital Journal), for example, was “meant to influence the 
war cripple while he is in hospital and prepare his mind for the future,” Ruth Underhill, a 
researcher for the Red Cross, reported in September 1918, around the time the Section of 
General Publicity was established by the U.S. Army Surgeon General. “Among short bits of 
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news about trades and pensions, (the Lubbecker Lazarett-Zeitung) has inspiring verses and talks 
on the joy of suffering for the Fatherland, and each month an article on the German nature, 
featuring such qualities as industry, courage, patience, and patriotism.”
6
 The Come-Back, one of 
more than 50 newspapers published in domestic military hospitals, assumed a similar structure, 
though the propagandistic tone alluded to by Underhill was, on rare occasions, subsumed by 
editorial content that was somewhat more reflective of the realities of soldiers’ and veterans’ 
lives, and their political desires.
7
  
The Come-Back was not the only hospital newspaper published in the aftermath of World 
War I, but because of its relatively extended run time and the fact that it was the paper of record 
for Walter Reed Army General Hospital, the site of care for some of the country’s most severely 
injured soldiers, it is an especially rich source. Published weekly from December 1918 through 
March 1921, it serves as a gauge of how priorities and concerns of the Army Surgeon General’s 
Office and other government entities changed and evolved during a turbulent time.  
Scholars have recognized the utility of hospital newspapers as historical sources. Jeffrey 
Reznick argues that magazines of British military hospitals were intended to convey a positive 
image of the institutions as “relaxed and harmonious,” but that soldiers resisted what they 
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deemed the “repressive nature of the hospital regime.”
8
 Beth Linker writes about The Come-Back 
and a later magazine, Carry On, which had a related mission, as well as patient complaints 
regarding Walter Reed. Linker argues that the publications had three primary aims: convincing 
soldiers that rehabilitation was “the best form of compensation for their injuries,” one for which 
they should be grateful. Second, she says, the newspapers aimed to demonstrate that hospital-
based reconstruction was a better alternative than returning home and seeking care from local 
communities. Finally, Linker argues, the publications aimed to be cheerful and supportive of the 
War Risk Insurance Act and the war itself. While the newspaper showcases the ideological 
portrayal of the rehabilitation program, Linker says, patients’ testimonies provide evidence of 




 I build upon and diverge from these arguments about the relevance of hospital 
newspapers and patients’ testimonies. Generally, I am concerned not only with the 
propagandistic tone of The Come-Back, but also with how the messages of the army-monitored 
newspaper came to reflect the undeniable realities of what was, for soldier-patients, the army and 
the government, a time of great adjustment. While Reznick and Linker juxtapose newspapers and 
soldiers’ complaints with their larger points about (respectively) the social experience of British 
army medical care and changing notions of disability, I examine both in the context of the 
eventual advent of a veterans’ hospital system within a developing American veterans’ welfare 
state. I build upon Linker’s findings regarding how The Come-Back attempted to sell the mission 
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of “reconstruction” to soldiers themselves, and how the newspaper helped bolster the idealization 
of medical care as one form of payback for wartime sacrifices. But I also view the newspaper as 
more than propaganda; by late 1919, it served as a gauge of government-level sentiment about 
the changing nature – and many challenges – of the project of soldier rehabilitation. Although it 
trumpeted the promise of the WRIA, its tone regarding later legislative and systemic shortfalls 
was indicative of a larger realization that the contemporary system was becoming truly 
dysfunctional for all concerned – medical professionals, bureaucrats, and patients alike. The 
newspaper’s changing tone reflected not only political transitions and difficulties, but also the 
undeniable reality of the hospital experiences of soldiers themselves.  
 
“Every day brings happy moments”: the hospital, according to the Come-Back 
 
 As the public organ of one of the premier military hospitals in the United States, a 
primary goal of The Come-Back was to represent Walter Reed Hospital in the best possible light. 
Articles in the newspaper characterized the institution as a place that offered much more than 
medical care; it constituted a tight-knit community where patients could capitalize on 
opportunities for educational and professional training that would equip them with the tools 
necessary to enter the outside world. The military hospital was portrayed as a somewhat idyllic 
place where “buddies” could attend concerts, sporting events, sightseeing trips, and holiday 
parties sponsored by generous Washingtonians and beneficent welfare organizations. 
Furthermore, the newspaper reminded its readers that Walter Reed was different than other 
military hospitals. It was the site of state-of-the-art care for the most complex medical cases. 
There, patients were treated by the most committed professionals – people not only devoted to 
soldiers’ individual care, but also to the tenets of scientific research. 
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 The Come-Back announced itself triumphantly in its inaugural issue of December 4, 
1918. A drawing at the center of the paper’s first broadsheet page featured a young soldier 
looking ahead, a female nurse standing behind him, and Uncle Sam at his right, arms around the 
fighter’s shoulder. “My lad, you have shown the will to win the war – now show the will to win 
the battle of life,” read the caption. 
 
 




According to the newspaper, the assistance of caregivers and the grateful government should be 
thought of as supplementary to individual motivation and self-worth.  An accompanying article 
                                                
10
 "Let's Go!," The Come-Back December 4, 1918.  
 150 
explained that The Come-Back would be “full of cheer,” and contained a message for the 
wounded returning from France: “If any of them have a notion that Walter Reed or any other 
hospital under the Surgeon General’s jurisdiction is a place of gloom, The Come-Back will knock 
it out in sixteen-inch-shell fashion.”
11
  
 Walter Reed was showcased as a joyful place, where patients celebrated holidays and 
watched concerts and sports matches. A “great yuletide” was arranged for Christmas of 1918, 
with “smokes and eats for all,” and there was extensive coverage of the many sports teams 
formed by the Red Cross Recreation Division.
12
 In January 1919, boxing matches were held 
between various members of the hospital staff of the Quartermaster Corps and the Knights of 
Columbus. The featured bout was between Sergeant Joe Chip of the Reconstruction Division, 
(reputed to be the “fastest middle-weight in the Army”) and Private Schaeffer of the 
Quartermaster Corps. “The whole evening’s entertainment was of a very meritorious character,” 
The Come-Back reported, “and it will be noted that every one of the performers are men attached 
to this post, proving that Walter Reed Hospital can live up to its high reputation in this as well as 
in many other lines.”
13
 Walter Reed was home to an array of social options for both patients and 
staff. The YMCA, Red Cross, Knights of Columbus, and Jewish Welfare Board each had 
facilities by early 1919 on or near the hospital’s campus, and sponsored a plethora of activities, 
including movie screenings, dances, and sightseeing trips around Washington, D.C., many of 
which were enthusiastically covered by The Come-Back.  
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A poem published in the March 12, 1919 issue of the paper noted some of the common 
challenges faced by patients – replaying memories of battles, for example – and the tremendous 
comfort, cheer, and community found in the services offered by the hospital and its associated 
organizations:  
Many things we will remember  
when discharged and we are freed. 
And our hearts will grow more tender. 
For the years soon pass away. 
And we’ll picture scenes and faces. 
Then the memories of today. 
There’s the pine trees through the window 
Showing green against the snow. 
And the fireplace in the evening. 
With its coals a rosy glow. 
Where we fight again the battles 
with the boys from o’er the sea. 
And we straighten out the details. 
For they’re now but history. 
There’s a feeling in our friendship 
For these comrades that will last. 
And we gain a certain pleasure 
In grim pictures of the past. 
Every day brings happy moments. 
For the Red Cross knows our need. 
Many friends in loving service 
Join the work at Walter Reed… 
There is work of reconstruction 
For the men who sadly lack. 
And a paper in the interest 




The hospital, like its nineteenth century forebears, was represented as a place where 
patients could find joy and camaraderie in a communal, home-like atmosphere, but also as a 
place where they could capitalize on a rich array of opportunities for training and education. 
Victor Kauffman, a reporter for The Washington Star and frequent advocate for the work of 
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Walter Reed Hospital, juxtaposed two of the primary missions of the The Come-Back and Walter 
Reed itself: to keep up the morale of “the boys” and create a sense of community, while 
simultaneously pushing soldier-patients to use their recovery time wisely in order to prepare 
themselves for civilian existence. “Occasionally one hears the remark made by thoughtless 
people that too much is being done for the entertainment of the boys at Walter Reed Hospital,” 
Kauffman wrote. “Their idea is that on leaving the hospital after their discharge these young men 
will be in an entirely different environment and must look out for themselves.” But, he argued, 
“all the boys at Walter Reed Hospital have given up months or years of the best part of their lives 
for their country and their friends, and all of them have made bitter sacrifices. It is my honest 
belief that they are entitled to a few hours of playtime before settling down to the stern realities 
of later life.” Kaufman noted, however, that there should be limits to carefree indulgences at the 
hospital. “All opportunities for enjoyment are liable to be abused,” he said, “and I would urge 
every boy to take advantage of every opportunity in the matter of education or vocational 
training before he goes in for any light form of personal amusement or recreation.” Kaufman 
reminded readers that, “the hospital offers wonderful chances to learn useful trades that will fit 
the young soldiers to take a very active and responsible part in the big battle of life ahead, and 
any young man who fails to take advantage of every such chance is his own worst enemy.”
15
  
To these ends, The Come-Back kept soldier-patients abreast of opportunities to better 
their physical condition by participating in occupational therapy crafts classes, and their mental, 
and economic conditions through academic and professional training courses. In March 1919, 
under the headline “Soldier-patients at Walter Reed Make Progress in Classes,” The Come-Back 
published a list of 27 courses being offered at the hospital, from shorthand and rug-weaving to 
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type-writing, and elementary and general academics.  The newspaper reported that 1,072 
students were enrolled in classes in March 1919: “Soldiers are alive to the work... ‘Prepare now, 
in the hospital while recovering from one scrap, for the big fight that is to come in civilian life’ 
are the words one soldier used to describe the situation.”
16
 Soldier-patients read in The Come-
Back that they could take classes in motion picture operating, electricity, stenography, linotype, 
and to train for civil service exams.
17
 “In auto repair shops,” as was the case in many other 
trades, the newspaper reported, “men who have lost one leg can manipulate the machinery and 
handle the tools for repairing to the same degrees of efficiency as any man.”
18
  
 Alongside informational pieces about educational opportunities, The Come-Back 
reminded patients that a perfect physique was not essential in order to live a fruitful economic 
life. A February 1920 editorial was addressed to those who might be skeptical of such an idea. 
Some, “who should be deeply interested in examples… of wounded men who, while 
convalescing, have laid plans and foundations for careers, far different from those they pursued 
in ante-bellum days, which have proven to be a marked successes… merely mutter, ‘the lucky 
bird.’” But, for people like Paul A. Bazaar and other “Johns” who found professional success 
after being wounded and rehabilitated, it had nothing to do with luck, according to The Come-
Back. “In reality it is highly probable that, while on a hospital bed, John realized his disability 
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would prevent a return to his former employment, made good use of spare moments and 
minimized the effects of his misfortunes…”
19
 
 The Come-Back offered somewhat conflicting messages regarding soldiers’ opportunities 
upon discharge. On the one hand, readers were encouraged to visit the library and peruse books 
about new professions such as advertising, which were typically thought of as less physically 
demanding modes of employment.
20
 But a seemingly contradictory point was communicated in a 
few articles urging men to return to their previous jobs, regardless of whether they desired a new 
one. Ex-soldiers should wait for the economy to improve, these articles argued, before making a 
big move to a large city, or attempting to undertake new employment. According to one Come-
Back article, “the soldier feels… that he is entitled to a job when he gets out, and sometimes a 
better job than the one he occupied when he went... He is unqualifiedly right… we want to 
encourage just this thing.” The newspaper pointed out, however, that while personal initiative 
was noble, it could bring about only limited results. “The trouble at this time is that just when the 
majority of our fighting men are being discharged, the industrial situation is in a delicate, 
disturbed condition… there are not one-half as many jobs available for the discharged soldier 
and the quest for this better job is liable to meet with unhappy results.” Given this reality, 
soldiers were advised that, “the best thing for the soldier to do at present, considering the 
delicately balanced industrial situation… is to return to his former job, if he has one.
21
 
                                                
19
 "Wound Stripes and Opportunities," The Come-Back February 4, 1920. 
20
 "Get a Good Start by Visiting the Library," The Come-Back January 15, 1919.  
21
 See, for example, "Best Bargain yet, Is Lad from Front," The Come-Back March 19, 1919. Scott Gelber also 
writes about vocational training programs limiting men from reaching too high. Scott Gelber, "A 'Hard-Boiled 
Order': The Reeducation of Disabled World War I Veterans in New York City," Journal of Social History 39, no. 1 
(2005). 
 155 
In spite of acknowledgements of soldier-patients’ limited future employment 
prospects, The Come-Back published testimonials from patients, and stories of successes 
following training – in large part to convey the importance of pursuing educational 
opportunities while at the hospital. “When I came to this hospital, I was full of aches and 
pains and my mind was constantly centered on my future,” wrote Private Frank A. Sobel 
in a Letter to the Editor on December 31 1919. When a nurse convinced him to enroll in 
an arithmetic class, he reported, “I at once forgot my aches and pains.” He urged fellow 
patients not to “push this wonderful opportunity aside.”
22
 Another letter to the editor on 
February 11, 1920 concurred. Lieutenant Newgirg told readers that after he had gotten 
“some relief from suffering,” he attended classes at Walter Reed, an experience he found 
to be of “great benefit.” “Often when not feeling able to come I have urged myself and in 
the doing have found that it helped overcome the pain.”
23
  
 Why did the army have such a vested interest in the civilian futures of its enlistees?  
What, after all, could these disabled soldiers offer the military? The training opportunities 
offered at Walter Reed, in fact, went above and beyond the mission set out for military hospitals 
by regulations passed prior to and during the war. At first, army officials hoped that men who 
were missing legs and arms could fill administrative positions in the service if they were 
properly trained. But by mid- to late 1919, when the war was over and it was clear that there 
were more disabled men than there were suitable military jobs, injured and ill soldiers became 
part of a broad attempt at an army institutional renaissance, which took as its primary goal the 
consideration of the “whole man.” The army was not merely a benevolent institution for men 
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who would never return to duty. It was using its interaction with them to create for itself an 
image as a sophisticated fighting force that not only used men as fodder for wars, but also trained 
them to be better auto mechanics, pilots, doctors, and the like.
24
    
As army brass fought to push through the National Defense Act of 1920, they 
simultaneously undertook a campaign to re-create the military in the eyes of the public and 
veterans.
25
 Rehabilitating disabled veterans corresponded with the image the army was putting 
forth of itself as an institutional force that intended to do more than fight, one that held value and 
rich opportunities for individual citizen-soldiers. To these ends, The Come-Back sponsored an 
essay contest in early 1920 that it promoted week after week, which eventually ended with a 
celebration held in Washington, D.C. In an effort to help grade school students fulfill the 
assigned task of writing about the benefits of army service, The Come-Back published articles 
focusing on the topic. Contestants were encouraged to use the articles as guides for their 
submissions.  “There has seldom been a time in the history of the military when an enlisted man 
of ambition and determination could not improve himself tremendously along educational and 
vocational lines,” The Come-Back declared. “The encouragement of such improvement… was 
subsidiary to the main object of the small pre-war army,” the newspaper conceded. Before the 
current conflict, military leaders were focused first and foremost on “the development of the 
hard-fighting, dependable force capable of expansion, and which was to be the foundation and 
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nucleus of a powerful army. In pre-war days,” The Come-Back noted, “vocational and 
educational improvement did not constitute the goal which much of the energy of the military 
establishment was directed.” But World War I brought about a tide change, according to the 
newspaper. “With the lessons of the great conflict being studied diligently, the new army has 




Going beyond a mere focus on fighting tactics, the army would offer instruction in 
various trades, from medicine to construction.  An article explaining why Walter Reed and other 
army installations were seeing a proliferation of athletic and recreational facilities explained the 
tenets of the “new army” similarly. “The policy… was based upon the belief that the 
responsibility of the War Department for the care and comfort of the soldier does not end with 
his working day… unlike civilian organizations the War Department feels itself charged with the 
entire 24 hours of the soldier’s day. It clothes and feeds him, it educates him...”
27
 Treating and 
training disabled soldiers was part of a broader vision of a vastly expanded military mission, not 
to mention good public relations. In order to get “the mothers of America” to “send us the lads 




 Soldier-patients who capitalized on training opportunities and became productive citizens 
were not only sources of pride for a military with an expanding vision, The Come-Back reminded 
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readers, but were also part of a grand success story of military medicine, a centerpiece of which 
was the institution of Walter Reed itself.  The newspaper regularly noted that the health care 
administered at Walter Reed served as a model for other facilities – civilian and military – and 
that the institution was at the pinnacle of the venerable Army Medical Department. Walter Reed 
patients were often reminded that they had access to a broad spectrum of professional specialists 
such as orthopedists, plastic surgeons, and occupational and physical therapists.  Although The 
Come-Back contained little coverage of medical care and doctors – technicalities of military 
medicine and health treatment, it seemed, were best left to journals like Military Surgeon – in 
early January 1921, the newspaper featured a story about a clinic held at the hospital the previous 
week.  Calling it the “largest medical clinic in the history of Washington,” The Come-Back 
reported that more than 150 doctors and students from Johns Hopkins University, George 
Washington University, and the Army Medical School had observed a presentation by Walter 
Reed doctors of 50 patient cases with conditions including bone defects, mustard gas burns, 
amputations, and gunshot wounds. Although patients’ names were kept confidential, the 
newspaper did report that, “from the point of view of the suffering soldiers undergoing treatment, 
the interest manifested in them by the clinic was most helpful. It has stimulated the morale of the 
sick.”
29
  Following a tour of the wards of Walter Reed, Brigadier General John M.T. Finney of 
Johns Hopkins, who was Chief of Medical Services of the American Expeditionary Forces, noted 
how impressed he was with what he saw. The ongoing work at Walter Reed, he contended, could 
be helpful in the instruction of doctors and nurses working in industry.  
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Finney argued that the hospital deserved recognition not only for its exemplary care, but 
even more so because it was dealing with patients who were “the left-overs from the hospitals in 
Europe and on this side… they are the most chronic and the most difficult to deal with… these 
are the severest cases of the war… men whose health has long been undermined, whose morale 
is affected.” The Johns Hopkins doctor called Walter Reed “a wonderful plant,” arguing that 
there was “nothing like [it] anywhere in the country.” It can’t be excelled,” he said. “You could 
not go into any civil hospital in the US and see better work and better results than we saw at the 
clinic today.” Finney pointed out that Walter Reed doctors had devised innovative ways to deal 
with empyema, a relatively common condition among soldiers of World War I, characterized by 
a gathering of pus between the lungs and the wall of the chest.
30
 They had also revolutionized the 
art of bone grafting, which allowed a portion of one bone to be used to replace another. “The 
men shown at today’s clinic, had they been wounded in previous wars, would simply have been 
abandoned without hope, to become, many of them, public charges,” Finney said. “Now, 




The clinic, intended to highlight the valor and uniqueness of the medical work being 
undertaken at the hospital, helped justify the call from army higher-ups and hospital officials for 
the expansion of Walter Reed Army General Hospital into a more expansive Army Medical 
Center, complete with a museum, Surgeon General’s Library, and medical school on premises.  
The vision of an all-encompassing medical center was consistently trumpeted in the newspaper. 
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In November 1918, Army Surgeon General Merritte W. Ireland laid a plan for a larger Walter 
Reed before the Secretary of War. “For a considerable time” after the war, the Surgeon General 
pointed out, “many sick and wounded will require treatment, and it is believed that the military 
population entitled to treatment in military hospitals will be greater after the war than it was 
before.” The permanent bed capacity at Walter Reed at the time, Ireland said, was only about 
2,500. The acquisition of more land would mean that the Secretary of War could “confine all of 
the Army medical activities in or near Washington on this ground.” It would also provide more 
space for outdoor recreation, a facility to treat civilian employees of the War Department, and 
“experts (to be) concentrated at this place to whom all difficult cases in the Service can be 
referred.”32 Although the Secretary of War initially rejected the request for more land, he came 
around to the idea after meeting with Surgeon General Ireland. According to one representative 
of the Army Chief of Staff, since the land surrounding the hospital would likely “steadily 
increase in value” the army should “take advantage of the options” which would permit it to 
“obtain possession of the land, without which there can be no centralization of the Medical and 
Surgical activities in the District of Columbia so essential to the best interests of the Medical 
Department.” The Secretary of War thus authorized an expenditure of $350,000 for the 
expansion of Walter Reed.33 But in moving forward with plans, the War Department faced 
resistance from landowners: “the price demanded” for plots surrounding Walter Reed Hospital,” 
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according to a June 1920 memo from Secretary of War Baker, “is in excess of a fair and 
reasonable value of the land.”34  
In spite of such setbacks, by the early 1920s, plans were moving forward on a vast 
expansion of Walter Reed. A congressionally-approved purchase of land was, Surgeon General 
Ireland reported in August 1920, the first step in an institutional expansion estimated to cost $12 
million. “This hospital, of course, will never fulfill its mission until it is completed in every 
respect,” Ireland lamented in The Come-Back. “The temporary buildings, constructed in great 
haste during the war emergency, have served for the care of the soldiers from the world war, but 
it is necessary to have many additional buildings to complete our plant.”35  The post World War I 
period, then, was not only a time of transition and adaptation for disabled soldiers and veterans, 
but also for the institution of Walter Reed itself. There, Great War era reforms helped push 
forward plans for a long-sought premier army medical center.  
Pre-war policies intended to ensure that ex-soldiers did not become pensioners, then, 
helped bring about a vast, long-term expansion of notions of what a military hospital should and 
could do. On September 1, 1923, Walter Reed went from being merely a “general hospital” to 
being an “Army Medical Center.” The sprawling complex, a Surgeon General’s report claimed, 
“acts as the central unit in the professional educational system of the Medical Department.” In 
the wake of the Great War, Walter Reed’s wards would serve not only as havens for the 
“treatment of the sick and wounded of the Army and discharged disabled soldiers,” but also for 
training programs geared at army medical officers, “hospital internes,” “enlisted specialists,” and 
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occupational therapists, among others.
36
 World War I marked only the beginning of a long-term 
institutional expansion. 
 
A different interpretation of the hospital: Soldier complaints 
Some patients’ perceptions of Walter Reed differed sharply from The Come-Back’s 
portrayal of the hospital as the pinnacle of medical advancement, and a community of healing 
and learning.  The Army Inspector General’s Department investigated more than 20 complaints 
pertaining to conditions and patient treatment at the institution between February 1918 and 
October 1921.  Many of these cases ended in absolution for the hospital, but some led the 
Inspector General to suggest that changes be implemented in its administration.  Two 
investigations in particular – into laundry services provided at Walter Reed and rules regarding 
discharge – demonstrate that individual patients and their loved ones had anything but 
unquestioningly positive views of the care being provided by the military and government.  Even 
during initial encounters with state-sponsored rehabilitation for the wounds and ills resulting 
from war, dissatisfaction was mounting among soldiers and their advocates. Service members 
expressed resentment at what they deemed low-quality hospital services, and at being discharged 
before they felt wholly self-sufficient; they faulted an army health system they argued was 
negligent. But army doctors, nurses, and other health officials defended the care being provided. 
They argued that they were forced to abide by vague policies in an over-extended medical 
system, and noted that ex-soldiers could turn to civilian entities upon release from service in 
order to obtain services.  
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A study of the testimonies gathered during these investigations demonstrates two things: 
first, it shows vast differences in expectations – and by extension, perceptions – of the nature and 
extent of governmental obligations to U.S. service members and veterans. Second, it highlights 
some of the main shortfalls of a rehabilitation effort centered in military facilities, and the root 
causes of the decision to establish a federally-sponsored hospital system tailored to the needs of 
ex-service members. Pre-war hopes that army medical services would serve any and all needs of 
injured and ill American Expeditionary Forces troops, the investigations show, had given way to 
bureaucratic realities.  
 
“Fair play was we should have our clothes washed”: The extent of military obligations 
On January 25, 1919, The Washington Evening Star ran a damning exposé regarding 
laundry service at Walter Reed. Some patients, the paper reported, wore the same undergarments 
for weeks on end because they lacked the physical ability, due to incapacity from injury or 
illness, to wash them.  Some sent the clothing to be professionally laundered at their own 
expense. Others, lacking the funds to do so, were compelled to do their own washing in bathtubs.  
The upshot, according the Star was that many were forced to abandon wearing undergarments all 
together, and remain only in pajamas, since those could be laundered by the same hospital 
service charged with cleaning linens.
37
  
 The underwear the Star referred to was likely somewhat cumbersome to wash. 
According to two authors, the World War I era marked a transition in the history of men’s 
undergarments, when the popularity of the “union suit,” a full-length, long-sleeved bodysuit, was 
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challenged. They contend that the turning point came about, in part, because A.E.F. soldiers were 
issued shirts and lightweight shorts as underwear – the precursor to boxer shorts, sometimes 
called “skivvies” by soldiers – rather than the union suit.
38
 But Doran Cart, Senior Curator at the 
National World War I Museum in Kansas City, Missouri, points out that lightweight cotton 
shorts were issued primarily to soldiers stationed in the U.S. The most common type of 
underwear issued to soldiers serving on the front lines consisted of wool pants and wool long-
sleeved shirts. A limited number of soldiers who served abroad, Cart says, were issued cotton 
pants and cotton long-sleeved shirts for wear in warmer weather. Given the fact that most of the 
Walter Reed patients who took issue with laundry services at the hospital had fought abroad, and 
some mentioned the idea that their underwear was comparatively warmer than pajamas, they 
were likely referring to long wool pants and a long-sleeved wool shirt.
39
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Soldiers who served abroad were typically issued heavy wool underwear, which injured patients 




After the release of the Star story, the Inspector General’s Department hastily conducted 
a follow-up investigation, which pointed out that of the 1,881 patients in the hospital, 1,054 were 
being treated for injuries or illnesses that did not involve amputations and were ambulatory; they 
were fully capable of doing their own laundry. Another 559 patients were amputees (267 arm 
and 332 leg amputees), of whom 450 were ambulatory. Testimony was collected from ten 
percent, or 45 of these ambulatory amputation cases, since the Star had focused on these men in 
its story.
41
 Some patients had little in the way of complaints. Private Jim Pares, whose right arm 
and right leg had been amputated, said he wore pajamas because they were more comfortable 
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given his physical condition. But he had no qualms with Walter Reed or its staff: “They treat me 
good,” he said. “I can only kick for this leg, that is all.”
42
  Private Joseph Thibodeux said he 
would have preferred to wear underwear instead of pajamas, mostly because the former were 
warmer, but his pair disappeared after he washed them in the latrine and left them there to dry.  
He had been unable to secure others since.
43
  Private Edward Stubbs, whose left arm had been 
amputated, said he was able to wash his handkerchiefs and socks, but that washing underwear, 
because it was comparatively larger, was impossible.
44
  These men were reserved in their claims 
and complaints, merely stating the facts about the laundry situation, but replying that they had no 
official gripes about the hospital when asked outright by the Inspector. Private Ernest E. Birge, 
who had both of his legs amputated at the thigh, reported that it was “perfectly alright” that he 
had to wear pajamas temporarily while he awaited his laundry.  He was fortunate enough to have 
his washing done by a local volunteer who decided to do her bit for wounded soldiers by 
washing their clothes.
45
   
 But a few who had not happened upon such resources spoke less blithely about their 
feelings. Private Samuel Ellis, a black soldier whose right arm had been amputated, explained to 
the inspector general that he was wearing pajamas because his only pair of underwear had 
disappeared after he washed them “with my one hand” and left them to dry.  Following his 
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detailed account, he was asked bluntly by the Inspector: “What did you report to me for?” Ellis 
answered with equal abruptness: “My complaint is no clothes, no underwear, no socks, bought 
my own socks and got no way to wash my clothes and can’t wring them out with one hand and 
there is no place to dry them in the ward.”
46
  Private Owen McMahon, whose right leg had been 
amputated, spoke with similar urgency directly to the issue of whether patients should be held 
accountable for doing their own washing at all: “I was expecting that we should have all our 
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Although members of the staff of the hospital recognized the problem at hand and vowed 
that immediate action would be taken, they expressed shock and disappointment about the 
patient complaints. The 1917 annual report of Walter Reed Hospital lamented that there was a 
lack of storage space and transportation to provide for the tremendous increase in the amount of 
washing being done at the institution; approximately 34,000 pieces had been laundered in 1916, 
compared with almost 87,000 in 1917.
49
 Major Francis Christian, hospital Quartermaster, noted 
that, in January and October of 1918, E.R. Schreiner, the Commander of Walter Reed, had 
requested that the Surgeon General authorize the expansion of laundry facilities at the hospital, 
but no action had been taken.
50
 Schreiner himself reported the same to the Inspector General, 
adding that prior to the publication of the story in the Star, “no information of maimed patients 
doing their own washing had come to my attention.” Following the article’s publication, he 
noted, he had worked with Christian to arrange for patients’ laundry to be sent to Fort Meade in 
Maryland.
51
    
Hospital staff never argued that patients deserved this service as an earned privilege; in 
this respect, there was a disconnect between what Walter Reed employees thought soldier-
patients deserved, and what soldier-patients felt they were owed. In fact, hospital higher-ups had 
considered utilizing a private laundry service at the expense of the soldiers themselves, but 
Schreiner thought the record-keeping involved in such an endeavor would be overwhelming. As 
the logistics were worked out with Camp Meade, he ordered that a stock supply of underwear, 
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 The American Red Cross was also eager to step up. Edith Oliver Rea, Field Director of 
the organization’s post at Walter Reed was regretful that neither she nor the women under her 
charge who visited patients in wards daily were aware of the situation. “Of course, we listen to a 
great many complaints of different kinds, but my orders to all my ladies have been not to 
encourage them in their grouches but to do everything in their power to help them; and I assure 
you that this thing was not brought to our attention,” she told a representative of the Inspector 
General. Even as hospital higher-ups like Schreiner and Christian planned to offer a new laundry 
service through Camp Meade, Rea said the Red Cross would take written requests from patients 
for that organization to assist them with washing. It was important to get the requests in writing, 
Rea said, to avoid abuse of the system by “some of those lazy men would want to have their’s 
(sic) done – you know, there are a great many men who want to accept favors without doing 
anything in return.”
53
   
 Rea’s statement alluded to a central principle of World War I-era reconstruction and a 
central issue in the broader (and ongoing) debate about models for hospital care in general: how 
to balance an institution’s medical and social missions. World War I caregivers knew they had an 
obligation to help wounded and ill soldiers get physically better, but they faced a conundrum 
regarding the prospective role they should play in promoting self-reliance and a hasty return to 
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non-institutional, civilian life.  The Star story neglected to convey the idea that allowing a soldier 
to do his own laundry could be seen as encouraging him to partake in activities essential to daily 
life. That was how Lieutenant Willard A. Widnew of the Sanitary Corps at Walter Reed saw it. 
He realized that the act of doing one’s washing was a “hardship” for some soldiers, but “our 
attitude – at least my attitude – in regard to the one-armed men has been to regard them as nearly 
as I was able to as whole men and to put account on it (sic) in that he was able to do what other 
men were able to do, and although I have seen men have difficulty with their washing, but (sic) I 
felt that they would devise a way to do it and it was an instrument to assist us in the rehabilitation 
of the men.”
54
  Where, the question seemed to be, was the line between rehabilitative therapy and 
excessively high expectations? Hospital staff faced the difficult question of whether to treat 
patients as soldiers who should be subject to maximum discipline with limited individual rights, 
or as venerated citizens, who had done their bit and deserved special treatment. 
 In defense of Walter Reed’s credibility, army brass and hospital administrators turned to 
two sensible explanations regarding oversights in laundry services. First, they said, Walter Reed 
was not originally intended to house a vast number of ambulatory patients and the proper 
resources had not been supplied for it to serve in that role. The facility was thus bound to 
encounter logistical challenges during war.  Second, administrators argued that the rehabilitation 
project itself called into question the veracity of a government-sponsored laundry service that 
spurred laziness by freeing men from a responsibility they would likely have to take on in 
civilian life.  Even as they attempted to absolve the institution of blame, however, administrators 
hastily implemented immediate changes to alleviate the situation.   
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In his summary of the investigation, the inspector general’s representative noted that the 
negative publicity that came with the publication of the article was “greatly deplored” by Walter 
Reed staff and volunteers. “The hospital facilities were not designed with the idea that patients 
would do their own washing,” he said.  In peacetime, the vast majority of the patients were bed 
patients, and would be wearing convalescent suits, but under war conditions, many more patients 
were ambulatory and could wear their uniforms. The fact that existing regulations provided no 
means for men to have their clothes cleaned, other than by paying for them to be professionally 
laundered, or by doing the washing themselves, “had evidently not been given consideration in 
the hospital plans.”  In the end, the Inspector General reported, 20 of the men interviewed were 
found to have been doing their own laundry – mostly while seated at hospital bathtubs – while 
others either sent it out to be washed at their own expense, or opted to wear pajamas.  Once the 
hospital Commander and the Red Cross became aware that the patients needed help, the 
inspector general reported, “immediate steps were taken to supply it.”
55
   
 Their well-intentioned efforts aside, the inspector general’s investigation highlighted the 
notion that the U.S. government was leaning heavily on military facilities to provide medical 
care (and living quarters, for that matter) for thousands of soldiers whose needs exceeded the 
services available to them. Soldiers’ complaints about a lack of clean clothes expressed more 
than just frustration with a daily need unmet; they were a demonstration that military hospitals 
and their staffs were ill-equipped – physically and ideologically – to handle the long-term needs 
of chronic patients. Extended care, it was clear, would have to take place in a different sort of 
venue.  
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“Until some provision is made I do not wish to be separated from the army”: Complaints about 
discharge 
 
In spite of complaints about conditions at Walter Reed, some soldiers were eager to 
prolong their stays there.  An investigation into claims of patients who felt they were being 
prematurely discharged from the facility shows that pre-war plans not only placed a heavy 
weight on military hospitals, but that they also left up to interpretation the question of when a 
soldier was, to use the words of pre-war legislation pertaining to the issue, “functionally restored 
as far as possible.”
56
 Many soldiers strove for a hasty discharge from service and a return to 
civilian life, but some others complained they were rushed out of the army – and its hospitals – 
before they were physically capable of taking care of themselves.  The disgruntled soldiers’ 
cause was taken up by South Dakota Republican Congressman Royal C. Johnson, whose May 
1920 letter to the Secretary of War resulted in a six-month inspector general’s investigation into 
matters of premature discharges and neglect at Walter Reed Hospital.
57
   
There were hints immediately following the Armistice that the rehabilitation project 
would be complicated by rules regarding when and how to release soldiers from service. In 
December 1918, the army, eager to rid itself of the responsibility of caring for patients who pined 
for home and resisted military dictates and discipline, modified its discharge policies. The War 
Department allowed service members who furnished documents showing they could access 
necessary care outside of the army to be released. According to the rules of such a discharge, the 
Secretary of War was thereafter released from any further responsibility for treatment. The army 
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policy stemmed from “an anxiety to be discharged among both officer and enlisted patients that 
amounted almost to hysteria and was universal...”
58
  
But the reasoning for seeking discharge could extend beyond a desire to be free of army 
discipline and hierarchy, and have to do with a hankering for control over the nature of medical 
care one could receive. Ralph Williams, who had been badly wounded in France, was one of 
those who rejected treatment and opted to be released from the military. “When I went before the 
examining board, they said I was to go to Walter Reed Hospital for possible surgery,” Williams 
reported. “I said I did not wish to have that done and explained that I had been told not to rush 
into it.” Williams’ dissent, he implied, brought about some hostility. “They informed me that I 
was still in the army and subject to their orders…. I was told that if I did not agree to the surgery 
I would have to sign waivers of any further claim against the government. That is what I did.
59
  
The fear of contemporary observers that the new discharge rules would mean that “the 
majority of the disabled would return to civil life in a physically unfit condition rather than in the 
best condition possible… thereby completely destroying the general utility of the entire 
reconstruction program,” ultimately proved prescient.
60
 Although the 1918 discharge rule 
released the army from further obligations to injured and ill ex-service members like Ralph 
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Williams, it was ultimately decided that it did not release civilian governmental agencies from 
the same. 
For those who did seek care in military hospitals, the discharge process could be complex 
and lengthy. In 1920, the typical procedure for a soldier’s discharge from Walter Reed, 
according to Major Lucius L. Hopwood, the hospital’s Supervisor of Clinical Records, began 
when the Chief of the Medical or Surgical Service decided that a patient had come as close to 
maximum improvement as could be expected.  The Ward Surgeon then proceeded to seek 
clearance from the chiefs of various services who had been involved in the treatment of the 
soldier, before working with the Section Chief to fill out discharge papers indicating, among 
other things, a disability rating and a judgment as to “whether or not further treatment is 




Soldiers and officers had limited say in the discharge process. As the Section Chief 
circulated the proper paperwork, hospital officials sent written notice to the patient that his 
discharge was being “contemplated” to take place two weeks from the date of notification. He 
was also told to appear before the hospital board for a physical examination.
62
 In the Spring of 
1920, one soldier’s Medical Board proceedings included four Board members: Lucius Hopwood, 
William L. Keller, Chief of the Surgical Service at Walter Reed, and two other, high-ranking 
army doctors and Medical Corps members.
63
 If an officer was found to have a disability, or 
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claimed to have a disability, or if he objected to his discharge, he could bring his case to a “board 
of review.” According to Hopwood, officers and enlisted men sat in on review board proceedings 
concerning their own cases and received an opportunity to share their opinions. But they were 
excused from the room when the doctors discussed the issues of greatest concern: the degree of 
disability and whether or not a disability would be listed on discharge papers as having been 
contracted in the “line of duty.” Once release from service was agreed upon and mandated, a 




Some soldiers testified that the process was not so systematic or fair. Complaints made 
about early discharge hinted at dissatisfaction with the quality of care offered at Walter Reed, but 
even more so at a sense of dejection about the prospects men thought they faced following their 
stays there.   
Lieutenant Arthur L. Chamberlain, for example, suffered from bronchitis, insomnia, and 
psychoneurosis after his boat was torpedoed off the coast of Ireland and he waded in the water 
for hours. Following five months of treatment at Walter Reed, Chamberlain was discharged with 
a disability rating of 15 percent in March 1920.  A few days before his scheduled separation from 
service, he wrote to Hopwood: “I have asked to be discharged March 15
th
 as I cannot see the use 
of staying around the hospital without improvement in my condition, however when I made this 
request I expected to be taken care of after leaving the service.”  Chamberlain withdrew his 
request for discharge, implying that his condition was as bad, if not worse than those who had 
received ratings of total permanent disability. “Until some provision is made I do not wish to be 
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separated from the army,” he wrote. “I have a wife and two children to support but as I cannot do 
anything for them I don’t know what to do but to commit suicide and end it all.”
65
  
By minimizing the degree of his injury, according to Chamberlain, the army had hindered 
his ability to support his family. The soldier’s plea was presented to a later disability board, 
which maintained the 15 percent decision, and released him from the army.  Under review by the 
Bureau of War Risk Insurance, the Treasury Department agency created to administer insurance 
and disability compensation payments to World War I veterans, the rating was increased to total 
temporary disability, which bolstered the veteran’s charge that Walter Reed administrators had 
been merciless. After being evaluated by the Public Health Service, the federal entity that 
assumed control of administering medical care to veterans once they were discharged from the 
army, he said: “I have been told I have not reached maximum improvement, but that I was 
curable and would be all right in time.”
66
    
 Lieutenant William H. Vail also argued that his subsequent treatment by the Public 
Health Service justified his claim that he had been prematurely discharged from the army.  Vail, 
who was treated at Walter Reed from March 1919 through April 1920, had his left leg amputated 
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below the knee and a fracture of the frontal bone of his head, which resulted in a depression in 
his skull.  Vail was relatively satisfied with the treatment he received for his leg, but reported: “I 
was very much afraid of my head, knowing that it involved the brain. I wanted everything to be 
just as good as possible, and I felt that the conditions (at Walter Reed) were not such…”  Several 
times, Vail asked for the authority to consult with specialists at Johns Hopkins Hospital.  “I lost 
confidence in the surgeons at (Walter Reed),” he said. “They did not seem to get down to brass 
tacks.”  In spite of his desire to seek medical care outside of the military hospital, Vail protested 
his certificate of discharge, which he said came “out of a clear sky.” He was not ready to leave 
the service, he said.
67
 But Colonel William L. Keller, Chief of the Surgical Service at Walter 
Reed claimed that army doctors offered to perform the head surgery for Vail, and that once he 
declined, they assessed that he had reached maximum improvement and should be discharged 
from the army.
68
 Soon after the soldier’s discharge, a Boston surgeon operated on Vail, telling 
him the surgery was unavoidable.  Vail reported to the inspector general that his expenses in 
Boston were covered by the Public Health Service, which “was all very satisfactory, but I 
constantly felt I should not have been discharged until this had been done.”
69
 Like Chamberlain, 
Vail believed that, given the fact that he had entered the service self-sufficient and whole, he 
should remain under the army’s auspices until his post-service condition was unquestionably 
stable.   
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 Lieutenant John Henry Gose claimed, like Vail, to be satisfied with the treatment he 
received for one injury, but not others.  A flying accident in England led to the amputation of the 
pilot’s right leg, and severe burns on the left. Gose also said he had fractures and a lack of 
circulation in his left ankle, a stiff jaw, and partial deafness. Fitted with a temporary limb at 
Walter Reed, Gose said he had few complaints about his overall treatment. “The only problem 
was the attitude to the ankle,” he said.  In March 1919, hospital administrators recommended he 
be discharged, but he refused to sign the papers until his ankle was X-rayed. Once this was done, 
hospital officials agreed an operation was necessary, but said that the soldier’s circulation had to 
be improved before it could be performed. For six months, Gose received massage treatments to 
these ends, but when the head of the Orthopedic Service was replaced by a new staff member, he 
said he was abruptly notified that “I received my maximum improvement… even though I 
expressed myself as feeling that I had not received my maximum improvement.”  Like 
Chamberlain and Vail, Gose’s original army disability rating of 70 percent was eventually 
increased by the Bureau of War Risk Insurance to total permanent disability. When asked about 
the extent of treatment offered to the soldier, both Marion R. Mobley, the new head of Walter 
Reed’s Orthopedic Section, and Lucius Hopwood, the Supervisor of Clinical Records, stood by 
the decision that he had reached maximum improvement by the time he was discharged.
70
   
 Private George B. Russo, like his fellow patient, Arthur Chamberlain, expressed his 
desire to be discharged from the hospital, but later testified that his release was premature, given 
the sudden challenges he faced upon being released.  A patient at Walter Reed from February 
1919 through his discharge from the army in May 1920, Russo, whose left leg had been 
                                                
70
  Inspector General's Department, "Sworn Statement of John Henry Gose, Taken by Major C.C. Kinney, I.G., at 
Washington, D.C." June 14, 1920.  Office of the Inspector General Correspondence, 1917-1934, Record Group 159, 
Box 1110, Folder 18, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. 
 179 
amputated, contended: “I did not want to stay in the hospital; I want to get into civilian life.”  But 
when his stump became infected and blistered immediately prior to his scheduled discharge date, 
he said, “I told them I was not fit to go out.”  Russo had only been walking on his temporary 
limb for two weeks and felt he was “not able to get around very well.”  When asked explicitly by 
the inspector general why he had not signed his discharge papers, Russo said, “my stump would 
not allow me. I have to earn my living when I get out, and I cannot put any weight on my leg.” 
After being released from service, Russo was immediately re-admitted to Walter Reed Hospital 
as a patient of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance. In that capacity, he remained in bed and 
received inoculations intended to fortify his blood so his stump would become strong enough to 
support his prosthetic limb.
71
 
 In response to the claims of premature discharge, army officials and Walter Reed doctors 
reported that they adhered to pre-war policies regarding maximum improvement. They referred 
the inspector general to a clause stating that, “The President is authorized and directed to retain 
in service disabled emergency officers until their treatment for physical reconstruction has 
reached a point where they will not be further benefitted by retention in a military hospital or in 
the military service.” Army Surgeon General Merritte W. Ireland reported that he interpreted that 
clause to mean:  
When it becomes clear that the condition of any officer patient is growing 
worse month by month, and when it is apparent for a period of several months 
that no improvement is being made, and when in other instance (sic) the 
patient’s condition fails to furnish any grounds for expecting improvement in 
the future, then I believe his treatment for physical reconstruction has reached 
a point when further benefit can not be expected by his retention in military 
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hospital or in the military service. Consequently his discharge is indicated 




Colonel William L. Keller, Chief of the Surgical Service at Walter Reed concurred, and offered a 
further explanation. Once medical treatments ceased being effective, he said, “the depressing 
atmosphere of a hospital is injurious to the patient.”
73
 According to Ireland and Keller, then, if a 
soldier’s medical condition was worsening, he should be discharged from the army hospital.  
The Army Medical Department thus only deemed itself responsible for patients so long 
as they were improving, and demonstrating that they were being actively reconstructed. Ireland 
said as much in a letter to Democratic Senator Charles Thomas of Colorado: “To retain all 
patients indefinitely… would require the continued maintenance of large military hospitals with 
the necessary medical personnel and material; for such a procedure, the Medical Department 
appropriations are not sufficient.” Furthermore, Surgeon General Ireland noted, the Bureau of 
War Risk Insurance boasted “abundant facilities for the care of officers and soldiers, and it is my 
firm belief that when the Medical Department of the Army has achieved all that can be expected 
in the way of the physical reconstruction of our military personnel… the individual should be 
discharged from the military service and should pass into the care of that Bureau.”
74
  
Army officers followed this plan in the immediate post-war years, discharging those with 
chronic ailments or injuries that were slow to heal to the auspices of the Bureau of War Risk 
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Insurance and the Public Health Service, sometimes to the chagrin of patients themselves, who 
balked at the idea of being sent into the civilian world with what they saw as a lack of guaranteed 
income or follow-up medical care.  With no other definitive entity to turn to, they occasionally 
blamed the Army Medical Department for their troubles. While Walter Reed Hospital 
Commander James D. Glennan substantiated the claims of others interviewed that it was much 
more common for soldiers to fight to hasten discharge than it was for them to try to delay it, he 
did concede that it was “very common” for servicemen to object to their discharge, implying that 
such objections stemmed from fear or intimidation.  “A certain type of officer after being in 
hospital a year or two years – sick in hospital – does not wish to leave the hospital to go into the 
world again to take up life outside.”
75
 
 The inspector general’s final report about the investigation into premature discharges 
concurred with the claims of some army officials that patients’ complaints were spurred mainly 
by a desire for higher disability payments and not by legitimate gripes with the system. “No 
branch of the government has been confronted with such an important, humanitarian and gigantic 
task since the signing of the armistice as the Medical Department of the army,” the report 
concluded. “Errors of judgment have probably occurred,” it said, but that was understandable, 
given that “thousands” were “passing through the hospital for treatment.” The report noted 
caustically that it was “difficult to conceive of patients who have been treated… for a long period 
not being appreciative of what was done for them.” Perhaps, it postulated, “the disability rating 
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fixed by the medical boards is the real basis for the majority of these complaints, the patients 
believing that they deserved a higher rating than was awarded them…
76
 
 The report overlooked the fact that the soldiers’ complaints indicated something that 
might have gone beyond their “not being appreciative of what was done for them.”
77
 Glennan’s 
response to Russo’s testimony, for example – which pointed out that the soldier could seek help 
through the Bureau of War Risk Insurance for continuing maladies – revealed a gaping distance 
between soldiers’ desires for and expectations of self-sufficiency, and the credo of “maximum 
improvement” adhered to by the Army Medical Department.
78
 Keller, of the Surgical Service, 
frankly stated that the military hospital could only help soldiers progress up to a point, but that 
“it will take two years before these patients reach maximum improvement.”
79
 Private Jeremiah J. 
Hurley, on the other hand, declared that “when I leave this hospital I do not want to have to enter 
any other hospital for treatment.”
80
  In his commentary regarding Hurley, the Inspector General 
had remarked caustically that when the veteran’s disability status was raised from 100 to 200 
percent (and his monthly payments thus doubled), “all his complaints seem to have 
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 In fact, Hurley, who had both his legs amputated, testified that, “what I want is 
justice in this disability… as I need a constant attendant after discharge, (and) the allowance of 
twenty dollars per month is not considered sufficient for one, I would therefore demand a rating 
of double total disability.”
82
 For Hurley, higher disability payments meant a higher degree of 
self-sufficiency and a greater chance that institutionalization could be avoided.  
 Similarly, Chamberlain, Gose, Vail, and Russo all wanted to be discharged from the army 
only when they felt they had the ability and resources to take care of themselves. Army higher-
ups, on the other hand, conceived of the military hospital as a first stop in an occasionally 
ongoing rehabilitation process. Soldiers’ expectations for their quality of life upon discharge 
conflicted with the army’s interpretation of vague policies regarding “maximum improvement.” 
The ideological divide led to hostility and resentment from soldiers who felt that the army in 
which they had served and sacrificed was cutting them off prematurely.  
 Both doctors and patients resisted embracing hospitals as ideal venues for long-term care, 
but for many, they became a seemingly inevitable choice.  As military hospital administrators 
discharged patients who they argued had either reached “maximum improvement,” or whose 
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condition had ceased to improve, and as ex-servicemen who had never received care from the 
Army Medical Department – either by choice, or because their health maladies arose after 
service – came forward seeking care, the number of war veterans falling under the auspices of 
the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, and seeking attention from civilian entities such as the Public 
Health Service, increased.   
The investigations into care offered at Walter Reed illuminate several important realities 
of World War I-era military and veterans’ health care. Army officials had limited resources at 
their disposal as they attempted to foster principles much emphasized by contemporary 
reconstruction experts, such as self-reliance and a hasty return to civilian life. The pre-war 
policies army doctors were obliged to follow defined the military medical service as the entity 
most directly responsible for soldiers’ recovery, but were also vague enough that they were open 
to interpretation. The question of when a soldier reached “maximum improvement,” for example, 
came to mean that any sick or disabled soldier who was not physically improving was discharged 
from the hospital and often, from the military. After all, army officials argued, facilities like 
Walter Reed Hospital were not intended as sites for the provision of long-term medical care; the 
United States military could not spend its time and resources rehabilitating soldiers who would 
likely never serve again.  
Meanwhile, injured soldiers had a very different perspective. Some felt that the 
government owed them not only the simple courtesy of laundry service, but that it also should 
return them to civilian life in much the same condition as they had been in when they entered the 
army. They resented being discharged physically compromised and therefore with no guaranteed 
source of a reliable income. As wounded soldiers became civilian citizens, they struggled to re-
define their societal roles and responsibilities. The claims of men like Ellis and Russo, which 
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gained power as soldiers organized into veterans’ advocacy groups, demonstrated that although 
extended government benefits and medical treatment were the antithesis of pre-war rehabilitation 
ideals focused on recovery, cure, and self-reliance, they were, in many cases, unavoidable.  
The institutional coverage of The Come-Back and the patient complaints, of course, 
represent two extremes of opinion. A great many saw Walter Reed neither as the paradise 
portrayed by the newspaper or the perdition alleged by some, but instead, as a site of “sober 
reflection” where one could begin to learn how to cope with new physical realities.
83
 The 
contrast between The Come-Back and the allegations against the hospital demonstrate that 
although the Army Medical Department predominantly fulfilled – in some ways, went beyond – 
the task set out for it by law to maximally rehabilitate wounded soldiers, its efforts were often 
seen as insufficient. Eager to embrace an identity as a “new army” that viewed the soldier as a 
whole man, not just as fodder for fighting, army officials attempted to ensure that medical 
services would live up to elevated expectations. But they ultimately resisted becoming ensnared 
in the administration of long-term after-care. By the early 1920s military officials, the 
government, and veterans – whether or not they felt army hospitals had adequately served the 
purpose set out for them by Congress in 1917 – all understood one thing: the facilities could not, 
in many cases, serve as the endpoint of care. 
 
The Come-Back and a “manifestly unsatisfactory” situation 
 Reflecting this reality, The Come-Back’s coverage of the nature of the military hospital 
expanded from a celebration of camp-like cheer and a promotion of professional military 
medicine, to include a frank representation of recovery as a somewhat painful process. By 1920, 
                                                
83
 See the discussion of Paul A. Bazaar’s case earlier in this chapter. "He ‘Comes Back’ by Aiding Folks with 
Income Tax." 
 186 
Walter Reed’s wards had been emptied of all but the most drastically ill and injured A.E.F. 
soldier-patients, and The Come-Back’s parochial tone of promotion was relatively less 
pronounced. Its editors’ growing respect for realism signified what was occurring among 
representatives, bureaucrats, and army staff in the halls of Congress, as well as among the 
general public: a coming to terms with the lasting and unpleasant effects of war. To be sure, until 
its final issue was published in March 1921, The Come-Back featured its fair share of sunny 
stories about sports events, holiday celebrations, and the actions of generous private citizens and 
welfare organizations. But by 1920, the heady post-war days had given way to a new sense of 
practicality, which reflected the fact that, for many patients, rehabilitation and recovery would be 
life-long endeavors. The Come-Back mixed informational and propagandistic missions in its 
coverage of government benefits and the future of medical care for disabled soldiers and 
veterans.  It bolstered the idea that the government was willingly assuming its rightful obligation 
to provide health treatment and occupational training to the war-wounded, and ran detailed 
articles explaining how soldiers could access such assistance.  But as ex-soldiers encountered 
difficulties while attempting to take advantage of benefits being offered, it became increasingly 
difficult to ignore the system’s shortfalls. Initially taking a defensive stance against emerging 
complaints about bureaucratic “red tape,” by late 1920 and early 1921, The Come-Back covered 
what were, by then, frequent legislative battles over expanding hospital access for wounded and 
ill ex-service members. The newspaper’s editors gradually began acknowledging that the future 
of medical care for disabled veterans constituted a central political concern. Articles in The 
Come-Back highlight some of the complex, emerging bureaucratic and policy-centered issues 
surrounding the issue of veterans’ medical care.  
 187 
Beginning in the winter of 1919-1920, articles and poems in the newspaper occasionally 
included hints of some of the hardships involved in injury, illness, and recovery. A writer, who 
referred to himself only as “Ex,” for example, attempted to explain the nature of the Spanish flu. 
“It is by misery out of despair it pulls your teeth and curls your hair / it thins your blood and 
brays your bones; and sometime, maybe you get well / some call it Flu – I call it hell!”
84
  Ex’s 
tone contrasted sharply with the tales of independent victory of will over illness put forth in 
earlier articles.  In February 1920, The Come-Back published a raw expression of candor in the 
form of a letter from patient W.B. Felger, who had lost his left ear during the war.  “Of the 
various kinds of injuries sustained from and as a result of the war,” Felger wrote, “perhaps none 
are more noticeable or cause more comment than those of the face and head."  
In all sorts of places and under all circumstances scarcely a person, from mere 
children to mature men and women, including the poorest observers, failed to 
notice my disfigurement, and in most cases I received a very searching look 
and thorough investigation. Of course such a state of affairs naturally would 
embarrass one meeting people day after day and one is inclined somehow to 
harbor a feeling almost like guilt as everyone looks at you as if they thought 
that you had committed a crime or just returned to civilization after serving a 
penitentiary sentence. In still another way I have found that occasionally, in 
coming in contact with people socially, there are some who will shun you – not 
because they dislike you, but they simply cannot look at disfigurements of any 
sort and feel at ease. A horror comes into their minds which forces them to 
avoid your presence. Naturally such a condition has decided disadvantages. It 
bars you from meeting certain people who would like to talk with you and, at 
the same time, you feel a little hesitant toward imposing yourself upon those 
who, you feel, might be sensitive to such things… 
 
The overall tone of Felger’s letter, however, was positive.  He was writing to thank Walter 
Reed’s museum curator, who had fashioned for him a prosthetic ear made of wax, which was “an 
exact duplicate of my right ear in shape and general appearance.” Only the “keenest observers,” 
said Felger, could notice that the ear was not his own.  “One can hardly imagine the relief that 
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came to me when I began the use of the artificial ear… there are now none of those looking after 
me with glances and looks which seem to haunt one from morning till night.”
85
  In spite of the 
relatively happy ending, Felger’s frank representation of the experience of disability contrasted 
greatly with the coverage featured in earlier editions of The Come-Back, which focused heavily 
on a “will to win the battle of life.”
86
  
 An October 1920 article in The Come-Back signified that the army perceived a turning 
point, and was ready to relinquish its responsibility for war-wounded veterans. Beginning as a 
tribute to the accomplishments of the Army Medical Department, the article ended with a 
declaration that “many discharged soldiers still require hospital treatment, and many others will 
at some future time require treatment for conditions resulting from their military service.” The 
administration of care for such cases, the newspaper noted “does not devolve upon the War 
Department, but by law is placed in the hands of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance.” Citing 
examples of the vast success of the Army Medical Department during the war – the creation of 
military hospital complexes that featured entertainment for soldiers and their visiting loved ones, 
an array of training courses, and innovations in medical treatment for amputations, speech 
defects, facial injuries, and training for the blind – The Come-Back declared: “The work of the 
War Department in caring for the victims of the World War is practically finished.”
87
   
 The declaration may have seemed unsettling to patients who read the newspaper just a 
year or two earlier, and who were constantly reassured that various government entities 
(including the army) would indefinitely provide and any and all necessary care for them. In late 
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1918 and early 1919, the news was, in many ways, good for troops being treated in military 
hospitals, according to The Come-Back.  A letter from President Woodrow Wilson to Dr. C.A. 
Prosser, the Director of the Federal Board for Vocational Education, the entity charged with 
organizing efforts to provide vocational training to discharged soldiers, encapsulated one of the 
primary messages of the hospital newspaper: “This nation has no more solemn obligation than 
healing the hurts of our wounded and restoring our disabled men to civil life and opportunity,” 
Wilson wrote.  “The government recognizes this, and the fulfillment of the obligation is going 
forward fully and generously.” Providing medical care and vocational education for wounded 
veterans, the President argued, was not charity, but “the payment of a draft of honor which the 
United States of America accepted when it selected these men, and took them in their health and 
strength to fight the battles of the nation.”
88
 His words succinctly summarized a message The 
Come-Back hoped to communicate to readers. An editorial praising Wilson’s strong stance for 
the war-wounded noted that although the placement of disabled men in industry had become a 
“much bigger task than was anticipated at the time of the signing of the Armistice,” the challenge 
was being met heartily by a grateful government.
89
 A cartoon published in January 1919 echoed 
the sentiment: 
“Ain’t it a grand and glorious feeling… after you’ve been wounded and you 
stay in a hospital in France several long and weary months… and when you 
land in the USA you can’t join the hurrah crowds… and you go to another 
hospital here not caring what happens because you’ll never be able to earn a 
living without your right arm… and the government tells you it will teach you 
a new trade without charge… and finally you are all fixed and get a better job 
than you ever had – also your compensation and insurance and everything… 
oh-h-h boy!!! Ain’t it a gr-r-r-rand and glor-r-rious feelin’”
90
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 Similarly reassuring pieces were consistently published throughout the post-war years. 
Service members’ bodily sacrifice was noble, justified, and worthwhile, the newspaper argued; 
the U.S. government and citizens would provide them the support necessary to facilitate their 
entry back into society.   
 
  




As patients transitioned from soldier to veteran, they were meant to feel both self-sufficient and 
entitled.  “Never before in the history of the world’s warfare have such extensive plans been laid 
out for the benefit of the men disabled in conflict as those which are now in operation and others 
being formulated,” the newspaper reported in May of 1920. “With practically no precedent to 
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follow… a stupendous task has thrust itself forward in the shape of the care of World War 
veterans.”  To deal with this “task,” a “mammoth machine” had been created, The Come-Back 
reported, which had four main parts. The first was the military hospital itself. Once a soldier was 
discharged from the service and that facility, he could utilize the second part of the “machine,” 
and receive disability payments from the Bureau of War Risk Insurance. If the veteran required 
further medical care, he experienced the third part of the machine: the Bureau of War Risk 
Insurance would cover the cost of his medical care at a Public Health Service Hospital or, if 
geographical or hospital space constraints existed, at a civilian hospital. Finally, veterans who 
were well enough to work, but not well enough to return to their previous occupations were free 
to take advantage of vocational education programs vis-à-vis the Federal Board for Vocational 
Education.
92
   
 In December 1919, The Come-Back reminded readers of their right to receive free care in 
military, civilian, and Public Health Service hospitals, calling such access a “privilege” of which 
few were aware.  In the article, Lieutenant Mathew C. Smith of the Army General Staff noted 
that discharged servicemen who felt their illness was due to wounds or other disabilities received 
or aggravated while in the service should arrange a physical exam with the nearest army hospital 
or representative of the United States Public Health Service.  They were advised to bring their 
discharge papers showing that their disability existed at the time of separation from the military. 
“However, if these papers are not available,” Smith noted reassuringly, “the man should not 
hesitate to apply. Such an applicant will be immediately placed under treatment pending the 
receipt of the necessary papers.”
93
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 But the newspaper’s declaration that the post-war “machine” for disabled veterans was 
“gaining in the smoothness of its functioning as the days go by,” was consistently called into 
question by patients and veterans’ advocates in the halls of Congress, and by the coverage of The 
Come-Back itself. Peppy cartoons regarding prospective benefits were interspersed with articles 
detailing the intricate process behind accessing those benefits.  
 Capitalizing on War Risk Insurance, vocational education, and finally, medical care, was 
more complicated than it may at first have seemed, according to the newspaper.  “Soldiers 
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desiring direct information on government matters are cautioned to be careful to obtain the 
proper addresses in order to save time and trouble,” announced one headline in March 1919. The 
article went on to list a plethora of offices where soldiers could write for information about 
insurance (the Bureau of War Risk Insurance); back pay and personal effects (the auditor of the 
War Department); liberty bonds (the officer in charge of liberty bonds at the Quartermaster 
General’s Office). A slew of separate contact addresses existed for queries from troops of the 
Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines who were patients at the hospital.
95
  Not only was it 
complicated to file a claim, but it was also not guaranteed that the effort would be fruitful.  A 
question and answer article about compensation under the War Risk Insurance Act was candid. If 
an ex-soldier obtained a job, it acknowledged, his disability compensation would be “reduced or 
discontinued." “Obviously,” the newspaper noted, “this is not just. A man with a disease like 
tuberculosis or Bright’s disease might by reason of his necessities be forced to find a job and 
earn something even in spite of the advice of his doctors.” In such a case, according to The 
Come-Back, “the result would be that the more he earned, the less he would get from the 
government and the government would profit by that man’s industry, even though that man’s 
industry might be one form of committing suicide.” However, the article pointed out, “such a 
method of determining the comparison… does not take into consideration that most men who 
had been in the service for any length of time had gained immeasurably by the experience, and 
probably had improved their earning capacity.”
96
  Disabled men might have lost their full 
physical or mental health, The Come-Back conceded, but they gained the invaluable experience 
of service. It was, the paper indelicately implied, a wash.   
                                                
95
 "Grab Off Right Dope; You'll Find It Here," The Come-Back March 19, 1919. 
96
 "Compensation under War Risk Act," The Come-Back December 31, 1919. 
 194 
 In its coverage of War Risk Insurance benefits and vocational education, The Come-Back 
sent mixed messages: it consistently painted a positive picture of allotments and opportunities, 
but at the same time, acknowledged with increasing frequency that there were limits to and rules 
about who could access them.  Boastful claims that “the United States government intends to put 
every disabled soldier and sailor into a good job” gave way to warnings that veterans “gotta be 
real to pass muster.”97 Requests for government-funded college courses from men “with trivial 
hurts,” such as an injured index finger, The Come-Back reported in May 1919, would be turned 
down by a Federal Board for Vocational Education that was scrutinizing cases ever more 
closely.98  Straying from its unqualified celebration of government generosity, the newspaper 
reminded readers that not everyone was “entitled” to all services.    
 By mid-1920, The Come-Back was reporting that veterans’ medical care was on shaky 
ground, and in need of re-fortification with Congressional funds. In July of that year, the 
newspaper noted that $46 million had been appropriated for the establishment of hospitals for 
discharged men.  Among other things, the funding would cover three national sanatoria and two 
hospitals especially for ex-soldiers with tuberculosis.99  By late 1920, however, the newspaper 
reported that the hospitals had yet to be built. “‘This situation is manifestly unsatisfactory to the 
disabled ex-service men and women and to the government alike,’” R.G. Cholmeley-Jones, 
Director of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, was quoted as saying. “It is obvious that it is 
impracticable for the proper supervision to be given by the government in the treatment of the 
                                                
97 The first quote is from "U.S. Will Put Disabled Men in Good Jobs," The Come-Back December 4, 1918. The 
second is from "Gotta Be Real to Pass Muster," The Come-Back May 21, 1919. 
98 "U.S. Will Put Disabled Men in Good Jobs."; "Gotta Be Real to Pass Muster."  
99 "Hospitals to Be Established for Discharged Men," The Come-Back July 31, 1920. The appropriation will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Four of this dissertation. 
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disabled if they are scattered in a large number of hospitals,” he added. “It is necessary in the 
best interests of the patients that they be assembled in larger groups in hospitals which are 
maintained exclusively for the treatment of ex-service men and women.”
100
   
 The newspaper’s coverage of post-discharge medical care reflected the larger reality that 
policies were in constant flux; it thus helped create political awareness among soldier-patients. In 
the Spring of 1919, Come-Back readers learned that 2,000 discharged soldiers were accessing 
War Risk Insurance benefits, but hospital and sanatorium care was thought to be necessary for “a 
considerable proportion of the 24,300 soldiers, sailors and marines discharged from active 
military and naval service because of tuberculosis and for approximately 30,000 cases of 
psychoneurosis, epilepsy and other nervous and mental disorders reported among the military 
forces up to December 1, 1918.”
101
 In late 1920, The Come-Back reported that BWRI Director 
Richard G. Cholmeley-Jones (along with the newspaper editorial staff) supported an American 
Legion-sponsored bill providing for the consolidation of the activities of the Bureau of War Risk 




 Interspersed with these policy updates, patients found practical news about meetings 
among officials of the Public Health Service to address “misunderstandings and delays” in the 
provision of government insurance and hospital treatment for discharged soldiers.
103
  They also 
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learned about an American Legion report showing that as many as 109,000 soldiers suffering 
from pulmonary tuberculosis and mental illness had been prematurely discharged from the 
military “before being properly cured and with no official effort having been made to keep track 
of them.”
104
  The newspaper of one of the premier military hospitals in the United States was 
openly acknowledging not only an exponentially increasing demand for services, but also the 
government’s desperate, and often unsuccessful, attempts to keep up. 
 
Conclusion 
 On March 5, 1921, two weeks before The Come-Back ceased publication, it reported a 
jarring statistic from Ewing Laporte, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury: the number of ex-
soldiers entering civilian hospitals each month was from 1,000-1,500 in excess of those leaving 
them.  Furthermore, Laporte estimated, a bed capacity of 30,000 would have to be maintained for 
World War I veterans “for many years to come.”  In spite of the fact that there were complaints 
about private institutions being “unfitted for the care of soldiers,” he maintained, the Public 
Health Service contract system – wherein ex-soldiers were cared for in civilian hospitals and 
reimbursed by the government – would have to be continued.
105
   
 Although Come-Back editors, like many army and government officials, subscribed to the 
belief that the “great need is to guard against hospitalization, that is, (ex-service men) reaching a 
state of mental and physical inactivity where the thought of initiative or action of any sort takes 
on the aspects of the impossible,”
106
 they had to come to terms with the reality that many 
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veterans would seek hospital care for an indefinite period. Patients with tuberculosis and 
neuropsychiatric diseases posed the biggest societal challenge of all: they would need 
institutional care for years to come. Confronted with the realities of enacted pre-war policies, 
bureaucrats and army officials were forced to adapt.  
In its early years of publication, The Come-Back – mirroring government policies – 
trumpeted the hope that wounded and ill veterans constituted a temporary problem. But the 
complaints of soldiers like Samuel Ellis, George B. Russo, Arthur L. Chamberlain, John Henry 
Gose, and Jeremiah J. Hurley hinted at the idea that the government faced long-term political 
challenges when it came to veterans’ medical care. The widely held sentiments that the 
government owed injured and ill veterans a safety net, and that chronic conditions such as 
tuberculosis and mental illness had great long-term implications, were powerful forces. Propelled 
by the experiences of veterans themselves, The Come-Back gradually adjusted its consistently 
rosy coverage, at times even publicly acknowledging shortfalls and limitations of the medical 
care and benefits available to former troops. The newspaper’s changing tone foreshadowed 
various policy changes to come.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
“War was hell but the after-war effects were ‘heller’”:  





Debates over the army’s extent of responsibility for care gradually gave way to 
congressional acknowledgement that the ailing soldiers of World War I had become a societal 
responsibility. In December 1918, the Bureau of War Risk Insurance (BWRI), the Treasury 
Department agency created to administer insurance and disability compensation payments to 
World War I veterans, estimated that approximately 640,000 men and women would be 
discharged from all branches of the military with some disability.
2
 By June 1920, the Bureau had 
sponsored examinations for 155,000 of those former service members and judged them entitled 
to further treatment. Among them were 15,000 “seriously afflicted with mental troubles, 15,000 
and more with tubercular troubles, and 81,000 cases of general disability.”
3
 Eventually, 
according to the Bureau, a total of 30,000 government hospital beds would be required to treat 
long-term cases of nervous and mental disorders, tuberculosis and respiratory diseases, 
amputations, and a variety of other ailments.
4
  
                                                
1
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Those daunting figures, presented convincingly by bureaucrats and medical professionals 
involved in the medical care system, led to the forging of partnerships among various existing 
government agencies and gave way to an ultimately unsuccessful congressional mandate. 
According to Public Law 326, the BWRI would receive case files from branches of the military, 
then pay the Public Health Service (PHS) to administer hospital and out-patient services to 
former soldiers.
5
 The arrangement marked a shift in focus for both organizations. The BWRI, a 
small bureaucracy focused primarily on administering the insurance offered under the War Risk 
Insurance Act, was ill-equipped to undertake the project of overseeing a national medical care 
program. The Public Health Service, too, was somewhat out of its depth; providing hospital care 
for discharged service members constituted only one part of a widely varied mission that 
included the international control of disease and implementing sanitary measures across the U.S. 
The organization’s relatively small number of hospitals and limited staff were hardly adequate 
for the task at hand. 
In the year following the Armistice, the Army Surgeon General’s office gradually ceded 
control of medical care for personnel who would likely never return to duty. In June 1919, it 
discontinued its Division of Physical Rehabilitation and Special Hospitals. By the end of the next 
month, the army had passed on to the PHS 14 hospitals containing more than 13,000 beds. In 
early November 1919, army policies were modified so that all patients would be discharged after 
spending one year in a military hospital. Some – depending on their medical needs and 
geographic locations – would be placed under the auspices of the BWRI in PHS hospitals, 
private facilities under contract with the PHS (“contract institutions”), or Soldiers’ Homes. In 
                                                
5
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other cases, patients would simply be discharged from the military and become BWRI patients, 
but remain in army hospitals – their status would change from soldier to veteran, and the BWRI, 
(not the army), would fund their hospitalization.
6
 As the BWRI gradually took more patients 
under its purview, the army oversaw fewer and fewer cases: in just a three month period, for 
example – between June 1919 and September 1919 – the number of patients being treated in 
army general hospitals like Washington, D.C.’s Walter Reed decreased from 30,000 to slightly 
less than 20,000. By September 1920, there were less than 3,000 patients in an ever-decreasing 
number of army general hospitals. In approximately the same period – between May 1919 and 




Under the new arrangement, officials of government agencies struggled to define areas of 
control and standards of treatment. Army officials expressed trepidation about sending patients 
to PHS facilities, which they felt could not offer the specialized and efficient treatment available 
in some military hospitals. For their part, PHS field officers complained that the army 
unjustifiably denied admission to some patients and enforced inappropriately strict discipline in 
its institutions. There were conflicts, too, between the BWRI and PHS, regarding control of 
funding and how veterans should be treated, among other things. The system was unsatisfactory 
to virtually all concerned, rife with bureaucratic lag and confusion. “It had not been supposed 
that the soldiers, sailors and marines would be discharged from the service immediately,” a 
BWRI medical adviser wrote in 1921, “as it was understood to be the intention of the 
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government to retain all those suffering from injuries and illnesses incurred in or aggravated by 
service until the maximum degree of improvement had been obtained.” Much to the chagrin of 
government bureaucrats, however, “this procedure was not… carried out, and the Bureau of War 
Risk Insurance was suddenly confronted with the problem of caring for thousands of disabled ex-
service men and women who were presenting their claims daily when no general hospitalization 
program had been mapped out…”
8
  
Even as government funding increased for the hospitalization of veterans, problems 
coordinating the work of various government agencies remained, and helped pave the way for 
the implementation of longer-term solutions. With everyone – the PHS, the BWRI, the army, 
Congress – seemingly to blame for shortfalls, no one was fully responsible for fixing them. By 
1920, veterans’ advocacy organizations, bureaucrats, and medical professionals increasingly 
argued that the system was broken. The government’s failure to fulfill promises made to those 
who served using available resources helped those groups convincingly argue that the ailing 
soldiers of World War I should be considered more than a temporary problem, and that the 
extent of their needs justified sweeping policy changes.  
 
The Bureau of War Risk Insurance 
The BWRI was established in September 1914 with the passage of the War Risk 
Insurance Act (WRIA). The original act (and thus, the purview of the agency) was relatively 
limited; it stipulated that the bureau would oversee insurance policies that would cover 
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“American vessels, their freight and passage moneys and cargoes against war risks.”9 As the 
country mobilized for war, however, policymakers considerably expanded the BWRI’s mandate. 
1917 amendments to the WRIA allowed the government to serve as a purveyor of disability and 
life insurance policies for soldiers, and provide financial assistance to a service member 
attempting to fulfill his duty of “supporting his family… while absent from home on military 
duty.”10  The 1917 version of the WRIA also guaranteed that discharged soldiers who needed 
medical care could receive it, but it did not stipulate where and how. According to Section 302 of 
the law, “the injured person shall be furnished by the United States such reasonable 
governmental medical, surgical, and hospital services and with such supplies, including artificial 
limbs, trusses, and similar appliances, as the director (of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance) may 
determine to be useful and reasonably necessary...”11 But the act contained no further 
explanation of how such ideals would become reality. Given the BWRI’s mandate to oversee all 
aspects of the WRIA, it was responsible for taking on the difficult and thankless task of defining 
how to fulfill an exceedingly vague promise regarding health services.  
As more and more soldiers became veterans, the BWRI’s original staff of about 20 
employees grew and its duties expanded; by December 1, 1920, the bureau had adjudicated more 
than 430,000 claims for death and disability compensation and administered $3.8 billion worth 
                                                
9 An Act to Authorize the Establishment of a Bureau of War Risk Insurance in the Treasury Department, Public Law 
193, S. 6357, 38 Stat. 711,  Sixty-Third Congress, Second Session, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
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the Treasury Department,' Approved September Second, Nineteen Hundred and Fourteen, and for Other Purposes, 
Public Law 90, H.R. 5723, 40 Stat. 398,  Sixty-Fifth Congress, First Session, (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, October 6, 1917), 406.   
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of insurance for approximately 228,000 men and women.
12
 But in the closing months of the war, 
there were plenty of reports of neglect and inefficiencies when it came to the BRWI’s handling 
of the sick and wounded.
13
  
The winter of 1918-1919, which saw the declaration of peace and a flood of soldiers out 
of the military and its hospitals, was a transitional moment for the BWRI. An organization 
founded primarily to adjudicate financial claims was faced not only with a huge increase in 
administrative work, but also with the task of arranging for the provision of physical exams and 
further medical care for ailing former troops. In December 1918, the newly anointed Secretary of 
the Treasury, Carter Glass, made it one of his first orders of business to appoint a new head of 
the BWRI, which had recently been attacked by members of Congress for being inefficient and 
lax in disbursing compensation checks to discharged soldiers. Glass turned to Col. Henry D. 
Lindsley, a past president of Southwestern Life Insurance Company of Dallas, Texas, and former 
Chief of the War Risk Insurance Section of the American Expeditionary Forces.
14
  Lindsley 
aimed first and foremost to restore faith in the BWRI. He urged Congress not to proceed with a 
planned investigation of the organization and requested that, “a reasonable chance be given to 
him to satisfy Congress.”
15
 In March 1919, when a recently dismissed bureau employee charged 
the organization with “gross inefficiency and wastefulness,” Lindsley shot back that the claims 
were “tissues of falsehoods.”
16
 In effect, both BWRI leadership and congressional 
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representatives were struggling to prove to veterans that their insurance and compensation 
payments would be distributed in good faith, that pre-war policy promises were not empty, and 
that trust in government should not be questioned. 
Within just five months of his appointment as Director of the Bureau of War Risk 
Insurance, however, Lindsley made a drastic turnabout, declaring that the organization he 
oversaw was “on the verge of breakdown and failure.” Lindsley charged that the Treasury 
Department limited the effectiveness of the BWRI by communicating in a “negative and 
destructive” manner and constantly “suggesting reasons why things cannot be done.” For 
example, Lindsley alleged that his authority to hire his own staff had repeatedly been called into 
question by a Treasury Department that scrutinized and questioned each appointment and salary 
request. Secretary of the Treasury Glass duly responded to Lindsley’s accusations. Glass accused 
the Bureau head of “insufferable personal vanity” and argued that there were no considerable 
delays or bureaucratic red tape at the BWRI. Only three out of 9,201 requested appointees had 
been reviewed by the Treasury Department, he noted, and only because the salaries requested for 
them were inordinately high. In May 1919, after spending approximately six months at the helm 
of the BWRI, Lindsley left the agency to join the leadership of a newly powerful veterans’ 
organization, the American Legion.
17
  
Lindsley was replaced at the bureau by Richard Gilder Cholmeley-Jones, who had served 
as a Colonel in the War Risk Insurance section in France.
18
 Prior to the war, Cholmeley-Jones 
worked in New York’s burgeoning insurance industry for the Mutual Life Insurance Company 
then independently as a broker. As head of the BWRI, he was not only credited with re-
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organizing the administration of payments of claims, but was also widely viewed as a great 
advocate for disabled and ill veterans. Cholmeley-Jones served as Director of the embattled 
bureau for two tumultuous years, from May 1919 through March 1921. When he died of heart 
disease at age 38 in February 1922, his friends alleged that, “his illness was superinduced (sic) 
by the hard work he performed in connection with the war.” In contrast with the conditions 
surrounding Lindsley’s stormy departure, The New York Times reported that when Cholmeley-
Jones left the BWRI, “he left most of the pending cases cleared up and every bit of the official 
machinery working in co-ordination.” Upon his death, he was cited by the American Legion as 
the “staunchest supporter in the fight for justice to disabled men.” During two years under 
Cholmeley-Jones’ directorship, the BWRI arranged and paid for hospitalization for 79,000 ex-
service men and women.
19
  
In spite of accolades for its director and large numbers treated, the BWRI faced 
significant challenges between 1919 and 1921. Cholmeley-Jones himself often frankly 
acknowledged shortfalls not only within his own organization, but also in its collaboration with 
the Public Health Service. The latter agency, from the start, was somewhat unprepared to take on 
the task of providing medical care to thousands of ill and injured troops.  
 
The Public Health Service  
The Marine Hospital Service, the forebear to the PHS, was established in 1798 with the 
mission of providing relief to sick and injured seamen, but its duties became increasingly varied 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to an Act “for the relief of sick 
and disabled seamen,” a portion of sailors’ monthly pay was to be deducted in order to fund a 
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system of hospitals and dispensaries at or near ports, so that they could seek care, even if they 
were traveling far from home. Harry S. Mustard points out that the act did not become law 
without controversy and opposition. Some legislators said the payroll deduction was a tax and 
called it unconstitutional. Others argued that the health and safety of sailors was a matter best left 
to the states. But in the end, the act passed “not as a progressive move that would give merchant 
seamen something better than average citizen,” but in order to ensure they had some guaranteed 
access to medical care. Because such services were locally based (and, generally, locally 
accessed) in the late eighteenth century, the law was seen as a means of providing seamen the 
opportunity to seek medical care even if they were away from home. Former Secretary of the 
Treasury Alexander Hamilton saw both humanitarian and commercial benefits to the legislation. 
It would, he said, “protect from want and misery a very useful, and for the most part, a very 
needy Class of the Community,” and serve “navigation and trade” interests.
20
  
Throughout the nineteenth century, the initial priority of maintaining state, as opposed to 
federal, control of marine hospitals and personnel was increasingly called into question. It was 
unacceptable to have different standards of care and practice at institutions throughout the 
country, and legislators were increasingly wary of a lack of centralized control in the 
organization, which they felt fostered a political spoils system for hospital building as opposed to 
a rational and pragmatic one. As trade increased, more policymakers came to believe that one 
overarching entity, as opposed to individual states, should be responsible for the interpretation 
and enforcement of international and interstate quarantine laws. There was a general “trend 
toward nationalizing health activities,” and the Marine Hospital Service gained more 
                                                
20
 All quotes are from Harry S. Mustard, Government in Public Health (New York, New York: The Commonwealth 
Fund, 1945), 25-67. The Hamilton quotes are on p. 32.  
      
 207 
responsibility. In 1912, the agency’s expanded mission was made somewhat more official when 
it was re-named the United States Public Health Service.
21
   
When President Woodrow Wilson passed an executive order on April 3, 1917 making the 
United States Public Health Service part of the military forces of the United States, operating 
hospitals was just one function of the burgeoning organization. In 1917, the PHS treated about 
18,000 patients in its 19 marine hospitals.
22
 It also devoted vast resources to scientific research, 
the prevention of the spread of epidemic diseases, and the monitoring of state quarantine and 
immigrant inspection stations. The April 1917 executive order meant that “all peacetime 
activities – investigations of the pollution of the Ohio River, the scientific studies of the 
laboratories, the rural health demonstrations, programs against trachoma and hookworm disease 
– had to become a dim background to the more pressing problems of war.” High-ranking 




In the short-term, as troops arrived at their U.S. posts from their hometowns and cities, 
the PHS undertook an expansive program of improving sanitation measures in communities 
surrounding military camps and bases. As then PHS Surgeon General Rupert Blue put it, “if the 
soldier and the sailor are to be kept well, the civilian with whom they come in contact must not 
be permitted to have a communicable disease, and the civil environment which the fighting man 
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enters must be kept in a clean and wholesome condition.”
24
 To these ends, the PHS attempted to 
improve the health of the local populations surrounding cantonment zones in mainly rural areas 
such as Petersburg, Virginia, Columbia, South Carolina, and Fort Riley, Kansas, among others. 
There, PHS officers inspected sewer systems, instituted vaccination campaigns for both children 
and adults, and attempted to ensure a clean water supply and hygienic conditions in local 
restaurants. According to Blue, the benefits of the PHS efforts went beyond those immediately 
visible in a few isolated communities. The wartime emergency, he said, was “building 
permanently for a better public health,” and “laying the foundations for an improvement in 




Within just a few months, though, the responsibilities of the PHS extended beyond 
sanitation and the health of the civilian population. As soldiers were discharged with illnesses 
and disabilities, the organization was called upon to use its limited staff and resources to treat 
former service members. As then Bureau of War Risk Insurance Director, William C. Delanoy 
said in July 1918, “the only ‘governmental’ hospital services available for this work are the 
hospitals and relief stations of the United States Public Health Service.” Army and navy 
hospitals, he pointed out, could not lawfully be used for the care of civilians. In any case, he said, 
they were entirely occupied with soldiers and officers.
26
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In September 1918, Rupert Blue made it clear that his organization was somewhat 
overwhelmed by its new obligations. When the PHS assumed responsibility for providing care 
for discharged soldiers, there were 1,500 in-patients in 20 marine hospitals across the country.
27
 
By mid-1918, 14,000 service members had been discharged from the army for tuberculosis 
alone; the government expected another 20,000 to be discharged for the disease during the 
remainder of 1918 and throughout 1919. The PHS, Blue reported, was finding it difficult to 
handle the load. In order to serve BWRI patients, it had filled many of its hospitals “to over 
flowing, by placing beds in hallways, on verandas, and even in tents scattered about the 
reservations…” Furthermore, it had rented private dwellings and converted them to temporary 
hospitals, a practice that was “neither satisfactory nor economical.”
28
 Blue and others argued that 
instead of strapping the limited facilities of the PHS, special arrangements should be made for 
Bureau of War Risk Insurance patients. “Hospital accommodations,” the 1918 PHS annual report 




Congressionally-sanctioned collaboration: Relationships and responsibilities “not clearly 
defined” 
 
In the fall and winter of 1918 and 1919, representatives of the army, Bureau of War Risk 
Insurance, and Public Health Service partook in a series of congressional hearings. They 
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discussed and debated the scope of the problem at hand, the availability of facilities and 
personnel, and the coordination of governmental efforts. This series of debates marked the first 
federal-level acknowledgement that government-sponsored veterans’ hospitals might constitute a 
long-term political reality. In December 1918, the Committee on Public Grounds heard 
testimony about whether or not a tuberculosis sanitarium for veterans should be built in Dawson 
Springs, Kentucky. Eventually, it approved the appropriation of funding for a Kentucky 
veterans’ hospital, setting a precedent that such an institution could be located and structured on 
the basis of congressional representatives’ political savvy, and begging the question of whether a 
federal hospital system for ex-service members would be established piecemeal.
30
 A few months 
later, the same committee held hearings regarding the extent of power of the PHS and the 
question of whether that organization, in its quest for resources, would take over supposedly 
under-utilized, or soon to be abandoned military hospitals. Following the debates, Congress 
passed Public Law 326, which allocated millions of dollars in funding to the Secretary of the 
Treasury and signified that the government would attempt to make good on its promise– albeit 
within a somewhat harried federal bureaucracy – to provide medical care to ex-service members 
who needed it. An examination of these two hearings reveals that during the months surrounding 
the Armistice, the U.S. government was struggling to come up with a viable solution for dealing 
with the health fallout of war, and that no set policy was yet in place for doing so; Congress was 
still torn regarding the question of how funding for veterans’ medical services should be 
proposed and allotted. As late as May 1919 – two months after the passage of PL 326 and six 
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months after the Armistice – the main organizations responsible for providing medical care for 
ex-soldiers were operating without a workable means by which to coordinate their respective and 
joint activities. 
On September 18, 1918, a few days after U.S. and French troops declared a decisive 
victory in the Battle of St. Mihiel, Democratic representative David H. Kincheloe tried to 
convince his colleagues to approve funding for a veterans’ hospital in Dawson Springs, a 
wooded town in his Eastern Kentucky district. Kincheloe had approached officials of the Bureau 
of War Risk Insurance and the Public Health Service about such a plan in the preceding months, 
he said, “knowing that there was some talk of this kind of an institution.” Dawson Springs, he 
pointed out, was on the main line of the Illinois Central Railroad route between Louisville and 
Memphis; it was centrally located among the larger part of the U.S. population; and, perhaps 
most importantly, a group of the town’s business people had come together and obtained 10,000 
acres of land, the title of which they were willing to pass on to the U.S. government at no cost.
31
  
The ensuing debate about Dawson Springs highlighted a central issue of post-war debates 
about veterans’ health care; in the fall of 1918, government and medical officials were first 
coming to the difficult realizations that the pre-war hope of healing soldiers’ wounds and 
ailments before discharge from the army was unrealistic, and that the promises contained in the 
War Risk Insurance Act made all sick and injured former soldiers a societal, not just a military 
responsibility. When the Chief Medical Advisor of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance seconded 
Kincheloe’s sentiments regarding the necessity of a veterans’ hospital in Kentucky, Frank Clark 
(D—FL), who chaired the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds, wondered why the army 
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was not completing all necessary medical work. “If they are entirely cured there would be no 
necessity for discharging them, and they might go back in the service,” he noted, echoing the 
hopes of those who debated pre-war health policy in 1917. But by September 1918, bureaucrats 
working within the system had a new grasp on reality. “I do not imagine in time of war it is the 
business of the Army Medical Corps to try to make healthy civilians, but rather to take care of 
the wounded and injured during active fighting,” Charles E. Banks, Chief Medical Advisor of the 
BWRI said. Once the “time of war” had ceased, he said, it would remain difficult to pursue the 
pre-war policy of treating soldiers within the military health system; all personnel – from 
conscripted privates to medical officers – were eager for discharge. Plus, it was difficult to 
justify funding a vast army medical system in peacetime.
32
  
The Dawson Springs discussions also made it clear that government representatives were 
beginning to realize and acknowledge that large numbers of former soldiers needed to be treated 
for chronic conditions such as tuberculosis, rather than heroic battlefield injuries.
33
 Echoing the 
sentiments of a BWRI official, who called tuberculosis “the great problem” among discharged 
soldiers and sailors, Banks pointed out that almost one-quarter of those discharged from the army 
and navy were suffering from the disease.
34
 He noted that 14,000 had already been discharged 
with TB, and another 34,000 were predicted to be released with the disease in 1919; 75 percent 
of those former soldiers were expected to seek treatment in sanitaria. The demand for care, 
Banks argued, far surpassed the BWRI’s supply of 1,400 beds suited to such patients. The 
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organization would need access to 13,000 beds in order to adequately serve veterans with 
tuberculosis, Banks said. He argued that providing treatment was necessary not simply based on 
the premise that the government had an obligation to veterans, but because tuberculosis 
constituted “a great public health and economic problem.” “Men who have broken down… in a 
diseased condition,” he said, “are a menace to their families and the communities where they 
reside.”
35
 The high prevalence of tuberculosis, in fact, helped bureaucrats and policymakers 
justify permanent veterans’ hospitals in places like Dawson Springs. “In tuberculosis, there is a 
very frequent recurrence of the breakdown, and these men will not only come in now, but they 
will come in later on and keep coming in from time to time as they break down,” Banks said.  
But some legislators resisted the idea of providing free medical care for a lung disease 
contracted by ex-servicemen, many of whom had never been shipped abroad, much less seen 
battle. They were conflicted about the extent of governmental obligations to such individuals. 
Frank Clark wondered aloud during the Dawson Springs debates how many veterans with 
tuberculosis had entered the service with the disease, and whether the same “allowances” were 
made for them as for those who had contracted it as soldiers. No one was knowingly accepted to 
serve who had tuberculosis, Banks reported, though he did concede that draft exams were often 
“superficial.” Some may indeed have had the disease before entering the military, but some 
otherwise latent cases may have broken down under the strain of service. Clark remained 
skeptical, taking a broad view of the issue at hand: “What do you think of the idea that when a 
man is discharged from the service he should be sent to an institution of this sort,” he asked 
Banks. The BWRI medical advisor approached the question pragmatically. It was a “good 
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business proposition” to treat them and get them well,” Banks argued.
36
 Clark’s and Banks’ 
perspectives provided an early hint of two opposing sides of the debate regarding veterans’ care: 
some argued that free medical care fostered dependency, while others argued that dependency 
could be staved off with proper treatment. 
During debates about whether or not an institution should be opened at Dawson Springs, 
an important precedent was set as a cohort of BWRI and PHS experts made the case that fiscal 
concerns – for example, the idea that large, centrally located hospitals were cheaper and more 
efficient than smaller, widely disbursed ones – could not justifiably trump humanitarian 
questions, such as whether or not a sick veteran could access a facility in proximity to his home 
and family. In response to representatives’ queries regarding the practicality of opening a 500-
bed hospital at Dawson Springs, as opposed to one that might hold 1,000 or more patients, the 
Public Health Service’s Director of Engineering remarked that larger hospitals were “more 
economical,” but did not afford the opportunity for families of patients to visit. It was not ideal, 
for example, to send a man from Maine to Kentucky for treatment.
37
 The principle that veterans 
– even those who had not seen battle – deserved access to institutions close to their homes and 
families continued to hold throughout the early 1920s and shaped the veterans’ hospital system 
that eventually emerged.  
The hospital at Dawson Springs was only one small part of the broad system of veterans’ 
care that representatives of the PHS and BWRI envisioned. A couple of months after 
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Representative Kincheloe and others first made the case for building a hospital in Kentucky, 
Clark and his colleagues on the Committee on Public Grounds continued to hear testimony from 
representatives of the army, BWRI, and PHS regarding the general topics of how much funding 
and how many facilities were necessary to adequately provide for the medical care of veterans. 
During these debates, it became clear that, even though the army was discharging soldiers 
rapidly, and would not maintain control of health care for veterans, it would pass on only limited 
resources to the BWRI and PHS.  
Winford H. Smith, of the Army Surgeon General’s Hospital Division, pointed out in 
December 1918 that the army still expected 50,000 sick and disabled soldiers to be returned to 
domestic military hospitals from abroad, and could therefore spare little in the way of facilities 
for the use of the PHS.
38
 Smith’s determination to conserve resources turned out to be well 
founded; peak patient load in army hospitals was not reached until May of 1919.
39
 In order to 
ensure that the army could fulfill pre-war governmental mandates to care for soldiers until 
“maximum curative results” were achieved, Smith felt he had to hold tight to facilities.
40
 Still, at 
the behest of congressional representatives who were frustrated with the army’s hoarding of 
resources after peace had been declared, Smith eventually suggested that the PHS could take 
over a 700-bed army hospital at Hot springs, North Carolina and a general hospital at Corpus 
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Christi, Texas. But he unapologetically qualified the seeming altruism by declaring that the 
facilities were “two of the least desirable properties which we now occupy.”41  
The PHS, in fact, was resistant to the idea of relying on old army institutions, let alone 
the least desirable ones. William G. Stimpson, who oversaw the selection of hospital sites for the 
Public Health Service, echoed the sentiments of those who had testified regarding the necessity 
of a hospital at Dawson Springs. Bureau of War Risk Insurance patients would have to be treated 
for chronic diseases “for a great many years,” he argued. The army’s institutions, many of which 
were not fireproof and did not have heat or running water throughout, were simply insufficient 
for the task at hand. Plus, he argued, some of the hospitals were located on larger army 
cantonments, which, once abandoned after the war, would feel like “nothing more or less than 
deserted villages” and have a “depressing effect” on patients. Stimpson requested that Congress 
appropriate $10 million for the Public Health Service to add 5,000 beds to the organization’s 
existing hospitals. Excess BWRI patients, he suggested, could be cared for in army hospitals as 
they gradually became available throughout demobilization.42  
The PHS obtained the requested funding on March 3, 1919 with the passage of Public 
Law 326, which bolstered the precedent that the federal government would continue to attempt 
to fulfill its promise of overseeing comprehensive medical care for veterans. The landmark law 
appropriated $3 million for the takeover of a newly built army hospital in Chicago, $1.5 million 
to establish a tuberculosis sanitarium at Dawson Springs, Kentucky, $2 million for enlarging a 
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PHS hospital in Stapleton, New York, and $1.4 million for the construction of hospitals for the 
use of BWRI patients in Washington DC and Norfolk, Virginia. It set aside another $1.5 million 
for an emergency fund that the Secretary of the Treasury could use to purchase additional land 
and buildings, and $785,000 for the PHS to use for hospital operations during the remainder of 
1919. In spite of concerns expressed by Stimpson regarding the “depressing effect” of using 
army cantonments for the treatment of BWRI patients, the bill also appropriated $750,000 in 
order to remodel and adapt seven army camp hospitals located across the country, which would 
be transferred to the PHS.43   
Public sentiment regarding the law was generally positive; newspaper articles presented it 
as a justified fulfillment of an obligation to former service members.44 But there was also some 
staunch opposition to its passage. In January 1919, a bipartisan group of representatives argued 
that the war was over, and the need for medical care less dire than it once was. In response to 
earlier claims by BWRI and PHS officials that illnesses like psychoneurosis and tuberculosis 
required long-term care, the representatives pointed out that the average hospital stay for a 
tuberculosis patient was just six months. Furthermore, they continued the trend of questioning 
the worthiness of BWRI patients, some of whom they said had been in the army no more than a 
few weeks. Just as many of these men had received medical care in local institutions before the 
war, the representatives said, they could “be cared for better, more promptly, and more 
                                                
43 An Act to Authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to Provide Hospital and Sanatorium Facilities for Discharged 
Sick and Disabled Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines, Public Law 326, H.R. 13026, 40 Stat., 1302. Also see "New 
Tuberculosis Sanatorium Dedicated," Journal of the American Medical Association Vol. 78 No. 8(1922). When 
Dawson Springs finally opened in 1922, it was placed under the auspices of the Veterans’ Bureau, which had begun 
overseeing care for ex-service members. The total cost to the government for the institution was $2.3 million. 
44 "Huge Plan to Care for the Disabled," Boston Daily Globe April 6, 1919. "Disabled Soldiers to Get U.S. Care in 
Big Hospitals," Chicago Daily Tribune April 6, 1919, 6. "Chain of Hospitals for Disabled Men," The New York 
Times April 6, 1919. "Uncle Sam Ready to Care for Men Disabled in War," New York Tribune April 13, 1919. 
      
 218 
economically in civilian institutions now in existence than in any other way.”
45
 In effect, the 
minority report was a statement against pre-war legislation guaranteeing that discharged soldiers 
would have access to publicly sponsored medical care. Although its rationale seemed 
ideologically sound to many, it did little to release the government from its legal obligations.    
As their patient load increased, the BWRI and PHS attempted to hash out the dynamics of 
their working partnership. In January 1919, Charles E. Banks, Chief Medical Advisor of the 
BWRI drafted a memo to the director of his organization, suggesting some rough guidelines for 
how to coordinate activities with the PHS. In providing hospital care for veterans, it would be 
necessary to temporarily lease facilities, he said. Representatives of the BWRI should be 
responsible for choosing the facilities, which would be limited to use exclusively by BWRI 
patients. The PHS would administer care there – just as they would at official PHS hospitals – 
with their own personnel. Any physicians, nurses, and attendants working with BWRI patients 
would be authorized and paid for by the Bureau, which would determine compensation rates. 
Furthermore, Banks suggested, the BWRI would pay for hospital operations and equipment at 
cost. The PHS would be obligated to submit the estimated costs of each leased hospital for the 
following month, which would not be considered valid until the institutions were approved by 
the BWRI. If the PHS required clerical help in order to execute such plans, its representatives 
could request it and the BWRI would pay for it, provided the request was approved.
46
 Banks’ 
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plan gave the BWRI virtually full control of major decisions and little autonomy to PHS 
personnel.  
Although the PHS and BWRI had, in some ways, a seamless partnership – PHS officers 
comprised some of the staff at the offices of the Medical Section of the BWRI, for example – 
friction between the two organizations increased over time.  PHS representatives resented the 
heavy-handed managerial tactics of their counterparts at the bureau. For their part, BWRI 
representatives – since they were charged with the onerous task of ensuring the functionality of a 
system of care for veterans – had little choice but to impose strict regulations. The problem, then, 
was not that officials in the BWRI and PHS did not attempt to meet needs and fulfill obligations; 
it was that the two organizations had a bevy of responsibilities, but limited resources available to 
fulfill them and coordinate their services.  
During the spring and summer of 1919, as the war became more of a distant memory for 
many Americans, the PHS consistently took on an increasing share of the post-war health 
burden. In June 1919, the latter organization worked with 24 contract hospitals. By September of 
the same year, it had signed on with 920. In June 1919, a total of 3,279 BWRI patients were 
under treatment at PHS hospitals; approximately 1,500 were being treated for neuro-psychiatric 
illness, 1,300 for tuberculosis, and 864 for general medical conditions. By September 1919, total 
numbers under treatment had increased to 6,135, with the breakdown of conditions remaining 
relatively consistent, though TB had overtaken mental illness as the most common condition; 
more than 2,200 veterans were being treated for tuberculosis, approximately 2,100 for “neuro-
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psychosis,” and another 1,800 for other medical conditions.
47
 In February 1920, the total number 
of BWRI beneficiaries being treated in PHS hospitals had ballooned by approximately 85 
percent since nine months prior, to slightly more than 11,600 patients. Tuberculosis continued to 
be the most common ailment – almost 4,300 patients were under treatment for the disease in the 
winter of 1920 – while more than 3,800 were hospitalized with neuro-psychiatric illness, and 
another 3,590 with general medical conditions.
48
 By May 1920, the BWRI had rated some 
205,000 veterans with some degree of disability.
49
 
The relationship between the BWRI and PHS was a complicated one, with the former 
acting as administrator of services and the latter as executor. When soldiers were discharged 
from a military hospital, their case files were sent from the army to the Washington D.C. BWRI 
office. According to BWRI head R.G. Cholmeley-Jones, his organization followed up by sending 
an application for future benefits and medical care to each disabled veteran. Many never replied, 
but those who did were sent, at government expense, to be examined by a local PHS doctor. That 
physician filled out a report regarding the former service member’s condition, and sent it back to 
the BWRI, which then handed down one of four possible disability ratings: total temporary, total 
permanent, partial temporary, or partial permanent. In the case of the latter two ratings, the 
veteran was assessed with a certain percentage of disability, based on the degree to which the 
BWRI officer believed the condition hindered the individual’s ability to be gainfully employed. 
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As BWRI Director Cholmeley-Jones put it, “the loss of a finger may be 12 per cent, but on 
account of the effect of the loss of his finger upon his vocation as a violinist they may possibly 
give him a temporary rating of 40 per cent.” The rating could change over time, Cholmeley-
Jones said, based on the ex-soldier’s progress in vocational training and his ability “to do 
something else.” As per the War Risk Insurance Act, monthly payments were based both on the 
individual’s percentage of disability, as well as his economic position as breadwinner. A veteran 
with a disability rating of twelve percent who was married, for example, would receive twelve 
percent of $100, whereas a veteran with the same rating who had no so-called dependents would 
receive twelve percent of $80. An ex-soldier who required hospitalization could report to a 
Public Health Service hospital, an institution contracted with the Public Health Service, or, if 
necessary, a private hospital, which would then send the bill to the BWRI. While being treated, 
he not only had his medical costs covered, but also (much to the chagrin of some members of 
Congress), received disability payments equal to beneficiaries with a temporary total disability 
“because he is out of employment and in the hospital.” In the case of the soldier with no 
dependents who had a twelve percent disability, for example, compensation would increase from 
$9.60 per month (or 12 percent of $80) to $80 while he received hospital treatment.50  
As BWRI officials attempted to set and abide by rules, PHS representatives tried to 
decipher the nature of the organization with which they were doing business, and they found 
much to be desired. In an April 1919 report, Senior PHS Surgeon Claude H. Lavinder and 
Surgeon Wade H. Frost described their findings following conversations with representatives of 
                                                
50 Ibid., 5-15. For a trenchant analysis of the somewhat arcane disability rating system, see K. Walter Hickel, 
"Entitling Citizens: World War I, Progressivism, and the American Welfare State, 1917–1928" (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Columbia University, 1999 ), 133-42. Hickel argues that WRIA laws and regulations allowed disability to be 
conceived as a “medical category.” A lengthy disability rating schedule ensured that “disability benefits were to be 
based not on self-presentation and explanation by the veteran himself, or on social values prescribing the abilities 
and capacities an adult male could be expected to possess, but on the identification of an objective impairment by 
individual medical examination and diagnosis.”   
      
 222 
the Medical Section of the BWRI. They pointed out that the latter organization received between 
300 and 600 claims per day, and was unable to estimate the volume of work to be expected 
during the following six months. The BWRI Medical Section at the time consisted of eight 
commissioned PHS officers, Lavinder and Frost reported, who each oversaw one Section 
division (classified by disease or disability, such as internal medicine and tuberculosis), and 
about 60 support personnel. When the claims division received a patient’s information, its 
representatives forwarded the records on to the medical officer overseeing the specific condition 
presumably affecting the veteran. In some cases, the officer could provide his opinion based on 
the paperwork at hand, but since “not infrequently” medical records were missing, the officer in 
question sometimes referred claimants to be examined at a PHS dispensary office or hospital. If 
none was locally accessible, the ex-soldier was referred to an American Medical Association 
physician in the vicinity. Lavinder and Frost pointed out that no clear guidelines existed 
regarding how to rate a disability and apply terms such as “total disability, temporary or 
permanent,” and the accepted rating of partial disability “undetermined in degree” did little to 
definitively close cases. Furthermore, they noted, there was “no definite and mutually binding 
agreement” between the BWRI and the PHS regarding various matters, including the extent to 
which facilities of the PHS were to be used by the BWRI. Such a loose arrangement was 
problematic, the authors argued, because it stipulated that the Public Health Service must 
shoulder “the responsibility of providing ample facilities, while it imposes upon the Bureau of 
War Risk Insurance no obligation to make use of them.” There was abundant confusion, 
Lavinder and Frost said, “as to definite policies regarding the establishment of specialized 
institutions and the provision of specialized services by the Public Health Service,” as well as 
“regarding methods of procedure in many matters such as the transfer and transportation of 
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patients, reimbursements, etc.” The PHS and BWRI, they suggested, needed to come to an 
agreement about “their respective jurisdictions.” The report also highlighted shortfalls in the 
PHS-BWRI partnership pointed out by BWRI Medical Advisor Charles Banks: PHS facilities 
were “frequently inadequate and the tact and judgment displayed by officers of the Service in 
dealing with patients referred to them was frequently very faulty; with the consequence that (the 
BWRI) office was constantly in receipt of complaints from patients…”
51
  
 Lavinder and Frost’s report concluded with some measured optimism and a call to 
action. The Medical Section of the BWRI, the authors pointed out, had been working 
with inadequate staff and little time for planning and deliberation. With a recently 
increased staff, the authors posited, would come improvements in operations. 
“Considering all the difficulties which have been encountered, the present organization is 
perhaps as good as might reasonably be expected,” they noted. Still, Lavinder and Frost 
argued, if present “deficiencies” were not corrected, they would “afford justification for 
very serious criticism...” Namely, they noted, the BWRI must compile more complete 
statistics, and equip itself to predict future workload. It also must clearly instruct 
examining medical officers to avoid the twin problems of inconsistent diagnoses and the 
necessity for re-examinations of claimants. Lastly, Lavinder and Frost highlighted the 
need for definitive and “scientific” standards for defining terms such as “total” and 
“partial” disability, as well as the unfortunate lack of a “systematized and clearly 
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understood plan of cooperation” between the PHS and BWRI.
52
 BWRI officials echoed 
the sentiment: W.G. Stimpson, Chair of the BWRI’s Service Board, which had been 
appointed to consider hospital sites for the bureau’s patients – told the PHS Surgeon 
General in April 1919 that the board had voted to suspend itself until the two 
organizations could definitively define their relationship.
53
 
   The call for a formal agreement between the BWRI and PHS was answered with the 
drafting of a six-page memo outlining the responsibilities of each organization. The May 
1919 document stated that the BWRI must provide necessary statistics for the PHS to 
carry out its work, but it left unclear exactly who would set the guidelines for the record-
keeping. It also failed to answer the question of how and when the organization was to 
disseminate information. The PHS was to supply adequate staff and facilities to fulfill its 
duties to the BWRI, the agreement said, but with what funding and with how much 
autonomy? At the time the memo was drafted, the PHS was in the process of organizing 
the United States into 14 districts, which would match those in place under the auspices 
of the Federal Board for Vocational Education, the BWRI, and the army. One PHS 
officer would be in charge of each district and would coordinate local claimants’ medical 
and hospital needs. In most cases, the proposed agreement declared, claimants should be 
supplied medical care close to their home districts, though it was acknowledged that 
long-distance travel to large-scale special hospitals for the treatment of psychoneuroses, 
tuberculosis, and perhaps orthopedic surgery, may be necessary. In spite of the memo’s 
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stipulations about organizational roles, the document did little more than re-state the 
general framework of previous, vague legislation, and left some of the most difficult 
questions about jurisdiction unanswered.
54
  
     The agreement draft was more remarkable for its very existence – and its silences 
– than for its accomplishments. It reveals that well after the Armistice, although 
legislation had been passed intending to make government-sponsored medical care a 
reality for ex-soldiers, it remained highly problematic to administer it.  
A November 1919 statement from the BWRI about how it was “meeting the herculean 
problem of examining, rating and returning the physical usefulness minds and bodies wrecked in 
the Great War” describes how officials wished the organization could function, and showcases 
the difference between reality and ideal. The Bureau reported that it was handling a “maze of 
intricacies” resulting from the War Risk Insurance Act’s guarantee of medical care for all 
soldiers who incurred disability in service, and it was doing it nobly and efficiently. The burden 
of proof regarding service connection of an injury or illness was always on the government, the 
statement said, with the benefit of the doubt given to the ex-service member in every instant. 
Claims were handled expeditiously by “specially trained” Public Health Service officers in one 
of eight sections of the Medical Division – internal medicine, surgery, tuberculosis, neuro-
psychiatry, eye, ear, nose, throat, and dental, prosthetics, statistical, and miscellaneous – who 
processed 5,000 claims per day. The officers rated disabilities, and secured medical equipment 
and institutional care. “Side by side, and handled in exactly the same way, are the cases of 
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Colonels, Captains and Corporals; white men, colored men and Indians; men who have no 
English – men who are illiterate, and men who have received their education at the finest 
institutions of learning…” the BWRI reported.
55
  
To enhance the highly idealized image of government-sponsored medical care, the 
Bureau report supplied examples of individual cases. There was a man who suffered from shell-
shock, “having been blown up with high explosives in Belleau Wood,” who contacted the 
Medical Division to report that the noise of plumbers pounding on pipes while his apartment was 
being remodeled “fair makes me nutty.” The BWRI expeditiously had the veteran sent, with an 
attendant, to a newly opened “psychopathic hospital” at Cape May, New Jersey, “where he 
received careful attention and accurate scientific treatment…” Within a few weeks, the patient 
was “happy, contented,” and “doing splendidly in a business college where he was taking a 
course at the hands of the Federal Board for Vocational Education.” Other cases were cited, 
including that of a “shy, timid mother” who sought help for her son; he “‘really isn’t crazy… he 
just hears voices,’” she told a Bureau agent. The mother’s “aching heart” was somewhat 
“lightened” when the BWRI secured a spot for the young man at a Public Health Service 
Hospital in Densville, New York. There was also the case of a young ex-soldier who had 
shrapnel lodged in the base of his skull and required special surgery. He was shipped, at 
government expense, to a far-away hospital, placed under the care of a specialist, and provided 
with round-the-clock attendant and nurse care. Eventually, he was operated on with great 
success. The BWRI report acknowledged that “time once was when letters were not answered as 
promptly as they are now,” but “now the work of the Medical Division is and has been for some 
time absolutely current.” Although it was clear that “the problem of hospitalizing the patients of 
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the War Risk Insurance Bureau is an enormous one,” the report maintained that the BWRI and 
PHS were working in concert to see that challenges were met.
56
 
PHS administrators also shared success stories regarding how their organization 
functioned in respect to disabled and ill veterans. According to a 1920 article in Walter Reed 
Army General Hospital’s newspaper, The Come-Back, in the New York, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut district, the PHS was caring for about 100,000 ex-service members, 6,000 of whom 
were being treated in hospitals and sanitaria, 200 in convalescent homes, and the remainder as 
out-patient beneficiaries of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance. When veterans reported to PHS 
offices in the tri-state area, they were examined, then their case records were sent to the Bureau 
of War Risk Insurance in Washington, DC. There, officials determined how much of a monthly 
allowance to allot during medical treatment. Ex-service members were then required to report “at 
regular intervals for re-examination,” and, the article reported, “the follow-up system of the 
Public Health Service keeps constantly in touch with those who fail to appear.” Dr. Cooke, the 
supervisor of the New York office of the PHS, told The Come-Back that he felt that if veterans 
complained about government services, they “should always receive the benefit of the doubt.”
57
   
Behind public statements of confidence in a robust and productive BWRI-Public Health 
Service partnership, however, major systemic problems existed. One, regarding whom, exactly, 
was eligible for treatment in PHS hospitals, came to the fore soon after Public Law 326 was 
passed in March 1919. According to the law, the PHS was “authorized to provide immediate 
additional hospital and sanatorium facilities for the care and treatment of discharged sick and 
disabled soldiers, sailors, and marines, army and navy nurses (male and female), patients of the 
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War Risk Insurance Bureau…” Some PHS officials interpreted the clause to mean that all 
discharged sick and disabled veterans, not only those who had received a disability rating from 
the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, were eligible to receive medical care. In August 1919, Dr. 
Bert Caldwell, Senior Surgeon for the PHS in Chicago, Illinois, wrote to William C. Rucker, a 
career Public Health Service officer temporarily serving as the BWRI Chief Medical Advisor. He 
wondered whether he and his staff were obligated to treat patients with the flu or gonorrhea, by 
virtue of the fact that they were veterans.   
Rucker’s reply, which cited both the War Risk Insurance Act and Public Law 326, was 
less than definitive, mainly because those two laws, in some senses, contradicted each other. 
Under the War Risk Insurance Act, Rucker explained, a claimant had to be compensable by the 
Bureau of War Risk Insurance before he could receive treatment. He based his argument on the 
fact that the law stated that, “in addition to the compensation above provided, the injured person 
shall be furnished by the United States… governmental medical, surgical, and hospital 
services…” But, Rucker continued, no compensation was provided for ex-soldiers whose injuries 
or illnesses resulted from their own “willful misconduct,” which, he implied, may bring on bouts 
of gonorrhea or the flu. Rucker also pointed out, however, that Public Law 326 was “far broader 
in its scope” than the War Risk Insurance Act in its provision for veterans seeking medical care. 
It was apparently designed, he said, “to care for any person who could show that he had been 
discharged from the military or naval forces of the United States and was sick or disabled.” The 
entire question, Rucker said, was before the Attorney General, who would henceforth notify the 
PHS of its decision.
58
 There, Rucker’s letter ended, leaving Caldwell and other PHS officials in 
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the same predicament they had faced since the law was passed five months prior: if they refused 
to treat patients who were not compensable by the BWRI, they may be acting outside the law. 
But if they did treat them, it was unclear whether and how the government would compensate 
physicians or institutions for services rendered.  
In September 1919, Acting Attorney General Charles B. Ames wrote to Secretary of the 
Treasury Carter Glass to report on his ruling regarding the question at hand, and eligibility for 
medical care. “It was not intended that every soldier who had been discharged and who should 
afterwards happen to be sick and disabled should be entitled to the benefits of the Act,” he said. 
Only those who had become sick or disabled in the line of duty were compensable by the BWRI, 
he said, and only those individuals were eligible for government-sponsored medical treatment.
59
  
The debate over the wording of Public Law 326 makes it clear that bureaucrats in both 
the PHS and BWRI were constrained and confused by sloppily conceived of and written 
legislation. It also shows that the question of whether treatment should be given for non-line-of-
duty injuries arose soon after ex-soldiers’ hospital care was deemed a societal responsibility. The 
Attorney General’s ruling did not signal the end of confusion; the point was continually debated 
throughout the early 1920s. 
 
A blueprint for the future: Estimates of massive need 
As their bureaucratic troubles escalated, PHS Surgeon General Rupert Blue and 
BWRI Chief Medical Advisor William C. Rucker brought their concerns to Congress, 
where they argued that more and better publicly funded medical care was needed for 
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World War veterans. In House Document 481, which was referred to repeatedly in 
debates regarding veterans’ care during the next few years, they presented a statistics-
laden case for the idea that the problem of veterans’ medical care posed a great long-term 
challenge. Blue and Rucker argued that the resources at hand were insufficient and ill-
conceived, and that a total of 30,660 beds – 7,200 for general, medical and surgical 
conditions, 12,400 for tuberculosis, and 11,060 for neuro-psychiatric patients – would be 
necessary to treat BWRI patients in the years to come. In addition, they requested that 
200 outpatient clinics be established, where state and PHS health officials would work 
together in a group practice model resembling that in place at Minnesota’s famed Mayo 
Clinic. At the clinics, medical specialists would see patients before and after hospital 
visits – ideally, the clinics would cut down on the need for hospitalization. Blue and 
Rucker estimated that $85.5 million in government funding would be required to fulfill 
the requests.60  
Evidently presupposing some skepticism from congressional representatives, 
Surgeon General Blue offered various justifications for the need for beds and clinics. 
First, there were the raw numbers: patient load was constantly growing – between April 
and October, 1919 PHS hospitals saw an increase of approximately 140 BWRI patients 
per week. Blue also noted that Public Law 326 stipulated that the PHS should make use 
of abandoned military hospitals for treatment of BWRI patients, but bureaucrats who had 
initially told congressional representatives that discharged service men and women would 
be unwilling to seek treatment at those facilities had, in fact, been proven correct; the 
PHS had ceased operations at all but two of the military hospitals in which it once 
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admitted patients. Now, new facilities were needed to replace those. Blue also pointed out 
that the most recent request for funding was not spontaneous, but instead, long foreseen 
by experts. In the lead-up to the passage of Public Law 326, Blue said, “it was stated 
many times to many Congressmen that this was only the beginning of what would be the 




  But given the fact that when Blue presented his data, only 3,100 War Risk 
Insurance patients were being treated in PHS hospitals and 3,200 in civil institutions 
under contract with the government, the estimated eventual need for more than 30,000 
beds seemed to necessitate a more extensive explanation.
62
 Blue said that peak patient 
loads for some neuro-psychiatric illnesses would not be reached until the late 1920s, and 
a need for services would be sustained for decades thereafter. It was preferable, he noted, 
to treat both neuro-psychiatric and tubercular patients in government institutions, as 
opposed to civil contract institutions, since the latter were “for the most part overcrowded 
and inadequate to meet the needs of the civilian population, without being forced to care 
for the large number of cases which have resulted from and have been discovered during 
the recent war.” Although he acknowledged that some regions of the country were 
overwhelmed with BWRI cases while others had a plethora of empty beds, Blue 
maintained that institutions serving veterans had to be spread throughout the U.S. so that 
patients could be treated near family and friends.
63
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 As he reported that the PHS and BWRI were lacking in resources, the Surgeon 
General also argued that a law should be enacted to “care for all discharged soldiers and 
sailors,” not just those who had been discharged with a disability rating of at least ten 
percent. In so doing, he brought up an idea embraced by emerging veterans’ groups, one 
that would shape the future veterans’ medical system. The “burden of proof” was on the 
government concerning those who claimed that their disease was aggravated by or 
incurred in the service, Blue said. Furthermore, he added, the government was also 
obligated to treat those who had newly emergent diseases they claimed were connected 
with their time in the service. Beyond providing a legal basis for offering medical 
treatment to all veterans, he offered an economic rationale: Providing care to all who 
served during the war, Blue said, will “operate to save the government millions of dollars 
in preventing or deferring the payment of compensation and insurance claims. Harkening 
back to pre-war arguments about using medical care as a means to maintain industrial 
productivity, he argued that it made good business sense to provide “medical supervision 
for such a large portion of the population at the greatest productive age period.”
64
 Blue’s 
opinion regarding comprehensive veterans’ health care jibed with his perspective on 
compulsory health insurance for the larger population – an issue gaining increasing 
attention from policy makers and medical professionals in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. In 1916, when Blue served as both PHS Surgeon General and 
president of the American Medical Association, he predicted, “health insurance will 
constitute the next great step in social legislation.”
65
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 Blue’s assessments of veterans’ needs were based in part on an October 1919 
report from William C. Rucker, to Assistant Secretary of the Treasury James H. Moyle.
66
 
By way of introduction, Rucker said, “the entire problem is one without precedent in 
history.” Although it was difficult to predict with statistical accuracy what the exact 
future demand for medical services would be, he argued, “the problem will grow with 
time rather than diminish, and… if mistakes are made they are far more apt to be in the 
direction of underestimating rather than of overestimating the magnitude of the 
situation...” He offered as partial evidence for his claim the massive increase in numbers 
of pension requests by Civil War veterans between 1861 and 1897 – an argument pre-war 




Rucker also offered a variety of statistical evidence demonstrating the ever-
growing need for more resources and funding. Of more than four million mobilized 
troops, he said, slightly more than 640,000 qualified as potential BWRI claimants, 
425,100 of whom had been discharged as disabled. An additional 16,500 limited-service 
men were called but rejected due to disabilities upon arrival at camps. Finally, there were 
200,300 men who were accepted by local draft boards but rejected by camp surgeons due 
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to physical disability. Rucker predicted that the largest proportion of patients – 25 
percent, or around 79,000 – would be discharged with “diseases of the nervous system 
and mental alienation”; another 25 percent, or 78,930 would have diseases of the 
circulatory system. 13.4 percent or 41,970 ex-servicemen, he said, would be discharged 
with “diseases of bones and organs of locomotion”; 12.8 percent or 40,090 with “general 
diseases”; 10.1 percent or 31,630 with tuberculosis; and nine percent or 28,190 with 
venereal disease. Many of the most prevalent disorders, Rucker noted, would require 
treatment for many years. “Psychoneurotic” patients, for example, could be treated 
successfully, but then need to be re-admitted in subsequent years in the event of 
reoccurrences.
68
 Tuberculosis also posed a long-term challenge, according to Rucker. 
46,000 cases of TB were expected to arise in the coming years, and it would be difficult 
to prove that they were not connected to service. If government policy was amended to 
include all veterans of the war – and not just those who were discharged with a disability 
rating of ten percent or more – the BWRI and PHS could be liable to treat more than 
300,000 cases of TB.
69
  
In spite of this daunting caseload number, Rucker joined Blue in arguing that all 
veterans of the war should be eligible for government sponsored medical care. First, he 
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noted that in claims filed with the BWRI, it had become clear that discharge ratings were 
not always accurate. Sometimes, he said, medical records proved that there was an 
extensive physical disability upon completion of service, but none noted by the discharge 
board. Also, he said, “many service men clamored for their discharges after the 
Armistice, and were discharged in a disabled condition because they had developed what 
might be termed ‘hospital phobia’ and a general dislike for the military service.” In spite 
of the fact that many of these ex-service members had signed away their rights to make 
future claims on the government, Rucker implied, they should be eligible for medical 
care.  
Finally, Rucker also argued that each of the more than 28,000 ex-servicemen 
discharged with venereal disease were “potential claimants.” A recent resolution 
suggesting that the government was not obligated to treat an ex-service member if a 
disease or injury resulted from “willful misconduct of moral turpitude,” Rucker said, was 
legally questionable. Even though 60 to 75 percent of ex-servicemen with venereal 
diseases likely had the conditions prior to military service, they were accepted by local 
draft boards “in sound condition,” he said. “To stigmatize a man suffering from a 
venereal disease by saying that the disease was contracted because of his ‘moral 
turpitude’ when that man had obeyed the prophylactic regulations of the Army or Navy, 
or if that man had contracted the disease prior to his enlistment in the service,” Rucker 
argued, “would be a task which no court or man would care to undertake or discharge 
with justice.”
 
Furthermore, he noted, treating BWRI beneficiaries with venereal diseases 
made practical sense. It would be difficult for the government to prove that a variety of 
diseases that could arise from conditions like syphilis and gonorrhea were linked to a pre-
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existing condition, as opposed to one contracted during service. Staving off clearly 
compensable disorders, Rucker suggested, was practical, if nothing else.
70
  
As Rucker and Blue made their case, they were laying the groundwork for later 
arguments that all veterans should receive government sponsored medical care, not just 
those discharged with a line-of-duty disability. Meanwhile, the seemingly astronomical 
estimates of need presented via House Document 481, though not immediately acted 
upon, helped pave the way for future appropriations. 
 
Interagency squabbles, questions regarding eligibility, and patients as heroes or “parasites”  
 
In 1919 and 1920, as patients and their case files were transferred from one government 
agency to another, the army, BWRI, and PHS each had a vested interest in and responsibility for 
some aspect of veterans’ care. Coordinating activities to ensure that the sundry promises of the 
U.S. government were met proved a significant challenge. Indeed, representatives of each branch 
harbored suspicions about the veracity of the efforts of their counterparts in other agencies.  
Army officials, for example, reported trepidation about sending officers to PHS facilities 
they deemed inferior to state-of-the-art military hospitals. In April 1920, Secretary of War 
Newton D. Baker wrote to Army Chief of Staff Peyton C. March expressing his worry about a 
policy dictating that all hospitalized wartime emergency officers and soldiers be discharged from 
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army hospitals by June 30, 1920. Focusing on the original mandate handed to the army prior to 
the war – that soldiers be discharged only once they were fully rehabilitated– Baker wondered, 
“Would it not be wise to ask Congress for some sort of legislative authority to retain those who 
have not at such time achieved the maximum benefit possible from medical and surgical care in 
Army hospitals?”
71
 After all, he argued, “there will be a few officers and maybe a few enlisted 
men in the hospitals like Walter Reed and Letterman where we have unusual facilities for highly 
specialized treatment, which can not be expected to be provided with the same degree of 
efficiency by the Public Health Service.” Baker implied that the military harbored a weighty and 
lasting obligation to provide for its recruits: “I would not like to have the Army put in the 
position of turning these men adrift or subjecting them to less favorable conditions for recovery 
than retention in the Army hospitals would provide.
72
 Baker, in fact, was so concerned that the 
Public Health Service was incapable of providing the care veterans needed that he volunteered 
the army to go above and beyond its prescribed duty.  
The army’s Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Henry Jervey, was considerably more 
conservative in his estimation of military responsibility. The army, he said, “should free itself as 
soon as practicable of the prolonged care of disabled persons, turning them over to the agencies 
approved by Congress to provide for their care, thus permitting the Medical Department to 
devote its energies to the normal and proper duties for which it is provided as a part of the 
military establishment.” Those duties included caring for disabled personnel during war, but not 
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afterwards. After all, he noted, “Congress has made no provision for the maintenance of the large 
medical establishment that would be necessary to continue the care and treatment of the large 
number of disabled persons resulting from the war.”
73
 Although Jervey recommended against 
asking permission from Congress to retain disabled men in the army so they could remain under 
the auspices of the Army Medical Department, he tacitly agreed with the point that military 
hospitals were, in many cases, superior to those of the PHS. Ex-officers, he reassuringly noted, 
could continue to receive care in some of the finest army hospitals even after discharge – that 
care would simply be funded by the BWRI.
74
 It was clear that some army officials continued to 
operate under the assumption that the military had an obligation to discharged service members, 
but they were forced into the uncomfortable position of rescinding control to outside agencies.  
Meanwhile, PHS officials had similar ill feelings about army facilities. In reply to a letter 
from the Director of the BWRI querying why the PHS was not making use of empty beds in 
army and navy hospitals on a contract basis, Hugh S. Cumming, appointed the Surgeon General 
of the PHS in March 1920, frankly stated that his organization’s attempts to utilize such beds had 
“not been productive of desirous results.” PHS field officers reported that military hospitals 
denied admission to patients suffering from tuberculosis, mental and nervous disorders, venereal 
diseases, and other conditions. The so-called empty beds, Cumming argued, were thus limited 
“to a very narrow class of patients.” Plus, he noted, ex-service members resisted the notion of 
being treated in military facilities “because of the discipline imposed on them while in such 
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 The statements of the War Department’s Baker, and Cumming, of the Public 
Health Service, demonstrate that members of separate branches of government harbored a 
distinct lack of confidence in other branches.  
In early 1920, officials openly discussed the urgency of the situation. At a 
conference between the BWRI and PHS, BWRI Director Richard G. Cholmeley-Jones, 
welcomed attendees, noting that, throughout the bureau, there was “a feeling of great 
intimacy” with the PHS. The two organizations, he said, had “many mutual problems to 
solve.” “I have heard some people remark that war was hell, but the after-war effects 
were ‘heller,’” Cholmeley-Jones said, proposing that post-war challenges were more 
drastic than wartime ones. “It is one of the most difficult things to build up an 
organization, an efficient organization…” Cholmeley-Jones urged his colleagues to 
imagine no “dividing line in the work we are doing. We have one man or woman to 
serve…”
76
   
Judging by the comments of both BWRI and PHS officials at the meeting, 
however, there were a great many dividing lines and questions. PHS representatives 
brought up a number of concerns, including questions about the rights of veterans. What 
if, for example, a patient requested to be transferred in order to be closer to family? That 
was an issue that “had to be borne with as patiently as possible, and everything must be 
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done to keep the patient satisfied,” Cholmeley-Jones said. If a bed was available at the 
desired institution, the patient should be moved as soon as possible.
77
  
The BWRI policy led to great difficulties in administration. For example, in an 
October 1920 letter to Cholmeley-Jones intended to answer complaints about a shortage 
of hospital facilities in Oklahoma, PHS Surgeon General Hugh S. Cumming noted that 
his organization “had always offered to hospitalize anybody sick in Oklahoma, and up to 
this time have been successful in doing so, provided they would accept facilities in 
another state.” Cumming argued that it was “impossible… for us to guarantee to 
hospitalize the inhabitants of each state within the boundaries of that state, regardless of 
the complaint with which they suffer. I do not see how the National Government could 
undertake to establish hospitals for every type of case in every state in the Union…
78
 
According to the PHS official in charge of the tuberculosis sanitarium in Tucson, 
Arizona, some patients took advantage of the BWRI policy to locate them according to 
their desires. “‘Local patients,’” he reported, “‘prefer to live in contract hospitals all (sic) 
account of no discipline.’” PHS Assistant Surgeon General C.H. Lavinder predicted that, 
in spite of overcrowding at the Tucson contract institution, and the existence of a vast 
number of empty beds at the PHS facility in the same town, there would be “some 
difficulty in removing patients from the contract hospitals to the government hospitals.” 
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He also noted that similar conditions existed in Saranac Lake, New York, Albequerque, 
New Mexico, and “scores of health resorts throughout the United States.”
79
  
Further to this point, PHS officials evidently found Great War veterans to be 
somewhat high-maintenance. At the April 1920 conference between the BWRI and PHS, 
one doctor noted that many District Supervisors had observed “a tendency toward 
snobbishness in some of the soldiers. Because they were ex-soldiers, they thought they 
were a little better than other patients, especially the charity ones.” To this, the BWRI 
Chief Medical Advisor could only reply, “This whim should not be encouraged. If 
allowed to exist, we would create a fine set of parasites.”
80
   
Both PHS and army officials questioned whether patients deserved to be treated 
as soldiers, charity cases, or heroes. They had been told by BWRI Chief Medical 
Advisor, William C. Rucker in December 1919 that it was “exceedingly improper to 
issue orders” that a patient be moved to a different hospital, as opposed to “requesting” 
that he proceed there.
81
 But there was resistance to such a sentiment: In February 1920, 
the Commanding Officer of U.S. Army Hospital Number 21 in Denver, Colorado 
reported to the Army Surgeon General that “civilian soldiers” were an especially 
“difficult class of patients:” 
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Having been petted, made heroes of, on account of their participation in the 
World War and the disabilities incident thereto… there is a feeling among these 
patients that they are not subject to ordinary discipline and have a perfect right to 
conduct themselves as they see fit. This condition obviously cannot be permitted 





At the spring 1920 conference between the BWRI and PHS, a PHS doctor 
summarized some of his colleagues’ viewpoints regarding the attitude and social status of 
veteran patients. He wondered what to do about the “numerous complaints” regarding ex-
soldiers in PHS hospitals who refused to complete the duties required of all patients – 
making their own beds, for example; “they would say, ‘I saved my country from 
democracy (sic) and I will not work.’” Cholmeley-Jones suggested what might have 
seemed to PHS officials like a somewhat drastic measure to handle this problem; change 
the commanding officer of the hospital, he said, arguing that a better “disciplinarian” 
could often garner better results.
83
 There was little in the response in the way of widely 
applicable, concrete measures to alleviate a very particular problem – a patients’ lack of 
discipline according to PHS standards. There was also a failure to address the larger 
question of whether such expectations of discipline were realistic or, indeed, appropriate. 
Demands from the BWRI that veterans be treated as honored civilians was likely 
resisted by some PHS doctors and officials who strongly felt that many bureau patients 
did not belong in hospitals at all. One PHS inspector reported that 80 to 90 percent of 
patients in hospitals he had recently visited were ambulatory and “seemed to be in 
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excellent physical condition.” Suggesting that ex-soldiers should not have unfettered 
access to government institutions, he argued that PHS doctors should have authority to 
discharge such patients in an “unimpeded” manner.
84
  Another physician who ran a 
sanitarium in Fort Dodge, Iowa reported to the BWRI’s Cholmeley-Jones that “many” 
beneficiaries sent to his institution with diagnoses of tuberculosis did not, in fact, have 
the disease. In order to remain in institutions like the one in Iowa, however, at least one 
patient was found to be “borrowing sputum from a man who had tubercle bacilli in his 
sputum.” When such patients were discharged, the doctor argued, they issued complaints 
with the American Red Cross and veterans’ organizations, which did “all they could to 
discredit our work and the care which we are giving them.” Institutions were not only 
caring for “malingerers,” according to the physician, but they were doing so while they 
waited for six months or more to be reimbursed by the BWRI. The entire system, he 
suggested, was broken: “…many worthy, sick ex-service men” deserved to receive 




A question and answer session during the April BWRI-PHS conference 
highlighted many holes within the system: Would the BWRI reimburse private doctors 
who performed medical exams on ex-service members, or only those physicians who had 
been approved as government examiners? Only approved examiners would be guaranteed 
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reimbursement, according to a BWRI official.
86
 Many in the room likely recognized the 
paradoxical implications of the stated policy: a physician might be put in the position of 
refusing services to an ill veteran seeking care, and a veteran might have to seek services 
far from home – two scenarios the BWRI repeatedly stated it was trying to avoid.
 
  
A January 1920 account from a Red Cross representative, Cora G. Irvine, 
provides an example of a prospective outcome of the rule. In Snohomish, Washington, 
Irvine reported, the designated PHS doctor kept patients waiting for hours, sometimes 
days, before they could be seen for an appointment, then refused to render services until 
an ex-soldier received approval for procedures from the Seattle office. Occasionally, 
patients were sent to Seattle to see doctors, often at their own expense, Irvine said. The 
government-approved examiner was evidently juggling his veteran-related duties with 
other professional functions. “For the good of the disabled man,” Irvine pleaded, “the 
suggestion is made that a Public Health Service physician be appointed who would give a 
specified time exclusively to the Public Health Service.”
87
 
There were many other questions from PHS officials at the spring 1920 
conference. What if ex-service members requested that they be re-examined, claiming 
that their condition had worsened? They should, according to BWRI officials, be re-
examined. And what if a man was healed from a gunshot wound (the disability for which 
he was discharged), but now complained of the effects of tuberculosis, which had 
resulted from influenza incurred during service? The man should be treated, according to 
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Rucker. And, what if he had misplaced his discharge form? Have the prospective patient 
sign an affidavit noting that he was honorably discharged, and then treat him.
88
 In every 
case, it seemed, PHS officials were being told to give the benefit of the doubt to ex-
service members, but the BWRI offered little assurance that the government would 
compensate them or their institutions in a timely fashion for services rendered.   
BWRI officials reported concerns of their own about their partner organization. 
For example, they said, many examination reports were returned to headquarters lacking 
diagnoses entirely, or containing non-descript diagnoses. One bureau representative 
stated with frustration that the common diagnosis of neurasthenia, which indicated that a 
patient had symptoms of both nervous exhaustion and epilepsy “does not mean anything 
to us.” “We want to know how many attacks the man is having, what kind, whether day 
or night. … we want a picture of the epileptic. It does not take more than a page of the 
examination… we want a picture of the man’s mal-adjustment.”
89
 In addition, BWRI 
staff requested that PHS officials be timelier in their correspondence. Official diagnoses 
of admitted patients needed to be sent to Washington, D.C. immediately, they argued, so 




“We will go to Hell first”: Debating the utility of Soldiers’ Homes 
One week after the conference, BWRI and PHS officials discussed particulars of 
veterans’ care at another public forum – a congressional hearing regarding the question of 
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whether Soldiers’ Homes should be used to care for discharged service members. BWRI 
officials, anxious to re-locate veterans from hundreds of private contract institutions and 
concentrate them solely in government-owned hospitals, turned to Soldiers’ Homes as 
prospective sites of care. But the idea was controversial. Unlike PHS hospitals, Soldiers’ 
Homes were not viewed as medical facilities. Their long-term, elderly residents used the 
institutions primarily as residences, rather than to seek improvements in their health. 
Those who might have had health problems were commonly seen as past the point of 
cure. World War veterans, on the other hand, could still (ideally) pursue recovery, and 
resume productive lives in the civilian world. Mixing the two patient types was, many 
felt, ill advised. 
In the early 1920s, there were eleven federally funded National Homes for 
Disabled Volunteer Soldiers located across the country.
91
 Most of them were founded in 
the late nineteenth century after it became clear that private charity could not cover the 
cost or labor involved in providing for the needs of thousands of Civil War veterans. Due 
to the age of the institutions, by the post World War I years, many were in poor physical 
condition. Although some soldiers’ homes contained hospitals on their campuses, the 
main mission of the facilities was to provide an opportunity for elderly veterans to find 
beds, meals, and the camaraderie of fellow former service members.
92
 Because the homes 
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(like PHS hospitals) were government funded, the BWRI could legally place 
beneficiaries in their available beds; as early as 1919, the bureau began to do just that. 
In addition to the federally run institutions, there were more than 40 state-run 
soldiers’ homes.
93
 Many of their administrators voiced concerns about admitting veterans 
of the most recent war, arguing that their facilities were not suitable for such a task. Some 
were also hesitant to admit World War veterans because they did not wish to work on a 
contract basis with the Public Health Service.
94
 Still, some veterans were placed in the 
state homes, which BWRI Director Richard G. Cholmeley-Jones argued led to 
“considerable complaint, because a great many of (them) are not modern in their 
methods.” By way of explanation, Cholmeley-Jones noted, “they are not real hospitals; 
they are just homes.”
95
  
It was not just state institutions that garnered “considerable complaint.” Robert 
Jones, a World War veteran with tuberculosis who was being treated at the federally 
sponsored Old Soldiers’ Home in Togus, Maine, reported that conditions there were 
highly unsatisfactory. Recently discharged soldiers were housed alongside veterans of the 
Civil and Spanish-American Wars, Jones said: “Not only is there no segregation of men 
according to ages, neither is there any according to the condition of patients.” The 
hospital surgeon, he added, “frankly admits that he knows nothing about tuberculosis…” 
Not to mention the fact that residents of the home were offered a steady diet of “steak and 
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eggs – not fresh by any means – milk and potatoes, seven days a week,” which Jones 
noted was “monotonous and insufficient.” The home’s lavatories were “not kept clean,” 
he said, and it was “no unusual sight to frighten away all species of water bugs before we 
wash or take a bath.” Because of the conditions, Jones said, he had recently lost weight 
and “suffered from colds and chest pains.”
96
 In July 1919, BWRI Chief Medical Advisor, 
William C. Rucker, acknowledged that Jones’ sentiments were hardly unique. World War 
veterans, Rucker noted, generally deplored being treated in soldiers’ homes.
97
  
Over time, however, the priority of ensuring that all veterans be housed in 
government run facilities as opposed to private contract institutions took precedence. At 
House hearings in April 1920, bureaucrats and congressional representatives discussed 
whether it was feasible to make better use of thousands of empty beds in federally funded 
soldiers’ homes across the country.  
According to the BWRI’s R.G. Cholmeley-Jones, it was perfectly legal to send 
Bureau patients to such facilities; his agency simply had to verify that the “old soldiers’ 
homes, in fact, were able to care for them.” Cholmeley-Jones also believed that the care 
of all ex-service members – including those of previous wars – should be overseen by 
one agency, namely the Public Health Service. “… It would be a mistake to divide the 
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authority in the handling of the patients of the World War,” he claimed. “I think the 
experience we have all had is sufficient to make that point very clear in our minds.”
98
  
Anxious to stave off complaints from constituents, and the critique that “we are 
doing nothing to help the boys who are so much in need of help,” members of Congress 
focused more on immediate solutions than the larger issue of jurisdiction. Why couldn’t 
administrators “cut the red tape” and get “beds for those boys right away”? Legislators 
argued that the approximately 8,000 beds available at Soldiers’ Homes should be put to 
use for recent veterans, and that new veterans could be sent to the homes, but be kept 
“segregated” from veterans of previous wars (as former serviceman Robert Jones implied 
they should be). Cholmeley-Jones backed the idea. Previous tenants of the homes could 
be requested to move to alternative buildings or different facilities, he suggested, so that 
younger veterans could be treated and housed together.
99
    
Congressman Frank Clark (D-FL) saw the irony in placing one group of ex-
servicemen above another. “I would be loath to fire (veterans of previous wars) out and 
put them anywhere else that might be available for them,” he said. Instead of focusing on 
the politically expedient goal of providing a certain standard of facilities for the newest 
veterans, Clark brought up the grander ideal of veterans’ rights. “Has any investigation 
been made to ascertain their wishes in the matter? Would the old soldiers be willing to be 
segregated in different parts of the homes?”
100
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PHS Surgeon General Hugh S. Cumming also had reservations about the plan to 
separate World War veterans from others, and brought up a host of prospective logistical 
challenges. A great number of World War veterans seeking institutional care were 
victims of psychoneurosis or tuberculosis, he pointed out, noting that such patients 
“should not be indiscriminately thrown in among well people.” Furthermore, he said, 
surgical patients of the most recent war required more space and personnel than was 
typically allotted for soldiers’ home residents. Therefore, according to Cumming, the 
estimate that there was space for approximately 10,000 BWRI patients in just as many 
soldiers’ home beds was somewhat optimistic. Unlike most tenants of the homes, who 
had “nothing particularly the matter,” but needed “to be looked over to a certain extent,” 
World War veterans “have to have the best possible treatment,” he said. Veterans of the 
Civil and Spanish-American Wars, Cumming implied, were beyond rehabilitation, while 
their younger counterparts could still benefit from modern medicine.
101
 Such statements 
revealed that the problem of providing medical care for World War veterans was seen as 
especially complicated and unique. Existing facilities and agencies, authorities suggested, 
would not suffice in the short- or the long-term.  
In spite of the concerns of Cumming and others, and complaints from veterans 
like Robert Jones, the BWRI continued to make use of beds in soldiers’ homes in the 
early 1920s, bringing about more dissatisfaction from disgruntled former service 
members. When the BWRI attempted to move World War veterans from various 
Massachusetts hospitals to the Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers at Togus, Maine, 
for example, the patients loudly protested, gaining support and publicity for their cause 
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from the Massachusetts American Legion. Standing by his decision to re-locate the men, 
R.G. Cholmeley-Jones explained that there was a shortage of hospital beds for veterans in 
the state. The move was part of a larger plan to concentrate former service members 
solely in government-owned hospitals, he said, rather than keeping them scattered in 
more than 1,000 private contract institutions nationwide. The larger intent, Cholmeley-
Jones noted, was to “‘improve the hospitalization program’” and “‘prevent a chaotic 
condition in the future.’”
102
 The situation escalated when more than 90 patients scheduled 
to be transferred to Togus from a tuberculosis sanitarium in Rutland, Massachusetts 
circulated a petition protesting the move. In Maine, they said, they would be far from 
family, exposed to potentially harmful sea air, and given inferior food. “We will go to 
Hell first,” said George A. Bryant, a representative of the Rutland men. “We don’t 
propose to go off to some spot to die just to suit them.”
103
  
An American Legion representative and lawyer, Col. Edward L. Logan, served as 
a spokesman for patients from Rutland and other Massachusetts contract institutions. 
Their publicity efforts quickly bore fruit. Merely one day after Cholmeley-Jones argued 
that the soldiers had to be re-located to “prevent a chaotic condition,” a Public Health 
Service representative told Logan, “as far as he was concerned the order of transfer… 
was rescinded.
104
 Within a few days, Massachusetts Legion representatives had met with 
Cholmeley-Jones, who provided them with a list of all BWRI patients under treatment in 
Massachusetts with the weighty request that the American Legion “review, with every 
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exactness, the case of each disabled soldier, sailor and marine now receiving treatment in 
a hospital or sanitarium in the state of Massachusetts.” If, after conferring with the patient 
and his doctor, the Legion found that “it is not to the best interest of the patient that he be 
moved,” Cholmeley-Jones suggested that the organization “so advise the District 
Supervisor of the United States Public Health Service…”105  
However unrealistic Cholmeley-Jones’ request was, here was governmental 
sidestepping in the extreme, and evidence of the hopelessness of the situation at hand. 
Not only was the BWRI handing over administrative responsibilities to an advocacy 
organization, it was also actively avoiding conceiving of or putting in place a viable 
solution to the immediate problem. Clearly, this was not a model that could be followed 
for an indefinite period, or nationwide.  
 
P.L. 246, debates regarding “shirks and slackers”, and intensifying governmental in-fighting 
 
 The situation surrounding veteran transfers to the National Soldiers’ Home in Togus, 
Maine did not bode well for the potential of Public Law 246, passed on June 5, 1920. The 
legislation allocated $46 million to the BWRI, to be used for compensation of staff and a variety 
of beneficiary-related expenses, including medical examinations and “medical, surgical, and 
hospital services.” Some of that money was to be “allotted from time to time” to agencies 
providing hospital care, including the Board of Managers of the National Homes for Disabled 
Volunteer Soldiers, the War and Navy Department, and the Public Health Service.106 The law 
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provided mainly for the improvement of existing medical facilities, rather than the building of 
new ones. It offered millions of dollars for veterans’ care, but did nothing to alleviate 
bureaucratic strife. 
 Although hard-fought and seen as a major victory by veterans’ organizations, PL 246 met 
with hostility from Public Health Service officials who loathed the idea of having to seek money, 
and by extension, being subservient to the BWRI. “You give us the hospitals, PHS Assistant 
Surgeon General Charles H. Lavinder told members of Congress, “but you do not give us any 
money to operate them.” PHS officials explained that in the current situation, they were 
“laboring under unusual conditions,” in that they had to request a specific amount of money from 
the BWRI to fund the improvement of buildings at each specific institution that necessitated 
work. If it turned out there was too little money once a project was underway, the PHS had to 
plead its case again. “We have no money during the coming year for making alterations or 
additions to any hospital that may be turned over to us in the future” said PHS Assistant Surgeon 
General William G. Stimpson, referring to institutions that may be passed on by the army or 
National Soldiers’ Home Board of Managers.
107
 As Stimpson’s colleague, Charles Lavinder, put 
it, “We have a big machine,” but unless the Secretary of the Treasury was given control of 
funding, as opposed to the BWRI, “we would have no guarantee of necessary funds for operation 
and no basis upon which to formulate plans.”
108
 PHS officials approved of devoting more money 
to medical care for ex-soldiers, but they disapproved of the BWRI controlling it. They argued 
that funding should be allocated not to the BWRI, but to the office of the Secretary of the 
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Treasury, which oversaw both the BWRI and PHS.
109
 Cholmeley-Jones, of the BWRI, countered 
that since “under the War Risk Insurance Act, these men are declared to be patients of the 
Bureau of War Risk Insurance and we deal with these men and their dependents in several 
respects,” the BWRI should have control of money.
110
  
 During debates regarding the passage of Public Law 246, some senators questioned the 
very idea of earmarking more public funds for the hospitalization of veterans, many of whom 
they felt were not worthy of such a privilege. James W. Good (R-IA) was disturbed to learn that 
22,000 ex-soldiers were classifiable as “feeble-minded,” meaning, according to William C. 
Rucker of the PHS, they had “never developed to the point of maturity.” Why, Good wanted to 
know, were they accepted into the military in the first place? Rucker explained that entrance 
exams were brief, so not all cases were detectable. Plus, he pointed out, “a man can ‘peel spuds’ 
even if he only has the mentality of a 10-year-old child.” Good was aghast. “Here is a person 
who never did develop mentally, was always feeble-minded, and his service in the war did not 
make him any more feeble-minded than before, and he is just as healthy and has as much 
mentality now as he had then,” he said. “Why does the government owe that man, because of his 
service in the war, any greater obligation than any other man who was not injured either mentally 
or physically because of his service?” Rucker declined to take up the question on an ideological 
level but instead, made a legal argument. By virtue of previous legislation, he said, it was 
assumed “that the men who are accepted shall be accepted as of sound condition.” And it was 
mandated that the government would provide necessary medical services for all those who 
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served.111  In a sense, Rucker was saying, the system was inherently flawed, but the government 
was legally obliged to ensure that it remain intact and functional.  
 Francis E. Warren (R-WY) focused less on the question of pre-existing health maladies 
than on whether individuals were consciously besting the system. Were veterans, he wondered, 
remaining in hospitals or on the disability rolls not because they had legitimate needs, but simply 
to garner large monthly payments? Warren was disturbed to learn that, before discharge from the 
army, soldiers were earning $30 per month while receiving hospital care, but that they could get 
as much as $100 or more once they were under treatment as BWRI patients. He worried that 
Congress was “setting up a premium upon shirks and slackers by paying them a good deal more 
than they can get in wages.” At some point, he said, “somebody somewhere has to say ‘No’ and 
stop the flood leading to indolence…”112 Concerns voiced by Good and Warren were typical of 
those who questioned the veracity of similar legislation granting rights and services to veterans 
throughout the early 1920s.  
 Advocates of Public Law 246 overpowered the opposition, in part by arguing that Congress 
had an obligation to approve the request for funding mainly because of guarantees contained in 
the 1917 War Risk Insurance Act regarding war-related illnesses and injuries. Certifications of 
disability were increasing at a rate of 1,200 per month, according to a congressional report 
regarding new hospital facilities for war veterans: “We have assumed this liability. Under the 
law, we are obliged to meet it… we must make adequate provision.” In fact, the report’s authors 
favored the passage of Public Law 246, not least of all because it allocated $46 million, as 
opposed to the full $85 million originally requested by William C. Rucker and Rupert Blue in 
House Document 481 of December 1919. In this way, PL 246 would actually allow Congress to 
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“avoid an expenditure,” though there was a distinct possibility that “additional hospitals may be 
required at a later date.”113  
 In spite of funding increases, systemic problems brought up in Congress and 
through inter-organizational conversations continued to plague the PHS and the BWRI 
throughout 1920 and 1921. Even after the allocation of $46 million to the latter 
organization in June 1920, governmental agencies faced administrative difficulties, 
problems coordinating standards of care and discipline, and the reality of inadequate 
facilities. By 1921, PHS and BWRI officials openly exchanged accusations of ineptitude. 
The question at hand had evolved from whether the system as it stood was working, to 
who was to blame for, and what was to be done about its myriad dysfunctions. 
In mid-1920, PHS Surgeon General Cumming made it clear to BWRI officials 
that he was frustrated with his organization’s lack of autonomy. The PHS, he explained, 
had put into operation various hospitals “in haste” in 1919, and “with a full realization 
that many of the hospitals opened were not satisfactory for the purpose.” Still, the 
organization was fulfilling its responsibility to answer an “urgent need… pending the 
adoption of some program which would more adequately and more permanently meet the 
needs of the situation.” But recently, Cumming pointed out, instead of honoring requests 
from the PHS for money to build new facilities, Congress had appropriated $46 million to 
the BWRI, which had chosen to allocate resources to transfer ex-service members to 
national soldiers’ homes as opposed to building permanent facilities that could be used 
for long-term needs. Now that the BWRI was in control of the money, Cumming asked 
for some definitive answers: should his organization continue to acquire hospital 
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facilities? Should the PHS continue to operate facilities it deemed inadequate, simply 




A later memo described the “legal position” of the PHS in relation to veterans’ 
care as “very unsatisfactory,” mainly because jurisdiction over funding had been placed 
entirely in the hands of the Director of the BWRI.
115
 Thus, the PHS was in the awkward 
position of requesting any and all necessary money to care for soldiers – including salary 
increases for its doctors – from another government agency. In March 1920, Cumming 
went public with his dissatisfaction with such an arrangement. Explaining that his agency 
was caring for 12,000 discharged soldiers, he noted that ten percent of officers had 
already resigned their posts, and the PHS was unable to attract medical personnel of any 
grade – specialists, surgeons, or otherwise – because “the pay offers no inducements.”
116
  
It was not just the PHS that complained to the BWRI about lack of payment. In 
February 1920, BWRI Chief Medical Advisor William C. Rucker requested that the PHS 
“expedite payment” to a state hospital in Fulton, Missouri, where ex-service members 
received treatment. “This institution is making vigorous protests on account of delays in 
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payment of their bills,” Rucker reported to PHS officers.
117
 The Fulton institution, one of 
more than one thousand private hospitals contracted to work with the PHS on providing 
care to BWRI beneficiaries, was compensated for its services by the PHS, which, in turn, 
was reimbursed by the BWRI. The idea of having medical providers two steps removed 
from funding sources in two different government agencies was simply untenable. It left 
both BWRI and PHS officials feeling as though they had little control. 
Government agencies encountered not only logistical problems related to 
payments, but also a lack of clarity regarding authority over treatment. In order for a 
patient to be transferred or discharged from a hospital, for example, the institution wired 
a request to the PHS Surgeon General’s office. From there, a telegram was sent to the 
BWRI advising how to proceed with the case. Then, BWRI headquarters replied to the 
PHS office in Washington, DC, which finally passed on word to the hospital. The entire 
process could take a week or more, often leaving both patients and doctors feeling 
frustrated. Meanwhile, PHS and BWRI officials in Washington, DC and elsewhere 
exchanged accusations that unnecessary delays were occurring in fulfilling requests for 
treatment, transfers, and disability payments.
118
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The necessity for a long string of communication surrounding each patient 
brought about shortfalls in services. In July 1920, William C. Rucker, of the BWRI, 
requested that Surgeon General Cumming advise PHS district offices to get in touch with 
army and navy hospital commanding officers in the event that more than ten veteran-
patients were to be transferred to their respective institutions at one time – at least a few 
days prior to the transfer, if possible. Cumming replied that he agreed that such 
notification was necessary, but argued that it should emanate from the office of the 
Director of the BWRI.
119
 Officials at both government agencies, then, acknowledged a 
lack of coordination and communication, but with their jurisdictions ambiguously 
defined, they were reluctant to assume the responsibility of acting to fix problems. 
In addition to reports about a lack of coordination and communication, there were 
increasing complaints by 1921 that some institutions where ex-service members received 
care were inadequate. In fact, no one – from patients and government personnel 
(including representatives of the PHS and BWRI) to doctors and emerging veterans’ 
groups – seemed satisfied with available facilities. Even though the PHS was charged 
with inspecting private facilities before approving their use as contract institutions and 
rejected many, some “inadequate” sanatoria and hospitals were approved to provide 
care.
120
  In January 1921, Walter L. Treadway, Chief of the Neuro-psychiatric Division of 
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the PHS, requested that the BWRI authorize that beneficiaries be “immediately removed” 
from the Sunnybrook Farm Sanatorium, a PHS contract institution in Illinois. 
Sunnybrook Farm, he said, was “poorly administered and poorly equipped.”
121
 
Throughout early 1921, Treadway wrote similar letters about other contract institutions: 
the Massillon State Hospital in Ohio, he said, was “not sufficiently staffed with medical 
officers, nurses, and attendants to accord proper treatment to neuro-psychiatric 
beneficiaries…”
122
 In June 1921, Treadway pointed out that an Augusta, Georgia facility 
lacked hydro- and electro-therapy equipment, and expressed some doubt that a doctor 
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Although BWRI officials attempted to ensure that institutions serving the majority 
of Bureau beneficiaries were of a certain caliber, standards were decidedly lower when it 
came to providing for patients of color. In February 1921, Treadway wrote to the Medical 
Division of the BWRI regarding the Central State Hospital in Nashville, Tennessee. The 
facility was “not sufficiently equipped or staffed to be considered desirable as a place for 
the treatment of beneficiaries of the Public Health Service…” he said, presumably 
referring only to white beneficiaries. He recommended that the hospital might be suitable 
for the “care of all colored insane residents of District No. 5 and 6…” He noted that 
“certain principles in respect to personnel” should be observed, including the provision of 
a minimum number of doctors, nurses, orderlies, and occupational therapists.
124
 The 
government was willing to fulfill its legal responsibilities to all ex-service members, but 
with varying degrees of generosity and abundance.
125
 
Whatever semblance of a system existed, it seemed, was spinning out of control. 
As BWRI Director Cholmeley-Jones put it in late 1920, the hospitalization situation was 
“manifestly unsatisfactory to the disabled ex-service men and women and to the 
government alike.” Federal agencies had not had time to acquire “adequate hospital 
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facilities,” he said, and it had thus become necessary to conceive of a re-vamped plan to 
provide medical care to veterans.
126
 
By September 1920, PHS and BWRI officials moved from suggesting that their 
partner organizations were bureaucratically impotent, to accusing their representatives of 
active malfeasance. In a letter that he asked be considered “confidential in the extreme,” 
PHS Senior Surgeon William S. Terriberry explained to a colleague in the field that he 
had obtained a copy of a letter from a BWRI official requesting that the Red Cross visit 
PHS facilities and “make certain investigations as to the satisfaction of the patients with 
their treatment,” including their feelings about their doctors, food, and living conditions. 
Red Cross personnel, Terriberry reported, replied that they were unwilling to use their 
organization to “spy” on the PHS. A frustrated PHS officer shared news of the 
accusations with a Boston reporter, who duly noted in a newspaper article that the 
organizations were sparring, Terriberry said. Now, Cholmeley-Jones of the BWRI had 
complained to the Secretary of the Treasury that PHS officers were “engaged in political 
propaganda.”
127
 The tension was evident on the ground level, too, according to a BWRI 
inspector who visited a Public Health Service hospital in Louisville, Kentucky. There, the 
bureau representative was greeted by a commanding officer who would not allow him to 
distribute questionnaires to patients in spite of his reassurances that he was “not sent for 
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the purpose of inviting criticisms… but merely for the purpose of cooperating with the 
U.S.P.H.S… to create a pleasing impression with the ex-service men themselves…”
128
  
Terriberry was correct that the BWRI had asked Red Cross officials to visit PHS 
facilities. In July 1920, BWRI Representative J.H. Widerman wrote to a Red Cross 
worker in Camp Sevier, South Carolina requesting a “confidential report” regarding how 
patients were being “treated by our… surgeons… with what degree of sympathy” their 
complaints were being received, and, in general, “how they are being cared for.”
129
  
Approximately one month later, Grover F. Sexton, the head of the BWRI’s Investigation 
Field Services, took it a step further, and sent a memorandum to his agency’s 
representatives throughout the United States, requesting “a general clean-up of all 
delayed cases…” He asked that BWRI employees visit PHS hospitals, “preferably in 
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company with representatives of the American Legion or the American Red Cross,” to 
assess patients’ opinions “of how service is being rendered,” and physicians’ thoughts on 
patients’ conditions. “The Director desires that he shall be able to say that a 
representative of the Bureau has called on every man in every hospital, ready to render 
every service possible,” Sexton reported. He asked BWRI representatives to “search” 
PHS office files “to see if there are any delayed cases,” but advised them to do so “in 
conjunction with” PHS officers, and noted that there was “to be nothing of criticism… 




The heads of the BWRI and the PHS each backed the accounts of their 
representatives. Cholmeley-Jones wrote directly to Surgeon General Cumming asking 
that he advise local hospital commanding officers to allow BWRI representatives to 
question patients. The visits were meant to serve less as “inspections” than as a means to 
make the work of the two organizations “more effective.”
131
 Cumming demurred: “the 
investigations,” he believed, were meant to “discredit the work of the Public Health 
Service.” Sexton’s original letter regarding a “clean-up” campaign was not so innocent, 
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he argued, and had prompted BWRI field representatives to “find something of which a 
complaint could be made.”
132
 
The correspondence between the two government agencies in the fall of 1920 
signaled the dawn of a new era in veterans’ medical care, wherein the impressions and 
opinions of ex-service members held renewed import. In each of their letters regarding 
the investigation and standards of hospitals, Sexton and Terriberry hinted at the impetus 
for the change: the emergence of a new and powerful organization called the American 
Legion. According to Terriberry, the PHS and BWRI should sort out their problems 
before the annual meeting of the Legion, or else damaging charges of infighting were 
“apt to be thrown about.”
133
  
Eager to uphold the congressional mandates set out for them with limited 
resources, and without being accused of neglect, disparate government agencies were 
unable to maintain appearances of harmony and success once veterans’ groups arrived on 
the scene, raising demands and expectations. Throughout 1920 and 1921, advocacy 
organizations helped bring to a close the era of PHS-BWRI joint authority over veterans’ 
medical care, and played an integral role in the successful fight for the August 1921 
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Conclusion 
 In March 1919, when the Public Health Service officially took over the medical 
care of all BWRI beneficiaries, it was treating 1,500 Bureau of War Risk Insurance 
patients. By March 1921, that number had increased to 26,000 patients, and the flow 
showed now signs of ebbing; an average of 2,000 BWRI beneficiaries were being 
admitted to PHS hospitals each week, while only 1,700 were being discharged, leaving a 
net increase of approximately 1,200 patients per month. All in all, by the summer of 
1921, the PHS had overseen treatment for 150,000 BWRI patients in a multitude of 
public and private medical facilities.
134
  
Around that time, PHS Surgeon General Cumming took to defending his agency 
against complaints about its post-war performance. His sentiments regarding the 
organization’s ability to rise to a challenge and perform well under pressure echoed those 
expressed by Army Medical Department officials earlier in the war effort. 
Representatives of the PHS, Cumming pointed out, had argued on the congressional floor 
as early as December 1919 that more facilities and funding were necessary. Their early 
predictions, he said, which were initially criticized as “pretentious,” had, in fact, proven 
prescient, as demand increased over time. “I know that we have sincerely attempted to 
render to ex-service men and women the best service possible under the circumstances,” 
Cumming said in July 1921. “I realize that we may have fallen short of our ideals in a 
great many respects, yet I feel under the circumstances that disabled veterans who have 
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come under the care of the Public Health Service have received sympathetic 
consideration as well as good professional care and treatment.”
135
  
Other PHS officials expressed similar perspectives. “There is nothing we can do 
that will adequately justify the sacrifices which you have made,” Senior PHS Surgeon 
B.W. Brown, told a gathering of veterans in June 1921. At the close of the war, he noted, 
“Congress had only one medical organization and that was the PHS. We were well 
organized for our specific duty, which is to administer the National Health Functions of 
this country, but we were improperly organized to take care of the disabled men of an 
army of 4,650,000 soldiers.” Still, Brown maintained, “We did not utter a complaint. We 




Bureaucrats and politicians faced a difficult task as they attempted to decipher 
how to fulfill responsibilities defined ambiguously by the 1917 War Risk Insurance Act. 
While they did so, rules and norms seemed to be ever changing. Even as memories of the 
war faded in the public eye, advocacy groups became more vocal and demanding, and 
veterans’ expectations of their government evolved. Congressional representatives were 
torn between enhancing benefits for former service members in the name of fulfilling a 
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righteous obligation, and demonstrating economy by questioning the veracity of claims 
that more hospital services were necessary. But age-old arguments about the existence of 
a national responsibility to veterans – especially those who had sacrificed their health 
while fighting on behalf of their country – were powerful. Savvy veterans’ groups were 
eventually able to gain political support for the establishment of one government agency 
to oversee all veterans’ benefits and medical care, in part, by pointing out how 
dysfunctional the system was as it stood. Veterans, they argued, had been short-changed, 




Civilian-citizens become veteran super-citizens:  
Interest group advocacy (1919-1921)  
 
The story of soldiers’ and veterans’ medical care in the World War I years is, in part, a 
story about veterans’ activism. The advocacy groups of the Great War built on the achievements 
of their nineteenth century predecessors, who helped ensure the creation of a massive pension 
system by arguing that ex-soldiers deserved special privileges from their government.
1
 But 
veterans’ advocates of the World War I era also capitalized on the widely held view that cash 
pensions were no longer an ideal form of recompense. They fought not only for monetary 
payments, but also focused on securing other lasting and extensive rights: among them, special 
access to jobs, land, and institutions such as hospitals. Advocacy organizations founded 
following the Great War, including the American Legion (AL) and the Disabled American 
Veterans (DAV), thus helped shape veterans’ policies and benefits for the remainder of the 
twentieth century.
2
 The efforts of the organizations pertaining to medical care for veterans reveal 
that political change took compromise and, in some cases, contradictory action. In many ways, a 
study of veterans’ activism in this era showcases democracy at its finest. It is a story of poor and 
middle-class Americans banding together in order to have their demands met by a somewhat 
resistant government.  
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But the story isn’t as simple as the powerless uniting to demand and receive privileges. 
Veterans’ groups won the fight for access to hospitals and other benefits for their constituents, in 
part, by cloaking their demands in rhetoric of “100 percent Americanism” and anti-radicalism, 
and thereby arguing against the notion that all citizens were worthy of the same rights. Even as 
they claimed to accept and welcome black members, for example, officials of the DAV and 
American Legion denied African American veterans access to the group’s conferences, and 
fought against the integration of both military and veterans’ hospitals. This seemingly 
contradictory stance illuminated intra-organizational divides and disagreements about policies 
regarding inclusion. On a more general level, it indicated that when it came to putting forth a 
public image of national veterans’ organizations in an era of growing racial and social tensions, 
the priority of gaining benefits for white, male veterans took precedence over gaining benefits 
for all veterans. 
Although their efforts were steeped in the predominantly anti-egalitarian ideology of the 
times, advocacy groups founded in the years following the Great War were instrumental in 
securing long-lasting and extensive rights for former service members. The political victories of 
the Legion and DAV, among others, helped bring about not only a federal hospital system for 
veterans, but also the 1944 G.I. Bill, and a flurry of government benefits for ex-service members 
in the following decades. They also provided a framework upon which women and minority 
former service members could fight for their own enhanced rights. 
The American Legion fought for material benefits for ex-soldiers, motivated not by an 
anti-government agenda, but instead, by the idea that politically and socially vulnerable veterans 
had to be convinced that their country was grateful for their efforts. Veterans’ groups after World 
War I were far from politically monolithic; the agendas of the American Legion and DAV were 
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influenced by larger social circumstances, as well as comparatively smaller organizations.
3
 Some 
ex-service members joined “single-population” groups, which brought together veterans based 
on disability, such as blindness or deafness; those organizations often attempted to eschew any 
political stances.
4
 There were also plenty of veterans’ groups with a decidedly leftist political 
ideology. While conservative groups like the American Legion advocated an anti-immigrant, 
anti-communist, pro-military ideology, these smaller groups embraced socialistic, pro-labor 
ideals, and were anti-military; they claimed that veterans should fight for material rewards from 
their government based on the conviction that they had been unjustly exploited and thanklessly 
discarded by the U.S. Army. Historian Jennifer Keene argues that the multitude of political 
stances articulated immediately following the war via veterans’ organizations with a variety of 
ideological backgrounds had been consolidated to a unified political voice by 1922, in part 
thanks to the government’s active attempts to silence so-called radicals.
5
 A unified political voice 
was also achieved because Legion officials learned that in order to be perceived as more than a 
right-wing propaganda machine controlled by elites, their organization had to advocate for 
special privileges, including access to free medical care.
6
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Interest groups in American politics  
The stories of the roots and activities of the American Legion and the DAV in the early 
1920s serve as case studies of the intricacies of interest group politics. Scholars have long 
recognized the importance of interest groups in the machinations of American government, 
though they have debated whether they foster or deter democracy. Political scientist Jeffrey M. 
Berry defines interest groups as organizations that aim to influence the government through 
lobbying (of members of Congress, the general public, or other key groups). They also play 
several other roles, Berry points out, from educating the public and framing political issues in a 
certain way, to building specific agendas, and closely monitoring existent government 
programs.
7
   
In 1787, as the U.S. government was taking shape, James Madison noted the potential for 
people to organize in “factions,” which he defined as citizens “united… by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
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aggregate interests of the community.”
8
 Madison, like many after him, saw the groups as a sort 
of necessary evil, a product of the larger idea that people living in a free society will pursue their 
self-interest.  
Political scientists have largely moved away from the “pluralist” theory of interest group 
politics, which dates form the mid-twentieth century and posited that interest groups were, by 
and large, good for society. While interest groups did historically increase the “democratic 
capacities” of their members, they did not represent the broad swath of citizenry, and their 
presence did not in itself ensure an egalitarian democracy.
9
  Indeed, until the middle to late 
twentieth century, minority Americans who organized among themselves hardly had the kind of 
access to Congress that their white counterparts did.
10
  
Interest groups focus on a variety of issues – from agriculture and the environment to 
education and reproductive rights – but scholars single out veterans’ groups as being particularly 
powerful. They qualify as one fundamental part of particular subgovernments, subsystems, or 
issue networks, wherein advocates “help bureaucrats build coalitional support for programs in 
Congress and provide information and electoral support for legislators. Legislators, in turn, 
create programs for the bureaucrats, and bureaucrats administer benefits to the groups.” Since 
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interest groups provide support for bureaucrats and legislators, “all of the actors within a 
subsystem share the same basic policy goals,” James Wright notes. “Policy making within 
subsystems entails little conflict, and the policies that result are generally distributive, or pork 
barrel in nature, having concentrated benefits and dispersed costs.
11
 
Interest groups in subsystems – whether they focus on veterans, senior citizens, farmers, 
or other constituents – have extensive access to Congress, which, according to Christina 
DeGregorio and other scholars, is the most fundamental precondition necessary for exerting 
political influence. In such an arrangement, DeGregorio argues, “advocates and (legislative) 
leaders each have something to gain from the relationships they enter.”
12
  
Veterans’ groups also generally possess another crucial political strength: they face little 
or no opposition from “other political actors.”
13
 As one scholar puts it, “if benefits are too 
generous, who is going to fund the lobby to fight against disabled veterans?”
14
 By virtue of these 
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In order to understand where interests and preferences come from, and how a group gains 
access and power, says David R. Mayhew, one must examine the events surrounding its 
existence and growth. Wars, he argues, are extreme examples of such events. They “can generate 
new problems and open up policy windows, thus often fostering new policies, but they can also 
generate new ideas, issues, programs, preferences, and ideologies...”
16
 They can lead to the 
creation of new organizations, which “tend toward stickiness… and are particularly good at 
rendering the effects of wars long-lasting.”
17
 A study of the veterans’ groups of the 1920s reveals 
the birth of a crucial issue network and shows that interest group politics and the events that 
bring them about can indeed lead to lasting, “sticky” political change.  
Theda Skocpol questions the idea that veterans’ groups have historically been as all-
powerful as some posit. In her discussion of the liberalization of Civil War pensions in the 
1880s, she argues that a “pressure group thesis” overstates the influence of the major veterans’ 
advocacy organization, the Grand Army of the Republic. The group, she says, did little lobbying 
for the lenient 1880 Arrears Act, which “seems to have affected the [Grand Army of the 
Republic] more than vice versa.” The Civil War era group, Skocpol notes, saw its largest 
membership gains only after the increased benefits were secured, not in the lead-up to the fight.
18
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As the American Legion waged successful battles in the early to mid-1920s for the 
establishment of the Veterans’ Bureau and increased access to veterans’ hospitals, the 
organization actually saw membership numbers fall from a high of approximately 795,800 in 
1920 to 609,000 in 1926. Only after increased rights were secured, and especially with the onset 
of the depression of the 1930s did the organization’s membership rolls increase.
19
 But rising 
numbers of adherents are not the only measure of political action or effectiveness. In the early 
1920s, the American Legion and DAV served as crucial partners for bureaucrats who argued for 
more and better hospitals for former soldiers. Their advocacy efforts helped justify calls for 
increased government spending by putting a human face on the problem and bringing it to public 
attention; they played an integral role in the establishment of a nationwide veterans’ hospital 
system.  
Skocpol’s argument brings up yet another important question: what motivates people to 
join advocacy organizations like the American Legion and DAV?
20
 David Gerber argues that an 
over-emphasis on political motives and advocacy “misconstrues” the goals of individual 
veterans. By joining forces with their fellow ex-service members, Gerber argues, veterans strived 
to fulfill “ideological, social, recreational, commemorative, and solidaristic” needs, not a hunger 
for government benefits. Often, he notes, compensation payments or medical care from the 
government were represented by veterans’ organizations either as a threat to constituents’ 
independence, or as necessary only in order to help an ex-service member achieve a modicum of 
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 The activism of the American Legion and the DAV after World War I bears 
out Gerber’s idea that veterans joined forces with one another for a variety of social reasons, and 
that some veterans, in fact, strongly opposed the idea of gaining access to welfare benefits based 
solely on their status as ex-service members. But it also reinforces the notion that a battle for 
government entitlements was an important pillar of veterans’ organizations’ general agendas.  
I interrogate the AL and DAV mainly as political organizations, while arguing that their 
cultural values and identities were central to their legislative successes. My approach of looking 
at interest groups’ interaction with the state is not intended to reduce the entire experience of 
individual veterans to a fight for institutional or monetary benefits. It is an attempt to assess how 
political capital was garnered and spent. The DAV and AL served a variety of purposes; many 
joined the groups with no knowledge of – or, indeed, in spite of – their efforts on Capitol Hill. 
But as the Legion and DAV became strong advocates for ex-service members with whom the 
general public could readily sympathize – especially those who had incurred maladies while in 
the line of duty – they gained potential members, added legitimacy, and a unifying mission.  
 
“Future lies in your aid now”: Medical care as a righteous, unifying cause 
 
The American Legion and other groups took on medical care as a political rallying point 
for a variety of reasons. There were indeed major fundamental problems with health services 
being administered by the Bureau of War Risk Insurance (BWRI), army, and Public Health 
Service (PHS), and fighting for better conditions fell within the purview of the groups’ missions. 
Furthermore, the quest for medical care provided a primary and unifying rallying point for 
veterans’ groups that encountered divides on other issues. Legion state representatives argued, 
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for example, over the importance of issues such as “the Asian menace”; western representatives 
thought that threat should constitute a primary focus of the organization while southern and 
eastern representatives were more concerned with the effects of immigrant and African 
American populations in cities. Leaders also disagreed about the desirability of providing 
“adjusted compensation,” or bonus payments, for veterans – some thought it was an 
inappropriate demand for charity while others called it justice. The provision of hospital care for 
ill and injured ex-service members, on the other hand, was something upon which virtually 
everyone could agree: injured and ill ex-soldiers should, of course, be housed in satisfactory 
institutions in relatively close proximity to their homes.
22
 Press coverage of ill-treated, ailing 
veterans mobilized both prospective members and the general public around the idea that 
veterans’ groups were doing good and noble work for those most in need.
23
  
During the Legion’s earliest meetings, some leaders and members argued that medical 
care for disabled soldiers and veterans was failing, and that the organization should provide 
strong advocacy on the issue. In May 1919, at the group’s first stateside caucus at St. Louis, 
Missouri’s Shubert Theater, Harry Mock, an Illinois surgeon who had served in the Army 
Medical Corps, took the floor. He noted that there would be approximately 300,000 soldiers, 
sailors, and marines released from the military with a disease or disability, who would not only 
be “discouraged” because of their handicaps, but also would resist joining the Legion unless 
“stimulated to do so.” In order to tackle the latter challenge, Mock suggested creating a division 
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of disabled soldiers of the American Legion. But according to Mock’s fellow representatives, 
organizational unity, based on the virtue of having served, was paramount. His proposal was 
rejected. But the fact that the matter was even discussed indicates that within the very first 
months of the Legion’s formation, its leadership recognized that disabled and ill soldiers would 
prove an important constituency.
24
  
Further to this point, at the group’s first national convention in November 1919, members 
passed a lengthy resolution regarding governmental obligations to soldiers and veterans, which 
included the stipulation that legislation be passed “making sufficient appropriation to provide 
adequate hospital and sanitarium facilities for the care and treatment of all persons discharged 
from the military and naval service…” Additionally, it said, the government should pay for 
“surgical treatment… irrespective of the service origin or aggravation of their disability…” 
Iterations of the resolution were passed each year through the early 1920s.
25
 Such measures 
became the blueprint for the Legion’s pro-active Legislative Committee, which lobbied on 
Capitol Hill in the hopes of making the interests of the organization a reality.  
Within one year of the Armistice, the American Legion was using its growing national 
network to gather first-hand evidence of the shortfalls of various government agencies in the 
provision of medical care to soldiers and veterans. In November 1919, the AL’s National 
Executive Committee received a visit from an official of Battle Mount Sanitarium, one of the 
Soldiers’ Homes where discharged soldiers with tuberculosis were treated courtesy of the Bureau 
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of War Risk Insurance. Post Adjutant Ranson, who, before working at the sanitarium, had been a 
patient there, described a dire situation. Men who requested treatment were being ordered to the 
institution, which not only lacked adequate space and food, but was also intended primarily to 
treat “stomach and rheumatism troubles.” The sanitarium doctor, Ranson said, was a “wonderful 
surgeon, but not a T.B. man.” It was not that Ranson and his fellow ex-servicemen were looking 
for a handout; he, for one, had sought care from a public facility because he did not “want to stay 
around home and run the risk of giving the disease to some of my relatives.” But, conditions 
were so bad at the institution that cure seemed impossible. For example, Ranson noted, wages at 
Battle Mount were so low that only former patients were willing to work there, many of who 
were still “spitting bugs – as we call it – or spitting T.B. germs.” One patient thought conditions 
were so dire that he wrote to the Public Health Service asking to be transferred to a private 
sanitarium. The PHS sent him to a facility in St. Paul Minnesota that was full to capacity, and he 
was unable to obtain treatment.
26
  
Some members of the National Executive Committee were more sympathetic to Ranson’s 
cause than others. A representative from South Carolina voiced his concern that more facilities 
and services may not necessarily be better for soldiers and veterans. He had served as a medical 
examiner for the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, he said, and as such, was authorized to provide 
any treatment necessary to patients who visited him. “It is their own fault,” he said of ex-soldiers 
who failed to get proper treatment for their ailments. But another representative disagreed; he 
argued that the Legislative Committee should take on the issue by passing a resolution to lobby 
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for legislation to provide for more extensive hospital facilities.
27
 The latter, more sympathetic 
perspective prevailed in the American Legion in 1919 and the early 1920s.  
By working with government bureaucrats, Legion representatives were able to compile a 
body of evidence that indicated that the medical care problem was systemic, and not the product 
of irresponsible or irrational demands from ex-service members. One Legion report pointed out 
that eight different entities – the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, the PHS, the Federal Board for 
Vocational Education, the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, the Medical 
Department of the Army, the Medical Department of the Navy, and private and public hospitals 
– were involved in providing care for veterans. Practically speaking, this meant that on July 30, 
1920, there were 17,981 war risk patients being treated in more than one thousand hospitals 
throughout the U.S. The report quoted R.G. Cholmeley-Jones, the Director of the BWRI, noting 
that the ‘situation’ was ‘manifestly unsatisfactory to the disabled ex-service men and to the 
Government…’ Soldiers still being treated in military hospitals, the report said, were “quite 
unhappy and dissatisfied.” They were “tired of hospital life,” which featured sub-par food and a 
corps of social service agencies, nurses, and doctors whose ranks had been greatly depleted since 
the Armistice. They often insisted on being discharged “before being cured in the hope of 
receiving better treatment” as ex-service men. But the report contended that as veterans, they 
would continue to encounter limited and flawed services.
28
  
Tuberculosis and neuropsychiatric patients proved the greatest challenges to the system, 
according to experts quoted in the Legion report. As Battle Mount Sanitarium employee Ranson 
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had noted in the Executive Committee meeting the year prior, there were not enough facilities to 
treat people with TB. Ex-service members were being sent to “county farms, poor houses and 
State Institutions” for treatment, where they were surrounded by charity cases. There, in spite of 
having their care funded by the government, veterans were “unhappy and displeased.” 
Furthermore, “their relatives resent the fact that, despite the sacrifice made by these men, they 
are not provided with the very best care which the Government can afford.”  
The “gravest problem throughout the country,” the report said, was ‘the proper 
hospitalization and care of nervous and mental cases…” The issue at hand was multi-faceted: 
there were not enough facilities to provide care for all those who sought it. Also, many reported 
neuropsychiatric problems after being discharged from service, leaving open the question of 
government liability for treatment. “‘Through failure to provide treatment,’” argued Thomas W. 
Salmon, Chief Executive Officer of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene and Chief 
Consultant in Psychiatry for the American Expeditionary Force, “‘many soldiers with curable 
mental diseases will become permanently insane.’” Such men were being “‘neglected’” and 
“‘abandoned,’” according to Salmon. Providing for their proper care required a “‘modern 
conception of needs… instead of incredibly complacent indifference,’” he argued. Salmon cited 
the potential of the American Legion to serve as liaison between veteran and government. 
“‘Believe Legion has great opportunity in securing treatment needed by Comrades in greatest 
distress,’” he said in a telegram to the hospitalization committee. “‘Future lies in your aid 
now.’”
29
 Doctors and government officials eager to see health facilities improve turned to 
citizens’ groups to advocate for their cause. 
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Behind the closed doors of Executive Committee meetings, Legion leaders spoke matter-
of-factly about the group’s potential influence. “It seems to me that our work will largely center 
around Washington,” said Legion co-founder Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. in May 1919. “There are a 
great many things, such as insurance, employment, and all that sort of work, which at this 
particular moment we have to take up.”30 By early 1920, Legion representatives were decidedly 
self-assured about their power on Capitol Hill. In a discussion of legislation pertaining to soldiers 
receiving cash bonuses, one representative pointed out to his fellow Legionnaires that “Congress 
is waiting to hear from the American Legion… its (sic) up to us to tell them what we WANT; 
they will give it to us (emphasis in the original).”31  
To many Legion leaders, taking on the cause of fighting for rights for the disabled and ill 
was not only worthy in itself, but also seemed like a powerful means of helping the organization 
gain public support and political legitimacy. The Legion needed to “emphasize two things,” 
Chaplain John Inzer told the Executive Committee in June 1919. “Pure democracy and 
unpolluted Americanism, and that we are going to take care of the discharged and disabled 
soldiers. With that kind of a program the whole country is back of us.” The leftist Soldiers and 
Sailors League, on the other hand, had asked for a “$500.00 bonus for each man,” Inzer said, 
adding incredulously, “They are going to kill the organization right there.”32 Inzer implied that 
by partaking in strategic messaging about selective ideals of “Americanism,” and debts to 
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citizen-soldiers who not only fulfilled them, but incurred sicknesses or disabilities in the process, 
the Legion would prevail among its competitors. 
Legion members and official reports repeatedly noted that those who were 
disabled in service had sacrificed the most, and should be the top priority of the 
organization. “The Congress of the United States and the responsible people have been so 
derelict in their duty to these men that it is fitting at this time to call public attention to it 
and take some affirmative action,” said Legion representative Foreman of Illinois, at the 
March 1920 executive committee meeting.
33
 He went on to describe a dire situation in his 
home state, where there were not enough beds in government institutions and mentally ill 
ex-soldiers were being sent to charity facilities against the will of their families. 
Foreman’s appeal for the Legion to support an emergency appropriation for the building 
of facilities was met with applause. Representative Emery of Michigan seconded 
Foreman’s sentiment, adding that tubercular ex-soldiers were “walking the streets and 
they ought to be hospitalized.” In Michigan, he said, the problem was not a lack of funds, 
but a lack of organizational power on behalf of the Public Health Service, which was 
charged with caring for the ex-soldiers. The PHS had funding, but it was “a hard thing” to 
find the buildings, doctors, and nurses that would constitute a proper hospital. 
Representative Hoffman, of Oklahoma, concurred, saying there were three thousand 
tubercular ex-soldiers in his state with nowhere to turn. “They simply send them down to 
New Mexico or Texas but the conditions have been investigated there and are not 
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satisfactory and these men… want to stay in their own home and among their own 
friends,” Hoffman said.34 
Hoffman also expressed frustration with the idea that the American Legion should 
assist the PHS in locating viable facilities, which he saw as “passing the buck.” “We 
weren’t asked for any conditions when we were called into the Service,” Hoffman said, 
“nor told that if we became injured you had to hunt out a place and lie down in it.” The 
American Legion was becoming the “catch basin” for doing the complicated work of a 
variety of government agencies, he argued.35     
According to Delaware Legion Representative Thomas Miller, chairman of the 
organization’s Beneficial Legislation Committee, the Legion should be viewed more as a 
proactive lobbyist than a thankless workhorse. In response to members’ concerns about 
government services for the disabled, he noted the sundry bills that the Legion was 
currently pushing to have passed. They included the Wasson Bill, which was intended, 
among other things, to establish 14 district offices throughout the country, in addition to 
unlimited sub-offices for handling the claims of War Risk Insurance patients. Legion 
Legislative Committee members were also advocating for passage of the Darrow Bill, 
providing $100 per month for all ex-soldiers enrolled in government-sponsored 
vocational training, and the Rogers Bill, which would consolidate veterans’ services 
overseen by the PHS, the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, and the Vocational Training 
Boards Rehabilitation under one Cabinet officer. (The latter Bill, we will see, served as 
an early forerunner to the August 1921 creation of the Veterans’ Bureau.) Finally, in 
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addition to helping ensure that ex-soldiers were not discharged prematurely from military 
hospitals, Miller reminded the Executive Committee, the Legion was also actively 
attempting, through its local chapters, to assist the government in finding the more than 
30,000 beds needed by War Risk Insurance patients. Miller’s main concern, he said, was 
to demonstrate that “your Committee and your National Organization have not been 
recreant to your resolutions passed at (the first stateside AL meeting in 1919 in) 
Minneapolis saying that the duty of The American Legion first was to the disabled men 




“To save those men from the doctrines of the radical agitator”: The cash bonus and benefits for 
all versus some 
 
Legion leaders advocated for injured and ill veterans because there was evidence that the 
medical system they encountered was gravely flawed. But their drive and persistence were at 
least partially fueled by a desire to stave off radicalism among seemingly vulnerable veterans by 
bolstering a perception of the U.S. state as grateful and generous. In order to maintain a pure 
sense of love of country, the Legion claimed, veterans needed certain things from their 
government, including good medical care. The groups argued for the justness of veterans’ access 
to unique rights and welfare based on the fact that they had taken up arms for the country, but 
also on the notion that they were “100 percent American.” The conservative, anti-egalitarian 
leanings of the Legion allowed the groups to win the ears of members of Congress when other 
groups could not. The same radical groups and individuals that were shut out from Capitol Hill, 
however, influenced the agenda of what became mainstream veterans’ advocacy organizations 
and by extension, helped lay the foundation of the nation’s largest federally-sponsored hospital 
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system. The Legion’s campaign against leftist ideologies and groups was part and parcel of its 
effort to obtain special privileges for veterans. The organization employed anti-radical rhetoric 
and declared its members super-patriots. Honoring requests for free medical care, the Legion 
said, was the least the government could do for such citizens. The organization’s argument that 
veterans deserved specific rights was contingent on the acceptance of the notion that others were 
less worthy of the same. Its leaders defined white, male ex-service members as defenders of 
liberty against leftists and “slackers,” who had failed to enlist or otherwise avoided service. In so 
doing, the Legion capitalized on a tense contemporary political climate and helped instantiate the 
idea of a venerated and privileged citizen-veteran class. 
In the immediate post-war years, Americans confronted new social realities and a 
growing sense of discontent with their elected officials. As increasing numbers of foreign-born 
and black workers made their way to American cities, anti-immigrant and anti-leftist sentiment 
soared, and tensions between whites and minorities escalated. Labor unrest, which had been 
building throughout the 1910s, erupted anew in 1919 as the economy slowed and unions and 
workers organized strikes across the country. Meanwhile, American women were well on their 
way to winning the right to vote. To many political and social conservatives, it seemed that a 
new and disturbing order was emerging.
37
 As the war came to a close, there was also a growing 
sense that the Democrats in power had bungled crucial aspects of war planning. In the 
congressional elections of 1918, Americans ushered Republicans into the majority in both the 
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House and Senate, thereby declaring their frustration with President Woodrow Wilson and the 
Progressive wing of the Democratic Party with which he was popularly associated.
38
 
At an especially tense moment, the Legion presented itself as a defender of freedom, 
appealing to “middle-class Americans’ classless vision of Americanism.”
39
 On the cover of the 
organization’s weekly magazine in July 1919, the Legion was represented as a strapping white 
man, tossing off his army coat in front of a pillar labeled, “American Institutions.” He eagerly 
pursued a hunch-backed, dark-haired, wild-eyed man toting a bomb, presumably to wrestle the 
implement from him. The message was clear: the Legion was a crucial protector of the country’s 
sacred freedoms against the most threatening menaces of the time.
40
 A similar cover a month 
later depicted the same towering personification of the American Legion, this time with his hand 
on the shoulder of the Statue of Liberty, glancing down at figures marked “Bolshevist,” “IWW,” 
“Propagandist,” and “Alien Slacker.” On this cover, the Legion was referred to as the “big 
brother” of liberty.
41
 Indeed, year after year, Legion annual conventions tackled the problems of 
radicalism and what was perceived as overly rampant immigration. Special scorn was reserved 
for foreign-born individuals who failed to enlist during the war – so-called “alien slackers.” 
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Even among those who had served, there were some who were more worthy than others, 
according to the Legion. As Regin Schmidt has shown, AL officials assisted with – even helped 
to spur – the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s monitoring of left-leaning veterans’ advocacy 
groups. Using tips from Legion representatives, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover surmised that the 
World War Veterans of America was a front organization for a threatening radical cabal of labor 
unions and the International Workers of the World (I.W.W.), aiming to take advantage of 
unsuspecting veterans and orchestrate a takeover of the country’s government.
42
  
In fact, the WWVA was among the first proposed advocacy organizations to represent 
ex-service members who had served in the World War; in February 1919, Representative George 
K. Denton (D-IN) sought federal recognition for incorporation of the group. Denton argued that 
the WWVA should be based in Indiana, since the first American killed after the U.S. declared 
war was from that state.
43
 By 1923, one newspaper referred to the organization as “highly 
radical… and in reality a subsidiary of the Communist party of America.”
44
 “To counteract the 
loyal and patriotic actions of the American Legion,” the Los Angeles Times reported, “the 




A similar fate awaited the Private Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Legion, which sought to organize 
only non-commissioned officers to demand that military higher-ups be held accountable for their 
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errors during the war, and that all veterans be granted jobs or land.
46
 By its own account, in the 
immediate post-war years, the Private Soldiers’ and Sailors’ League attracted as many as 
700,000 members.
47
 The group was vocal in debates regarding soldiers’ bonuses and other 
pertinent issues; its President, Marvin Gates Sperry, was called to testify before Congress on 
such matters. In early 1922, however, Sperry was accused of embezzlement. Though the charges 
were later dismissed as being wholly unfounded, internal conflicts among the Private Soldiers’ 
and Sailors’ Legion’s leaders rendered the organization all but defunct.
48
 More generally, the 
negative publicity surrounding the political leanings of the WWVA and the Private Soldiers’ and 
Sailors’ Legion undercut membership, and helped allow the Legion to assume a position as the 
primary veterans’ advocacy group of the time.  
The American Legion’s occasionally contentious intra-organizational debates about 
whether or not former soldiers should be granted a cash bonus for their time in service illustrate 
how central anti-leftist ideology was in the organization’s eventual support of government 
benefits, including medical care. The question of whether veterans should receive post-service 
payments divided the Legion throughout late 1919 and early 1920; it brought about tough 
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Plenty of Legionnaires believed that publicly funded cash payments and services for 
veterans should be as limited as possible, lest they foster dependency. Fighting for compensation 
for individual ex-service members, they believed, contradicted the organization’s commitment to 
put “something into the Government, not take something out of it…”
50
 The Legion was founded 
to “be a great, American, unselfish organization, that would devote itself to the problems of 




Many Legionnaires who did favor cash payments for those who served spoke strenuously 
against the notion of a bonus, per se, which they deemed “too much like a gift… from the 
government.” Instead, they asked for “adjusted compensation,” monetary assistance from the 
“government to assist the ex-service man in overcoming some of the financial disadvantages 
incidental to his military or naval service.”
52
 Furthermore, they pointed out, adjusted 
compensation was “an obligation of our government to all service men and women,” but it was 
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still “second” in importance to “caring for the disabled and for the widows and orphans of those 
who sacrificed their lives.”
53
  
Legion members who supported adjusted compensation relied on two main arguments: 
first, they said, adjusted compensation served as the government’s fulfillment of patriotic duty. 
While in service, doughboys had sacrificed months of salary, and the opportunity to advance in a 
quickly expanding industrial economy. Congress would merely be paying them an owed debt, 




Second, adjusted compensation supporters argued, post-service benefits were hardly a 
selfish means of taking from the government. Instead, they were assets in an ongoing battle for 
the malleable hearts and minds of ex-servicemen. “We cannot put anything finer into our 
Government than to do something to save those men from the doctrines of the radical agitator,” 
said Washington state Legion Representative Wilkeson at a meeting of the National Executive 
Committee in March 1920. He continued: 
We must take some action or urge the Government to take some action which will 
make it impossible for the agitator to say to him, ‘what has your Government 
done for you? They have been unsympathetic when you have asked about your 
War Risk Insurance. They have paid no attention to you. They have been 
unsympathetic if you have been a wounded man. You have been underrated in 
many instances as to your disability. The Government has nothing for you 
whatever.’  
 
Twenty percent of those drafted, Wilkeson noted, were illiterate. “Those are the men that 
are the prey of the I.W.W.,” he said, and they were to be “pitied not blamed,” if they 
succumbed to pressure from leftists. “Remember when a man wants sympathy and does 
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not get it, that he is a good, fit subject for the radical agitator.” Spending ten million 
dollars to “save five hundred ex-service men from becoming good I.W.W.’s,” Wilkeson 
said, was well worth it.
55
 His fears were well-founded: at the time, Washington was a 
hotbed of labor unrest and tension between conservative veterans and radicals.
56
 
The fight for government benefits was central not only to the Legion’s larger 
mission of saving ex-service members from the menace of radicalism, but also it its 
attempt to gain credibility as a non-elitist group that would take on the causes of the rank 
and file. In Michigan, said Legion Representative Gansser, “the I.W.W., the labor 
agitators, got busy early last summer and fall, saying in open meeting and through their 
labor paper, mind you, that the Legion represented big business, that the Legion never 
would represent the service man, the rank and file, that the Legion was composed of 
officers, and tried to put us on the defensive.” At the state AL convention soon after, 
Gansser noted, the organization “went unanimously on record” in favor of adjusted 
compensation. In spite of the support, Gansser was disturbed to report that a “hopeless 
minority” of Michigan Legion representatives had told the press that the organization was 
against the bonus, and “the mischief was largely done.”
57
 
Montana Representative West also characterized the organization’s support of a 
bonus as being directly related to an attempt to undercut that state’s I.W.W. “agitators.” 
“We have got our problems out there that you fellows back east here haven’t got,” West 
                                                
55
  "Minutes of Meeting of the National Executive Committee of the American Legion, Held in Washington, D.C., 
March 22-24, 1920", 258.    
56
 For more on post-war tensions in the Pacific Northwest, see Tom Copeland, The Centralia Tragedy of 1919: 
Elmer Smith and the Wobblies (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1993). Also, Keene, 
Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America, 168. 
57
   "Minutes of the National Executive Committee of the American Legion, Washington D.C., May 18-19, 1920", 
30-80.  National Executive Committee Minutes, The American Legion Library, Indianapolis, Indiana. 
 294 
said. The Montana Legion was “pretty near the home and the habitat of the industrial 
worker of the world,” he said, which spoke openly against the Legion, representing it as 
“a wolf in sheep’s clothes.” Following his description of hostility between the AL and 
I.W.W., West noted “the people and soldiers of Montana as a whole are for this 
proposition.” The Legion’s support of the bonus, West implied, proved that it was no 
“wolf in sheep’s clothes” but a true friend to all ex-service members.  
Washington Representative Jeffrey was even more explicit: 
I think that most of the businessmen in our state recognize that the American 
Legion is the one greatest factor in combating the radical element and will be the 
greatest factor in stabilizing the laboring element and their employees. We have, 
in the state of Washington, like my friend from Montana, a hotbed of I.W.W. and 
reds of the various classes and they are making a great play to the ex-service man 
in our state to secure them in their ranks and they make this plea that the 
government has done nothing for the ex-service men and they say to them that 
‘you can’t get Congress to do anything to help you now, you join our ranks and 
we are going to bring about the reform and get those things to which you are 
entitled.’ Now, there are a few of the illiterate, uneducated men falling for that 
propaganda. There are a lot more in the balances, who are subject to being taken 
and converted into the ranks of the radical or of being stabilized by the American 
Legion. Lots of them haven’t joined the American Legion for the reason that they 




Although many Legion members were ideologically opposed to the idea of a cash 
bonus, some eventually favored it in order to ensure that the organization did not lose 
face or membership to other organizations. American Legion representatives believed 
that pushing for expanded rights for former soldiers was not only ethically sound but was 
also a means of gaining credibility, and avoiding claims that the group was elitist or 
detached from common concerns. 
In spite of Legion officials’ best efforts to manage public perceptions, the 
organization’s support of the cash bonus drew the ire of some disabled former soldiers, 
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who felt that it indicated that the Legion was prioritizing benefits for all veterans too 
highly, and not doing enough specifically for injured and ill former soldiers. In May 
1920, a representative of the Disabled Emergency Officers, Lieutenant Graham, brought 
his concerns to a Washington, DC meeting of the Legion’s National Executive 
Committee. He said that he deplored the new War Department policy stipulating that all 
disabled emergency officers would be discharged from military hospitals and released to 
the care of the PHS on or before July 1, 1920. As things stood, he said, they were being 
released from the military with no proof of having incurred a disability in service. Upon 
leaving service, he argued, they should receive cards that noted that their injuries 
stemmed from their time in the military, and that also contained directions in case the 
individual fainted or became ill outside of a hospital. Furthermore, Graham told the 
Executive Committee, “the officers and men in the various different hospitals are very 
much disgruntled and very much dissatisfied with the attitude of the American Legion.” 
Their “spirit,” he said, was “getting lower and lower all the time, perhaps justly.” They 
felt that the Legion should use “at least as much effort for the disabled men as you are 
using for the bonus.” It was clear, Graham said, that the organization had “not been on 
the job regarding the disabled men.”
59
  
Graham’s testimony was borne out by the coverage of Walter Reed Hospital’s 
newspaper, The Come-Back, which reported a rising hostility to both the American 
Legion and legislation for a bonus payment in the spring of 1920. The Legion started off 
on solid footing at Walter Reed, but over time, disabled soldiers became increasingly 
focused on their own concerns and identities, as distinct from those of non-wounded ex-
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soldiers. When American Legion National Commander Franklin D’Olier visited Walter 
Reed Hospital in December 1919, “men crowded into the Red Cross hut… though it was 
chow time.” D’Olier was met with “a burst of applause” when he guaranteed that the 
Legion would not “appear before the American people as asking for a specific sum of 
money as payment for service,” but would focus on obtaining a “square deal” for all 
veterans, and prioritize fighting for improved treatment of the wounded.
60
 At Walter 
Reed, a Legion post was established, which held regular, well-attended meetings. 
Activism increased over time at various hospitals, with patients starting groups of their 
own focusing on obtaining access to better medical care.
61
 But by early 1920, hospital 
Legion meetings were less popular and the organization was “bending every effort to 
secure larger attendances at future meetings.”
62
 In March 1920, the Legion’s District 
Commander felt it necessary to “exhort the Reed men to be punctual in their attendance.” 
For its part, the hospital newspaper re-printed the preamble to the organization’s 
constitution, “owing to a misunderstanding on the part of many men as to what the 
American Legion stands for.”
63
    
Apparently, Graham and Walter Reed patients were swayed by arguments of 
budget-conscious government officials who argued in 1920 and 1921 that disabled 
soldiers had to choose between supporting a general bonus payment and obtaining their 
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own rights and services; there was not enough money, those officials maintained, for the 
government to provide both. According to former Secretary of War, Henry T. Stimson, 
“the real bonus issue, now as in the past is whether more than $2,000,000,000 in 
gratuities shall be disbursed among the able-bodied veterans or whether several hundred 
million dollars shall be available annually for the care of the tubercular and mentally 
disabled, the crippled and handicapped veterans.” Secretary of the Treasury, David F. 
Houston, made a similar point: “The country must pay a tremendous price for the present 
and future care of the disabled, and the ability of the country to pay cannot be jeopardized 
by the distribution of several billions of dollars to their more fortunate comrades.”64 
Legion officials felt that rising hostility at Walter Reed, and Lieutenant Graham’s 
complaints, were, to say the least, unjustified. Representative Jones, who had recently 
addressed Walter Reed Hospital’s Legion post, said members there expressed no hostility 
toward the organization. Mr. Gibson, of Wisconsin wanted to know “how the blame 
could be laid on the American Legion.” “Don’t you think,” he said, “it would be a good 
idea for members of the American Legion like yourself, disabled men, to down any 
remarks made around the hospitals to lay the blame on the American Legion when the 
American Legion has done its share and the government has failed to carry out the 
programme as laid down by the Legion?”  Mr. Wicker, of Virginia, pointed out that the 
Legion had already helped usher to passage important legislation which had tangible 
benefits for the disabled, and wondered whether disabled soldiers felt that “nothing 
should be done for the other men who were financially disabled” until all laws 
concerning those who were wounded or ill were passed. Representative Gansser of 
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Michigan was concerned with what he saw as a “continual passing of the buck to the 
Legion.” “Congress is responsible,” he said, “the people are responsible, the Legion is 
just as helpless as you are. We are humbly appealing and have the right to petition and 
that is all.”  Representative Barrett of Maryland shared his opinion as well: “I don’t think 
it right to come into the Executive Committee of the American Legion and say that the 




If Lieutenant Graham needed proof, Mr. Raege of the Legion’s Legislative 
Committee offered an exhaustive explanation of the varied efforts of the group on Capitol 
Hill on behalf of the disabled soldier: the AL had helped obtain one-cent rail fare for 
disabled men in hospitals who wanted to travel home. It had also acted on some of the 
very legislation Graham mentioned, including War Department Circular 345, which 
stipulated that all emergency officers had to be discharged from military hospitals no 
more than one year after being admitted, and the Stevenson Bill, which would grant 
retirement benefits to temporary officers. The Legion was limited in the demands it could 
make, Raege argued, by the reality of the inner workings of congressional committees, as 
well as existent laws. For example, Graham and other disabled soldiers argued that they 
should be granted a portion of the War Risk Insurance they had purchased while serving, 
as compensation for their injury or illness. But, Raege reminded him, the “term insurance 
that these men bought at the time of the war provided no disability clause…” Even as he 
used a rhetoric of entitlement to declare that Legion leaders had to lobby their state 
representatives and senators to pass laws that would grant wounded and ill ex-service 
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members benefits that no other Americans were privy to, Raege stipulated that there were 
practical limits to what could be requested.66 
Raege’s remarks offer only a snapshot of the Legion’s legislative work. A glance 
at the organization’s robust lobbying efforts provides a window onto the sundry pieces of 
legislation geared toward disabled veterans under consideration between 1920 and 
1922.67 In 1920, there were no fewer than 473 bills “directly affecting” ex-service 
members pending in Congress, according to John Thomas Taylor, Chairman of the 
Legion’s Legislative Committee. That was a liberal estimate; the bills had to do with such 
varied topics as adjusted compensation, Courts-Martial regulations, immigration, and 
patents and copyrights. But there was one area of focus that received a disproportionate 
amount of attention: more than one-third of the Legion’s 38 self-declared legislative 
successes in 1920 had to do with laws concerning disabled ex-soldiers. By testifying in 
Congress and otherwise lobbying, Legion leaders assisted in obtaining $46 million for the 
Bureau of War Risk Insurance to fund hospitalization of veterans; securing the transfer of 
various army hospitals to the auspices of the PHS; and gaining funding to remodel 
existing army hospitals and Soldiers’ Homes for use by the Bureau of War Risk 
Insurance.68 Even as they trumpeted the organization’s commitment to the disabled, 
Legion leaders emphasized that the job at hand was far from complete. “A great deal of 
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satisfaction may be derived from the fact that the general situation of the disabled ex-
service man is several hundred percent better than it was a few months ago,” reported The 
American Legion Weekly in September 1920. But “vigilance and effort” was still 




The Legion and minority service members 
The American Legion’s leaders were particularly challenged by the question of what role 
people of color and white women would play in the organization. After all, members of those 
groups had served, too, and, ostensibly, the primary purpose of the organization was to provide a 
forum for all former military personnel. But the organization’s ideal of unity by virtue of holding 
veteran status had its limits. Although there were some efforts at egalitarianism, the Legion 
helped instantiate the prevailing prejudices of the time instead of challenging them. In the end, 
the organization fought most vigorously for rights for white, male veterans, not all veterans.  
Cognizant of the growing political and social power of the American Legion, people of 
color attempted to gain access to the organization. African Americans from various southern 
states challenged the Legion’s national leaders to rectify contradictions between the 
organization’s segregationist state constitutions and the stated egalitarian policies of its national 
constitution. Austin T. Walden, an ex-captain for the 365
th
 Infantry, and Charles A. Shaw, a 
former Lieutenant for the 92
nd
 Division, wrote to Legion Headquarters on letterhead from 
Walden’s Atlanta law office on September 25, 1919.  They, along with “several other Colored 
officers and soldiers who served in the late War,” had applied for membership in the 
organization, but the Georgia Division had rejected their request. The state constitution, they 
                                                
69
 "Progress of the Disabled," The American Legion Weekly September 17, 1920. 
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were told, only allowed white veterans to join. Walden and Shaw therefore applied on behalf of 
“thousands of colored soldiers in Atlanta and Georgia,” for permission to establish a separate 
state organization “composed exclusively of colored men, with representation in the National 
Convention as provided by the National Constitution of the American Legion.”
70
  In fact, similar 
requests streamed in to the Georgia Legion throughout 1919, according to the organization’s 
State Secretary, C. Baxter Jones: “We did not anticipate that… there would be as many requests 
for Charters as there have been,” Jones reported to AL national headquarters.
71
 In Louisiana, 
black soldiers from various regions banded together and referred to themselves as “delegations.” 
In July 1919, representatives from New Orleans, Alexandria, and Shreveport attempted to gain 
entry to the state convention in Alexandria, and were told that, “as colored men,” they would not 
be granted charters from the Louisiana Division. “This information,” they said, came to us “like 
a thunderbolt from a clear sky.”  After being turned away form the state convention, they wrote 
to national headquarters for “advice.”
72
  
As Legion leaders struggled to grow the organization and attract members, they faced 
dueling perspectives from white members regarding what they commonly referred to as “the 
negro problem,” or “the negro question.” Some argued that the decision by individual states to 
reject black ex-soldiers as members “was not in any way a satisfactory solution.” According to 
Louis H. Bell, a member of the National Executive Committee from Georgia, the acceptance of 
African Americans by the American Legion there was imperative for the region. “We in the 
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black belt of the South are sitting on the edge of a powder keg as far as the race problem is 
concerned, and are very anxious that all opportunity be given for a smooth adjustment of the 
situation,” he said. Most white members of the Atlanta Legion chapter, he added, were 
“embarrassed” by the vote at Georgia’s state convention to reject all black veterans from the 
organization.
73
 John M. Parker, of Louisiana, said he would resign from the Legion if black 
veterans were forbidden to join. Like Bell, he argued that the organization was in a position to 
act as a “stabilizer” in the region if it adopted egalitarian policies.
74
  
The perspectives of Bell and Parker contrasted sharply with other Southern Legion 
members, who saw the acceptance of African Americans as a prospective means of guaranteeing 
turmoil, not promoting progress. State Adjutant of South Carolina, Irvine Belser, ominously 
predicted that if black veterans were admitted to the organization in that state, “no more white 
people would care to join, and probably those already members would withdraw.” He argued that 
no national body – at this point, Legion headquarters were in New York – should dictate to state 
leaders how to handle “the negro problem.” Southerners, he argued, were “peculiarly qualified” 
to deal with it themselves.
75
 The idea of white and black individuals associating – even if they 
were all veterans – was simply unthinkable to Belser and many of his Southern counterparts. The 
Department Commander of Virginia felt the same way. “There will be no colored brethren of 
either sex” in the Virginia American Legion, he said. The organization was to be “100 percent 
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 Legion Chairman Henry D. Lindsley answered such correspondence by noting that the 
general question would have to be discussed at the annual convention. In his reply to Irvine 
Belser, he delicately noted,  “I am, myself, from the South… and I, of course, understand the 
situation in a general way that pertains to your state relative to this matter.”
77
  
In the end, the Legion adopted the state’s rights policy bolstered by Belser and his fellow 
strident Southerners, though Lindsley and other organization leaders were somewhat embattled 
about it. At the June 1919 national Executive Committee meeting, in the midst of a debate about 
the issue, representative Miller of Delaware asked, “Does the tentative constitution as adopted 
recognize the absolute equality of every member of the A.E.F.?” Indeed, it did, he was told by 
Chairman Lindsley. “Then can this committee approve a scheme which would tend to 
inequality?” Miller asked. But the only viable solution was to leave the question to the states, 
even if some inequality should result, according to Legion Chaplain John Inzer. “The father 
sometimes has to let (his children) know that he is the boss around there until they get big 
enough to take care of themselves,” Inzer said. “That represents to my mind the situation of the 
colored people in the south.” Inzer echoed the sentiments of both fear and paternalism expressed 
by generations of white southerners by arguing that if African Americans were “given too much 
rein they will run wild.” Furthermore, he pointed out, in many towns in Alabama, Georgia, and 
Mississippi, black men and women outnumbered whites; “so if you threw the whole thing wide 
open, it would cause unlimited trouble.”
78
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Throughout the country, segregated posts were established. As William Pencak has 
pointed out, the bulk of Legion leaders chose not to risk losing the support of Southern whites 
and instead, allowed each state to reach its own conclusion about extending membership 
privileges.
79
 The largest black post was in Louisville Kentucky, with 110 members. The Legion’s 
failure to restrain the exclusionary, segregationist impulses of its Southern constituents had 
serious implications for growing the organization’s membership: in some regions of the South, 
more than half of A.E.F. troops were black.
80
  
By virtue of their relatively smaller numbers in comparison with white veterans, some 
minority groups posed less of a threat in the eyes of the Legion than did African Americans. 
American Indians, for example, could be admitted and even celebrated within the organization; 
in 1919, the Legion adopted as official policy the tenet that “all American Indians who served in 
the war (should) be given the full rights of citizenship…” In 1924, the organization held a 
“ceremony of appreciation” for American Indian veterans.
81
 The Legion’s sentiment, according 
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The Legion’s relationship with Asian Americans was more complex. In 1919, the 
organization demanded that “foreign born Japanese be forever barred from American 
citizenship” but Asian American veterans constituted a distinct category.
83
 In the interwar years, 
Chinese American Legion posts were established in San Francisco and Honolulu, and a Japanese 
American post was founded in Los Angeles. As Lucy E. Salyer has shown, although the Legion 
was a vehement force for anti-immigration sentiment throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the 
organization supported the efforts of Asian Americans veterans who sought naturalization. The 
backing of veterans’ groups helped ensure the 1935 passage of the Nye-Lea Act, which provided 
for the naturalization of Asian former service members.
84
 Within less than a decade, however, 
even this conditional support was called into question: as anti-Japanese sentiments flared in the 
World War II years, the Legion revoked the charter of its Japanese-American post.
85
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Women, like other minority groups, were seen somewhat as a class apart within the 
American Legion, but they fared better than others in winning favor in the organization. From 
the Legion’s inception, women who were regularly commissioned in the U.S. Army, Navy or 
Marine Corps were eligible for membership. That included nurses, who were often referred to 
with reverence in Legion publications.
86
  Indeed, the organization’s official policies constantly 
noted the necessity of obtaining rights for “service men and women.” Over time, all female posts 
were established in various locations.
87
 In 1921, a report from the Legislative Committee to the 
annual convention noted:  “your committee has not been unmindful that women as well as men 
who served in the Great War are eligible to (sic) the benefits of hospitalization, compensation 
and vocational training.” Approximately 34,000 women served “with the colors,” the report 
pointed out, about 600 of whom were receiving post-service government compensation, and 240 
of whom were in private hospitals. “Your committee has recommended that the best type of 
hospital care be provided in private hospitals for these women,” the report said. The declaration 
was not quite as egalitarian as it may have seemed; the call for care in “private hospitals” 
demonstrated that the Legion felt that women ex-service members should have access to 
different, if not fewer, privileges than men. By 1921 – the year of the report – the organization 
often pointed out the shortfalls of private institutions, and was fighting strenuously for the 
establishment of more government hospitals, so that (male) ex-service members could be treated 
in institutions controlled solely by the Veterans’ Bureau.
88
  
                                                
86
 See, for example, Carol Bird, "The Army Nurse Explains; Hard to Come Back to Civilian Patients after Serving 
Men Who Took a Wound as Part of Day’s Work " The American Legion Weekly March 12, 1920. 
87
 Regarding all-women posts in Wisconsin, for example, see George E. Sweet, The Wisconsin American Legion: A 
History, 1919-1992 (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Wisconsin American Legion Press, 1992), 32, 111. 
88
   "Report of the Committee on Rehabilitation to the Third Annual Convention of the American Legion, Kansas 
City, Missouri, November 1, 1921".   Rehabilitation Reports, The American Legion Library, Indianapolis, Indiana. 
The issue of private versus government hospitals is discussed further in Chapter Six of this dissertation.  
 307 
Legion leadership was divided on the issue of granting access to the organization for 
women who worked with the military branches in non-commissioned roles.
89
 In September 1920, 
individuals representing women who had served as secretaries, laboratory technicians, dieticians, 
anesthetists, and reconstruction aides pleaded with the organization to endorse their efforts to 
obtain some degree of status within the military, as opposed to being viewed merely as civilian 
employees. By extension, they would be eligible for membership in the American Legion, and 
the privilege of eligibility for a bonus. Lucy Chamberlain’s call for Legion support demonstrated 
that women, like other minorities, recognized the necessity of making a passionate case to the 
all-powerful veterans’ organization and the potential weight of its stamp of political approval. 
She drew applause at the Legion’s second annual convention in September 1920 with an urgent 
plea: 
I defy any one to tell me how you can call a woman who has taken the oath of 
enlistment who has a discharge, who is AWOL if she is off her job six hours 
without leave, a civilian employee… I ask the American Legion which is the only 
body of men we can appeal to (we served with you; you are the logical people for 
us to come to) to get behind this thing and attain for us a definite military status.  
 
Miss McKeever from Pennsylvania shared a similar view: “I went over as a matter of 
service; I thought I could do something,” she said. “ I didn’t go to either see France or learn the 
language.”
90
 At the 1921 annual convention, pleas like those of McKeever and Chamberlain led 
Representative Davis, of Pennsylvania, to propose that since “secretaries, dieticians, and 
technicians took the oath of allegiance, were paid by the Quartermasters’ Department of the 
United States Army and wore the prescribed uniform… were subjected to the same discipline 
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and enjoyed the same privileges and received the same discharges as did the Army Nurse 
Corps,” the AL should recognize them as eligible for full membership in the organization. The 
proposal was referred to the Legion’s National Executive Committee for consideration.
91
 
Because such women were admitted to the army as civilian employees, rather than 
commissioned personnel, they faced an uphill battle. If the Legion admitted them as full 
members, it would be setting the precedent that any civilian employee could join, thereby calling 
into question the exclusivity of the organization.
92
      
The issue of whether women and other civilians who had not served, but still hoped to 
join the Legion arose even before the organization’s first convention. When, in June 1919, 
Executive Committee members discussed the formation of the AL Women’s Auxiliary, the 
community service bastion for wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters of veterans, they made 
clear their beliefs regarding the potential benefits of bringing women into the fold of the 
organization. “The local posts are going to need the refining influence of women,” said one 
Executive Committee member in June 1919. Women’s involvement, said Legion Commander 
Franklion D’Olier, would “strengthen very materially the formation of posts in certain towns.”
93
 
If the American Legion was a family affair, and women in communities were making their way 
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to meetings, they could encourage their male counterparts to do the same.
94
 In fact, D’Olier 
suggested opening up membership in the auxiliary to “members of draft boards, state militia not 
inducted into federal service, and others interested in the American Legion.” Chaplain Inzer 
added that the few “old soldiers left” are “just simply crazy about us,” and the Legion should 
encourage them to remain loyal to the organization, but the Committee’s first order of business 
had to be the establishment of the American Legion itself, which should be limited to soldiers 
who served in the Army, Navy, or Marines in the current war. Mr. Price argued that if 
membership – even in an auxiliary – were opened as D’Olier suggested, “Legion members will 
think there are other organizations coming in to which they are very much opposed.” All present 
seemed to agree that, for the time being, women relatives of full members should be the only 
people to whom auxiliary membership was open. There was little to lose, according to Chaplain 
Inzer. “An auxiliary member has no authority in the American Legion,” he pointed out. Plus, 
welcoming them would “get the country solidly back of us… because these women are 
wonderful things.”
95
 In fact, the Legion Auxiliary that was born in this era became “one of the 
largest women’s organizations in the United States,” one that not only led a variety of fruitful 
community service efforts, but also played a crucial role in helping to publicize and gain support 
for enhanced benefits for disabled veterans.
96
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Women veterans and male veterans of color attempted to establish a place for themselves 
in the American Legion and other like-minded organizations, but were often shunned. The 
organization’s leadership – albeit, in some cases, hesitantly – placed concern for the loyalties of 
white, male members above the priority of fulfilling the tenets of the Legion constitution, which 
stated that all veterans were to be treated equally. Members of minority groups remained fiercely 
civically engaged in their own advocacy organizations, but few groups had the political clout – 
or the ear of as many members of Congress – as did the Legion.
97
 It follows that the veterans’ 
hospital system, which was shaped, in part, by the American Legion, was less accessible to 
minorities than it was to white men.  
 
“That power of winning the audience to his side”: The Disabled American Veterans and Robert 
Marx 
 
Although the American Legion might have been the most politically powerful veterans’ 
group to emerge after World War I, others were also instrumental in raising awareness of the 
plight of injured and ill ex-service members. At the first convention of the Disabled American 
Veterans in June 1921 at the Detroit, Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the organization’s 
National Commander addressed a packed house, and explained the group’s ideological origins. 
“During the long years to come, while the paths of the able-bodied service men may tend to 
diverge,” Robert Marx said, “the life paths of the disabled men will run closer together.”  
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In the hospital, the disabled man received the public sympathy to which he is 
justly and generously entitled. In addition he has the protection of the institution, 
the friendly visitation and good advice. His wound heals. He leaves the hospital 
but his disability continues. He loses the protection of the institution, the friendly 
and the helping hand. He is still disabled but in the public imagination, he is now 
one of them and must shift for himself. Through an association such as ours, the 
needs of this man are met, the comradeship, the friendly advice and the helping 
hand continued... 
 
The DAV, Marx said, would perform “the social service side of rehabilitation” by 
helping members work through a “tangle of red tape” to secure medical treatment, 
compensation, and vocational training.
98
 An increasing number of veterans were attracted 
to the message in the early 1920s: in 1921, the DAV had 17,486 members; by early 1924, 
membership had grown to more than 44,200.
99
 
A barometer of major causes and lesser-known eccentricities of his time, Robert Marx 
was a fortuitous choice as the DAV’s first spokesman. He was a successful lawyer and judge, a 
proud ex-service member, and an articulate and instrumental Democratic Party standard-bearer. 
Indeed, Marx’s political connections helped the DAV find its national footing in the early 1920s. 
From the DAV, Marx gained visibility as a prominent war-wounded veteran, which could be a 
professional and political asset. A pillar in the Midwest legal community, Marx was involved in 
some landmark cases of his time; in one of the most famous libel lawsuits in American history, 
he helped Aaron Sapiro, who was briefly his law partner in the mid-1920s, elicit an apology from 
auto tycoon Henry Ford for making anti-Semitic remarks in his Dearborn Independent 
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newspaper. He was also instrumental in establishing compulsory auto insurance as law.
100
 Of 
German-Jewish descent, Marx’s secularism did not preclude him from speaking publicly about 
the contribution of American Jews to the war effort. At the same time, he declared himself 
American before Jewish; he was outwardly opposed to the idea of Zionism and a Jewish state.
101
 
Marx was a loyal subscriber to fitness magazines, and spent his spare time pursuing wrestling, 
mountain climbing, “hand-balancing” – the practice of holding his own or another man’s body 
weight while posed in a physically challenging position – and other hobbies that promoted health 
and well-being.
102
 While Marx was a firm believer in the power of exercise and other forms of 
what could be construed as self-help, as the DAV’s first National Commander, he also tirelessly 
argued that the U.S. government had an obligation to provide material support for wounded 
veterans. A bachelor until his death in 1969, Marx lived well – he traveled widely and had 
multiple vacation homes – but he thought beyond himself and created a rich personal legacy. In 
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his will, he left substantial portions of his fortune to universities, libraries, and the veterans’ 
organization he helped launch to national prominence.
103
  
Robert Marx’s passions were rooted in his upbringing. Within a year of his birth in 1889, 
his parents, William and Rose, re-located from an apartment above a shop in downtown 
Cincinnati to the upscale suburb of Avondale. Marx’s father, William Marx, a successful shoe 
salesman, had connections and ambitions in the Democratic Party. In 1906, his friend and 
frequent lunch date, Cincinnati Mayor Edward J. Dempsey, appointed him president of the Board 
of Public Service. William Marx’s service in that post ended abruptly when he accused his 
fellow Board members of “prejudice.” But he was remembered, upon his death from cancer in 




Some of the same traits were recognized in Robert Marx as early as high school. A 
member of the debate club and the football team, the 1906 Walnut High School yearbook noted 
that he had “oratorical qualities which fill the rest of his classmates with pride,” and “that power 
of winning the audience to his side.”
105
 In 1910, Marx was admitted to the Ohio Bar and began 
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making a place for himself as a prominent member of his community. He became involved in 
various civic organizations, and helped establish an Americanization program meant to 
encourage immigrants to assimilate.
106
   
Not quite thirty years old when the United States began recruiting troops for the Great 
War, Marx eagerly answered the call. In the winter of 1916-17, he served as chairman of a local 
enrollment committee, which aimed to enlist Cincinnatians to attend training at U.S. military 
camps. Marx himself completed a naval training cruise aboard the Battleship Illinois in the 





 Brigade, at Camp Travis in Texas, he was appointed senior instructor in physical 
training and the regimental athletic officer.
107
  
Marx was shipped overseas in July 1918 as a Captain with the 357
th
 Infantry, which 
participated in some of the most vigorous battles of the U.S. war effort. He exercised strict 
discipline with his troops, even while expressing veneration for them. The 357
th
, George von 
Roeder notes, was especially active: the signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, he 
says, “ended 75 days, except 7 for the changing of sectors, that the Regiment was under fire. 
With the exception of 48 hours, the Regiment was in the front line this entire time.”
108
  
Even in the trenches, Marx proudly recalled after the war, “I required every man to shave 
himself every day, as nothing does so much to increase morale as a clean shaven company of 
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men.” He also mandated that trenches be “kept clean.” “Clean shaven faces and clean trenches 
are bound to promote clean rifles and clean ammunition,” Marx declared. “Added together, the 
whole creates pride, confidence, and spirit.”
109
 He and other veterans’ group leaders would 
employ a similar rhetoric of pride in service and high expectations and standards in the post-war 
years.  
Like other officers of the professional middle class, Marx’s reverence for the enlisted 
man was couched in a Progressive Era sense of classism, but it was also heart-felt.
110
 “The mere 
private, the insignificant doughboy is the one man who should be worshiped by every American 
at home or abroad in or out of the army,” Marx wrote to his mother in October 1918. “Nothing is 
too good – nothing ever can be to good for the boy who has fought in the front line infantry in 
France,” he said. Still, Marx said it was important not to “pity” the soldier. He “eats well – he 
has three blankets – he gets his mail – his daily newspaper – splendid hospital and first aid 
service when wounded – everything that can be done for him… is done.”
111
  
Marx soon experienced that hospital and first aid service for himself. In the closing hours 
of the war, he was stationed with his battalion in the small village of Baalon in northeastern 
France, when a barrage of German shells began dropping “with alarming accuracy.” He never 
heard the one that eventually struck him; he only knew he was hit in the head. Fighting the urge 
to faint, Marx attempted to walk himself toward medical assistance, but found himself unable. 
After the war, he recalled:  
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I sat down and ten minutes later, men came with the stretchers. The only thing I 
know of the trip back is that it was equally as dangerous as the advance had been. 
Every foot of the way was through a shell swept area. The number of gas shells 
used was so large that the stretcher-bearers had to put my gas mask on in spite of 
all my head wounds. I did not suffer so much, but that I could not help marveling 
even in that state, at the courage of the men who persisted in carrying me back 




Alfred Segal, a columnist for the Cincinnati Post, saw Marx soon after his injury, and described 
his legs and arms as being “peppered with high explosives,” and generally, “quite a wreck.” He 




As a result of his injuries, Marx experienced a variety of the medical care facilities 
available to U.S. troops. His first stop was at a regimental first aid station for an anti-tetanus 
serum. From there, he was transported by ambulance to the 90
th
 Division triage station at Sun-
Sur-Meuse, and finally to a mud-floored mobile hospital at Verannes, where he received an 
operation and “hovered between life and death.” “When I became conscious, it was November 
twelfth,” Marx later recalled. “I asked how soon I could go back to my outfit; the doctor 
answered: ‘no hurry boy, the war is over.’” Soon after the injury, Marx reported to his mother 
that his wounds were “all from shell fragments but no vital parts are affected. I have some flesh 
wounds in my shoulder and in my arms which are rapidly healing and some scalp wounds which 
are steadily improving.”
114
 By the time Marx was finally discharged six month later, he had 
experienced “delightful” American Red Cross hospitals and “most unpleasant and 
unsatisfactory” base hospitals in France, as well as “comfortable” convalescent hospitals in New 
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York and New Jersey.
115
 As Marx recovered from his wounds, his fellow patients made a 
powerful impression on him: “… the legless, the armless, the lungless (sic), the sightless,” he 




Before Marx was discharged from the army in May 1919, Cincinnati’s local newspapers 
heralded his service and endorsed him for election as a judge in the city’s superior court. His 
victory as a Democrat in an otherwise Republican-dominated race in November 1919 was a 
testament to the political power of a battle injury overcome and a “gallant military record.”
117
 In 
the lead-up to the election, Marx’s proponents regarded him as a “most excellent soldier” whose 
efforts as a Captain “contributed no little to the glory of the brigade… and the ultimate victory of 
our army.”
118
 His “fearlessness,” they said, had “been tested” and he had “proved himself of the 
courageous stuff public officials, especially judges, should be made of.”
119
 “This is your first 
chance to honor a service man with your vote…” a newspaper advertisement by the local 
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Soldiers and Sailors Committee said. “He fought for us over there; let’s vote for him over 
here!”
120
 In the end, Marx’s slim margin of victory was attributed to the unflagging support of 
fellow veterans. His election made it clear that when former soldiers stood by their “comrade,” 
their power was immense.
121
    
 
The DAV finds its voice 
The particulars of the story of the founding of the DAV are recounted in various ways. 
According to one account, a group of disabled veterans gathered at the American Legion 
National Convention in 1919 and “discussed the need for an organization to represent the 
disabled veterans, and concentrate on their particular needs.” Following that meeting, Marx 
“invited a hundred men for dinner and discussion,” then, within a few weeks, “asked that a 
committee be formed to work with him in charting the organization’s beginning.”
122
  
The most careful, detailed, and credible account of the organization’s formation is found 
in a 1926 letter and sworn affidavit from fellow veteran and Ohio native, Charles C. Quitman, 
who enlisted in 1916 and served as a stretcher-bearer in at least two major battles of the World 
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 According to this version of the story, in the spring of 1920, shortly after Marx was 
elected as a judge, Quitman approached him in the locker room of the Cincinnati Gym and 
Athletic Club, where both men were members. Quitman and other students from a University of 
Cincinnati vocational education class were organizing a meeting with fellow disabled veterans 
from the Ohio Mechanics Institute on April 27, 1920, he told Marx. They hoped he, as a 
prominent and respected wounded veteran, might be willing to address the group. Marx agreed to 
speak about the necessity of an organization whose sole focus would be to represent the needs of 
disabled veterans. By May 1920, the group had met three times to discuss possibilities and goals, 
eventually drawing more than 200 disabled veterans from Ohio and neighboring states. As 
interest in the cause became clear, Marx helped draft a constitution and by-laws for an 




Through Marx’s leadership, the burgeoning group gained ideological and political 
legitimacy and national recognition. Marx helped spread the word about the growing Midwest-
centered organization during an August 1920 cross-country train trip with Democratic 
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Presidential candidate, Ohio Governor James M. Cox and aspiring Vice-President, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. While Marx’s main focus on the trip was to help the Democrats gain veteran backing, 
he also used the 32-state tour as an opportunity to address local groups of disabled veterans and 
try to bring them into the fold of a national organization. In the process, Marx successfully 




He was also able to convince Franklin D. Roosevelt, to send “a telegram of greeting and 
good wishes” to the DAV convention the following year. “I hope,” FDR wrote, “you will keep 
together and work together until the debt of gratitude has been paid to the lowliest among 
you.”
126
 In his correspondence with Roosevelt, Marx represented himself as a sort of temporary 
head of the DAV – more of a fellow political operative than an advocate. “For the moment I am 
the national president of this association, known as the Disabled American Veterans of the 
World War,” Marx wrote. “May I suggest that the delegates would sincerely appreciate a 
telegram of greeting and good wishes from you to be read at the convention.”
127
 Marx’s 
correspondence with Roosevelt – the two remained in touch at least through the early 1930s – is 
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As the Disabled American Veterans of the World War gained members and garnered 
publicity, its leaders identified several key goals – more and better hospitals, reality-based 
vocational training, an adequate employment program, just compensation, social services for 
disabled veterans – and employed rhetoric similar to that of the American Legion in order to 
fight for them.
129
 They simultaneously trumpeted sentiments of entitlement and anti-dependence. 
In this way, Marx and fellow advocates echoed and validated the fundamental ideals of 
government reconstruction efforts, even as they argued the latter were falling short of 
expectations. In September 1920, about 100 disabled veterans from Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana 
nominated the DAV’s officers and proclaimed their determination to “assist disabled soldiers and 
suppress efforts to exploit public sympathy.”
130
  
Robert Marx, the organization’s now popularly elected chairman, was candid about his 
belief that self-improvement and self-reliance should be a cornerstone of every veteran’s return 
to civilian life. His outside interests in strength training and his reverence for bodybuilder 
Bernarr MacFadden, who deplored “weakness,” helps illuminate the fact that he did not support 
anything that could be construed as dependency.
131
 Veterans’ advocacy, in Marx’s eyes, was a 
means of fostering independence and strength. The main goal of the DAV, he told the gathering, 
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was “to inspire in its members a determination to come back and to take their place in the nation 
as self-supporting and independent citizens.”
132
  
Marx was careful to separate the organization with which he was affiliated from those 
that had a reputation for radicalism. When it came to the DAV, he said, there would be “no 
politics, no promises to redeem, no axes to grind.”
133
 Board member, H.E. Michaels emphasized 
similar points. The DAV was not intended, he said, to “make unreasonable demands” on the 
government, but instead “to give (the disabled veteran) an opportunity to speak for himself.”
134
 
Stars and Stripes, the military’s newspaper of record, validated the group’s mission: “So many 
organizations have undertaken to aid the wounded and disabled in various ways that an 
expression from these men… would be watched with great interest.”
135
 
The young organization took as a cornerstone edict the idea that disabled veterans were 
entitled to certain medical and educational benefits. Instead of having other groups plead their 
case, DAV officials said, disabled veterans should “determine for themselves what they want.” 
By banding together in a group, they would be better able to access “advantages” to which they 
were rightfully entitled, such as education and medical services.
136
 The DAV prided itself on 
holding the government accountable for making good on its promises. “The community,” Marx 
said at the DAV’s first annual convention, needed to “pay its obligations” to wounded 
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 That obligation, advocates argued, was substantial. “Why should our boys be sent to 
the insane asylums and make no discrimination as to ex-soldiers, no special treatments to try and 
restore their minds,” asked Mayme A. Rock in a telegram to the DAV’s first convention. Rock’s 
brother, John, was being treated in a state asylum in Phoenix, Arizona. “Why,” she wanted to 
know, couldn’t “the boys mentally afflicted have special hospitals to care for them properly?”
138
   
At the same convention, Rabbi Michael Aaronsohn, who, after being blinded in battle, 
attended rabbinical school, and then become the DAV’s chaplain, voiced a contrary opinion, one 
that was somewhat rare in the veterans’ activism arena. He argued that disabled veterans had to 
see themselves as part of a larger group of civilians with disabilities. “The war wounded have 
been peculiarly favored with the care of a generous and wealthy government,” he told the DAV’s 
first annual convention. “However, we must not overlook those about us who are similarly 
crippled or handicapped by the loss of some member or organ of the human body.”
139
 In a later 
memoir, Aaronsohn shared poignant impressions of being blinded in war and subsequently living 
with a disability. And he voiced beliefs that were likely held, but rarely shared, by other war-
wounded ex-soldiers. Why, he wondered, were disabled soldiers and veterans more venerated 
than those who escaped with no injuries? Aaronsohn expressed gratitude for the care offered him 
in military and other publicly funded institutions following his injury, but he also argued that the 
American government was misguided by the idea that blind people should be educated in 
institutions specifically for people with no sight. After all, he noted, they would have to work 
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with sighted people for the rest of their lives.
140
 Aaronsohn’s perspective highlights the idea that, 
in more ways than one, not all disabled veterans saw themselves as a class apart.  
In general, however, groups like the DAV and American Legion fought for policies that 
bolstered the idea that they were just that. The DAV’s ability to publicize the plight of wounded 
veterans and make the problem visible was equally as important as its political and social work. 
Like the American Legion, the DAV had a variety of committees, including one focused on 
legislative issues, which lobbied members of Congress to support its agenda. It also boasted a 
social service arm – a liaison between individual disabled veterans and the government entities 
intended to serve them. In addition, the organization ran summer camps and other programs that 
provided a forum for socialization between wounded and ill ex-soldiers. These functions had a 
pronounced and direct effect on the lives of many veterans.
141
  
But it was the DAV’s ability to bring together apparently vulnerable ex-soldiers en 
masse, and draw abundant press coverage, that allowed the organization to have a wide-ranging 
public impact. When veterans from around the country attended the DAV’s second annual 
convention in San Francisco, for example, newspaper articles about the event trumpeted 
inspirational stories of individual attendees, and the cause of the organization. A Tucson Arizona 
Star headline read: “Vets will try to unravel red tape in federal bureau’s work when they hold 
meeting.” The “army of broken boys” gathering in San Francisco, the article said, “look to the 
government as a worthy son looks to a father.”
142
 The Tacoma Washington Ledger reported that 
                                                
140
 Michael Aaronsohn, Broken Lights (Cincinnati, Ohio: The Johnson & Hardin Company, 1946), See especially p. 
284-92. 
141
 For a helpful summary of DAV activities in these years, see Keller, Wars and Scars: The Story of Compassion 
and Service for Our Nation’s Disabled Veterans; a History of the Disabled American Veterans. 
142
 "Veterans Will Try to Unravel Red Tape in Federal Bureau's Work When They Hold Meeting," Tuscon Arizona 
Star June 22, 1922. 
 325 
four local veterans would attend the DAV meeting; in fact, Merwin Stewart, who had lost both 
his legs, would drive the car.
143
 The Santa Barbara News noted that a veteran named Charles G. 
Galloway, who had his leg amputated below the knee following an injury during the Battle of 
Belleau Wood – a “badge of honor,” the story said – was passing through town as he made his 
way from San Antonio, Texas to the convention in San Francisco. “Galloway is a merry-
appearing youth,” the News reported, “who even though he is minus a leg, appears to know how 
to get lots of real joy out of life.” Earlier in the week, five disabled veterans – two who had legs 
amputated and three with “severe scars,” had passed through Santa Barbara on their way to San 
Francisco from New York.
144
 The San Francisco Examiner urged readers to “listen carefully” to 
the veterans gathering in their city. “They are a race apart,” the paper reported, “these men who 
have gone half the distance that separates the living from the dead, but returned.”
145
 Likewise, 
the San Francisco Bulletin argued, “the most American thing in America is an American war 
veteran with a wound... He is the true American aristocrat…”
146
 Headlines in newspapers from 
Utah to California echoed the sentiment: “City honors heroes of struggle”; “Heroes of war 
modest men”; “Disabled vets lack hospital care”; “Vets will further peace”; “Toll of war shown 
as veterans meet”; “Cut red tape in caring for war heroes demands disabled vet chef”; “U.S. 
handling of war insane unfair.”
147
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The DAV – and the publicity surrounding its formation and events – introduced the 
general public to the stories of individual ex-soldiers. In a time of demilitarization and growing 
weariness with war-related funding, it helped bring a unified rhetoric to the plight and demands 
of disabled veterans that were widely appealing, or at least difficult to argue against. The Vallejo 
Chronicle summed up the idea in an article previewing the DAV’s San Francisco convention: 
“Such a convention in every city of the land would bring home to the citizenry of the country the 




The DAV, anti-radicalism, and veterans of color 
 Even though the DAV was attracting more and more attention, members of Congress 
from both parties, when asked to approve a federal charter for the organization in the early 
1920s, expressed skepticism about whether another veterans’ organization was necessary. John 
Newton Tillman (D-AR) and Earl C. Michener (R-MI) agreed that too many organizations were 
appealing for federal charters in the first place. As a case in point, they noted that a group of 
women had attempted to obtain a charter for a national business and professional women’s 
league. “There is no end to applications,” Tillman said. However, given the nature of the DAV’s 
mission, both acknowledged, “from a sentimental standpoint, it would be rather difficult to deny 
these crippled boys this privilege if they feel they should be put in a class by themselves…”
149
 
Other congressmen voiced the concern that recognizing another veterans’ organization could be 
redundant, and make it more difficult to legislate. After all, they wondered, wasn’t the recently 
incorporated American Legion the mouthpiece of veterans nationwide? Wasn’t that group 
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already “covering the issues”? Why was a “separate and distinct organization to take care of the 
disabled… necessary”?
150
 What if a legislative issue arose and the DAV and Legion disagreed? 




In fact, disenchantment with the American Legion was a motivating factor for some to 
become involved with the DAV. Rabbi Michael Aaronsohn, the DAV chaplain, recalled in the 
early 1940s that soon after World War I, the Legion represented to him a “grand monopolization 
of patriotism.” “The arbitrary classification of men according to war service was,” Aaronsohn 
believed, “an affront to the loyalty and devotion of those who were not ‘privileged’ to bear 
arms.” In June 1921, Colonel Frederick Galbraith, the AL’s National Commander who was seen 
as a great advocate for the disabled, was killed in a car crash. At that moment, Aaronsohn said, 
“it seemed that those who came after Galbraith only promised whole-hearted devotion to the 
cause of the needy and afflicted at opportune occasions…”
152
  
As the DAV sought federal support in 1921, public statements from other organization 
officials were quite different in tone. Indeed, it was a testament to the power of the American 
Legion that Robert Marx and others justified the righteousness of the DAV by noting that AL 
leaders supported its creation. The new group would not take political stances contrary to the 
American Legion, Marx noted. Making a politically powerful argument, he proclaimed that the 
granting of a charter was a matter of lending dignity to those disabled in war.  
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DAV leaders also justified the necessity of the organization by arguing that it could help 
stanch radicalism and anti-government sentiments. The DAV, Marx said, could serve as a means 
of unifying disabled veterans in a group that Congress could be sure was “under the right 
leadership.” Marx’s fellow DAV leader, Ralph A. Horr, went a step further. One of the goals of 
the DAV, he said, was to keep members “out of other organizations that would amount purely 
and simply to the exploitation of the disabled men and result in embarrassment to the 
government.”
153
 The fact that Horr was a devoted Republican and Marx, a devoted Democrat, 
demonstrates that DAV membership and leaders had a variety of political backgrounds.
154
 
Horr and others who argued that anti-radicalism should be a priority of the organization 
justified the claim that veterans deserved publicly-funded medical services by juxtaposing ex-
service members’ righteous patriotism against leftists’ supposed anti-Americanism. At the first 
DAV convention in Detroit, Horr told the crowd of approximately 1,000 that he had visited a 
hospital in Chicago, where a disabled veteran was in want of medical care, the lower part of his 
arm amputated and the upper part turning black. There were soldiers like him throughout the 
country, Horr reported to applause; they had problems the DAV had to “attend to” that were 
“almost political.” Immediately following his discussion of the Chicago hospital, Horr described 
various lingering threats; “German-speaking societies” in the U.S. and supposed radicals who 
were “in communication with the Soviet of Russia…” “We have problems to solve as disabled 
veterans of this great war,” he said, “that are national and international in their scope.” Fighting 
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for enhanced rights for disabled veterans and taking a stand against radicals, Horr implied, were 
complementary missions.  
He and fellow DAV members who favored a greater emphasis on surveillance of 
immigrants and suspected communist agitators gained enough support within the ranks of the 
organization to spur conflicts between attendees of the organization’s meetings and members of 
the comparatively left-leaning Disabled Soldiers’ and Sailors’ League.
155
 When a representative 
from the latter group, Mr. Bodine, visited a DAV meeting in May 1921 and criticized Robert 
Marx’s praise of the government’s Federal Board for Vocational Education, attendees shouted 
that he and his comrades were radicals, bolshevists, and troublemakers. As Bodine left the room, 
one newspaper reported, he shouted back: “‘We are proud to be called Bolshevists. Although we 
have not so many members as this association we will start a drive tonight to enlist all the 
‘radicals’ we can find among the disabled veterans who want a square deal.’”
156
 About a month 
later, Horr led a contingent of DAV members into a socialist convention in Detroit and 
announced that “the Americans who fought against a foreign enemy would fight as hard against 
enemies at home if the need should arise.”
157
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There were plenty of DAV members, including the organization’s national leaders, who 
did not support Horr’s inflammatory tactics.
158
 Robert Marx and Michael Aaronsohn often 
emphasized the importance of fighting for rights for disabled veterans over engaging in political 
debates. But the publicity surrounding incidents like the run-in with suspected socialists helped 
the DAV, like the American Legion, gain an image as a protector of conservative American 
values. When such a group requested extensions of government entitlements, the latter seemed 
justified and rational, not radical.  
Like the American Legion, the DAV was challenged by a variety of sensitive social 
issues: it faced questions not only regarding political ideology, but also the matter of whether to 
welcome into its ranks veterans of color. Many of the organization’s officials from the northeast 
and Midwest strongly felt that the group should include all former service members, regardless 
of sex, ethnicity, or race. Rabbi Michael Aaronsohn’s account of the first annual DAV 
convention in June 1921 in Detroit, Michigan, painted a somewhat idealized picture of a highly 
egalitarian organization, which promoted “the friendship of Christian and Jew, of nonbeliever 
and priest, of Republican and Democrat, of Indian and immigrant, of Negro and Caucasian…” 
and united them in “brotherhood.”
159
 At the same meeting, however, members shared laughs and 
applause after one delegate opened his speech about the necessity of land grants for veterans 
with a joke about a “darkey” who had spent his time in the army not in valiant frontline service, 
but cleaning stables. Like their American Legion counterparts, attendees also passed a resolution 
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urging that “foreign-born Japanese shall be forever barred from American citizenship” in spite of 
opposition from a member named O’Boyle, who felt it went beyond the DAV’s “sole object… to 
work for the welfare of the disabled, and nothing else.”
160
  
Indeed, members like O’Boyle and Aaronsohn faced strong ideological opposition from 
their counterparts – many from the South and West –who were not only strongly anti-immigrant 
and anti-radical, but also staunchly segregationist. The proposed policies of the latter group 
prevailed at the June 1922 annual convention in San Francisco, California, when three black 
veterans from Fairview, Texas were denied seats after travelling across half the country in order 
to attend. The incident prompted National Commander Marx to announce that, like the American 
Legion, the DAV’s official policy would be to allow state departments to determine whether 
black veterans would be recognized as members. Marx noted that the Fairview men had, in fact, 
been granted a chapter charter by the national body before the Texas state department was 
functioning, but the handing down of the state’s whites-only policy meant that charter would be 
revoked.
161
 The organizational constitution, adopted at the annual convention in Detroit in 1921, 
explicitly said that state departments and local chapters could “admit or reject any applicant for 
reasons satisfactory to such State department or local chapter.”
162
  
Although veterans of color were discriminated against in the DAV, and the organization 
was far from egalitarian, it was more accepting than some other groups of its time. Eventually, a 
“national chapter of colored members” was created within the DAV; by the early 1930s, state 
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and local chapters were urged to refer membership requests from eligible African Americans to 
National Headquarters, so they could be passed on to that unit.
163
And Jews (including Robert 
Marx and Michael Aaronsohn) assumed positions of leadership. Occasionally, Marx even used 
his perch as National Commander to promote the idea that – contrary to the beliefs of some – 






The background of the establishment of a federal hospital system for veterans cannot be 
wholly understood without an examination of the role of veterans’ groups in the contemporary 
political landscape. Groups like the American Legion and the Disabled American Veterans 
gained credence and political legitimacy in the months following the war by undermining efforts 
of less conservative groups at a point when public suspicion of leftist ideology was especially 
heightened, and simultaneously usurping aspects of their agendas. They helped to reinforce the 
long-standing belief that veterans were worthy of special reverence, and they worked closely 
with politicians to ensure they had the tools they needed to sponsor favored legislation. Disabled 
ex-service members, the groups argued, were the most worthy of all. While other issues such as 
veterans’ bonuses and racial tensions divided membership of the Legion and the DAV, virtually 
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everyone could agree that those who had been injured or become ill while serving deserved 
enhanced government-sponsored privileges, including free hospital care. Once that premise was 
widely agreed upon, veterans’ groups propelled the political debate toward the issue of systemic 
change, and creating one government entity with concentrated power to oversee all veterans’ 
benefits. 
As veterans’ groups found their footing and made the fight for the rights of ill and 
disabled ex-service members a cornerstone of their organizations, they served as willing allies 
for medical professionals and bureaucrats attempting to set the terms of the debate regarding 
veterans’ hospital care. Legion and DAV representatives argued that veterans were not getting 
the quality of services they deserved and that the government should provide more funding. They 
maintained that ex-service members should not be treated in state facilities alongside other 
citizens. And they argued that they should have access to institutions close to their homes and 
families. Although they encountered skepticism from members of Congress regarding the 
necessity of these expensive measures, their agenda eventually prevailed; it formed the basis for 
the future of veterans’ medical care. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
“One of the epochs of veteran relief”:  
Creating the Veterans’ Bureau and  




By the time the American Legion (AL) joined with congressional representatives to write 
legislation proposing the coalescence of all federal entities involved in veterans’ social 
assistance, government officials and professionals involved in the system were open to – indeed, 
desperate for – new ideas. It had been an arduous 18 months of attempting to coordinate 
disparate services of the army, Bureau of War Risk Insurance, and Public Health Service. In 
early 1921, thanks in large part to the influence of the American Legion, congressional debates 
surrounding the issue of medical care for veterans shifted from focusing primarily on temporary 
measures (the need for additional and better facilities in the short-term, for example) to the 
merits of more permanent and far-reaching legislation that mandated the creation of the 
Veterans’ Bureau, and the consolidation of government efforts to provide services.  
Great tension existed surrounding the creation of a new welfare agency in a social and 
political climate that prized the ideal of self-reliance. Over a period of approximately nine 
months, between December 1920 and August 1921, the notion of establishing a distinct bureau 
for the management of veterans’ benefits went from being widely maligned, to being adopted as 
policy. The Veterans’ Bureau was approved in August 1921 because politically powerful 
advocacy groups were able to represent it not as a revolutionary agency that would oversee an 
array of new entitlements for a select group of citizens, but instead as the most cost-effective, 
efficient means of alleviating a dire, emergency situation. In its original form, the agency had 
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few vested powers when it came to structuring a national system of veterans’ hospitals, but it had 
great potential for expansion. 
Motivated by political expediency, social concern, or both, politicians of each of the 
major American political parties came to accept the idea that the situation surrounding medical 
care for veterans was untenable, and that sweeping change was necessary. Veterans’ groups 
successfully kept the health problems of ex-soldiers in the public eye, and made it easy for 
policymakers to support their cause on a practical level; the American Legion authored multiple 
far-reaching bills concerning veterans’ benefits, and thus handed congressional representatives 
the tools they needed to support and even promote the group’s agenda. Veterans’ advocates, with 
the support of bureaucratic “experts,” not only negotiated millions of dollars in funding for the 
creation of hospitals and other resources, they also won the attention of, and occasionally, 
control over, governmental committees intended to decipher how the funding would be used. 
The creation of the Veterans’ Bureau in August 1921, involving one central office in 
Washington, D.C. and 14 regional offices, put in place a systemic framework ripe for growth. At 
last, Congress had enacted policies that were not only favored by interest groups and government 
officials, but that would also shape soldiers’ and veterans’ medical care for the remainder of the 
century. 
 
A legislative turn toward systemic change: The Rogers Bill and political challenges 
John Jacob Rogers, veteran, American Legion member, and Republican representative 
from Massachusetts put forth the earliest legislative iteration of the Veterans’ Bureau in 
December 1920.
2
 A result of a three-day meeting of “high Legion officials with the chiefs of 
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various government bureaus,” the Rogers Bill contained a wish list of requests from the powerful 
advocacy group.
3
 The extent to which the AL was responsible for its contents became clear when 
Rogers ceded conduct of the December 1920 congressional hearings pertaining to the bill to John 
Thomas Taylor, acting Chair of the Legion’s Legislative Committee.
4
 Taylor comfortably 
assumed control, beginning by quoting from the Legion’s recent convention proceedings: “We 
cannot conceive of a greater accomplishment for the American Legion than the securing of the 
passage of a law which will unify the efforts of… the government agencies,” Taylor announced, 
referring to the veteran-related functions of the Federal Board for Vocational Rehabilitation, the 
Bureau of War Risk Insurance, and the Public Health Service. Abel Davis, the head of the 
Legion’s newly created hospitalization committee had written the bill, Taylor said, before the 
organization’s “good friend,” John Jacob Rogers,  “perfected” it.
5
  
The main function of the legislation was “consolidation at the top and decentralization in 
the field,” as Rogers put it.
6
 The Bill would establish a “Bureau of Veterans’ Reestablishment,” 
in Washington, D.C. with one director who would oversee 14 or more regional offices. The 
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organization would be charged with “treating all the necessities of the disabled man, whether that 
be hospitalization, compensation, or vocational training.” The suggestions, Abel Davis said, were 
based not on “any theoretical discussions with experts as to what is the way of handling 
problems of this sort,” but instead, on “practical knowledge” of veterans’ needs.
7
 Legion officials 
were flexible about many particulars of the bill – the new entity did not have to be called the 
“Bureau of Veteran Reestabishment,” for example, and it did not have to be placed in the 
Department of the Interior – but there was one seemingly non-negotiable point: its director must 
have absolute authority over the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service and all other 
bureaucrats involved in veterans’ welfare. 
Debates over the Rogers bill showcased some of the core issues connected with – and the 
primary arguments for and against – establishing a special government bureau intended solely to 
oversee the needs of veterans. Supporters of the bill cited various justifications for its passage. 
Although Congress had been generous with funding for ex-soldiers during the past three years, 
Abel Davis argued, it was relying on disparate entities to handle their treatment, compensation, 
and rehabilitation, which resulted in conflict and “passing the buck.” In other words, no one was 
fully responsible for fulfilling veterans’ needs, and therefore, no one was fully culpable for 
systemic shortfalls. The current bill, Rogers said, meant that there would be “some one whom we 
can hold individually responsible if things go wrong.”
8
  
Then, there was the issue of money. Although the government might be over-spending, 
Legion officials argued, many veterans were not getting their due. If an ex-soldier enrolled in a 
FBVE training program, for example, he was eligible for compensation from that bureau, so he 
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was taken off the rolls of the BWRI. But the latter organization was sometimes slow in 
transferring paperwork, so the ex-service man could go for months without receiving payment. 
Alternatively, in some cases, the government was paying double compensation because men 
were not taken off the BWRI roll before being added to the FBVE one, or vice versa.9 Drawing 
on the latter point, Robert Marx, testifying both as a representative of the Legion’s 
hospitalization committee and his new organization of disabled soldiers, the Disabled American 
Veterans, emphasized that the current bill was unique and worthy because it would, in fact, save 
the government money.10 According to one 1920 estimate, the BWRI had made more than 
$11,000,000 worth of overpayments to soldiers due to faulty communication between the BWRI, 
army, and Federal Board for Vocational Education.11  
Centering authority in one bureau, advocates suggested, could enhance not only 
economic efficiency, but also coordination. Frederick W. Galbraith, the newly elected National 
Commander of the American Legion, argued that awards were all too unpredictable. He said he 
had recently visited a hospital where two men with the same disease were getting very different 
monthly payments – one, $8, and the other $80. The latter had been rated when his tuberculosis 
was at full force, while the former had been rated when it was arrested.12   
Galbraith argued that passing the present bill would fulfill a duty, rather than constitute 
an expensive and questionable expansion of government. He reminded representatives that men 
were drafted into the army for the recent war, “without regard to their desire” and “accepted the 
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obligation willingly.” The government, he argued, “said to these men, when you are disabled… 
we pledge our national wealth and our sacred honor that you should be cared for…” Galbraith 
hinted at the next frontier of the Legion’s advocacy work for disabled soldiers, which was 
intimately connected with the current bill: the building of new hospitals solely for the use of 
veterans. Before the war, Congress had failed to mandate a hospital building program and now, 
he said, “men are still suffering.”
13
  
The soldier who was in need of hospital care, said the Legion’s John H. Sherburne, 
“absolutely throws his hands up.” Instead of getting into a “terrific tangle of red tape” by 
attempting to access care at a government hospital, men were going to local charities for help.
14
 
Sherburne dramatically conveyed the gravity of the situation as he saw it, and the possible 
benefits of passing the bill: “The government today,” he said, “has the chance to salvage more 
human wreckage than they have ever had in a similar situation before.”
15
  
Dr. Thomas Salmon, who had served as the Chief Consultant in Psychiatry for the 
American Expeditionary Forces and visited asylums, jails, and hospitals in 26 states, not only 
seconded the opinion that only a small percentage of soldiers who needed care had come forward 
to get it, but also that “divided authority” among various government agencies meant that “5,000 
men who are suffering from insanity… are so poorly care for…” He reiterated Galbraith’s point 
that veterans and their families loathed the idea of seeking treatment for shell-shock and related 
diseases at state institutions, and that more hospitals were necessary specifically for ex-soldiers. 
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If institutions were built “for young men in full vigor,” Salmon said, veterans would not be in the 
embarrassing situation of having to receive care alongside the elderly and the poor, and they 
would “come out in number that will surprise you all.”
16
 The statements of dire need found 
willing support among some of the representatives present. “I, for one, think it is about time that 
our Government established institutions to take care of these patients,” said John G, Cooper (R-
OH).  
As government officials involved in the Federal Board for Vocational Education, the 
Public Health Service, and the Bureau of War Risk Insurance – the three agencies that would be 
“unified” – testified against the rationale of various portions of the Rogers Bill, it became clear 
that although the legislation would constitute a major victory for the American Legion, it 
contained major flaws. Secretary of the Treasury, David F. Houston, argued that the Legion’s 
wish to eliminate delays was “very commendable,” but he called the notion of creating a new 
bureau, the head of which could be held fully responsible for veterans’ welfare “inadvisable and 
impractical.” First, he noted the breadth of the work of the Public Health Service, arguing that 
consolidating it with the Bureau of Veteran Reestablishment would “impair the efficiency of a 
governmental agency concerned in matters affecting vitally the entire population solely for the 
purpose of rendering service to… one group of people.” Furthermore, he hypothesized that such 
an organization “would not function satisfactorily,” and would fail to effectively serve both 
veterans and non-veterans alike. Houston seemed especially put off by the idea of placing the 
Surgeon General of the Public Health Service and its hospitals under the directorship of a “new 
bureau.” Such a transfer, he said, “would amount to a dismemberment” of the PHS. Instead of 
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consolidation, Houston argued for an earlier iteration of the Rogers Bill, which would better 
coordinate the efforts of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance and the PHS under one head.
17
  
Other government officials also implied that the legislation was too broad and sweeping. 
Before reassigning the job of veterans’ welfare to a new agency, argued the Secretary of the 
Interior, Congress should investigate where efforts were being duplicated and address specific 
problems.
18
 James P. Munroe, of the Federal Board for Vocational Education, was more explicit 
in his critique: “No facts have thus far been produced to show that any greater efficiency would 
be achieved, any more sympathetic consideration would be given to the disabled soldiers, or any 
more economical administration would result from combining the rehabilitation service with the 
other bureaus.” Munroe joined the Secretary of the Treasury in his skepticism regarding whether 
current administrative problems could be solved by the “mere expedient of consolidation under a 
single officer.” The FBVE’s work was temporary in nature and was, “through experience, more 
efficient every day,” he said, and to reassign its duties to “new and untried hands” would be both 
costly and “injurious to the disabled soldiers.”
19
  
Hugh S. Cumming, the Surgeon General of the PHS, concurred: far from serving to 
coordinate the workings of the three bureaus, the measure “absolutely disrupts the Public Health 
Service and its personnel, serves to destroy its carefully constructed corps of medical men, 
professional nurses, and other trained personnel…” “Confusion,” Cumming said, would be the 
only result if the “ill-considered” Rogers Bill became law. Like the Secretary of the Treasury, 
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Cumming said he believed the three bureaus should be coordinated under one head, in one 
department, but that person should act as coordinator, not absolute authority. The heads of the 
FBVE, the BWRI, and the PHS, each had different areas of specialty, and no one director could 
be a “Poo Bah,” Cumming said. It was impossible “to gather together in one individual a doctor, 
a financier, and an educator.” Division of authority, he implied, was wholly necessary. Passing 
this “radical legislation,” Cumming said, would result in a disruption in administration and care 
for disabled service men.  
The director of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, Richard G. Cholmeley-Jones, 
seconded Cumming’s opinion that the PHS should run hospitals where veterans were treated, 
instead of turning over the responsibility to the Bureau of Veteran Reestablishment. In such an 
arrangement, the new bureau would oversee physical examinations of men before they were sent 
to hospitals, but once they arrived there, the PHS would have authority over their care.
20
  
At the center of debates over the Bureau of Veteran Reestablishment (and later, the 
Veterans’ Bureau) was the question of whether the legislation would lead to the creation of a 
long-term federal hospital system for veterans. The “ultimate hope,” according to Abel Davis of 
the Legion, was that the PHS would cede control over hospitals where veterans were treated to a 
new Bureau of Veteran Reestablishment. But even as they advocated for the creation of a distinct 
veterans’ medical system, Legion officials attempted to assuage the fears of cost-conscious 
politicians. One congressman wondered whether a PHS “general” hospital system would 
eventually exist, and another system “exclusively for the service of ex-service men.” That was 
not a “necessary conclusion” of the legislation, according to Congressman Rogers, but “in the 
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main, and rightly, it would be the rule.”
21
 The Legion’s assertion that a new Bureau of Veteran 
Reestablishment, not the PHS, should have authority over hospital facilities and care, which 
arose in legislative debates throughout the next year, represented more than just a stance on 
semantics and administration. The group was laying the groundwork for the argument that 
veterans should have their own autonomous federally-sponsored hospital system; that resources 
– funding and facilities – should be devoted to an organization solely for the benefit of former 
service members, not a pre-existing government agency focused on the needs of the greater 
population.  
The Rogers Bill proved to be slightly ahead of its time. As Madeleine Edison Sloane, 
daughter of Thomas Edison, told The New York Times, it was “‘killed in subcommittee, 
presumably because of the unwillingness of the officials of the existing boards to work under one 
director.’” Sloane neglected to note the concerns brought up by PHS and other officials 
regarding the legislation, and instead emphasized the ongoing plight of disabled and ill soldiers 
and veterans. “‘Apple pies are no substitute for wooden legs,’” she lamented. There was “no 
coordination” among the government bureaus overseeing care for disabled soldiers, and now, 
Congress had failed to pass the Rogers Bill, the one viable solution to the problem.
22
 Sloane 
emphasized the issue of veterans’ neglect and the crisis at hand, rather than the more 
controversial questions brought up at the Roger’s Bill hearings concerning the broader, 
potentially negative effects of creating a Bureau of Veterans’ Reestablishment.  
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 “It will rest with the Government to determine their final use”: A comprehensive system of 
hospitals for veterans, for the short-term 
 
Soon after the failure of the Rogers Bill, in the closing hours of Woodrow Wilson’s 
presidency, advocates and bureaucrats pushing for a more expansive hospital system won a 
major legislative victory. As Wilson “waited upon Congress in its final hour in his room off the 
Senate Chamber,” one of the bills he signed into law was an $18.6 million appropriation 
intended for the improvement, expansion, or building of hospital facilities and dispensaries for 
BWRI patients.23 Public Law 384 – the so-called Langley Bill – stipulated that $6.1 million 
could be used for the improvement of existing institutions, and the remainder for the construction 
of new facilities.24  
The Langley Bill received a hearing and became a reality, in large part, because of a 
mighty fight on the part of the American Legion. The tale of the bill’s long journey to the House 
floor demonstrates that veterans’ legislation was often hard-fought. According to The Come-
Back, the newspaper of Walter Reed Hospital, the Legion appeared before the Committee on 
Public Buildings and Grounds four times urging a favorable report on the Langley Bill, which, in 
its original form, provided $10 million for hospitals to be used for BWRI patients. Just before the 
House adjourned in June 1920, the bill was favorably reported and placed on the calendar of the 
House. In December 1920, the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds voted unanimously 
for the appointment of a subcommittee to secure a special rule from the Rules committee in order 
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to allow the bill to be brought before the House for a vote. The special rule was granted on 
January 11, 1921.25  
The Langley Bill marked a turning point for several reasons. First, it was a hospital bill 
above all else, based largely on the requests of the Public Health Service, rather than the Director 
of the Bureau of the War Risk Insurance. Although both the BWRI and PHS were in the 
Treasury Department, previous legislation concerned with veterans’ medical care had provided 
money directly to the BWRI, bringing about complaints from Public Health Service officials 
about a lack of control and access. It was impossible to plan a hospital program, they argued, 
when approval and funding for every project or idea had to be sought from an outside agency.26 
In passing the Langley Bill, legislators responded to this complaint. Senators and representatives 
who debated the bill cited as the basis for its contents the PHS Surgeon General’s estimates 
regarding extent of need.27 The passage of the Langley Bill indicated legislative acceptance of 
the claim that hospitals were an issue that needed to be dealt with on its own, rather than as part 
of a lump sum appropriation that covered other benefits as well.  
The new law was also important because it took power for locating institutions out of the 
hands of representatives and senators. In its original form, the bill proposed that new hospital 
sites would be located based on the recommendations of a “commission composed of 
congressmen.” According to Wesley L. Jones, (R—WA), the involvement of legislators in the 
selection of sites would “save the government a good deal of money.” But a few of Jones’ 
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26 See Chapter Four for a further description of PL 246, which allocated $46 million to the Bureau of War Risk 
Insurance and brought about a storm of protest from PHS officials. 
27 See, for example, United States Congressional Record, Senate,  Sixty-Sixth Congress, Third Session, 
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colleagues spoke against such a provision. James W. Wadsworth (R—NY) argued that a 
commission ruled by congressmen and senators would “take months to bring about any 
decision.” Almost as a case in point, the Senate hearings soon devolved into a series of calls 
from senators for the Langley Bill to include funding for the enhancement of specific facilities in 
their respective states. “If we want to save time, if we want to do this thing effectively,” 
Wadsworth suggested, sites for new institutions should be chosen by the PHS, subject to the 
approval of the president.
28
  
Democrats in both the House and Senate concurred with Wadsworth’s suggestion that 
representatives of the PHS and other medical experts had the best knowledge of what facilities 
were needed where, and that they should be left to autonomously decide the matter. Would a 
senator with “a sick friend or, unfortunately, an ill relative, consult a physician or four 
politicians?” asked Henry F. Ashurst (D—AZ).
29
 Ladislas Lazaro, a Democratic representative 
from Louisiana and a doctor, made a similar argument in the House. Health professionals, 
Lazaro said, “who know how to treat those cases” should say “where they should be treated.” 
The “medical authorities who have charge of this money,” he suggested, “could select a 
commission composed of experts, especially in these tuberculosis cases, who would make a 
rapid survey and then decide where this money should be spent and where these boys should be 
treated.”
30
 Lazaro’s idea was greeted with applause. 
Debates over the passage of the Langley Bill also demonstrated that many had come to 
accept the idea that the provision of hospitals for veterans constituted a persistent need, one that 
                                                
28
 Ibi., 2708-10. For the series of requests from senators to locate facilities in their own states, see p. 2711-2714. 
29
 Ibid., 2709.  
30
 United States Congressional Record, House,  Sixty-Sixth Congress, Third Session, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, February 7, 1921), 2734.  
  347 
might not be adequately addressed by piecemeal annual allotments from Congress. In the House, 
discussions of the bill reached a high partisan pitch, with both Democrats and Republicans 
arguing that members of the other party were erecting barriers to treatment for needy and 
disabled war veterans. Democratic representatives resented the fact that the bill was introduced 
under a suspension of House rules, which meant that no amendments could be offered to the 
legislation; therefore, a representative (of either party) “who wants to go further and offer 
amendments so as to meet the whole problem by a broad constructive bill instead of the 
piecemeal bill is denied the opportunity to do so,” said Otis Wingo (D—AR). When Wingo 
offered his critique, the Langley Bill contained specific recommendations for hospital sites, 
which Democratic representatives claimed overlooked their party’s strongholds, and were 
politically motivated. Republican legislators, for their part, argued that Democrats were stalling, 
and that action on the present bill was necessary immediately.  
Beyond the partisan bickering, representatives of both parties paid lip service to the same 
long-term vision. The Langley Bill represented “merely the beginning of a great hospital-
building project, which may ultimately cost many times the amount authorized by this bill,” said 
John W. Langley (R—KY). Likewise, as Otis Wingo put it, Democrats were eager to write 
“broad” legislation that would “adequately take care of the hospitalization of our soldiers in 
every section of the country.”
31
 The bill passed the House with 239 voting in favor of it and no 
members voting against it, indicating that even though Democrats disagreed with many of its 
core provisions, they would “vote to provide hospitalization for the soldiers…”
32
 Like so many 
pieces of veteran-related legislation before and to come, congressional representatives voted 
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based on the principle behind the law – that former soldiers should have access to better hospital 
facilities – and not their judgments regarding its specific contents and logic.33  
In the Senate, too, legislators acknowledged that the Langley Bill represented only the 
beginning of much more expansive provisions, though members of opposing parties differed as 
to what that meant for policy in the short-term. Joseph T. Robinson (D—AR) noted that the 
Surgeon General of the PHS had requested $35 million, much more than the $18.6 million 
allotted in the legislation. “If we only authorize the amount carried by the committee’s provision 
(the amount that could be spent within one year) we will never catch up with the requirements of 
the service or even approximate that accomplishment,” Robinson said. “The construction of 
permanent, suitable institutions,” he suggested, could not be accomplished within the confines of 
fiscal year appropriations. He estimated that it took five to six months to locate a site for a 
hospital, and even longer to secure “contracts, plans and specifications.” “If we wait and only 
make the authorizations now of such sums as will be actually expended during the coming fiscal 
year we will be no nearer up (sic) with the requirements of the service at the end that time than 
we are now,” Robinson said. Reed Smooth (R—UT) attempted to quell his colleague’s concerns. 
“I am positive that at the end of the year, when the next appropriation bills come up, or, if 
necessary, a bill carrying the amount outside of a regular appropriation bill before the 
appropriation bills pass… whatever is necessary to take care of hospitalization for the ex soldiers 
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will be granted by Congress at any time.”
34
 The Langley Bill was thus passed with the 
acknowledgement that it was both insufficient and necessary.   
Public Law 384 was a relic of Wilson’s administration, but it would be executed under a 
new President, Warren G. Harding. Throughout his campaign, Harding sharply distinguished 
himself from his predecessor, guaranteeing Americans he would usher in a “return to normalcy,” 
lower taxes, and less government intervention. He won the accolades of veterans’ groups early 
on. In December 1920, the president-elect made time to meet at his home with his fellow Ohioan 
Robert Marx. Although the DAV chairman had campaigned eagerly for Harding’s Democratic 
presidential opponent, once the returns were in, Marx was able to note Harding’s virtues. The 
president-elect, he said, was “simple and democratic,” and “as plain as an old shoe.” He further 
reported that Harding had “a very keen understanding of the problems facing the disabled 
soldiers and sailors; a very sincere and heartfelt sympathy for them and a firm determination that 
they shall be the first charge and first duty of the nation as soon as he becomes president.”
35
 Two 
weeks before he assumed office, Harding attempted to affirm this belief with a public statement: 
“I shall make it one of the first items of important business,” he said, “to see that the conditions 
affecting the government’s care of our disabled veterans are rendered more efficient.”
36
  
To those ends, in the days immediately following the passage of the Langley Bill, 
Harding’s new Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon appointed a board of medical 
experts to decide how to disburse the allocated money. The Consultants on Hospitalization, 
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referred to as the White Committee after its director William Charles White, was tasked with 
conceiving of a building program for hospitals that would serve veterans.  
The committee took as its point of focus not only the recently passed Langley Bill, but 
also PL 326, which in 1919 authorized the Treasury Department and by extension, the PHS to 
take over a Chicago army hospital, establish a tuberculosis sanitarium at Dawson Springs, 
Kentucky, enlarge a Marine hospital in Stapleton, New York, and build new hospitals in 
Washington, D.C. and Norfolk, Virginia – all for the benefit of World War veterans. According 
to the White Committee, PL 326 “did not take into consideration at all the question of a 
consistent program for the complete hospitalization of the veterans of the world war; nor did it 
make any attempt to provide a hospital system in relation to centers of military population…”
37
  
The White Committee was intended to right such previous wrongs and offer professional 
advice that was untainted by politics or greed as, it was understood, previous parties had been 
when proposing isolated hospital projects in certain districts.
38
 The committee consisted mainly 
of nationally renowned experts on tuberculosis and mental illness, a nod to the two major health 
challenges facing the government in the long-term care of ex-soldiers. White served as medical 
director of a tuberculosis hospital in Pittsburgh and on the executive committee of the National 
Association for the Prevention of Tuberculosis, and, during the war, headed the tuberculosis unit 
of the American Red Cross in France. The Committee included as well Frank Billings, a past 
president of the American Medical Association, the Association of American Physicians, and the 
                                                
37
  "Delays in Hospital Construction, Conclusions", August 22, 1922.  Records of Collaborating Boards and 
Committees, Board of Consultants on Hospitalization, General Correspondence and related records, 1921-23, 
Record Group 121, Box 27, Entry 164, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. 
38
 See Chapter Four for more on PL 326, and early debates regarding political motives behind the location of 
veterans’ hospitals. According to Rosemary A. Stevens, the White Committee “provided a useful transition in the 
veterans’ hospital debates.” Rosemary A. Stevens, "The Invention, Stumbling, and Re-Invention of the Modern U.S. 
Veterans Health Care System, 1918-1924," in Veterans' Policies, Veterans' Politics: New Perspectives on Veterans 
in the Modern United States, ed. Stephen R. Ortiz (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012). 
  351 
National Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis. During the war, Billings 
served as head of the rehabilitation program of the Army Surgeon General and chairman of an 
American Red Cross mission to Russia. In the early 1920s, he was Dean of Rush Medical 
College. Pearce Bailey, and his eventual replacement, George Kirby were both psychiatrists. 
Another committee member, John G. Bowman, was a leader in the emerging field of hospital 
standardization, authoring in 1919 the first volume of the formative Minimum Standards for 
Hospitals. The group undertook detailed studies of available government-owned hospital beds, 
creating copious charts, reports, and maps describing its findings. Its members not only visited 
institutions themselves, but also interviewed the foremost experts on hospital and medical care 
for veterans and the greater population.  
In a preliminary report released soon after the White Committee’s founding, an advisory 
committee consisting of Thomas W. Salmon, Thomas B. Kidner, and Henry A. Pattison, of the 
National Tuberculosis Association, and Charles M. Pearsall of the National Home for Disabled 
Volunteer Soldiers, laid out a “comprehensive plan of hospitalization” for veterans with 
tuberculosis and mental and nervous diseases. (A separate report on the needs of general medical 
patients, the group explained, would subsequently be submitted.) The report noted that the $18.6 
million appropriation was hardly enough to solve the problem at hand, but contained concrete 
suggestions for providing enough hospital beds for veteran-patients. When it came to treating 
patients with mental diseases, for example, Thomas Salmon suggested that the White Committee 
plan for three distinct stages: a “relatively slow ascent,” a “rather long level phase,” and finally, a 
“slow descent.” He recommended additions and improvements to four PHS hospitals in 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Georgia, and Iowa, along with the building of several new institutions 
in the districts with the most limited resources and the highest ex-soldier populations, including 
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California, Illinois, Minnesota, and Colorado.39  The White Committee drew attention to the fact 
that it was mindful of costs. In a list of issues “to mention to the President,” it noted that “with 
few exceptions,” many of the 6,000 beds it was planning to add to government facilities for the 
use of ex-soldiers would be “enlargements of government-owned properties.”40  
The $18.6 million allocated by the Langley Bill was granted to the Department of the 
Treasury and it was clear that the White Committee envisioned a hospital system that would 
serve veterans in the relatively short-term, but benefit a larger population – in Treasury 
Department facilities such as Public Health Service Hospitals – at a later date. “In locating these 
hospitals your consultants have had in mind the permanent value to the Government of its 
investment in these institutions,” said one Committee report. “It will rest with the Government to 
determine their final use.”41 A “crisis expansion” of an expansive veterans’ hospital system, it 
was understood, would be short-lived; most of the resources it provided would be useful later for 
purposes other than providing medical care for a distinct population.42  
That notion – and the White Committee’s determination to be efficient and results-
oriented – was challenged by the August 1921 creation of the Veterans’ Bureau and that 
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agency’s subsequent expansion of power. Within less than two years, the building program 
overseen by the White Committee in the Treasury Department would be subsumed under a brand 
new government organization – one with a director who was eager to maintain control of 




“So far as treating them in separate institutions, it is almost a necessity…” 
Local customs of segregation and reports from black soldiers that they were being poorly 
treated in government institutions complicated the question of how to structure a veterans’ 
hospital system. Throughout the U.S. (in the north as well as the south) prior to the 1960s, three 
“architectural patterns” existed for hospitals where black patients could be admitted: the first was 
the all-black hospital; the second was the “‘mixed-race hospital,’” where African Americans 
were separated from other patients, often in basements, attics, or separate wings. The third 
model, “rare even in the north,” according to scholar P. Preston Reynolds, was the integrated 
hospital, where all patients might be treated in the same building. But black patients often 
endured inferior conditions even in the latter institutions; wards housing white patients often had 
fresher paint, better nurse staffing, and more lenient visiting hours. Rules were different for 
white and black doctors, as well: white physicians could treat any and all patients, while black 
doctors were generally restricted to working only in units reserved for African Americans.
44
  
Early wartime army policy went against these larger realities, (as well as the military’s 
policy of segregation), and dictated that black and white soldiers would be treated in the same 
military hospital wards. But in March 1918, Army Surgeon General William C. Gorgas 
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mandated that because of tensions that arose in hospitals by virtue of integration, black and white 
soldiers should be separated in the institutions, so far as possible. Even in government hospitals 
where black troops and veterans were admitted and treated, they were often barred from social 
activities and full participation in educational programs.
45
 Vanessa Northington Gamble points 
out that many southern communities refused to hospitalize black and white veterans in the same 
facilities. Some black veterans, in fact, were unable to receive any hospital care at all, or were 
placed in jails or mental institutions instead of medical institutions.
46
 
As early as 1919, the Wilson administration responded to dissatisfaction among injured 
and ill black soldiers and veterans by assigning an African American lieutenant, J. Williams 
Clifford, as the “special representative of the Colored service men in the Bureau of War Risk 
Insurance.”
47
 In that capacity, Clifford received telegrams and letters reporting “unjust, 
discriminating and cruel treatment that is accorded wounded heroes by medical examiners in 
certain United States government hospitals in the south.” When Clifford attempted to organize an 
investigation of one such institution – Camp Logan, in Texas – he said his efforts were “held up, 
it being claimed that such procedure would get the bureau into trouble.” After Clifford was 
directed “to send my dictated letters down to another office, where a white high school graduate 
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approved and signed them, signing my own signature to my own letters before they were sent 
out,” he resigned in frustration.
48
 It had been slightly more than a year since he assumed his 
federal post.  
Following his departure, Clifford shared with the Associated Negro Press excerpts of the 
letters he received from black soldiers being treated under the auspices of the BWRI in Texas 
and Arkansas. Veteran S.H. Cavitt wrote from Houston, Texas to report that, “the doctors and 
nurses turn deaf ears to (black veterans’) pleadings.” Another former soldier, Lloyd Bates, wrote 
from Texarkana, Arkansas that he was a “cripple… unable to walk and work,” yet his 
compensation had been cut. “I want a new rating from some doctor who does not call us Nigger 
and make us wait two hours until all the whites are waited on.” Augustus Stansbury, of Dallas, 
Texas, reported that “it seems that all these white doctors here are giving us a raw deal they will 
not send in our medical reports so that we can get our compensation.” Theodore Roe, of Halley, 
Arkansas, reported a similar problem, adding, “We do know they will write to the Bureau for the 
white boys but not for us.” J.E. Davis, Y.M.C.A. secretary in Marshall, Texas, suggested that the 
problem was widespread. “Hundreds of colored people hereabouts in the State of Texas are 
being robbed, cheated, deprived of the things rightly due them from the Bureau,” he said.
49
  
In addition to facing bureaucratic challenges, black soldiers and veterans also 
experienced segregation and violence in hospital wards. Black patients at Fort McHenry in 
Baltimore, Maryland, for example, reported that they were only allowed to use the Red Cross 
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reading room when white patients were eating dinner.
50
 Segregation was practiced not only in 
the south, but in the north as well. At a Public Health Service hospital in Chicago, Illinois, a 
group of black patients complained that when the hospital sponsored a trip for patients to the 
theater, white patients were escorted in “touring cars and limousines” while black veterans “rode 
down in an ambulance.” These former soldiers wondered: “Haven’t we done as much and do we 
not deserve the same as the whites?
51
  
In February 1922, tensions peaked when a riot erupted between black and white veterans 
at the Edward J. Hines Jr. Memorial Hospital in Mayood, Illinois. The episode began, The 
Chicago Defender reported, when four white ex-soldiers knocked on the door of a room where 
six black veterans were gathered. “‘We’re going to chase you out of here,’” said George Rice, 
one of the white men, to Charles Jones. “If you were in the South you wouldn’t be in any 
hospital at all,” added George Germain, another instigator. The fact that the white veterans were, 
in the end, discharged from the Public Health Service Hospital legitimized the Defender’s 
account, according to the newspaper, and showed that there was some limit to the government’s 
tolerance of racially motivated violence. Hospital Commander M.J. White told the Defender that 
there were 100 black veterans and 900 white veterans at the hospital and the “whites are the only 




The riot at Hines Memorial Hospital was just one clear demonstration that resistance to 
any semblance of integration was widespread and deep-seated. In March 1920, Adina de Zavalia, 
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“a Mexican, who now resides in San Antonio,” complained that “sick soldiers of both races are 
mixed indiscriminately in the base hospital at Ft. Sam Houston.” A representative of Zavalia 
claimed that, “irrespective of the record the soldiers made on foreign battlefield… the Southern 
Jim Crow law must be upheld.”53  
The Disabled American Veterans took up a similar cause when its leaders presented to 
the Congressional House Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds a report lamenting the 
fact that white and African American veterans were treated in the same wards at Walter Reed. 
On ward 35, according to the report, there were “26 white men and two negroes,” a proportion 
mirrored closely in several other wards.  The suggestion of separate treatment facilities was not 
meant to be an attack on black former soldiers, argued Frank J. Irwin, national rehabilitation 
chairman of the Disabled American Veterans. In fact, Irwin felt “they would welcome a change 
in policy as much as the white patients.54  
The deliberations of the White Committee highlight the fact that, while laying the 
groundwork for a national veterans’ hospital system, government officials were challenged by 
the question of how to provide for black men who sacrificed their health in service to nation, but 
who were still deemed unworthy of the privileges of full citizenship, let alone state-sponsored, 
modern medical care. In the spring of 1921, African American veterans with neuropsychiatric 
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illnesses were treated in separate hospital units from their white counterparts in institutions in 
Mississippi and Louisiana, and in separate facilities entirely in Georgia, Alabama, and Texas, 
according to the White Committee’s Dr. Thomas Salmon. The largest hospital located closest to 
the center of the African American veteran population on the border of Georgia and Alabama, 
was at Marshallville, Georgia. More than 4,000 patients were housed at that hospital, which 
Salmon referred to as a “very unsatisfactory” facility. One of the major disadvantages of treating 
white and black patients in the same institutions, Salmon said, was that white patients “will not 
work where the negroes are working.” So, in southern hospitals, “all the (white) patients sit on 
the porch and the negro does the work, which is fine for the negroes but bad for the white 
patients, because there is no occupation for these agricultural people except farm labor.” Since 
white veterans could not receive proper and full work training when housed and treated among 




Salmon further reported that African Americans were seeking hospital care at a much 
lower rate than white veterans. 4.4 white veterans per thousand were admitted to hospitals to be 
treated for tuberculosis, while only 2.1 per thousand black veterans were. The difference was 
even greater for the treatment of neuropsychiatric disorders, for which 5.1 of every thousand 
white veterans sought care, as opposed to 1.5 of every thousand black veterans. The great 
majority of African American veterans were likely aware that care at many institutions where 
they could be treated was, as Salmon put it, “very unsatisfactory.” As black newspapers reported 
hospital riots and unequal treatment at the hands of the army and the BWRI, it is no wonder the 
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former soldiers resisted willingly placing themselves in government facilities. But according to 
Salmon, the low admission rates among black veterans presented a major problem: “If they did 
not need hospitalization, that would not make any difference but somewhere the negro insane are 
a danger and they are much more liable to be a danger to white than to negro.”
56
  
In order to solve the “emergency problem,” Salmon recommended moving forward with 
what he imagined would be a world premier “negro scientific institution” in Tuskegee, Alabama, 
where the highest concentration of black veterans could be found.
 
His idea met with approval 
from fellow committee members. “I think it would be extremely unwise to put white and colored 
in one institution,” said White Committee member and a fellow expert on psychiatric illnesses, 
Dr. George H. Kirby. “It seems to me that so far as treating them in separate institutions, it is 
almost a necessity,” said C.H. Lavinder of the Public Health Service.
57
 
 Educator Alice Dunbar Nelson was one of many African American activists who voiced 
her support for the notion that ill and injured black soldiers should be treated in institutions 
intended solely for them. “It may be objected and is frequently a source of controversy that 
separate hospitals are non-essential,” Dunbar Nelson wrote in 1919. But she argued that such 
reasoning was “idle and fallacious.” Hospitals for African Americans, she said, “are needed in 
some places as schools, churches and social organizations are needed.”
58
 In New York and 
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Philadelphia, local groups undertook efforts to establish new hospitals for the treatment of 
African American soldiers and veterans, to be staffed by black doctors and nurses.
59
  
Many felt that such institutions could serve as nexuses of black education and 
opportunity, but the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and 
others balked at the proposal to locate the premier hospital for black veterans in the deep 
southern city of Tuskegee, Alabama, charging that doing so would further entrench customs of 
segregation and do a disservice to former service members.
60
 “One needs only read both white 
and colored newspaper (sic) to find out how welcome the colored soldiers will be in that hell-
ridden section,” one World War veteran wrote to The Chicago Defender newspaper. “Our 
newspapers and race organizations owe it to the Colored soldiers who were shot and gassed in 
France and maltreated on their return to America to take steps to see that this outrage is not 
consummated.”
61
 The National Committee on Negro Veterans Relief and other organizations 
agreed. They argued that it was more important that a hospital for black veterans be located 
“near some recognized medical center,” rather than close to the center of the African American 
population. “We do not believe Alabama, or that general vicinity offers such a strategic 
location.” The committee argued that the “bulk of the probable cases” were not located near 
Tuskegee. Perhaps most importantly, according to the committee, “the men generally would 
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prefer to dispense with medical treatment altogether than to receive it at an institution in the 
proposed environment.”
62
 Advocacy groups like the National Committee on Negro Relief 
believed a hospital for black veterans should be located near Washington, D.C.’s Howard 
University, a premier institute of higher learning for African Americans. They became even 
more hostile to the idea of locating a veterans’ hospital in the deep south when the Director of 
the newfound VB mandated in 1923 that although Tuskegee would be staffed by black 
professionals, whites would occupy the highest posts at the hospital. The move led to calls of 
injustice from advocacy groups, and black doctors’ refusal to work there.  
After a protracted battle with local whites, African Americans achieved black control at 
the hospital. The NAACP and other groups who originally opposed the location of a hospital in 
Tuskegee lent their support to the institution only after President Warren Harding guaranteed that 
it would be staffed and run by black professionals. The accomplishment was deemed a major 
victory at the time, but later, some would argue that the existence of the Tuskegee institution 
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Continuing the drive for consolidation: The Dawes Committee 
A few weeks after the first meeting of the White Committee, President Harding 
demonstrated his determination to show that he was fulfilling his campaign promises to veterans 
by convening a separate group of experts, this one less focused on a building program than on 
addressing and recommending ways for dealing with the general administrative problems facing 
disabled ex-soldiers seeking government benefits. “I should like you to make… an effort to find 
out just where the Government agencies are in any way lacking in authority, neglectful, or failing 
to carry out what is the unquestioned intent of the Congress…” Harding wrote in his letter 
establishing the “Committee to investigate the administration of the law in caring for the crippled 
and impaired soldiers of the late war.” It was unquestionable, he said, that the government aimed 
to provide the best possible care for ex-service members, but he urged the group to help establish 
a “firm foundation” for the administration of veterans’ benefits by examining past “abuses” and 
“regulations.” After all, Harding presciently noted, “the policies adopted at this time are very 
likely to be in effect for a full half century to come.”
64
  
In the first week of April 1921, during three days of meetings of what became known as 
the Dawes Committee, representatives from the American Legion, the Red Cross, and organized 
labor questioned officials from the BWRI, PHS, and FBVE, and repeated many of the concerns 
expressed in hearings regarding the failed Rogers Bill. The group’s head – banker and long-time 
Republican loyalist, Charles G. Dawes – stated his determination to remain focused on solutions, 
                                                
64
 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of 
Representatives, H.R. 3, Part I,  Sixty-Seventh Congress, First Session, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, April 29, 1921), See Exhibit No. 2, Letter from President Warren G. Harding to "General Dawes and 
members of the Committee," 44.  
  363 
not problems.
65
 “We know the conditions, and they are deplorable,” he said. “The thing is to find 
a remedy.”
66
 Dawes’ determination prompted one author to argue, “the disabled American 
veteran in need of medical care has had no more effective champion in all of U.S. history than 
the fiery General Dawes.”
67
 Dawes did maintain a tone of urgency that helped keep committee 
members focused, and ensured that discussions extended through meal times, and late into the 
evening. Still, he served primarily as a moderator, rescinding control of the proceedings to Col. 
Frederick W. Galbraith, National Commander of the American Legion.
68
 Galbraith and other 
Legion representatives assumed control as easily as they had during the Rogers Bill hearings, 
taking occasionally contentious stances with government officials while covering topics ranging 
from compensation during vocational training, to methods of determining disability ratings.  
During discussions, it became clear that several significant points of confusion and 
differences in opinion could not be immediately resolved. Charles Sawyer, President Harding’s 
personal physician, who was detailed to the committee as his “special representative,” wanted to 
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know why more than 10,000 available beds at army and navy hospitals could not be used for 
veteran patients in need. The answer, he contended, was that no one bureau existed which could 
demand that such beds be turned over. “Our house is on fire,” Sawyer said, arguing that patients 
needed to be put in any institution that had space.  
Doctors familiar with the situation took issue with Sawyer’s rationale. Even if someone 
had “autocratic power,” one physician said, it would be difficult to find places for existing 
patients in available facilities. Hospitals, Thomas Salmon said, were not like “stables or 
garages.” They had limited numbers of beds for specific types of cases. Patients with mental 
illness and tuberculosis, he said – patients who may be threatening suicide, for example – could 
not be placed in just any medical ward. Not to mention the fact that, “a man can not be grabbed 
up and taken to a hospital,” said Army Surgeon General Ireland. Unless facilities were relatively 
advanced and close to ex-service members’ home, he said, they would likely resist seeking 
treatment. William White articulated a related point: “The only way to get beds for mental or 
tubercular cases,” he said, “is to build them at the government expense.” This met with the 
approval of American Legion representatives, who repeatedly argued that the $18 million 
allotted by the Langley Bill was not nearly enough to accomplish all that was needed. Ex-
soldiers, they said, could immediately be placed in available empty beds in the short-term, but in 
the very near future, many millions of dollars more would be necessary to undertake a 
“permanent building program.”69  
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The Dawes committee broached a series of other difficult questions. How, for example, 
should a prospective veterans’ bureau be organized? Would each state have a district office, or 
would the organization follow the structure of the FBVE and the PHS, which had 14 regional 
offices? There was also the issue of salary limits. BWRI, FBVE, and PHS representatives all 
reported that is was difficult to recruit qualified professionals given restrictions on how much 
they could pay them. How could this new organization get around that matter? Another pressing 
concern was what to do with the estimated twenty percent of veterans who remained in 
institutions even though they were well enough to be discharged. Uniform rules and regulations 
had to be adopted to ensure that patients were not spending an unnecessarily long time in 
institutions, but who would conceive of and enforce them?  
Late on the first night of the committee meetings, the Legion’s Galbraith posed one of the 
most crucial questions regarding the future of veterans’ hospital care. If the government forged 
ahead with its plan to put in place a permanent hospital system, he asked, which government 
entity would operate the facilities – the new veterans’ agency, the PHS, the military? William 
White’s response revealed the fact that while the American Legion clearly aimed to demonstrate 
the need for institutions that would be used indefinitely and solely for veterans, civilian medical 
professionals intended to create a temporary fix, then arrange for facilities to be turned over for 
the general use of the public. The hospitals, White told Galbraith, would be run not by the 
proposed Bureau for Veterans’ Affairs, but instead “by the departments for which they are built,” 
such as the Public Health Service and the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers.
70
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Apart from these significant areas of disagreement and difficulty, the Dawes committee 
was able to reach a consensus regarding two important matters. First, no one outwardly disagreed 
with the idea that the government had to first deal with the emergency situation and get soldiers 
who needed care into hospitals immediately, and that it also had to organize and oversee a large-
scale building program. After all, medical experts pointed out that the apex of the patient load 
would not be reached until at least the late 1920s.  Another major point of agreement was that 
one government agency was needed to oversee the administration of rehabilitation, medical, 
social, and vocational services for veterans. What that agency would look like and who would 
head it was unclear, but committee members concurred that it should assume control over the 
BWRI and all activities of the FBVE and PHS having to do with ex-service members. The idea 
that the PHS, in its entirety, should be placed under the control of the new veterans’ agency was 
proposed – as it had been during hearings over the Rogers Bill – this time, by Uel Lamkin of the 
FBVE. Surgeon General Cumming repeated his argument that, because the PHS performed many 
functions for the benefit of the civilian public, folding it into the new veterans’ agency would 
amount to sacrificing the good of many for the good of the few. All present thus agreed that the 
PHS should serve as a contracting organization, which the new bureau could call on to 
administer hospital and other services. Committee members also agreed that whoever was 
chosen as the director of the new entity should be seen as having “one of the greatest honors that 
the president can bestow,” and have a tremendous amount of freedom and autonomy so he might 
fulfill his duties to the fullest.  
Thanks in part to Dawes’ ability to consistently bring his committee members back to 
what he called the “bird’s eye view” and emphasize points of harmony, after three days of 
meetings, the group was able to compile seven recommendations to pass directly on to President 
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Harding. Among other things the list included the suggestions that a veterans’ service 
administration be established encompassing the BWRI and sections of the FBVE and PHS; that 
“inconsistencies” in past legislation be eliminated and the director of the new agency be allowed 
to pay his employees what he deemed fit; that all government hospital facilities be made 
available for the use of the new agency; and that a “continuing hospital building program to 
provide satisfactory care for the disabled veterans of the world war be entered upon at once,” 
overseen by the White committee.  
The Dawes Committee provided a forum for advocates and government officials to 
discuss their perspectives and differences prior to the drafting of new legislation and 
congressional hearings. Bold, but short on detail, the committee’s recommendations served as a 
foundation for what would become the Veterans’ Bureau, and the building of a nationwide 
hospital system for ex-service members.  
 
Political victory: The establishment of the Veterans’ Bureau, and the seeds of a national hospital 
system 
 
On May 7, 1921, Congressman Burton Sweet (R-IA), who had introduced some of the 
most prominent recent bills expanding ex-service members’ benefits, laid out his plan for a 
Veterans’ Bureau, which was based on recommendations from government officials involved in 
the system as well as suggestions from advocacy groups. Its 29 sections accomplished almost all 
of what the Dawes Committee had recommended, and then some. During congressional hearings 
in the summer of 1921, a few important issues concerning the proposed legislation were brought 
to the fore during congressional hearings.  
One sticking point was the question of how lasting and extensive to make the 
infrastructure of the proposed Veterans’ Bureau. Edwin Bettelheim, Jr., Chairman of the 
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Veterans of Foreign Wars Legislative Committee, argued for permanence by asking Congress to 
stipulate in the legislation that PHS hospitals be immediately turned over to the new bureau. He 
also pointed out a clause in the Bill stating that all regional offices of the VB would terminate by 
June 30, 1926, and asked that it be removed. “There is not a man in this country who can tell 
when those offices should terminate,” Bettelheim said. The director of the new bureau, 
Bettelheim said, should have the power to terminate the offices at his own discretion only after it 
was clear that they were no longer needed. Senators Reed Smoot (R – UT) and David I. Walsh 
(D – MA) both retorted that as the number of patients decreased during the next five years, the 
law should provide that the number of administrative offices would also decrease. Smoot argued 
that including a termination date was beside the point, since the legislation would likely be 
amended well before 1926.
71
  
Furthering the argument that the longevity of the VB had to be limited, Smoot relayed his 
concern with a section of the bill stipulating that benefits would cover not only veterans whose 
injuries or illnesses could be conclusively proven to be “upon service origin,” but also ex-
soldiers whose ailments had been “aggravated” in service. For example, according to the 
proposed legislation, if a soldier was admitted to the military with arrested tuberculosis, and the 
condition was noted in his record, he would be eligible for medical and disability benefits for 
that condition within two years of his discharge.
72
 The precedent that benefits could be granted 
for injuries or illnesses aggravated in service had previously been set, most recently via June 
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1919 amendments to the Vocational Rehabilitation Act.
73
 But when it came to hospital care, such 
a guarantee, Smoot said, would “work havoc.” Addressing the author of the legislation, Burton 
Sweet, Smoot contended that if an injury was of service origin, it should be “taken care of,” but:  
This thing is wide open; there is no limit to it and from the way you have carried 
it on here in other places, I do not know whether we could get documents enough 
to follow them up, and if they did follow them up there is not one case out of a 
hundred that could ever be stated positively… every soldier thinks his case is an 
aggravated one. There will be no end to the examinations; there will be no end to 
the dissatisfaction; there will be no end to the demands for the next 50 years for 




In spite of their concerns regarding some details of the bill, Smoot and Walsh joined a 
chorus of legislators who supported its passage. They, along with a great majority of their 
colleagues in both houses of Congress believed that the Veterans’ Bureau was the best available 
means of quelling an out-of-control situation: “Further continuation of the present system of 
separate bureaus handling the problems which are so closely interrelated,” a 1921 Senate report 
said, “would be not only unfavorable from the viewpoint of our incapacitated war veterans, but 
would be a pitiable reflection on Congressional inability to bring about quick beneficial changes 
in the present laws.”
75
 In the lead-up to a Senate vote on the Bill on July 20, 1921, David I. 
Walsh urged an amendment to the Act that would absolve veterans and nurses with tuberculosis 
or “neuropsychiatric disease” from having to prove that their conditions were contracted in 
military service. He justified his proposal by citing the dissatisfaction of BWRI beneficiaries: 
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“The men who have been most disappointed, the wave of protest, I might say, against these 
bureaus and the Government have come from these men who have these diseases, know they 
have them, have had it demonstrated by doctors that they have them, and then have the 
Government say to them, ‘Prove it, prove it, prove that you have the disease as a result of your 
service.’” The rule resulted in veterans having to “go about looking for affidavits and looking for 
evidence,” leading to “much trouble and inconvenience.” Walsh looked for approval to Smoot, 
who responded that he had “no objection” to the amendment. Within minutes, (though more than 
two months after it was introduced in Congress), the bill was passed in the Senate.
76
 Legislation 
to establish the Veterans’ Bureau also found strong support in the House. There, not one 
representative voted against it.
77
  
Immediately following the House vote, Burton Sweet paid tribute to Col. Frederick W. 
Galbraith, the National Commander of the American Legion, who had “taken an active and 
enthusiastic part in the framing” of the VB legislation. Killed in a car crash just a few weeks 
before the House vote on the Bill, Galbraith was “well and favorably known by a large number 
of the Members of the House and Senate,” according to Sweet, and was constantly “discussing 
and setting forth the needs of his comrades.”
78
 Sweet’s heartfelt tribute to Galbraith on the 
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congressional floor was a testament to the respect offered by legislators to the American Legion 
and its representatives. 
Ultimately signed into law on August 9, 1921, “an Act to Establish a Veterans’ Bureau” 
granted extensive power to the organization’s director, and laid the groundwork for the most far-
reaching system of federally sponsored hospital care in the U.S. The new bureau would replace 
the BWRI, and assume responsibility for all functions concerning veterans performed by the 
FBVE, and the PHS.
79
 Each of the agencies would transfer records and personnel to the new VB. 
Although details regarding the bureau’s structure would be determined by its new director, the 
legislation stated that there would be one central office in Washington, DC, 14 regional offices, 
and up to 140 “suboffices” scattered throughout the country.
80
 Concerns brought up by 
Bettelheim of the VFW regarding the inclusion of a termination date for the regional offices 
went unheeded; by legislating that the offices would close on or before June 30, 1926, members 




Other aspects of the legislation ensured that the new organization would be – as veterans 
groups had hoped – a lasting institution. In addition to overseeing the disbursal of insurance 
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benefits and vocational education, the bureau would be responsible for providing examinations, 
medical care, treatment, hospitalization, dispensary, and convalescent care not only for veterans 
who had incurred injuries or illnesses in the line of duty, but also for those whose pre-existing 
conditions had been aggravated in service. This latter clause, as Senator Smoot predicted when 
he questioned it during Congressional hearings, helped pave the way for the 1924 extension of 
federal benefits to all veterans; by that point, government officials were simply overwhelmed 
with handling lengthy claims attempting to prove service origin or aggravation. The law also 
included David I. Walsh’s proposed amendment regarding presumed service connection for 
tuberculosis and neuropsychiatric diseases, a major boon for veterans’ advocates, which aimed to 
ensure that VB hospitals would be fully accessible to veterans suffering from the most common 
chronic conditions resulting from the late war. 
Two other measures included in the VB legislation, regarding institutional expansion and 
control, helped ensure the agency would grow instead of shrink over time. The law provided that 
PHS hospitals housing veterans could be transferred to the VB at the President’s discretion. It 
also said that if proper facilities were not available to provide care for veterans through the PHS, 
Army, Navy, and Old Soldiers’ Homes, the director of the VB could “acquire additional 
facilities.” The latter could then be placed under the direct control of the VB, as opposed to being 
handed over to other agencies, as William White suggested should be done during meetings of 
the Dawes Committee. The head of the new bureau was thus given license to grow a veterans’ 
hospital system as he deemed fit. It followed that efforts undertaken by the White Committee 
prior to the establishment of the VB to ensure that government funding would be spent on 
improving and temporarily expanding available medical facilities and services for veterans, soon 
gave way to a permanent building program propelled and overseen by the VB. 
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Conclusion 
Scholars note that the limited population initially covered by VB medical benefits 
gradually expanded throughout the 1920s, and argue that the law in its original form “was not 
quite as generous as it seemed.”
82
 Still, the legislation marked a turning point in the history of the 
veterans’ welfare state: it established a service-oriented agency solely for the benefit of former 
service members. It included almost every major request of veterans’ groups. And most 
importantly, it served as a seed for future growth for what one scholar calls “the single most 
powerful social policy agency in U.S. history.”
83
  
An examination of World War I era policy debates concerning the medical care of ex-
soldiers reveals that a veterans’ hospital system was never truly deliberately legislated. Once the 
Veterans’ Bureau was created and vested with the authority to build institutions and administer 
medical services, however, the roots of such a system were planted. The subsequent, 
aggressively pro-active lobbying of veterans’ groups, coupled with eager building drives 
undertaken by overlapping federal agencies, resulted in generous allotments for construction of 
new facilities and a more far-reaching national system of veterans’ hospitals than many in the 
government originally thought necessary or advisable. 
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“That centralization of activities that some people call socialism”: 




The Veterans’ Bureau was initially granted limited powers pertaining to the 
administration of medical services, but it had a tremendous capacity for growth. Between August 
1921 and June 1922, the agency went from overseeing the care of its beneficiaries in a variety of 
government and private institutions, to managing 47 of its own hospitals. It also won funding to 
undertake its very own hospital building program. Charles R. Forbes, the first director of the 
Veterans’ Bureau, is most commonly remembered as a corrupt figure who bilked the government 
and the country’s former service members out of millions of dollars. But his aggressive drive to 
expand the powers of his new agency helped ensure that the Veterans’ Bureau would gain 
control of all hospitals treating veterans, and that the system would be both highly autonomous, 
and in place for many years to come. In fact, by 1924, advocates argued that veterans’ hospitals 
should be open to all who served (and not just those whose injuries could be connected to 
service) in part, because there was a surplus of hospital beds. Their requests were answered with 
the passage of the World War Veterans’ Act in 1924, which helped ensure that demand for 
newly planned facilities would continue, and likely increase, for years. 
The 1924 World War Veterans’ Act was important for another reason; it granted ex-
soldiers a distinct welfare privilege as a reward for their membership in a powerful interest group 
of citizen-veterans, not by virtue of having incurred an injury or illness in the line of duty. 
Although the precedent for universal veterans’ benefits and a “citizen-veteran” class had been set 
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 The quote is from Hearings before the Committee on World War Veterans' Legislation, House of Representatives, 
on Proposed Legislation as Recommended by the Director of the United States Veterans' Bureau and American 
Legion, Disabled American Veterans, and Veterans of Foreign Wars,  Sixty-Eighth Congress, First Session, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 20, 1924), 47.  
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by liberal pension laws in the post-Civil War years, the establishment of the privilege of access 
to hospital care had enduring consequences: it gave veterans a highly visible and increasingly 
valuable institutionally-oriented connection with their government, and it paved the way for the 
veterans’ medical system that remains intact to this day. 
 
The Veterans’ Bureau gains autonomy 
 
In the short-term, the creation of the Veterans’ Bureau led to more, not less, bureaucratic 
confusion. The task of transferring paperwork, office space, facilities, and personnel from the 
BWRI to the VB proved onerous.
2
 Furthermore, VB staff, officials from federal agencies already 
involved in veterans’ care, and members of the White Committee, which had been placed in 
charge of deciphering a hospital improvement and expansion program approximately five 
months prior to the founding of the Veterans’ Bureau, had questions regarding how they would 
divide and share responsibilities. For example, would the PHS and White Committee serve the 
VB, or be overtaken by it? Finally, there was the crucial issue of leadership, and who would take 
the helm of the new bureau.  
In March 1921, Warren G. Harding had barely served a day in office when R.G. 
Cholmeley-Jones stepped down from his post as Director of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance to 
return to work at a financial services firm in New York City. In spite of allegations of 
bureaucratic dysfunction throughout 1919 and 1920, bureaucrats and veterans’ advocates alike 
credited Cholmeley-Jones with performing well at an almost impossibly tough job, and making 
the BWRI more efficient.
3
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 A useful summary of this transition period can be found in Annual Report of the Director, United States Veterans' 
Bureau for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1922,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 1-24.  
3
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Harding chose as his replacement Charles R. Forbes, who, after emigrating from Scotland 
as a child, attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and made his living as an engineer 
in the construction industry. Forbes served in the army during the Spanish-American War and 
soon thereafter, as a sergeant in the Signal Corps. Prior to World War I, he was working on 
various federal committees in Hawaii, where he met and became fast friends with a traveling 
Warren G. Harding.
4
 Forbes’ apparent lack of specifically relevant experience for the task at 
hand was highlighted by a New York Tribune report noting that, up until the day before his 
appointment, the president was debating between making him the Governor of Alaska, or the 
head of the BWRI.
5
 According to Rosemary A. Stevens, “The new bureau needed someone of 
impeccable status, a rock-hard reputation, first-rate professional credentials, and superb people-
skills. Forbes had none of these attributes.”
6
 
Veterans’ groups registered their early reservations with Forbes’ appointment. Edwin S. 
Bettelheim, Jr., of the Veterans of Foreign Wars testified at a Senate hearing that “Colonel 
Forbes is a very good man,” but that the “present incumbent” should not necessarily 
automatically be appointed the head of the new Veterans’ Bureau.
7
 In spite of the reservations of 
the VFW and others, Forbes got the job.  
                                                
Cholmeley-Jones. "Cholmeley-Jones to Stay," The New York Times April 10, 1921. A few weeks later, as 
Cholmeley-Jones noted that he had only accepted the reappointment “to render emergency services,” he was 
replaced by Charles Forbes. "Takes War Insurance Job; Colonel C.R. Forbes Named to Succeed R.G. Cholmeley-
Jones," The New York Times April 28, 1921. For details about the BWRI under Cholmeley-Jones, see Chapter Four.  
4
 "Col. C. Forbes Dies; Led Veterans' Unit," The New York Times April 12, 1952. 
 
5
 "F.M. Goodwin Named for Assistant Interior Post," New York Tribune April 26, 1921.  
6
 Rosemary A. Stevens, "The Invention, Stumbling, and Re-Invention of the Modern U.S. Veterans Health Care 
System, 1918-1924," in Veterans' Policies, Veterans' Politics: New Perspectives on Veterans in the Modern United 
States, ed. Stephen R. Ortiz (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012). 
7
 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, on H.R. 6611, an Act to 
Establish in the Treasury Department a Veterans' Bureau and to Improve the Facilities and Service of Such Bureau, 
 377 
Those who shaped the legislation establishing the VB aimed to ensure centralized control 
over hospitalization, but Forbes’ new bureau entered a crowded, somewhat chaotic field of 
medical services. The bulk of veteran patients were located in Public Health Service Hospitals, 
though many were scattered in other federal, state and private contract institutions. Meanwhile, 
the White Committee forged ahead with plans to systematically improve medical facilities 
serving veterans across the country. By the August 1921 founding of the VB, the White 
Committee had released a comprehensive plan regarding hospital needs, and received approval 
to build, expand, or improve 13 facilities across the country.
8
  
From the first, Forbes demonstrated great eagerness to control all aspects of the hospital 
building program. He set out to usurp control from the White Committee – and by extension, the 
Department of the Treasury – and win more government funding for his agency. As early as the 
fall of 1921, Forbes began making the case that the White Committee had been inefficient and 
lackadaisical, and that the VB should have full autonomy when it came to improving and 
constructing hospitals.  
The new director first took his claim to the newly formed Federal Board of 
Hospitalization (FBH). Established by the Harding administration in November 1921 – three 
months after the Veterans’ Bureau – the Board was intended to “consider all questions relative to 
the coordination of hospitalization” of all federal entities overseeing hospitals: the new VB, the 
Army, Navy, Public Health Service, National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, 
Department of Indian Affairs, and the so-called Government Hospital for the Insane, St. 
                                                
and Further to Amend and Modify the War Risk Insurance Act,  Sixty-Seventh Congress, First Session, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 5 and 7, 1921), 15.  
8
 Report of the Consultants on Hospitalization Appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury to Provide Additional 
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Elizabeth’s in Washington, D.C. Growing in part out of a larger contemporary movement to 
ensure that hospitals across the U.S. meet the same universal criteria, the Board aimed to  
“standardize requirements” so that facilities, supplies, and buildings could be shared between 
government departments. It also aimed to “formulate plans designed to knit together in proper 
coordination the activities of the several departments” in the interest of the government and 
improving efficiency.9 During early meetings of the Federal Board, the issue of veterans’ 
medical care commanded much attention.  
Soon after the November founding of the FBH, Forbes drafted a letter asking its members 
to support the so-called “second Langley Bill,” which would allocate $17 million to the VB to 
oversee eight new hospital projects. The institutions, Forbes said, would be pursued separate and 
apart from the projects already under the auspices of the White Committee, which had control 
over the $18.6 million allocated earlier in 1921 under the “first Langley Bill.”10 “It is felt that the 
recommendation of your board… in the matter of hospitalization will be a source of strength to 
this Bureau in making its wants known to congress,” Forbes wrote to the FBH.11 During Senate 
hearings on the second Langley Bill in December 1921, Forbes not only argued that the $17 
million appropriation was necessary, but also touted the judgment from the Federal Board of 
Hospitalization that “the money provided” should be “disbursed under the direction of the 
Director of the United States Veterans’ Bureau.” In case there was any doubt of the implications, 
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Robert U. Patterson, assistant director of the Veterans’ Bureau Medical Division, noted: “The 
board expressed the opinion that (the money) should be disbursed as the director (of the VB) sees 
best, in his judgment, and not by the Secretary of the Treasury.”12   
When senators present wondered about the status of the previously allocated $18.6 
million controlled by the White Committee, Forbes dismissed the group’s efforts: “None of the 
hospitals that were to be constructed… are completed,” he said. “There are some of them that are 
not started.” The Treasury Department, Forbes noted, was slow to take action, and wasteful in 
the way it assigned contracts.13 In later hearings, Forbes detailed the “crying demand” for more 
hospitals in populous districts like New York, improved facilities in the South, and more 
dispensaries across the country. Expansions and additions provided for under the White 
Committee, he said, were insufficient.14  
Thanks in part to Forbes’ lobbying, the spring of 1922 saw a great expansion in VB 
powers. An April 29, 1922 Executive Order referred to previous legislation that had established 
the VB, which stated that the director of the bureau could request additional facilities if they 
were deemed necessary, and went even further. Although the White Committee would continue 
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to exist and pursue projects approved under the first Langley Bill, the order stipulated that the 
VB would gain control of the facilities once they were completed. It also gave the VB control 
over 57 Public Health Service facilities primarily serving former soldiers, sailors, and marines.15 
In essence, the executive order marked the Treasury Department’s departure from direct 
involvement in the administration of veterans’ hospital care. Here was a step towards full 
autonomy for the Veterans’ Bureau in the arena of the provision of medical care. The goal of 
ensuring that all former service members would be treated in government hospitals, was 
gradually giving way to the ideal that they would be treated in veterans’ hospitals – facilities 
intended solely for them. Forbes’ agency gained further power and autonomy with the May 1922 
approval of the second Langley Bill, or Public Law 216, which granted $17 million directly to 
the VB, so that the agency could “provide for the construction of additional hospital facilities 
and… medical, surgical, and hospital services and supplies” for veterans.16  
Another, related act – a response to claims that there was “clear discrimination against” 
those who served in previous conflicts who were “not getting an equal show with the veterans of 
the late war” – greatly expanded the VB’s pool of potential claimants. It stipulated that the 
bureau would sponsor medical care for a variety of groups of veterans, not just ex-soldiers of the 
World War. Congressional representatives claimed that a law passed in March 1919, which 
opened Public Health Service facilities to all “discharged sick and disabled soldiers, sailors, and 
marines,” meant that all veterans were already guaranteed access to government hospitals. But, 
in spite of previous legislation, representatives of Spanish-American War veterans claimed they 
                                                
15 Executive Order 3669,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 29, 1922).  
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were being denied treatment. By naming in legislation the groups of veterans to whom hospitals 
were to be available, advocates argued, the confusion could be avoided. As William L. Mattocks, 
editor of the United Spanish-American War Veterans National Tribune put it, “We, of course, 
feel that the veterans of the Spanish War are entitled to the same medical attention” as those of 
the World War. Thanks to their efforts, Public Law 194 ensured that hospitals and other medical 
provisions of the VB would be available to “persons who served in the World War, the Spanish-
American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and the Boxer Rebellion.
17
 Gradually, the 
government was expanding benefits, and growing the purview of the Veterans’ Bureau. 
By June 1922, less than a year after its establishment, the VB oversaw care for more than 
18,000 patients in 96 government hospitals; the bureau owned and operated 47 of the institutions. 
Those 47 “veterans’ hospitals” provided treatment for almost 12,000 patients. While the capacity 
of the VB continued to grow, the agency faced a challenge in fulfilling the mandate to locate all 
hospitalized veterans in VB facilities – as opposed to other government owned or government 
contracted hospitals – not least of all because many former soldiers resisted being moved to 
institutions that were far from their homes.
18
 While more than 5,400 Bureau beds remained 
vacant, no fewer than 6,000 veteran-patients were being treated in Public Health Service, army, 
and navy hospitals, Soldiers’ Homes, and St. Elizabeth’s, the Washington, D.C.-based federal 
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hospital for neuropsychiatric patients.
19
 An additional 2,248 patients underwent treatment in 
1922 in more than 1,200 civil hospitals under contract with the Veterans’ Bureau.
20
 In addition to 
working with existing facilities, the VB pursued its own hospital projects, adding 3,650 beds to 
13 institutions in 1922, all but one of them intended to serve neuropsychiatric and tuberculosis 
patients.
21
 Separate and apart from the new beds being added by the VB, eleven veterans’ 
hospitals were being constructed or expanded as per the advice of the White Committee; once 




The tale of Charles Sawyer, and the unassailability of the Legion agenda  
The story of Charles Sawyer, and his efforts to curtail spending on veterans’ welfare 
helps explain why requests for funding for veterans’ hospitals were so often granted. Sawyer 
played various roles in the Harding administration, always faithfully trumpeting the goals of 
economy and efficiency the president had emphasized on the campaign trail. His passion for 
those ideals – which were encapsulated, in part by his willingness to repeatedly argue that 
veterans might be treated in spare beds in soldiers’ homes, as opposed to those designated 
specifically for them in more modern institutions – led the American Legion to undertake a 
lengthy and vigilant smear campaign against him.
23
 Sawyer’s experience showcases the 
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challenges faced by those who chose to speak out against generous benefits for wounded and ill 
former soldiers. 
Charles Sawyer played three major roles in the Harding administration. First, he was the 
president’s personal physician. A homeopath who ran multiple lucrative sanatoria in Ohio, 
Sawyer earned the Harding family’s trust by defending the future president’s mother and fellow 
homeopath, Phoebe Harding, against claims that her prescribed treatment played a part in the 
death of a young boy in the summer of 1897. Soon after the episode, Sawyer began managing the 
treatment of Florence Harding’s floating kidney condition; she came to believe that “Doc” (as 
the Hardings called Sawyer) “was the one man who could keep her alive.” By the time Harding 
ran for President in 1920, Sawyer had become a close personal friend, and he served as an 
invaluable local booster during the campaign.
24
  
Many viewed the political and professional credentials of Sawyer, who was a homeopath 
in an age when homeopathy was seen as an increasingly antiquated practice, with some 
skepticism. According to Joel T. Boone, a navy doctor who worked alongside Sawyer in caring 
for the Hardings during the administration, the president’s family doctor was commissioned as a 
Brigadier General in the Reserves mainly because “President Harding realized that unless he 
paid him himself, Doctor Sawyer would have to have some military status… this action brought 
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forth much public criticism.”
25
 One historian reports that Sawyer was known as “‘the suddenest 
brigadier general in history.’”
26
 Members of Congress felt they could not very well justify 
opposing the nomination of Sawyer, given that they had approved a similar request by President 
Wilson, who successfully lobbied for his physician, Cary Grayson, to be appointed as a Rear 
Admiral in the Medical Corps of the Navy.
27
 Although an earlier precedent had been set for 
Sawyer to obtain rank, the physician’s willingness to wear a uniform in spite of his lack of 
military experience gave “offense to real soldiers and sailors,” including some of the veterans’ 
activists who came to strenuously disagree with his policies.
28
   
Beyond his position as family doctor, Sawyer also spearheaded an effort in the spring of 
1921 to create a Department of Public Welfare, which Harding hoped would oversee “‘affairs 
relating to public welfare,’” including public health and “‘social justice,’” which he felt were 
“‘vital to the nation’s perpetuity.’”
29
 Inspired by the notion that two-thirds of those eligible for 
the draft during the recent war were rejected because of “lack of physical capacity” and “mental 
inability,” as Sawyer put it, the proposed department would allow the United States government 
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to proactively aid in the production of “the biggest, best and strongest citizen.” The department, 
which would contain four branches – education, public health, social service, and veterans’ 
services – also represented an effort by the Harding administration to respond in one fell swoop 
to various factions that had been lobbying for federal funding and power. “If cabinet officers 
were allowed to each one who is asking for it,” Sawyer contended, “it would result in a very 
unwieldy body as a cabinet of the United States.”  Specifically, education advocates were 
fighting for their own department, as well as a law that would provide social and health services 
for impoverished women and children, and veterans’ advocates were fighting hard for the 
Veterans’ Bureau. The Public Health Service cost nearly $50 million annually, and the “social 
service” problems of vocational accidents and “children’s well-being” were costing the 
government more time and money each year. In all, Sawyer estimated, the PHS, Bureau of War 
Risk Insurance, Children’s Bureau, Soldiers’ Homes, Employees Commission, Pension Bureau, 
Federal Board of Vocational Rehabilitation, Bureau of Education, and other related departments 
were allotted more than $701 million annually. The proposed Department of Public Welfare, he 
suggested, would “bring them all into one united family” with the dual goals of “economy” and 
“efficiency.”30  
Sawyer’s tendency towards thrift was evident in his proposals for the branch concerning 
veterans’ services. Apparently shrugging off previous controversies that had erupted following 
the transfer Great War veterans to soldiers’ homes, and prior discussions regarding the necessity 
of specialized beds for tuberculosis and mentally ill patients, he consistently argued that the latter 
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institutions should be used to house injured and ill veterans of the recent war.
31
 He understood 
that veterans’ advocates wanted ex-service members treated close to their homes in up-to-date 
facilities. But, he noted, the Soldiers’ Homes scattered throughout the nation were “wonderful 
properties.” Their population was “decreasing very rapidly,” and the government had “no other 
apparent use for them.” Since most of the homes boasted extensive grounds, buildings could be 
erected, expanded, and improved according to need. World War veterans – who the Legion and 
other activists argued were too young to be confined to institutions with aged Civil War veterans 
– could bring the latter “joy and satisfaction,” according to Sawyer. At the same time, he argued, 
Great War veterans could “take lessons” from their elder counterparts. “It will redound to the 
good of both,” Sawyer maintained.
32
  
During hearings for the Department of Public Welfare, the doctor exhibited the same lack 
of recognition of the complexity of the hospitalization situation as he had during the April 1921 
Dawes Committee meetings focusing on shortfalls veterans’ care. At the latter gathering, Sawyer 
had brought up the idea of treating World War I veterans in soldiers’ home beds, and medical 
professionals involved in the system retorted that hospitals beds were not like “stables and 
garages,” but were suitable for the treatment of specific maladies. The tuberculosis and mental 
illness suffered by veterans of the recent war, they suggested, would, in the main, be best treated 
in specialized medical facilities rather than soldiers’ homes.
33
 Sawyer also defiantly refused to 
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pay heed to two primary claims of veterans’ groups: first, that the act of placing young Great 
War veterans in what were widely viewed as well-worn convalescent homes equated to a tacit 
rejection of the idea that they were capable of recovery, and second, that their rights should be 
viewed as separate, apart, and in some ways, above those of all others.
34
 
Not surprisingly, many legislators and advocates felt their agendas were threatened by 
Sawyer’s attempt to include their causes in his Department of Public Welfare “united family.” 
Horace Mann Towner (R-IA), a tireless advocate for federal allotments for local education, and a 
primary sponsor of the Sheppard-Towner Act, which allotted federal entitlements to poor women 
and children, told Sawyer in no uncertain terms that he was “worried that education would be 
subordinated” in the department. The interests of “the public health men,” who already enjoyed 
exponentially more funding, Towner feared, would “be dominant.”
35
   
The Department of Public Welfare never became a reality, however the Sheppard-
Towner Act and the Veterans’ Bureau legislation were passed in the fall of 1921, just months 
after Sawyer proposed his idea. Although the two laws served quite different populations, they 
were based on similar ideals surrounding gender and capitalism, and both were landmarks in the 
history of federal entitlements to citizens.
36
 In spite of the fact that his bill was ultimately 
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unsuccessful, hearings regarding the Department of Welfare helped Sawyer gain a reputation as 
cost-conscious, above all else, and to a fault – a trait many veterans’ advocates came to find 
abhorrent.  
Once the Department of Public Welfare was scrapped, Sawyer assumed his third major 
role in the Harding administration, as the head of the Federal Board of Hospitalization, the entity 
established in November 1921 to coordinate hospital care administered by various federal 
entities, including the Veterans’ Bureau, the Army, Navy, Public Health Service, National Home 
for Disabled Soldiers, and the Department of Indian Affairs. In his role as the FBH Chief 
Coordinator, Sawyer continued to advocate for a more economical approach to hospitalization 
for ex-service members, much to the chagrin of American Legion officials. His position was 
finally publicly maligned in the summer of 1922, when he corresponded with Albert A. Sprague, 
Chairman of the National Rehabilitation Committee of the American Legion.
37
  
In February 1922, Sprague made known his disapproval of Sawyer’s statements in a letter 
to Charles Dawes, who directed meetings in 1921 intended to decipher how veterans’ medical 
care might be improved, and was currently serving as Director of the new Bureau of the 
Budget.
38
 The Legion leader told Dawes that he felt Sawyer’s “ill considered use of figures and 
statements that are not capable of proof in regard to adequate facilities and proper care of 
disabled ex-service men, will do incalculable harm.” They would, he argued, “shake the 
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confidence in the administration and the integrity of its assertions that it is going and intends to 
do everything in its power to give the proper hospital facilities, treatment, and care.”
39
  
Five months later, Sawyer sent a four-page letter to Sprague calling into question many 
of the claims the Legion made during the past two years and, by extension, the hard-fought 
policy of building new hospitals. Sawyer alleged that “few” Americans maintained their 
unconditional sympathy for – and, he implied, willingness to spend money on – World War 
veterans. He conceded that current facilities in at least one VB district were not fireproof, per se, 
but added that hospitals “as a rule” were “very free from fire hazard” because they were always 
under the “watchful care” of attendants, nurses, and others. Only four times during his 25-year 
career running institutions, Sawyer said, had he witnessed hospital fires. Repeating conceptions 
that Legion officials and bureaucrats had fought to disprove during their previous year of 
advocacy work, Sawyer noted that he was “personally convinced that the peak of hospitalization 
has been passed,” and that it seemed to make sense to “use the hospitals we now have at our 
command.” There were more than 10,000 vacant beds in government owned hospitals, Sawyer 
reminded Sprague; before new beds were added to the system, patients should be offered 
existing ones. If questioning the veracity of Legion claims was not enough, Sawyer took his 
argument one step further, patronizingly telling Sprague, “I like your spirit, your determination, 
your enthusiasm, your interest…” but he urged the Legion leader to “think this subject all over… 
in an unbiased unprejudiced way.” Sawyer was opposed, he wrote, “to the domination of people 
outside of the government” exercising their influence. Perhaps most infuriating to the Legion 
leader, Sawyer questioned whether it was necessary to spend the money the organization had 
fought so hard to have allocated for hospital-building and improvement. He said he was relieved 
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that it was “not mandatory” to use the millions of dollars appropriated by the Langley Bill: “Just 
because we have money is no reason why we should waste it,” Sawyer wrote.
40
   
The Sawyer letter was, in essence, an expression of a power struggle between 
government officials and interest groups. It was also remarkable in its tactlessness; it was 
pedantic and demeaning. By calling the need for hospitals into question, it seemed to suggest that 
the Legion’s hard-fought legislative victories were for naught. Definitive policy, Sawyer 
suggested, was still up for debate, subject to the personal whims of individuals like him, who 
could be appointed at any time to be involved in the planning process.   
Sprague’s quick, fierce response railed against almost every one of Sawyer’s claims. 
Americans still stood firm behind Great War veterans, he said, and Sawyer’s suggestion 
otherwise was “an indictment of every American citizen.” He took issue with Sawyer’s 
suggestion that outside interest groups wielded too much power in Washington. After all, he 
said, it was thanks to the Legion that legislation was passed correcting the “miserable neglect” of 
disabled ex-service members. Sprague also rejected Sawyer’s reiteration of the already 
discredited idea that veterans should be placed in old army barracks or national soldiers’ homes. 
Ten thousand neuropsychiatric patients especially, he said, could not just make do “with any 
arrangement.” Veterans’ hospitals were “needed now,” Sprague said, questioning why facilities 
could be provided immediately when it came to treating soldiers at the front, but were so delayed 
when it came to treating ex-service members after the war. As more days passed without the 
availability of adequate facilities, Sprague said, men with shell-shock were less likely to be 
cured, and more likely to need lifelong institutional care. In this light, Sprague took the 
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opportunity to call Sawyer’s credibility and credentials into question. Before assuming 
leadership of the Federal Board of Hospitalization, Sprague scathingly said, “you had no contact 
with the men and women who were serving in the army and navy… no experience either in the 
field or government service that would give you a chance to really know how men feel who lose 
their nerve, their health and their minds in their devotion to duty…” He reminded Sawyer that 
experts had estimated that the peak of hospitalization would not be reached until 1926. “It is 
almost unbelievable,” Sprague said, “that having satisfied Congress that these hospitals were 
needed and that they should be built to capacity that we now have to reply to your statement that 
they are unnecessary.” He ended with the plea that Sawyer “stand aside,” and give full autonomy 




Sprague released portions of both his and Sawyer’s letters in an editorial, which was 
published in newspapers throughout the country. In New York, Iowa, Washington, DC, 
Missouri, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Florida, articles appeared about the controversy, 
a great many of them trumpeting Sprague’s position. Under banner headlines such as “Sawyer 
told to aid vets or quit,” editorial writers noted that the “storm of protests over the bungling of 
Brigadier General Sawyer… must have some basis.” Sawyer was “no doubt a darn good doctor 
in his own home town,” the Burlington Iowa Gazette reported, but he had undoubtedly gained 
power not because of his credentials but because “the President wanted to do something 
extraordinary for his friend.” When it came to heading the Federal Board of Hospitalization, the 
Gazette said, Sawyer had “fallen down on the job.” C. Hamilton Cook, National Commander of 
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the Disabled American Veterans, also bolstered the Legion’s claim by repeating Sprague’s 
argument that Sawyer was holding up progress. “We want conditions to be such that Colonel 
Forbes (the director of the VB) will be responsible for anything and everything pertaining to the 
disabled men,” Cook told the New York Post.
42
  
The Legion’s public relations campaign did not stop at sending press releases to 
newspapers; national officers sent telegrams to state offices, which in turn contacted local 
chapters, to urge them to get into the fray. Joe Sparks, a Legion liaison representative based in 
Georgia, was an especially eager participant. He shot off a letter to Georgia’s state adjutant 
suggesting he “get men at Augusta to pass a resolution giving Sawyer HELL, and wire it to 
Washington [emphasis in the original].” Sparks also wrote to congressional representatives 
telling them that Sawyer was “blocking” the government hospital program for disabled ex-
service men. Various representatives and senators responded with the assurance that they had the 




Perhaps that was because President Harding himself, as well as other notables, stood 
firmly behind the Ohio physician. Although Harding showed some willingness to accommodate 
ex-soldiers’ demands by, for example, forming the Dawes and White Committees to decipher 
problems in the administration of medical care, he had a long history of skepticism toward many 
veterans’ benefits. In the summer of 1921, just as legislation to establish the Veterans’ Bureau 
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was being debated, Harding took a strong stance against an adjusted compensation bill that 
would have provided cash payments to World War I soldiers. He made a bold move in 
personally addressing the Senate to report his belief that, “the enactment of the compensation 
bill... would… greatly imperil the financial stability of our country.” He referred to the push for a 
bonus as a “menacing effort to expend billions in gratuities” that would lead to a “treasury 
breakdown.” In the same address, Harding noted the many efforts that had been undertaken on 
behalf of World War veterans, including the provision of hospital care. In spite of the fact that 
there were 6,000 empty beds in government hospitals, he said, there had been much “progress 
made toward the construction of additional Government hospitals, not because we are not 
meeting all demands, but to better meet them and the better to specialize in the treatment of those 
who come under our care.
44
 World War veterans, Harding suggested, were getting plenty from 
their government. 
About a year later, when the Legion-Sawyer controversy was in full swing, The New York 
Times and Washington Post reported that a White House spokesman said Harding would “not 
necessarily be subject to the will of the American Legion or any one else, but governed entirely 
by what he considers in the best interest of the former service men.”
45
 The Sioux City Iowa 
Journal rightfully pointed out that “the president’s well-known loyalty to his friends will hardly 
permit him to displace General Sawyer,” and that the most the Legion could hope for was a 
                                                
44
 "The President's Address on the Bonus Bill," The Baltimore Sun July 13, 1921. Harding’s personal visit to the 
Senate was attacked by some as over-reaching, but seen by others as a justified move against an all-too-powerful 
veterans’ lobby. See, for example "President Harding Warns Senate of Soldier Bonus Bill Danger," Los Angeles 
Times July 13, 1921. "Harding Urges Delay on Bonus," Boston Daily Globe July 13, 1921. "No Bonus Now; Load 
Too Big, Harding Says," Chicago Daily Tribune July 13, 1921. For background on Harding’s stance on adjusted 
compensation, see John W. Dean, Warren G. Harding, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., American Presidents Series 
(New York, New York: Holt, Henry and Company, Inc., 2004), 108. 
45
 "Harding Won't Change War Hospital Policy," The New York Times July 29, 1922. "Veterans' Interests to Be 
Harding's Guide," The Washington Post July 29, 1922. 
 394 
“hastening of the hospital program.”
46
 Charles Dawes, who Sprague had corresponded with in 
February 1922, also came to the defense of his administration colleague. “The practice of many 
government officials ‘to run to cover whenever Legion men give a blast’ and to change their 
plans to avoid public condemnation has been responsible for much unnecessary delay, waste and 
lessened efficiency in relief work,” Dawes told The New York Times.
47
 According to the Journal 
of the Institute of Homeopathy, of which Sawyer was president, President Harding was “standing 
back of General Sawyer and says that the program which has been carried out is his and he 
should be blamed, not General Sawyer.”
48
  
At an August 9, 1922 meeting of the Federal Board of Hospitalization, Sawyer defended 
himself against the Legion’s allegations and maintained his position regarding empty beds. 
Sawyer told his fellow board members he was regretful that the Legion controversy had garnered 
so much public attention. He said he received as many as 30 letters from Legion representatives. 
Because he ignored them, Sawyer surmised, Sprague’s hostility increased: he “picks up every 
side issue he possibly can,” Sawyer said of Sprague. As for the letters published in the press 
during the previous weeks, the president’s doctor argued that the Legion leader sent them to 
newspapers before he even received them. Sawyer stood by his original idea of offering empty 
beds to patients. If they refused them, he said, “then the burden of this whole matter is upon their 
shoulders.” Both Charles Forbes of the VB and William C. White, of the White Committee, took 
issue with Sawyer’s argument in the same respect as Sprague and others had in the past; they 
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reminded him that three types of cases – neuropsychiatric, tuberculosis, and general medical and 
surgical – each required different types of beds.
49
  
In September and October 1922, the American Legion claimed victory in the battle with 
Sawyer. After a meeting between Harding, Sawyer, Sprague, and other Legion representatives, 
the organization released a statement saying Sawyer agreed with the Legion’s program for “the 
removal of the mentally unsound men from contract institutions to government owned and 




In spite of the impression given by newspaper coverage, Sawyer’s statement did not mark 
a sentiment of acquiescence. In his very first letter to Sprague, Sawyer suggested moving 
veterans from contract institutions to government-owned hospitals, and working with the Legion 
to accomplish mutual goals. “Why not get our forces together…” he had asked Sprague.
51
 
Although the Legion claimed that Sawyer had yielded to their demands, his later actions did not 
represent much of a tide change from his original endorsement of the idea of moving veterans 
from private contract institutions to government-owned military and naval facilities.  
In any case, the peace between the AL and Sawyer did not last long. At the Legion’s 
national convention in New Orleans in October 1922, a member of the rehabilitation committee 
tried to set a harmonious tone. Noting the fact that Sawyer had stated his agreement with the 
Legion program, and his intention to cooperate with the organization, the committee 
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representative proposed a resolution endorsing “relations” with the Brigadier General. Although 
the Legion would maintain its “constructively critical attitude” toward the federal government, it 
would “accept for the time being the pledge of cooperation.”
52
  
In response, a Legion representative from Minnesota proposed a decidedly less 
diplomatic resolution. It noted that in the four years that had passed since the Armistice, “vast 
sums” of money had been appropriated by Congress for hospital care, but Charles Sawyer had:  
hampered the efforts of the Director of the Veterans’ Bureau… shown an utter 
inability to understand the necessity of immediate action… repeatedly made 
public statements which can only be construed to mean that he is more interested 
in economy than in saving the lives of the men who gave their health to their 
country, has in public statements shown his complete ignorance of existing 
conditions… and has shown himself by speech and action to be temperamentally 
unfitted for the position which he holds and for the responsibilities which he 
exercises…”  
 




A member of the rehabilitation committee spoke up strongly against the hostile 
resolution. The Legion should remain focused on the goal of improving hospital care, he argued: 
“While we quarrel, while we demand somebody’s resignation, somebody is suffering.” A 
representative from California said that if the resolution was passed, “we can expect little from 
Washington.” A fellow representative concurred. If the Legion demanded the removal of 
Sawyer, and Harding refused – which most involved in the discussion realized was a likely 
outcome – “where are we?”  Sprague spoke up as well, saying that the Legion needed to work 
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with Sawyer as an ally; passing the resolution would not reflect badly on the president’s 
physician, but instead on the National Rehabilitation Committee of the American Legion. This 
revelation led Sprague to strike a conciliatory tone regarding the battle that had ensued over the 
past year. The Legion, he said, had acted “possibly foolishly and in a mistaken manner.”
54
  
But Sprague’s words failed to quell the anger fostered by months’ worth of hostile 
editorials and statements. A Legion member from New York voiced his disgust with the lack of 
institutional care in his state. He was willing, he said, to “embarrass” the rehabilitation 
committee and Sprague, in order to help disabled veterans. The resolution should be passed, he 
exclaimed, and if Sawyer “bobs his head in this convention, let us smash it.” The New York 
representative’s sentiments carried the day; the resolution condemning the president’s physician 
was passed with 601 in favor and 375 opposed.
55
  
As it turned out, the predictions of those who spoke against the hostile statement proved 
correct. After the Legion convention, headlines reported “Harding Backs Sawyer’s Acts” and 
“President Refuses to Oust Sawyer at Demand of American Legion.”
56
 Harding said he felt the 
organization’s attacks were unfounded – based largely on the fact that he had approved plans for 
a hospital to be built at Camp Custer, Michigan instead of Sprague’s hometown of Chicago – and 
that the President wished the Legion would “blame me, not Sawyer.”
57
 In fact, a White House 
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spokesman said, Sawyer’s Federal Board recommended that the veterans’ hospital for the district 
comprising Wisconsin, Illinois and Michigan be located at Chicago, as the Legion hoped, but the 
President had pushed for it to be built at Camp Custer. Although the president steadfastly refused 
to remove Sawyer or acknowledge bureaucratic shortfalls, the episode did convince him that his 
administration should get “‘into close touch with veterans’ affairs.’”
58
 Still, in private 
correspondence, a Harding appointee noted “‘Mr. H. dislikes AL and resents attacks on S.’”
59
  
It was questionable how much the Federal Board, or Charles Sawyer, had to do with the 
delays in new hospital construction in the first place. A central idea contained in Sawyer’s 
original letter to Sprague – that beds should be used at a specific naval station before new 
institutions were built – was merely a reiteration of an idea first proposed by William C. White, 
of the White Committee, at a Federal Board meeting in June 1922.
60
 Meanwhile, during these 
months, the FBH gatherings that Sawyer headed served as a meeting ground – and sometimes a 
contentious one – for the main players in veterans’ hospital policy, but the group’s actual powers 
and functions were being questioned in the winter and spring of 1922. Was it even a legal body? 
Did its powers stop at advisory? “If this Board has no legal existence it would only have 
authority in an advisory capacity, and the Director of the Veterans’ Bureau could get your advice 
and then go on an do whatever he wanted to,” board member and Commissioner of Indian 
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Affairs, Charles H. Burke said to Sawyer at a February FBH meeting
 61
 As the controversy with 
the American Legion erupted, Burke declared that “this Board is in a position approaching the 
ridiculous.” Sawyer was being blamed for decisions regarding the location of hospitals made by 
Forbes, and the Board was being held responsible for mistakes in carrying out policy, when it 
was, in fact, only an advisory panel.
62
 The problem of “divided authority” that Legionnaires and 
legislators hoped to be rid of with the creation of one overarching entity called the Veterans’ 
Bureau, apparently still existed.  
Although the immediate results of the shaming of Charles Sawyer were somewhat muted 
– Sawyer maintained his position and the Legion remained a powerful lobbying force – the 
episode demonstrated that those who opposed, or questioned the rationale of making vast 
appropriations for veterans’ welfare, assumed a great political risk. Many bureaucrats and 
legislators never interrogated the idea of spending great sums on veterans’ hospitals, and 
genuinely believed it equated to good policy. Those who did harbor doubts about the Legion’s 
legislative agenda – those who held lesser offices than President Harding, and who did not enjoy 
virtually guaranteed job security, like Charles Sawyer – may not have been willing to endure the 
wrath of veterans’ advocacy groups, which could mobilize forces and undertake a “barrage” of 
publicity to perpetrate a very wide-ranging and personal attack.
63
 In his role as director of the 
FBH, and by conceptualizing the Department of Public Welfare, Sawyer touted the merits of 
                                                
61
  "Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the Federal Board of Hospitalization", February 10, 1922, 3.  Records of the 
Public Health Service, Correspondence with War Risk Insurance Bureau and Veterans Bureau, 1917-1923, Record 
Group 90, Box 6, NC-34 Entry 23, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland. 
62
   "Minutes of the Twenty-First Meeting of the Federal Board of Hospitalization".   
63
 The term “barrage” is used by William Pencak in reference to the techniques of the Legion’s National Legislative 
Committee head, John Thomas Taylor. “‘Opposing a Legion measure is like poking one’s political head out of a 
train window,’” Taylor once said. Pencak argues that this was an “exaggerated” claim, but it still speaks to the 
perceived power of the veterans’ lobby, which was enough to keep some from disagreeing with the organization’s 
policies. Pencak, For God and Country: The American Legion 1919-1941, 117-22.  
 400 
saving resources and eliminating waste. He and others who brought up reservations about the 
Veterans’ Bureau and later, about vesting it with vast powers, often had their concerns silenced 
as advocates accused them of lacking concern for defenders of the nation’s liberties. 
 
Scandal, the legacy of Charles R. Forbes, and “overhospitalization”  
The public outcry against Charles Sawyer helped divert attention from the apparent 
malfeasance of Charles Forbes, another Harding appointee of whom many were growing 
increasingly skeptical. Since soon after the VB’s founding, Forbes had fought to keep a veterans’ 
hospital building program free not only from the dictates of the Treasury Department’s White 
Committee, but veterans’ groups as well. In the winter of 1922-1923, frustration with – and 
eventually, suspicions of – the seemingly autocratic VB Director began to build.  
Tensions mounted in the spring of 1922, when the transfer of facilities from the Treasury 
Department to the Veterans’ Bureau allowed for plenty of federal spending and a vast expansion 
in the capacity of the VB, but very few tangible new beds. A White Committee report blamed 
Forbes, arguing that he had hampered the committee’s efforts to provide fully functioning 
hospitals. Once President Harding transferred PHS supplies to the VB in April 1922, the report 
said, the Veterans’ Bureau “refused the use of surplus supplies, and for weeks it was impossible 
to draw on supplies for equipment.” The Committee was therefore forced to purchase equipment 
in order to complete Treasury hospitals before transferring them to the VB.
64
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Forbes argued that the White Committee was obligated to use funding from the first 
Langley Bill in order to complete projects before handing them over to his bureau. “I had no way 
of foreseeing what shortcomings would result by reason of the hospitals constructed by the 
White Committee,” Forbes wrote to the Legion’s Albert A. Sprague, “They made their own 
plans and specifications and constructed their own hospitals.” Furthermore, Forbes 
unapologetically noted, “it was not my intention nor would I under any consideration use any 
money of the second Langley Bill to complete and equip the hospitals that were turned over by 
the White Committee from the first Langley Bill.”
65
 One can surmise why veterans’ groups and 
White Committee members began to suspect that Forbes was placing bureaucratic and financial 
concerns above the supposed needs of veteran-patients. 
Forbes and leaders of the American Legion had long harbored mixed feelings towards 
each other, but they maintained cordial relations out of necessity. Veterans’ groups were openly 
disappointed when Harding appointed a friend with experience in the construction industry, 
rather than an expert in ex-soldiers’ affairs, as director of the Veterans’ Bureau. At a January 
1922 meeting of the Federal Board for Hospitalization, Forbes made it clear that he had his own 
doubts about the Legion and its counterparts. Discussing delays in hospital construction, he 
noted his belief that “the whole trouble is that about fifteen different ex-soldier organizations are 
opposing every hospital plan suggested by any organization other than the White Committee, 
which was backed up by the American Legion.”
66
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In spite of those sentiments, Forbes took the time and effort to explain himself to the 
Legion. In August 1922, he wrote to Sprague to report that he felt that the hospital sites 
recommended by the White Committee were insufficient. He had therefore taken it upon himself 
to develop new plans, which would provide more beds.
67
 Instead of building the facilities one at 
a time, he thought it “more advisable to proceed with the construction of the total number of 
hospitals with a smaller bed capacity… making the money go as far as possibly (sic)… then once 
construction is far enough along so that I can see just how far the funds are carrying us, I will be 
able to ask Congress for more funds if they deem them necessary.”
68
 In other words, Forbes’ 
plan was to undertake a variety of projects, entangling government funds in each, so that 
Congress would eventually be all but forced to approve funding to complete each hospital.  
One might think, from the perspective of advocates who only wished to have more and 
higher-quality beds available, that it could seem a brilliant strategy. But Sprague was skeptical of 
Forbes’ efforts. If the funds allotted for hospitals were insufficient, he said, the Director of the 
Veterans’ Bureau should “not… delay the presentation of actual needs to Congress.” “Out of this 
new quicksand of difficulties,” Sprague wrote, “we must take another step at once and go all the 
way to solid ground.”
69
 Legion officials were evidently perturbed by Forbes’ lack of concern 
with the fact that, throughout the time of political wrangling, none of the institutions would be 
ready to receive patients.  
                                                
67
   "Letter from Charles Forbes to A.A. Sprague".   
68
   "Letter from Charles Forbes to A.A. Sprague", August 14, 1922.  Microfilms, Rehabilitation – Veterans' 
Administration Hospitals – Hospitalization (con’t) Rehab – VA – Hospitals – Survey 1929 Library 92-1012, 
American Legion Library, Indianapolis, Indiana. 
69
   "Letter from A.A. Sprague to Charles Forbes", September 12, 1922.  Microfilms, Rehabilitation – Veterans' 
Administration Hospitals – Hospitalization (con’t) Rehab – VA – Hospitals – Survey 1929 Library 92-1012, 
American Legion Library, Indianapolis, Indiana. 
 403 
The correspondence between Forbes and Sprague reveals two things. First, Forbes could 
not win. Advocates were disappointed by the fact that more and better hospital beds were not 
available within a relatively short time. In many ways, Forbes (like officials of the BWRI and 
PHS before him), was being blamed for problems arising from pre-war plans gone awry and 
ever-expanding expectations of the responsibilities of government. The correspondence also 
reveals that suspicions of the VB Director were growing. Veterans’ groups and others questioned 
how and why government funding was being spent, but facilities remained insufficient. 
Increasingly, they suggested that Forbes’ own impropriety was to blame.  
Within the Harding administration, some were beginning to suspect that Forbes’ motives 
were less than genuine. As rumors flew about embezzlement and corruption, Florence Harding, 
who hoped to keep intact her reputation as an advocate for disabled veterans, asked friends who 
worked for the VB to keep her informed about inter-organizational activities. The First Lady had 
heard reports of Forbes taking cross-country “junkets,” during which he and his traveling 
companions enjoyed “a constant flow of liquor, movie stars as party guests, and occasional 
swims in full evening dress.” Beyond the fun, Forbes was allegedly engaging in outright graft by 
awarding government contracts to firms who granted him personal loans. In August 1922, he 
reportedly sold government supplies he claimed were damaged from a storage site at Perryville, 
Maryland to associates for a fraction of their actual cost. Around the same time, he loaded into 
Perryville supplies he purchased new with government funds for more than they were worth. 
Forbes reportedly received kickbacks on both ends of the deal.
70
  
                                                
70
 Forbes’ corruption is widely cited as one of the defining scandals of the Harding administration. The quotes here 
are from Anthony, Florence Harding: The First Lady, the Jazz Age, and the Death of America's Most Scandalous 
President, 368-71. Also see, Payne, Dead Last: The Public Memory of Warren G. Harding's Scandalous Legacy, 
59-60. Jr. Charles L. Mee, The Ohio Gang: The World of Warren G. Harding (New York, New York: M. Evans and 
Company, Inc., 1981), 147-55. Wilson, The Presidency of Warren G. Harding, 181-82. Kathleen J. Frydl, The G.I. 
Bill (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 49-50. One Congressional report describes the 
reign of Charles Forbes as “one of the most regrettable periods in the history of veteran care.” R.E. Adkins, Medical 
 404 
Throughout the summer and fall of 1922, it was not just the Legion and Florence Harding 
who were keeping an eye on Forbes. Charles Sawyer, too, was growing increasingly skeptical 
and “spying” on his colleague, who was absent from a fair number of FBH meetings in late 
1922.
71
 On one occasion, a Veterans’ Bureau executive officer, T. Hugh Scott, transmitted to 
Sawyer a copy of one of the Federal Board’s reports, marked with question marks and notes, that 
was “found in Colonel Forbes’ desk.”
72
 A few months after forwarding on the report, Scott was 
transferred from his post in Washington, DC, to a VB hospital in Muskogee, Oklahoma. As the 
extent of VB corruption became clear shortly before Forbes’ resignation in early 1923, one 
journal reported a suspicion that the transfer was a sort of punishment for Scott’s reconnaissance 
work: “Perhaps T. Hugh Scott of Oklahoma, who took straight to the White House some 
accounts of things done and left undone, will tell how he was shifted overnight from high 
authority in Washington to exile at a distant hospital.”
73
  
As tensions built, Forbes became somewhat defiant. When the matter of the Perryville 
sales came up at an FBH meeting in December 1922, for example, Charles Sawyer stated his 
belief that it had been a great mistake to sell the supplies instead of keeping them on hand for 
future use. Forbes responded that if he was to continue as the head of the VB, it was necessary 
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Within just a few months, however, the suspicions of the Legion and others led Congress 
to open an investigation into the VB.
75
 As news of the probe trickled out of Washington, Forbes 
resigned from his post. “‘There is little understanding of the magnitude of this task, and there is 
little appreciation of the splendid service of its employes (sic) in the interest of the disabled 
men,’” he said in a statement immediately following his resignation in February 1923. 
Inefficiencies in his bureau, he maintained, were due to attempts by unnamed parties to “inject 
politics,” in part by ensuring that only Republicans were hired for available jobs. Slighting the 
accomplishments and potential of the already existent White Committee and Federal Board of 
Hospitalization, Forbes also argued that a “board of consultants” should be “on duty at the 




In 1924 and 1925, a congressional investigation and a subsequent grand jury trial found 
that Charles Forbes had defrauded the government – and, by extension, the veterans he was 
meant to serve – out of millions of dollars. Forbes’ denial of all charges and his claim that 
Charles Sawyer and other witnesses who testified against him were undertaking a politically 
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motivated conspiracy came to naught: he was sentenced to serve two years at the Leavenworth 
Federal Penitentiary.77 Frank T. Hines, who replaced Forbes as head of the VB, made it his 
mission to ensure that the Bureau would not only be a model of administrative efficiency, but 
would also continue to grow.78 In the short-term, it seemed the Legion’s push for the creation of 
a Veterans’ Bureau, with an all-powerful director, had backfired.  
But Forbes’ eager aggressiveness in expanding his agency’s power and institutional girth 
– whatever his underlying motivation – had a lasting effect quite apart from the scandal: it served 
as a primary factor in the early expansion of the Veterans’ Bureau hospital system. It is debatable 
whether, without the efforts of Charles Forbes, an autonomous veterans’ hospital system would 
have emerged after World War I. Had he not tried to usurp power from the Department of the 
Treasury over PHS facilities, and pursue a building program under the auspices of the VB, 
veterans may have been housed in facilities owned by a variety of federal entities, which would 
have eventually reverted to the auspices of previously existing government branches. Instead, in 
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part thanks to Forbes’ influence, a vast system of hospitals was controlled by the VB, and 
accessible specifically and indefinitely, for veterans. 
In the spring of 1923, the White Committee submitted its final report and exited the field 
of veterans’ hospital policy and planning. The Veterans’ Bureau had gained control over the task 
of locating veterans’ hospitals, and the Federal Board of Hospitalization had assumed the 
responsibility of coordinating all federal hospital activities.
79
 The passing of the White 
Committee represented a larger pattern: the end of an era when social reformers and medical 
experts dominated policy-making. In the post-war years, as the Progressive Era trend of expert 
committees waned, government bureaucrats and advocates, as opposed to reformers and doctors, 
dictated policy.
80
 It also marked the beginning of an era of fruitful cooperation between the 
Veterans’ Bureau, veterans’ advocates, and legislators.
81
 
In spite of facing many challenges during its 20-month existence, including inter-
departmental transfers of power and administrative problems within the VB, the White 
Committee forged ahead with its mission to recommend a comprehensive national building 
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program for veterans’ hospitals. By 1923, based on the suggestions of the consultants, work was 
mostly complete on 19 hospital projects designed to provide approximately 6,000 beds for 
veterans. Four new hospitals were constructed, three were purchased and later remodeled, and 
twelve were transferred from the PHS or War Department, or were additions to existing National 
Homes for Disabled Soldiers.82  
In a November 1923 report, the White Committee recorded its frustration with what it 
viewed as separatism and redundancies on the part of the Veterans’ Bureau. In response to 
Charles Forbes’ repeated claims that the White Committee was inefficient and wasteful, the 
report pointed out that 18 months after the April 1922 passage of the second Langley Bill, the 
Veterans’ Bureau had provided only 200 new beds for occupancy, and those were “at a hospital 
in Memphis, Tennessee, which was purchased completely equipped, and ready to operate.” 
Furthermore, the VB had completed only an average of 68 percent of the thirteen hospital 
projects it had started. On the other hand, the efforts of the White Committee had, after just 18 
months, allowed for the provision to the VB of more than 2,900 beds (many of them, the report 
neglected to mention, in previously existing institutions), and completed 84 percent of its “total 
program.” By May 1924, the White Committee report said, more than 5,800 completed beds 
would be turned over to the VB, thanks to the efforts of the Treasury Department.83  
The White Committee used its final report to bring up a thorny question: had the 
government fostered “overhospitalization”? $316 million had been spent on hospital construction 
since 1917, the report pointed out, “a great deal” of which was “spent for temporary hospitals 
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established during the war which had to be abandoned.”  Getting to the supposed root of the 
problem, it noted: “If the United States Government had had a Federal plan for its hospital work, 
probably much that was otherwise wasted could have been preserved as permanent institutions 
for use in the situation that confronts the country to-day.”
84
 Following the release of the White 
Committee report, newspapers echoed the sentiment: “Charge huge waste in hospitalization,” 




Although it was politically expedient – and, in part, accurate – to cite previous policy 
oversights as the culprit for later wastefulness, planning efficiently for the provision of hospital 
care for veterans was problematic for a variety of reasons. Because of the unpredictable and 
chronic nature of two widespread conditions of World War I former soldiers – tuberculosis and 
mental illness – it was, according to the White Committee, “impossible… to give accurately the 
numbers of (veteran) beneficiaries in order to get a true idea of how many beds were needed.” 
According to the committee, “actual practice,” had shown the figures it originally used in order 
to estimate the necessary number of beds to be “too high.”
86
  
Another reason why organizing a hospital system was challenging, and haphazard growth 
occurred, was because it was difficult to assess how many beds were actually in existence and 
useful at any given time. For example, in January 1922, the White Committee recommended that 
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a total of 20,000 beds be made available for veterans: 8,000 for patients with tuberculosis, 8,000 
for patients with neuropsychiatric disease, and another 4,000 for general medical or surgical 
cases.
87
 According to the 1922 annual report of the Veterans’ Bureau, 27,985 government beds 
were available as of June 1922.
88
 On the surface, it seemed simple enough that there was a 
surplus of more than 7,000 beds. But medical professionals joined veterans’ advocates in 
pointing out that beds had to be of a certain quality and type, and in locations relatively close to 
veterans’ homes. Also, they argued, tuberculosis and neuropsychiatric patients needed to be 
housed in buildings specially suited to their conditions; not just any empty bed would do. 
Neuropsychiatric patients posed a particularly vexing problem, and resources were especially 
scarce for their care. While the VB had successfully located more than 70 percent of both 
tuberculosis and general medical patients in government hospitals by June 1922, only 50 percent 
of neuropsychiatric patients were in government facilities by that time. Most of the new facilities 
proposed in 1921 and 1922 by Treasury Department and VB officials were aimed at alleviating 
that specific problem, even as other (unsuitable) government beds sat empty.
89
 For members of 
Congress seeking to understand the problem at hand, it was challenging to get a handle on the 
actual numbers – of patients or necessary beds – involved. Eager to stave off reputations as anti-
veteran, many reacted by simply granting more funding when it was requested.  
The third reason why somewhat chaotic growth of hospitals occurred was because 
various government committees and organizations were operating at cross-purposes and in 
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competition for resources. The White Committee moved forward on conceptualizing a national 
system of veterans’ hospitals even as a new VB Director – initially, with the blessing of the 
Federal Board for Hospitalization – undertook a separate building program and strove for control 
over the system. In addition to pursuing new institutional projects, the White Committee and 
Forbes had to determine which, if any, military and Public Health Service hospitals being turned 
over to the Veterans’ Bureau were suitable for occupancy by ex-soldiers. Both parties were 
propelled by veterans’ groups, which argued consistently and forcefully that more and better 
facilities were necessary.  
 
“You are going to have a pension roll here that will make the pension roll of the Civil War look 
like a tip to the waiter”: The World War Veterans’ Act and hospital access for all ex-service 
members 
 
One person who was not “‘greatly worried over the possibility of being 
overhospitalized’” was the new VB Director, Frank T. Hines, who worked alongside advocacy 
groups to organize and further expand the veterans’ hospital system following the Forbes 
scandal.
90
 In fact, Hines and veterans’ groups somewhat counter-intuitively argued, an over-
abundance of hospital beds indicated that an expansion in access to benefits was justified. One of 
the most lasting achievements of their efforts came on June 7, 1924, when the World War 
Veterans’ Act (WWVA) was signed into law. The Act, which had the overarching goal of 
revising and clarifying aspects of legislation related to the functioning of the VB, had a dramatic 
effect on the nature of veterans’ hospital care.  
Previous legislation allocating funding for hospitals and creating the VB provided the 
framework necessary for the creation of a medical system intended solely for veterans. The 
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WWVA exponentially expanded the pool of potential beneficiaries who could access that 
system; it not only loosened restrictions regarding “presumed service connection” of illnesses 
such as tuberculosis, but also stipulated that all ex-service members and military nurses – 
regardless of how much time had passed since they were in the military, or the nature of their 
ailments – were eligible to receive care in veterans’ hospitals. “With one stroke of the pen,” 
Rosemary A. Stevens writes, “the original hospital and medical program, which had been 
designed as workers’ compensation, was translated into comprehensive hospital insurance.”
91
 
In the months leading up to the proposal of the WWVA, access to VB benefits gradually 
expanded as legislators and veterans’ advocates attempted to answer a variety of difficult 
questions. When it came to medical conditions such as tuberculosis and neuropsychiatric illness, 
how could the ailment be definitively traced to service? How could the government know that a 
veteran who sought treatment for tuberculosis in 1922 did not have the illness prior to 
enlistment? Was the government obliged to treat such a veteran, even if the origins of his 
condition could not be traced directly to his time in the service? These were complex questions 
with somewhat subjective answers, and the World War I period was, in many ways, precedent-
setting. In July 1919, access to vocational rehabilitation was granted not just to those who had 
incurred a disability in-the-line-of-duty, but to any ex-soldier whose disability was “incurred, 
increased, or aggravated while a member of such [military] forces, or later developing a 
disability traceable in the opinion of the board to service with such forces…” In 1923, benefits 
were further expanded when the War Risk Insurance Act was amended such that tuberculosis or 
neuropsychiatric disease causing more than ten percent disability would be presumed to be 
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service connected if they arose within three years of discharge from service.92 These piecemeal 
legislative measures were spurred by administrative difficulties and strong advocacy efforts on 
the part of veterans’ groups, and they helped pave the way for the broader changes contained in 
the World War Veterans’ Act. 
The Act’s stipulation that all veterans could have access to government hospitals built not 
only on recent developments in veterans’ benefits, but also on a deeper history. The notion of 
granting government benefits to veterans across the board, as opposed to by virtue of service-
connected disability, was not new to the World War I era. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
what was intended as a small government pension program for indigent ex-soldiers swelled into 
the first major welfare system. Beth Linker points out that the Revolutionary War Pension Act of 
1818 was initiated as a sort of poor law; by providing an “oath of indigency” ex-soldiers could 
receive annual payments between $96 and $240. Advocates successfully argued for passage of 
the legislation by estimating that no more than 2,000 veterans would file claims for pensions; in 
fact, the government received more than 20,000 requests for payments. In an attempt to narrow 
the pool of potential beneficiaries following the nation’s next major war, the authors of the 
General Law of 1862 made pensions contingent on degree of disability resulting from service. 
Instead of proving he was destitute, a veteran had to supply affidavits from physicians and other 
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experts about his physical condition. Throughout the following decades, veterans’ groups like the 
Grand Army of the Republic successfully lobbied for expansion of coverage; in 1873, ex-service 
members gained the right to compensation even if their injury or illness arose after service, and 
in 1890, they won access to pensions regardless of whether they could prove that their injuries or 
illnesses could be traced to their time in the military. Linker points out that the latter law (like 
preceding legislation aimed at expanding rights for veterans) faced staunch opposition from 
fiscally conservative Republicans and others. Offering privileges to the few on the backs of the 
many, they argued, was not only “an affront to social justice,” but also could “‘climax… in 
communism.’” 93 In the face of such critiques, the nineteenth century laws set a precedent that 
veterans could and should receive government payments by virtue of the fact that they had 
served. And their passage demonstrated the potential political power of a veterans’ lobby.94  
By the time the World War Veterans’ Act came up for debate, the Veterans’ Bureau had 
become a vast bureaucracy. Since its inception in 1921, the agency had disbursed more than $40 
million for hospital-related expenses. In January of 1924, it had 157,000 claimants and was 
paying for the care of more than 18,000 hospital patients: approximately 7,800 of them were 
being treated for tuberculosis, 6,200 for neuropsychiatric conditions, and 4,400 for general 
medical and surgical issues.95 Between 1919 and 1921, advocates worked hard to ensure that 
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former service members could receive proper care while remaining close to their loved ones. In 
so doing, they pushed for a Veterans’ Bureau hospital system that consisted of relatively small 
institutions scattered throughout the country. By 1924, there were 44 Veterans’ Bureau hospitals 
that specialized in tuberculosis, neuropsychiatry, or general medicine and surgery.96 
Ironically, in the mid-1920s, the problem of a lack of beds had been replaced by the 
problem of the existence of what some said was too many beds. There were plenty of examples 
of supply – and provisions of previously approved hospital plans – exceeding demand. In 
February 1923, Goerge H. Wood, President of the Board of Managers of the National Home for 
Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, said the branches of his service did “not have the number of 
patients from the Veterans’ Bureau” previously expected. For example, Wood said, a $50,000, 
1,000-bed annex had been built at the Western Soldiers’ Home, in order to provide care for 200 
Veterans’ Bureau patients. Wood reported that he received a letter from Charles Forbes in July 
1922 (once the building was complete) “cancelling all reservations.” Now, “Annex R” stood 
“completely closed, with no patients in it.” Wood surmised, “there is no demand in that district. 
In fact, I might say that the number of patients treated by the Veterans’ Bureau has decreased in 
the last year, and has not increased, while the number of hospitals for their care has been so 
decidedly increased… that they have a superfluity of facilities.97 By January 1924, when the 
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World War Veterans’ Act was under discussion, approximately 25 percent of the Veterans’ 
Bureau’s 16,000 hospital beds were empty.98 
But the problem could not be summed up simply as over-supply. Demand for hospital 
services varied by locale, specialty, and – in the case of a diagnosis like tuberculosis – the 
season. So, while some facilities were sparsely populated, others were filled to capacity. 
Furthermore, although the number of neuropsychiatric patients in VB hospitals steadily increased 
between 1919 and 1924, the number of tuberculosis and general medical cases decreased overall 
during the same period.99 In debates regarding the bill, advocates argued that huge numbers of 
empty beds had more to do with rules about disability ratings and diagnoses than they did with 
“overhospitalization,” or real levels of demand. There were plenty of veterans who needed 
treatment, said Frank Hines, Director of the Veterans’ Bureau, but their claims were denied 
because their disabilities were not considered connected to service.100  
Hines relied on a pragmatic argument to justify why veterans’ hospitals should be opened 
to such patients: empty beds led to decreased efficiency; expanding access to more veterans was 
the most viable option for improving services across the board. “It is better if the government 
uses the facilities to their full load which you have spent some $41,000,000 to build than to have 
                                                
98 Hearings before the Committee on World War Veterans' Legislation, House of Representatives, on Proposed 
Legislation as Recommended by the Director of the United States Veterans' Bureau and American Legion, Disabled 
American Veterans, and Veterans of Foreign Wars, 12-14.  
99 Annual Report of the Director, United States Veterans' Bureau for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1922, 24-46, 
see esp. p 31, 35. Annual Report of the Director, United States Veterans' Bureau, for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 
1924 44. 
100 Hearings before the Committee on World War Veterans' Legislation, House of Representatives, on Proposed 
Legislation as Recommended by the Director of the United States Veterans' Bureau and American Legion, Disabled 
American Veterans, and Veterans of Foreign Wars, 47.  
 417 
vacant beds,” he said.
101
 In other words, Hines suggested, now that the veterans’ medical system 
existed, access to it had to be expanded in order for it to be efficient.  
Providing access to more veterans made sense from an administrative standpoint as well, 
according to Edwin Bettelheim of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. He noted that the reviews of 
records necessary in order to prove service connection were time-consuming and costly. “We 
believe,” Bettelheim said, “rather than go through all the administrative work of investigating 
and segregating, (that the VB should) take care of the man as he comes knocking at your 
door.”
102
 Treating all veterans who sought care, as opposed to only some, advocates counter-
intuitively argued, would help alleviate wastefulness.  
Bettelheim and others pragmatically declared that the neediest and most worthy cases 
would receive care first, and assured legislators that demand would remain manageable. Wasn’t 
it worth spending four or five million dollars per year, Bettelheim asked, “to take care of these 
men that will become a charge on some community”? Like those who argued in 1818 
(inaccurately, as it turned out) that many ex-soldiers would choose not to capitalize on a granted 
benefit, Bettelheim suggested that it was illogical to assume that “veterans will be out and try to 
get all the hospital treatment they can.”
103
 In fact, said the VB’s Frank Hines, a vast majority of 
the four million people who served during the war would “prefer to go to hospitals of their own 
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selection and under their own doctors.” He predicted that the number of people being discharged 
from veterans’ hospitals would balance the numbers being newly admitted, and that even once 
all veterans were granted the right to hospitalization, the patient load “will not, as we go along, 
be very much greater than the load we have carried in the past.”
 
 Hines went so far as to 
guarantee that no new facilities would need to be built as a result of the proposed legislation.
104
  
Legislators rejected such optimistic forecasts, and voiced deep skepticism about the 
premise of the proposal. Above all, Republicans and Democrats alike were astonished by the 
sheer magnitude of the request. “Would it be true to say that we are adopting a new principle, if 
we establish the precedent of undertaking to furnish hospitalization for 4,000,000 of our people 
during the terms of their lives?” asked Robert Luce (R-MA). Alfred L. Bulwinkle (D-NC) was 
also baffled, and expressed the incredulity many Southern whites would doubtless harbor 
regarding such a request: “You do not recommend that every man who walks up to a hospital 
with a discharge in his hand with some ill, regardless of his financial standing, shall be admitted 
to that hospital?”
105
 The measure would cost “billions of dollars,” said James H. MacLafferty (R-
CA).
106
 After all, he noted, “during a man’s life there would be a vast amount of sickness that 
could not be connected with the service...” Homer P. Snyder (R-NY) conceded that there was a 
“crying need” for better policy in the short-term, “but whether it should be carried to the extent 
                                                
104
 Hearings before the Committee on World War Veterans' Legislation, House of Representatives, on Proposed 
Legislation as Recommended by the Director of the United States Veterans' Bureau and American Legion, Disabled 
American Veterans, and Veterans of Foreign Wars, 46-47.  
105
 Ibid., 45-46. 
106
 Hearings before the Committee on World War Legislation, House of Representatives, on Proposed Legislation as 
Recommended by the Director of the United States Veterans' Bureau, the Amerian Legion, Disabled American 
Veterans, and Veterans of Foreign Wars, and H.R. 7320, Part 2, 549.  
 419 
of all time is another story.”
107
 John E. Rankin (D-MS) was most definitive in his disapproval. 
“You are throwing the door wide open,” he told Bettelheim. “You are going to have a pension 
roll here that will make the pension roll of the Civil War look like a tip to the waiter.”
108
 Luce 
questioned the contention that no new facilities would have to be built in order to fulfill the 
mandate in the proposed legislation: “Don’t you see, if we establish the principle of free 
hospitalization for all veterans, it would then be incumbent upon us to furnish the facilities 




Congressional representatives also disagreed on an ideological level with the proposal to 
provide free hospital care for all ex-service members. Rankin, like those who had fought against 
granting blanket pensions in the nineteenth century, argued that offering special treatment to ex-
soldiers amounted to creating a privileged class. “Why limit it to soldiers?” he asked: 
Why should we come up here 25 years after the war closes and say to this man… 
‘you say you served a few weeks or months in the training camp. Of course you 
did not get across; you did not get hit. But you come up here 25 years after the 
war is over and you contract measles or you break your leg, and you can go into 
the hospital now and stay there the rest of your life.’ Because when you get them 
in there, believe me, there will be many a one who will stick. Here is another man 
who had a wife and children to support. He contributed whatever we required of 
him. He would have gone if the draft had demanded it. He is down and out, and 
has some incurable disease. Possibly he has reached the age of 70. You say to 
him, ‘oh no you are precluded from this.’ He is just as likely to become a public 
charge as I am. If you are going to put that on the ground that these men are likely 
to become a public charge, do not let us narrow it down to the men who have 
served a short time in the Army, Navy or Marine Corps. 
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Doubtless sensing the hostility of his audience, Bettelheim refrained from arguing that veterans 
were more worthy of federally sponsored hospital care than others. The legislation in question 




Robert Luce shared Rankin’s sentiment, but was most perturbed by the degree of 
government intervention called for by the legislation. “We are opening up… a very important 
problem,” he said. “Because it involves an immeasurable expense over 50 to 75 years, but also 
involves a long step toward that centralization of activities which some people call socialism.” 
By granting millions of ex-soldiers access to government hospitals, he suggested, communities 
would no longer be encouraged to collectively provide the institutions necessary to care for their 
neighbors. “You are throwing away… the idea of local responsibility,” he said.
111
  
In the face of this skepticism, at least three historical circumstances paved the way for the 
passage of the World War Veterans’ Act. A major factor contributing to its ultimate approval and 
leniency was the emergence in the early to mid-1920s of what scholars have referred to as a 
“subgovernment,” wherein a congressional committee, veterans’ advocacy groups, and the 
Veterans’ Bureau formed a consolidated and highly effective political force.
112
 In early 1924, as 
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the House debated whether to create a Committee on World War Veterans’ Legislation, some 
representatives voiced concerns. Would the committee only consider legislation regarding World 
War veterans, even if it might affect veterans of other wars? What about the issue of 
hospitalization? Since the Veterans’ Bureau was liable to treat former soldiers of all wars, should 
the new committee be tasked with overseeing all proposals regarding that agency instead of only 
one specific group of veterans? Proponents of the World War Veterans’ Committee argued that 
former service members of the Civil and Spanish-American Wars already had committees where 
they could make their needs known, so the creation of one that would focus on World War 
veterans would “equalize… opportunities.” Besides, according to Chairman of the House Rules 
Committee, Bertrand Snell (R-NY), “it is impossible to get all veterans to agree, and as we are 
not taking anything away from (Spanish-American War veterans), their legislation will go to the 
same committees it always has, we are simply now trying to help out the World War veterans.” 
A political victory in itself, the Committee on World War Veterans’ Legislation was established 
on January 14, 1924.
113
 Headed by South Dakota Republican and Legionnaire Royal C. Johnson, 
(who had helped publicize the claims of Walter Reed patients in the months after the Armistice), 
it provided a sympathetic open ear and a forum for Legion-backed legislation.
114
 The Committee 
gave the American Legion a clear target: the organization could coordinate its efforts to ensure 
that all of its proposed legislation would “be presented to Johnson’s new committee,” according 
to Legion historian Thomas A. Rumer. The World War Veterans’ Act, for example, was the 
result of the “amalgamation of corrections, additions, and other changes” upon which advocates 
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and committee members –some of whom were veterans and Legion members themselves – could 
all agree.
115
 The existence of the Committee on World War Veterans Legislation meant that 
Legion officials could “concentrate their… work on relatively few legislators and staffers.”
116
 
While providing a forum for the views of representatives like Luce and Rankin, the committee 
showed a willingness to work through legislative proposals until they could gain the 
congressional backing necessary to pass.  
When it came time to vote on the WWVA, committee members trumpeted the bill as a 
stunning accomplishment, and (as in the case of legislation establishing the VB), even those 
legislators who initially voiced skepticism about some details of the Bill, eventually expressed 
strong support for it. “I am glad today that the House of Representatives is going on record, and I 
doubt not practically unanimously, before the disabled men of this country to the effect, 
‘Fellows, we have said in the past that nothing was too good for our disabled men, now here is 
what we proposed to do…” said James MacLafferty. John Rankin assured all present that he and 
each member of the Committee on World War Veterans’ Legislation had worked hard on the 
WWVA, “actuated by a desire to do the best he could for the disabled ex-service men.” Although 
the bill was not perfect, these legislators argued, it went a long way in enhancing the rights of 
worthy veterans. Robert Luce joined his fellow committee members in a chorus of self-
congratulations, “indorsing what has been said about their absolute freedom from partisanship 
and also testifying as to their lack of self-assertion, their anxiety to reconcile conflicting views, 
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their unanimous desire to dispense not only justice but also equity.” Like the bill establishing a 
Veterans’ Bureau, the WWVA passed the House with no opposing votes.
117
 
The World War Veterans’ Act also gained favor simply by virtue of what it was not. 
Debated in the shadow of the highly controversial Adjusted Compensation Act, the WWVA 
seemed relatively innocuous. An iteration of the Bonus Bill that Harding had denounced in 1921, 
and that had failed to pass numerous times since the end of the war, adjusted compensation 
granted the soldiers and sailors of World War I the right to collect a payment in 1945 for their 
time in service. It was passed three weeks before the WWVA became law. The provision of a 
cash “bonus” for all soldiers – even those who had served just a short time – drew the ire of 
many who saw it as “class legislation.”
118
 But access to hospital care was a much less divisive 
issue. In his State of the Union address in December 1923, President Coolidge unapologetically 
noted that he did not “favor the granting of a bonus,” but recommended “that all hospitals be 
authorized at once to receive and care for, without hospital pay, the veterans of all wars needing 
such care, whenever there are vacant beds, and that immediate steps be taken to enlarge and 
build new hospitals to serve all such cases.”
119
 Legislators, for their part, were relieved that the 
World War Veterans’ Act was virtually uncontroversial, as opposed to legislation surrounding 
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adjusted compensation. “Those of us that took a stand for the service men recently in the matter 
of adjusted compensation have heard some criticism,” said James MacLafferty. “That is an open 
question, but, thank God, on this question there is no debate necessary.” John Rankin joined 
MacLafferty in his “gratification over the fact that there will not be much criticism of the 
members of the Veterans’ Committee.”
120
  In a time when hospitals were only just beginning to 
emerge as desired sites of care, access to government medical institutions seemed to many to be 
a small price to pay to ensure the well-being of disabled and ill ex-soldiers. Coolidge and others 
could, in good conscience, support the seemingly humane ideal of providing access to state-of-
the-art medical care for veterans, even as they rejected the rationale of cash payments.
121
  
In this respect, the medical provisions of the WWVA were helped by the fact that it was 
difficult to comprehend the material value of providing access to hospitals for needy veterans. As 
one scholar notes, “organizational interests have a high probability of affecting policy outcomes 
when they lobby on issues about which the public and media know and care little about… when 
they lobby on issues that are highly technical or complex…”
122
 Hospital care for veterans in the 
World War One era fit both of those criteria.  
As veterans’ advocates fought for passage of the WWVA, their cause was also likely 
boosted by an ongoing Congressional investigation regarding corruption and embezzlement in 
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the administration of the Veterans’ Bureau. Released the day before the WWVA became law, a 
Senate report on the matter alleged, among other things, that the VB’s first Director, Charles 
Forbes, sold government property at well below cost to personal friends and sold hospital sites at 
inflated prices to reap his own financial rewards. The report painted a dark picture, noting that it 
would “probably never be known how much money was spent for makeshift expedients…”
123
 
Many felt that this systemic failure demonstrated that veterans still had not received their fair 
due, and made the call for more and better benefits all the more necessary. It helped make 1924 a 
“banner year” for veterans, not least of all in the arena of federal entitlements.
124
  
As it turned out, worries expressed by legislators like Rankin and Luce regarding the 
expansiveness of the World War Veterans’ Act were more accurate than the sentiment of Hines, 
who thought the legislation would result in somewhat of an increase in the VB’s number of 
patients, but that there would be a general balancing out of discharges and admissions. As a 
result of the passage of the World War Veterans’ Act and a general expansion of rules regarding 
disability ratings and service-connection for various conditions, the number of patients getting 
hospital treatment sponsored by the VB grew from approximately 18,000 in 1924 to more than 
30,000 in 1930. In 1925, one year after the passage of the Act, patients being treated for non-
service connected disabilities amounted to 14 percent of the VB’s hospital load. By 1930, 46 
percent of all Bureau patients were receiving hospital care for non-line-of-duty injuries or 
illnesses. The “growing problem of hospitalization of veterans of the world and other wars, and 
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the necessity for the expansion of government facilities,” one Veterans’ Bureau report said, “are 
shown in increasing number of hospital admissions each year.”
125
 As Robert Luce had argued, 
the “principle of free hospitalization for all verterans had been established,” and it was 





When the VB was established in August 1921, veterans’ groups wished it to be a highly 
autonomous unit, answerable only to the President, and they attempted to ensure that it would be 
a permanent entity. Budget conscious congressional representatives, on the other hand, held out 
hope that it would be a temporary fix to a crisis situation. In the end, the advocates’ hopes were 
fulfilled. The agency’s first director, Charles R. Forbes, ensured that the new bureau would 
replace the Department of the Treasury as overseer of hospital building and administration, and 
he worked aggressively (if not always morally) to ensure that the number of veterans’ hospitals 
would grow under his watch. Veterans’ groups aided the cause by calling attention to the federal 
government’s failure to provide what they deemed an acceptable standard of medical care for 
former soldiers. They presented the situation as a catastrophe that could only be alleviated by 
former service members’ access to an unparalleled level of government assistance.  
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Advocates cited the pragmatically appealing twin goals of administrative efficiency and 
fiscal responsibility in order to convince Congress to establish the Veterans’ Bureau, and later, to 
extend health services to all veterans, not just those who had incurred their disabilities or 
illnesses in the line of duty. They fought for their demands based on the fact that the current 
situation was unacceptable. Anything, they argued, was better than sick or hurt veterans being 
treated in unsuitable institutions, or worse, having to wait to be treated at all; immediate change, 
they urgently noted, was necessary. When the World War Veterans’ Act was passed in 1924 
stipulating that all veterans could have access to publicly sponsored hospital care, it became clear 
that the Veterans’ Bureau would continue on a growth trajectory. The government would, for an 





“No End of Trouble”:  




Lieutenant Frank Schoble, Jr. used few words to convey the gravity of his feelings. “One 
day I was a man amply able to take care of myself,” he told the Philadelphia Rotary Club in the 
fall of 1920. “The next morning I was a piece of baggage – something to be taken care of.”   
 Schoble’s dual realities represented his perspectives before and after the Meuse-Argonne 
Offensive, the bloodiest operation undertaken by the American Expeditionary Forces during 
World War I.  One of approximately 100,000 American troops wounded in a campaign that 
stretched from late September through the signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, 
Schoble was blinded in battle.
2
  
 The soldier’s initial feelings of utter hopelessness relented, he reported, as “everything 
that a grateful government and self-sacrificing individual welfare workers could think of to make 
me a self-supporting citizen was placed at my disposal.”
3
  
 Schoble’s account encapsulated a primary hope of the army and government; that injured 
soldiers would be rehabilitated quickly and efficiently – ideally, before being discharged from 
the military – and contentedly resume their duties as fathers, sons, brothers, and workers. Indeed, 
Schoble’s testimony demonstrates that, in many ways, the U.S. government prepared for the 
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health outcomes of the Great War more comprehensively than it had for any other previous 
conflict.  
But Frank Schoble’s experience was far from the norm. The “grateful government” often 
faltered, and not all veterans found themselves quite so satisfied. John D. Kirchenstein made 
numerous appeals to the Public Health Service and, later, the Veterans’ Bureau for cash benefits 
and medical care to alleviate the effects of a mustard gas burn to the lungs that he claimed led to 
chronic coughing and caused him to miss work often. Even with the notarized affidavits of 
fellow troops, who verified that he had been the victim of a gas attack near Chatteu-Thierry in 
the summer of 1918, and of doctors, who confirmed that he had been treated since his discharge 
from the military in 1919 for chronic lung conditions likely caused by gas, his application for 
benefits – including repayment for a $150.00 hospital bill – were repeatedly denied. “The 
mustard gas burn which my husband received is giving no end of trouble now,” his wife wrote to 
a friend in April 1931. “He certainly is entitled to compensation, but because there is not a record 
of it on his medical report, they have no proof of it.”4  
Fellow veterans who, like Kirchenstein, sustained injuries that were less visible than 
Schoble’s, faced similar challenges. Looking back on his experience in the war, Harold Lafferty 
noted that, although his military record contained no evidence that he sustained any injury during 
the war, his service led to “nervous facial twitches” that likely contributed to a later onset of 
“mental problems.”5 Edmond Sorenson, recounted a story similar to Kirchenstein’s. “I was 
gassed in France – had lung troubles later, which persisted for a long time – applied for 
educational benefits after discharge, but was turned down, not of service origin. I needed it badly 
                                                
4  Kirchenstein, "Army Services Experience Questionnaire, 1914-1921".   
5  Harold A. Lafferty, "Army Service Experiences Questionnaire, 1914-1921", Ibid.   149th Field Artillery, Division 
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but went to work and made it in spite of this – wasn’t easy.”
6
 The claims of Kirchenstein, 
Lafferty and Sorenson make it clear that even with the passage of legislation in the early 1920s 
guaranteeing expanded benefits, government assistance was not always forthcoming.  
Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the veterans’ health system 
experienced both challenges and successes. Within just a decade of the establishment of the 
Veterans’ Bureau, the United States was steeped in the Great Depression, and President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, among others, called the very idea of a veterans’ benefits system into question. In 
an effort to reign in spending, Roosevelt proposed the Economy Act, which would preclude the 
more than 30,000 ex-service men with non-service-connected disabilities from receiving care at 
veterans’ hospitals. Facing a cacophony of opposition from the American Legion, the Veterans 
of Foreign Wars, and other groups, the stipulations in the legislation regarding medical care were 
quickly reversed. As a result of the activism generated by opposition to Roosevelt’s plan, 
veterans’ benefits were not only restored, but, by the mid-1930s, somewhat enhanced.
7
  
Even after the Veterans’ Bureau, the Bureau of Pensions, and the National Home for 
Disabled Volunteer Soldiers were consolidated into the Veterans Administration (VA) in 1930, 
however, the veterans’ hospital system remained a “backwater,” as scholar Paul Starr puts it. 
After World War II, when public concern for former service members was reignited, veterans’ 
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hospitals gained more federal attention and funding, and began affiliating with medical schools.
8
 
By the mid-twentieth century, the system had grown exponentially – it consisted of hospitals, 
nursing homes, ambulatory care, education and training for medical professionals and research – 
but it failed to shake its negative reputation among veterans and many others. Indeed, in the early 
1970s, in the wake of the Vietnam War, the majority of veterans eligible for care through the VA 
opted not to access it.
9
  
In the late twentieth century, as medical costs in the private sector increased unabated and 
more Americans found themselves without insurance, the VA system underwent major reform. 
In the 1970s, VA doctors pioneered an electronic health record system that continues to serve as 
a model for private sector institutions.
10
 And in the mid-1990s, the cumbersome administrative 
set-up of the Veterans Health Administration – the health service sector of the VA – was 
reorganized in an attempt to make services more accessible to non-indigent veterans and those 
with non-service-connected disabilities. Instead of maintaining an “anachronistic” “hospital-
centric focus,” the VHA arranged for 23 regional “integrated service networks,” consisting of a 
variety of types of in- and out-patient facilities. In the wake of those organizational 
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improvements, the number of veterans eligible for care rose sharply in the early twenty-first 
century as the U.S. engaged in two lengthy wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, legislators 
increasingly called for “tighter eligibility criteria (and) re-restricting the VHA entirely to the 




The Legacy of World War I era policies 
World War I era policies surrounding medical care for soldiers and veterans, then, did not 
bring about unyielding progress, but their legacy is lasting and profound. The legislation and 
activism of the Great War years provided a sturdy building block for something government 
officials and the general public hardly envisioned, and something that remains intact to this day: 
a vast, federally-sponsored hospital system geared at the needs of veterans. Throughout its more 
than 90 years of existence, the veterans’ health system has not always been a model of efficiency 
and quality, but battles fought in the interwar years established the fact that it was both worthy 
and necessary.  
How did such a system come to be in the wake of World War I?  After all, in 1917, when 
legislators, doctors and government officials attempted to plan for the rehabilitation of the war-
wounded, they hoped to defend against long-term obligations – monetary or otherwise – to ex-
service members. But their efforts were unsuccessful for various reasons. Pre-war policies made 
the military medical system responsible for the rehabilitation project, but also left the 
government liable if the system failed. Army rehabilitation efforts were plagued by vague 
policies that stipulated that the military should hold control of cases until “maximum curative 
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results” could be attained.
12
 The army medical system was ultimately not ideologically or 
physically suited to fulfill this poorly defined mandate. As it became clear that soldiers’ needs 
went beyond the resources the military could provide, and that they expected the government to 
provide a financial and medical safety net until they felt they could support themselves and their 
families, Congress declared that pre-existing government entities – the Public Health Service, the 
Federal Board for Vocational Education, and the Bureau of War Risk Insurance – would oversee 
ex-soldiers’ care. But in spite of receiving millions of dollars in funding, and repeated attempts at 
legislative coordination, the problem of “divided authority” prevented these offices from 
effectively serving former service members. Veterans’ advocacy groups ensured that the failure 
did not go unrecognized. Capitalizing on the social turbulence of the time by employing hyper-
patriotic rhetoric, they ceaselessly demanded three things: funding for a vast veterans’ hospital 
system; a powerful new government bureaucracy that would oversee the institutions and ensure 
the proper administration of all veterans’ benefits; and, finally, the admission of all honorably 
discharged ex-soldiers to veterans’ hospitals.  
The health fallout from the Great War, and the advocacy work that followed, led to a vast 
expansion of veterans’ rights and privileges. Beginning after the Great War, former service 
members could obtain not only disability compensation and pension payments, but also access to 
a distinct system of government sponsored medical care.  
That right became increasingly valuable over time. Only a few select groups in the 
United States won access to government-sponsored health care in the twentieth century: military 
personnel and veterans; American Indians (through the Indian Health Service); the poor (through 
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Medicaid); and the elderly (through Medicare). Legislation establishing mini systems of 
government sponsored health care and insurance has been passed on both practical and 
ideological grounds: practically, American Indians, veterans, the elderly, and the poor were each 
thought to be potentially heavy medical burdens, who were less likely than others to be able to 
afford the costs of care. Ideologically, advocates maintained that members of each of those 
constituencies were somewhat helpless; they were rightful recipients of aid from their fellow 
citizens. Although opponents repeatedly fought against these justifications and attempted to 
prove that the state was over-reaching, Americans were won over to legislation expanding 
government involvement in health care by arguments regarding constituents’ practical needs, and 
their worthiness of privileges. If the United States remained the only developed nation without a 
system of national health insurance throughout the twentieth century, its government 
nevertheless provided limited assistance in making health care accessible – albeit hesitantly, 
conditionally, and only for select groups of citizens.  
The Affordable Care Act, signed by President Barack Obama in March 2010, marks a 
departure in American social policy, in part, because its proponents cannot point to one specific 
group as a central and worthy beneficiary. To the contrary, supporters of the Affordable Care Act 
have presented it as a means by which the government can help all ordinary Americans access 
health insurance and, by extension, health care. Time will tell if it, like the veterans’ hospital 
system rooted in the World War I era, will prove to be a lasting element of an ever-changing 
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